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Civil war creates significant opportunities for the contestation of political authority. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, rebels commonly use organized violence to challenge the authority of pre-
conflict elites. Nonetheless, armed movements also ally with pre-conflict elite actors as a strategy 
for mobilizing popular support and maintaining political order. Contestation and cooperation 
between rebels and pre-conflict elites is possible because local communities are often comprised 
of multiple elite groups. What explains coalitional choices? Why do local leaders of armed 
movements ally with certain actors and not others? These questions are puzzling because local-
level rebel leaders sometimes make counterintuitive coalitional choices that restrict their ability 
to establish and maintain social control.  
 
To explore the relationship between coalition-building and control, this study focuses on the 
political crisis and war-to-peace transition in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2013). It compares three towns 
– Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – that fell under the military control of the principal 
armed movement involved in the conflict, the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Despite being under the 
control of the same group, each of these cases demonstrated marked variation in the ability of the 
FN to politically control local populations. 
 
My argument is advanced in two steps. First, what explains patterns of coalition-building in 
rebel-held zones? I argue that coalition-building is shaped by pre-conflict brokerage relations. 
Brokers are those political actors that link local communities to the state. I argue that if elites 
function as brokers between local communities and the central state in the pre-conflict period, 
this limits their availability as potential allies for leaders of armed movements. Pre-conflict 
brokerage relations constrain the choice of potential local partners. Second and relatedly, this 
study explains levels of control established by armed movements that result from coalition-
building. The wartime authority of armed movements can, in some cases, be met with stiff 
resistance from local actors. In others, the wartime political order imposed by armed movements 
is underwritten by broad support within local communities. I explain these differences by 
focusing on what I call ‘hierarchical configurations’. Hierarchical configurations describe the 
relative levels of social hierarchy of competing elite groups. I argue that the level of wartime 
control established by armed movements is a function of variation in hierarchical configurations 
because these differences influence the political clout of rebel allies relative to their broker 
counterparts (or those elites aligned with the state). In summary, pre-conflict brokerage relations 
influence the coalition-building strategies of armed groups. These coalition-building strategies 
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Chapter 1. Coalitions and Control: Political Authority 
in Violent Conflict 
The Puzzle of Counterintuitive Coalitional Choices in Civil War 
In January 2011, I had a lengthy conversation with a high ranking member of the Forces 
Nouvelles (FN), the rebel group that controlled the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire for nearly ten 
years. His explanation of the group’s armed struggle was simple. In 2002, Ivoirians persecuted by 
Côte d’Ivoire’s then-President Laurent Gbagbo, ‘northerners’, Muslims, and perceived supporters 
of one of his principal political rivals, Alassane Ouattara, confronted a stark choice: they could 
continue living in the discriminatory system established by Gbagbo or they could take up arms 
against him. My interviewee expressed a view of the FN shared by many of the movement’s 
members. The FN was seen as a group fighting for the basic freedoms and opportunities (voting, 
getting a job or going to school) for all Ivoirians that were being closed off by the current 
government. FN members viewed themselves as a movement positioned squarely against the 
nativism espoused by Gbagbo and his supporters.  
 However, this image of the FN, as a group fighting to advance the rights of all Ivoirians, 
including ‘strangers’1 in Côte d’Ivoire, was frequently inconsistent with the strategies it adopted 
to mobilize support in many localities. This dissertation highlights cases where the FN rallied 
support by constructing political alliances with elites indigenous to the different sub-regions 
under their control. These alliances often worked to antagonize immigrant or non-native groups 
                                                 
1 In the context of Côte d’Ivoire, the label ‘stranger’ (étranger) has been used to describe two distinct groups: 
migrants (and descendants of migrants) from other parts of West Africa (particularly Burkina Faso and Mali) and 
migrants with origins elsewhere within Côte d’Ivoire who are considered non-native to particular localities.   
3 
 
and actors in these communities. For instance, in Bouna, a town adjacent to the large Parc 
National de la Comoé in Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire, the FN allied with members of the 
Koulongo monarchy, the group indigenous to this part of the north. This coalition-building 
strategy is puzzling for the simple reason that the politically, economically and demographically 
predominant group in the Ivoirian northeast is not the Koulongo, but the Lobi, a group of 
migrants who have settled in the rural areas surrounding Bouna in growing numbers since the 
turn of the 20th century. Why would the FN not choose to ally with Lobi, a group that appeared to 
be a natural ally for the rebels given their status as migrants and non-natives to Côte d’Ivoire’s 
northeast? The political implications of the decision to ally with the Koulongo make this decision 
even more puzzling. Many Lobi felt that the Koulongo were using their relationship with the 
rebels to check or reverse the political and economic gains that the Lobi had achieved relative to 
the Koulongo over the course of the 20th century. Consequently, the Lobi viewed themselves as 
the principal political targets of the rebels. In 2007, these tensions reached their peak when some 
Lobi youth organized an armed revolt against the FN. My fieldwork in Bouna revealed that many 
retained a deep resentment towards the rebels four years later.  
What explains the disjuncture between rhetoric and practice? Why would an armed group 
committed to fighting the politics of nativism at the national level marginalize the position of 
strangers locally? More generally, why do local leaders of armed movements ally with certain 
local groups and actors and not others? What explains the patterns of cooperation and 
contestation over power and authority that result from coalitional choices?   
Existing responses to these questions provide only partial explanations. Studies that focus 
on contestation between armed movements and civilian groups ask questions about violent 
interactions between these groups (Reno 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Johnson 
2008; Metelits 2010). Why do armed movements use violence against civilians? What explains 
variation in the employment of violence against civilian populations by armed movements? 
Research focusing on the most violent aspects of civil war and armed conflict are typically 
justified because civil wars are at least partly defined by the violence they cause. Yet, as 
Lubkemann (2008) argues, this privileging of violence as the object of study in civil war can 
obfuscate and push to the background a host of other political struggles and social processes. 
Civil wars are about “much more than violence or its avoidance” (Lubkemann 2008, 13; see also 
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Wood 2008); they can offer a host of opportunities for implicated actors to contest, renegotiate 
and reconstruct social relations along generational, gendered or class lines. In war, these 
contestations are not suspended; actors continue to struggle to shape social and political futures 
that are influenced as much by pre-war processes as they are by wartime dynamics and violence.    
Civil wars are violent, but violence does not preclude other forms of political interaction. The 
analytical challenge is to see how changes in the larger contextual environment produced by civil 
war create different sets of opportunities and constraints for the actors engaged in these local 
political contests. Moreover, political contestation does not preclude cooperation between armed 
movements and other civilian groups and actors. Pre-conflict elites can use alliances with armed 
movements to advance their position vis-à-vis local rivals. Similarly, the local-level rebel leaders 
use coalitions established with pre-conflict elites as means of buttressing rebel social control over 
civilian populations.   
There is also a growing scholarship showing how coalitions formed between armed 
groups and diverse sets of local actors  – non-governmental organizations, churches, businessmen 
and ‘traditional’ authorities – underpin systems of governance and preserve political order in the 
face of protracted state weakness (Little 2003; Tull 2003; Menkhaus 2007; Arjona 2008, 2010; 
Roberts 2008; Boege, Brown and Clements 2009; Mukhopadhyay 2009; Mampilly 2011; 
Raeymaekers 2010, 2013; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Joireman 2011; Meagher 2012; Seay 2013). 
These perspectives emphasize the partnerships and collective action taken by different actors to 
maintain political order where the state cannot. Nonetheless, despite the successes of these 
alliances in maintaining political order, the authority of elites playing prominent roles, as part of 
emerging ‘non-state’ systems of governance, remains hotly contested. Elites empowered by the 
reconfiguration of political order work to maintain and institutionalize their positions of 
authority. Subordinate groups and other elites who have lost out amidst wartime transformations 
struggle to mitigate, circumvent or even reverse the political changes prompted by violent 
conflict. As a result, incipient political orders often exhibit patterns of both conflict and 
consensus. In this sense, wartime orders are similar to authority relationships in other settings, 
which typically exhibit a contested, dynamic quality, given the inequalities they tend to generate 
and support.    
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The empirical focus of this dissertation is the almost decade-long political crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire (2002-2011). The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began as an attempted coup d’état in 2002. 
While failing to take Abidjan, the rebels established control over the Ivoirian north, dividing the 
country in two. This north-south divide would last through repeated efforts to peaceably resolve 
the conflict, until the forced removal of the country’s then-President, Laurent Gbagbo, in 2011. In 
addition to the well documented national-level conflicts unleashed by the rebellion, the civil war 
also precipitated a host of heated contests over local-level authority in different parts of the 
country. Different actors – traders, ‘traditional’ chiefs, bureaucrats, elected politicians, as well as 
the rebels themselves – used the crisis as an opportunity to jockey for position and preserve or 
improve their relative political standing. Rebel commanders appointed by the FN within northern 
communities were just one of many types of actors looking to reposition themselves in the new 
political environment created by the conflict. In order to strengthen their political status within 
the communities they controlled, rebel leaders explicitly threatened and challenged some pre-
conflict elites, while mobilizing and drawing on the support of others. Each of the cases included 
in this dissertation – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – exhibited markedly different 
patterns of conflict and cooperation while under the control of the rebels. In Bouna, the rebels 
were heavily resented and the target of collective action. In Korhogo, FN leadership took sides in 
ongoing factional conflicts. In Ouangolodougou, the FN drew on broad support from local elites 
who were resisting efforts at state reconstruction. 
This dissertation presents a two-step argument that explains differences in the patterns of 
conflict and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict local elites during civil war. First, this 
study provides an explanation of the coalitions that emerge between local-level rebel leadership 
and pre-conflict elites. Rebels confront choices over potential allies because local communities 
are frequently comprised of multiple sets of elites. Why do rebels ally with certain elites and not 
others? I argue that if elites function as brokers between local communities and the central state 
in the pre-conflict period, this limits their availability as potential allies for leaders of armed 
movements. Coalitions between pre-conflict brokers and rebel leaders are less likely to form 
because the political status of brokers is likely to be threatened by the presence of the rebels and 
because brokers are more likely to be viewed with some suspicion by rebel leaders, as result of 
their proximity to the pre-conflict state. Second and relatedly, this study explains levels of social 
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control established by armed movements in particular localities. As indicated above, the wartime 
authority of armed movements can, in some cases, be met with stiff resistance from local actors. 
In others, the wartime political order imposed by armed movements can be underwritten by broad 
support within local communities. I argue that relative levels of social hierarchy within broker 
groups (local opponents of rebels) and rebel ally groups influences rebel control. I describe 
differences in relative levels of social hierarchy in terms of competing ‘hierarchical 
configurations’. Levels of wartime control established by armed movements is influenced by 
differences in hierarchical configurations because configurations shape the political clout of rebel 
allies relative to their broker counterparts (or those elites aligned with the state). In sum, pre-
conflict brokerage relations influence the coalition-building strategies of armed groups. These 
coalition-building strategies shape levels of contestation and rebel control because they influence 
whether rebels ally with strong or weak elites relative to their broker counterparts. Where rebel 
allies are weak, they should confront serious obstacles to mobilizing support and controlling local 
populations. Where rebel allies are stronger, systems of rebel governance should confront less 
resistance. 
Authority Relations, Coalitions and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This dissertation focuses on contests over authority in rebel-held zones during violent conflict. It 
is based on a straightforward two-part definition of authority. First, at a basic level, authority is 
commonly thought to represent any relationship of inequality that is imbued with legitimacy by 
others.2 ‘Legitimacy’ itself speaks to the extent to which relations of political inequality, or 
                                                 
2 Scholars have expressed competing understandings of the relationship between authority and legitimacy. Some 
view authority as representing any relationship of political inequality imbued with legitimacy (Hurd 1999). This is in 
line with my understanding of the relationship between authority and legitimacy expressed above. From this 
perspective, where legitimacy is lacking, relationships of political inequality are defined by relations of power alone. 
Compliance is achieved through coercion, rather than the perception that rules are normatively good and should be 
followed as a result. Alternatively, authority relationships could themselves vary according to the legitimacy with 
which political hierarchies are imbued by subordinate groups. From this perspective, one might juxtapose 
‘domination’ with ‘legitimate authority’ as simply being competing types of authority (rather than arguing that all 
authority relationships legitimate). Competing interpretations stem in part from ambiguities in Weber’s original texts. 
As Onuf and Clink (1999, 152) write, “the term Herrschaft occurs dozens, possibly hundreds of times in the original 
text of Economy and Society. As we have seen, the standard English translation renders Herrschaft as domination, 
but not exclusively or systematically. It also uses ‘authority’ on numerous occasions (e.g., 1968, 213), as well as 
‘dominance’ and ‘dominancy’ (e.g. 1968, 225, 942; dominancy was Rheinstein’s choice, retained in the standard 
translation) and ‘system of domination’ (1968, 214). Such variability in rendering a word in translation would 
suggest any one of three possibilities: that the word is used inconsistently throughout the work; that it has an unstable 
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relations of domination, are considered right or just (Friedman 1990, 59-60; Lukes 1990, 207; 
Hurd 1999, 381; Lake 2010, 591-592). Second, in this study I do not understand legitimacy to be 
a static or “fixed” quality inherent in all authority relations (Sikor and Lund 2009, 6). Instead, 
legitimization and de-legitimization better represent diverse, dynamic processes that can work to 
either support or undercut relations of authority. As a result, authority relationships typically have 
a perpetually incomplete and contested character to them. Dominant actors go to great lengths to 
legitimize, institutionalize and naturalize relationships of political inequality. They draw on a 
diverse set of material and symbolic resources to delegitimize, mitigate or threaten any 
challenges to the established political order (Lake 2010, 593; Poteete and Ribot 2011, 440). 
Dominant elites act to preserve their power vis-à-vis rivals as well as subordinates. Predictably, 
those who are disadvantaged by existing political orders struggle to delegitimize them and push 
for reform. They can challenge dominant actors directly through collective action or other, more 
“everyday” forms of resistance (Scott 1985). Sally Falk Moore summarizes this dual process 
succinctly, suggesting that “the making of rules and social and symbolic order is a human 
industry matched only by the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing and unmaking of 
rules and symbols in which people seem almost equally engaged” (quoted in Lund 2006, 697).  
Civil wars create unique spaces and opportunities for heightened contestation over 
authority and the legitimate right to rule (Cramer 2006, 216; Wood 2008; Hagmann and Péclard 
2010, 556). Specifically, violent conflict and the weakening of existing social and political 
institutions create conditions for subordinate groups to mobilize different material and social 
resources, and challenge existing hierarchies and the authority of established elites.3 In Africa, 
challenging established social hierarchies at the local level has typically represented an important 
goal of armed movements. Mike McGovern (2011, 55) suggests that in the forest zones of West 
Africa, intergenerational competition was an important element underscoring warfare and 
violence: “younger men often found that warfare was their best chance to jump ahead in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
meaning in the original language; or that that language into which it is being translated does not have a precise 
counterpart for the concept conveyed by that word.”  
3 Beyond civil wars per se, Christopher Cramer (2006, 216) argues that this is a characteristic of many historical 
examples of political and economic transformations. He writes that “the terms of accumulation and distribution of 
wealth and the institutions in which these terms are cast are contested. New classes are forming around changing 
activities and interests; old classes are gripping tight onto accustomed sources of wealth or survival.” 
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elder-dominated (gerontocratic) hierarchy” (see also Chauveau and Richards 2008, 533). 
Similarly, Krijn Peters (2011, 88) suggests that the potential for “role reversal” between young 
people and their seniors in rural communities attracted recruits to the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) during the course of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Pierre Englebert (2009, 168) has made this 
point more generally, arguing that armed movements in Africa typically function as “vectors for 
the formation or replacement of regional elites”. Marginalized groups use “rebellions to challenge 
the state and obtain recognition as a local counterpart or interlocutor, in competition with existing 
local authority”.4 
Despite these motivations for rebellion, there are reasons to expect both conflict and 
cooperation between strongmen engaged in violent conflict and pre-conflict elites. Despite their 
purported reformist agendas, armed movements in Africa have rarely enacted any meaningful 
change in the zones they occupy. As Pierre Englebert (2009, 48) has argued, armed movements 
in Africa “typically do not embark upon institutional innovation; they rarely implement any 
substantive political project in the region they control.”5 Instead, many African insurgents have 
relied on local elites as partners in territories under their control. This dependence stems partly 
from the minimal authority rebels have over issues related to local governance. In the absence of 
the state, managing conflicts at local levels represents an enduring challenge for the young people 
who comprise the bulk of Africa’s rebels. In Guinea-Bissau’s struggle for independence, for 
example, Chabal suggests “the support of the homen grande was indispensable” in establishing 
PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) presence in rural villages, 
given “the fact that the PAIGC members were young and carried no natural or traditional 
authority, particularly in their regions of origin” (1983, 72). Reflecting on the post-conflict period 
after independence in Mozambique, Harry West makes a similar point regarding the relationship 
between age and resolution of conflicts over land in rural areas:  
                                                 
4 Ahram and King (2012, 172) argue that this is, in fact, a goal shared across many historical cases of ‘warlordism’: 
“the warlord seeks a privileged place within the existing legal system – wedging himself into a legal order provided 
by a recognized state or crafting his own (often arbitrary) code of behaviour that he claims represents the will of a 
superior political authority.”  
5 Indeed, prominent instances of sustained insurgencies – in Southern Sudan, Eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Northern Côte d’Ivoire, and Northern Uganda – support this point. They all stand in stark contrast to 
historical and contemporary cases of rebellion elsewhere in the developing world, where principled social and 





…because people continued to cultivate land which they had obtained through likola 
networks [matrilineal descent group], village authorities [young and foreign to the region in 
which they worked] were in no position to resolve land conflicts as they rose. If they 
became involved at all, village presidents had to rely on expert witnesses to confirm or 
deny the validity of claims. In most cases, expert witnesses were none other than 
venang’olo vene kaya [village founders] of the disputants’ valikola [rural settlements] 
(1998, 156).  
 
Thandika Mkandawire (2002, 202) summarizes this challenge more generally: any African 
insurgency looking to expand the territory it controls is “likely to end up in some other area in 
which it enjoys neither traditional authority nor communal usufructuary rights to land.” 
Without political institutions tying them directly to the bulk of the rural population (such 
as revolutionary cells or village committees), armed movements have had to rely overwhelmingly 
on the support of rural elites to maintain political order in rebel-held zones. In the words of James 
Scott, pre-conflict hierarchies remain one of the few “graspable” social structures through which 
leaders of armed movements can govern rural populations (2009, 209). In the Eastern DRC, Tull 
writes “since the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) does not dispose of any 
alternative local assets to extend its authority to the countryside , the chiefs are by default 
perceived as valuable instruments contributing to the establishment of a minimum of control over 
the rural areas” (2003, 438). During the Angolan civil war, “local communities were integrated 
into the UNITA system under the leadership of traditional authorities… [who] had both their 
economic reproduction and their positions of authority secured by their relations to the 
insurgents” (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005, 370). Even in rare cases where armed movements have 
been far more ‘interventionist’ or reformist, existing relations of authority have often proved 
highly resilient. Challenging the view that African liberation movements commonly achieved 
significant political and social changes within the ‘liberated’ areas under their control, Patrick 
Chabal writes “there is little ground to suggest that the experience of political mobilization and of 
war-time collaboration between villagers and party turned village committees into ‘revolutionary 
cells’” (1984, 119). In the post-colonial era, the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri 
Museveni in Uganda reinforced the powerful Buganda notables, despite its professed 
commitment to equality and democratic decision making by civilians in the areas under its 
control. The potential for broad social change stemming from the introduction of elected 
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committees was limited by the fact that committee chairs were “mostly conservative landed 
notables” (Kasfir 2005, 287).     
 Herein lies the tension confronting many African armed movements. On the one hand, 
upsetting local relations of power and privilege guarded by elders at local levels represents an 
important motivation for both the leadership and rank-and-file. On the other, any changes 
resulting from these political challenges seriously threaten the principal means by which rebels 
establish political order in liberated zones. One way of making sense of this tension is that the 
leaders of these movements frequently ‘talk’ about these grievances in order to further social 
mobilization in rural areas, but have very little actual intent to follow through with these 
reformist commitments (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoefller 2004). This argument is plausible but 
cannot explain the varying relationships between rebels, local elites and larger populations that 
develop during episodes of violent conflict, such as those described in this dissertation.  
 It is possible to observe simultaneous conflict and cooperation between rebels and pre-
conflict elites in violent conflict because multiple elites exist within local political arenas. This 
study explains divergent patterns of conflict and cooperation by focusing on variation in wartime 
coalition-building at local levels. Coalition formation and fragmentation feature prominently in 
explanations of political stability (Boone 1990; Allen 1995; Oyugi 2006; North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009), economic development (Beall and Ngonyama 2009; Poteete 2009), and the 
consolidation of democracy (Brownlee 2007). In a number of cases of rebellion in Africa, 
scholars have examined the shifting coalitions underpinning these movements, as well as the 
causes and consequences of the dissolution of these coalitions (Tull 2003; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2004; Debos 2008; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Bakke, Cunningham 
and Seymour 2012). Much less has been said about the coalitional arrangements underpinning 
local political order in violent conflict.  
In rural Africa, political power at local levels commonly rests on the continual 
renegotiation of alliances (Lonsdale 1981, 158; Bierschenk 1988; Lund 2001; Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan 2003). Continuity of political order and the apparent acceptance of political 
hierarchies by rural communities belie the frequent tensions within them and the shifting 
coalitions that sustain them over time. This study highlights how national-level conflict propels 
reconfigurations in the alliances underpinning political order in local arenas. Political changes at 
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the national level work to introduce new actors and resources and legitimize certain discursive 
claims or strategies, empowering some groups over others in the process (Lund 2006, 687; see 
also Bierschenk 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003). By focusing on coalitional 
dynamics at the local level, this dissertation shows how very similar armed group strategies (in 
terms of levels of violence, the procurement of taxes, or the absence of institutional innovation) 
are themselves underwritten by coalitions that vary dramatically in terms of their breadth and 
subsequent stability. I argue that differences in coalition-building strategies explain the extent to 
which armed movements are able to establish political control in rebel-held zones.      
 
‘Everyday’ Politics and Contested Authority in Rebellion: A Gap in the Literature 
This dissertation explains variation in levels of contestation and control established by armed 
movements by focusing on the coalitions that emerge between rebel leaders and pre-conflict local 
elites in civil war. Existing research focusing on the relationship between civilians and armed 
movements ignores coalition building. It focuses on one of two things: (a) the conditions under 
which civilians will support armed movements in their struggle against the state and (b) the 
behaviour of armed movements and the strategies they employ to elicit political support from 
civilian populations. Studies that focus on civilians and rebel group behaviour offer some insights 
into variation in levels of control, but by themselves, they remain only partial explanations.    
 
Rebellion and Civilian Support 
Under what conditions will civilians support armed movements? Scholars have responded to this 
question in one of two ways. First, a well-established literature focuses on the objective 
conditions under which actors, largely peasants, support rebellion or participate in organized 
violence against states (Johnson 1964; Huntington 1968; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985). 
Many early studies of violent mobilization advance structural explanations for decisions to 
organize violent opposition and participate in rebellion. At their core, structural explanations 
share an emphasis on how different social, political and economic changes wrought by 
‘modernization’ (literacy, urbanization, participation in political life beyond the village, the 
development of rational or ‘non-traditional’ relations of authority, the transition to capitalism) 
work to upset pre-existing social relationships that maintained political stability and order. From 
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this perspective, these changes either directly produced the grievances that prompt heightened 
political mobilization (Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985) or put immense strains on the 
ability of newly established political systems to channel or manage social change in ways that 
preserve political order, rather than endanger it (Johnson 1966; Huntington 1968).  
 In contrast to the structural approaches, agency-based approaches focus on the choices 
and diverse survival strategies employed by civilians in violent contexts (Arjona 2008; Baines 
and Paddon 2012; Barter 2012). Civilians confront difficult choices, but choices nonetheless. 
Civilians can choose to stay or flee, support or join armed movements, or resist the authority of 
armed movements through a litany of direct or indirect means.  
 Both structural and agency-based approaches ignore why some actors or groups ally with 
armed movements while others chose to contest rebel authority. Structuralists overlook 
contestation between armed groups and civilians altogether. Perspectives emphasizing civilian 
choice treat contestation as one of an array of options available to civilian groups. However, as a 
fundamentally social relationship, relations of authority are ultimately formed through practice 
and hence are always contested (Lund 2006; Sikor and Lund 2009; Lake 2010; Hagmann and 
Péclard 2010; Poteete and Ribot 2011). As Lake writes, political authority “is more or less biased 
toward the governor and toward different groups within society. As a result this contract is 
continuously contested and open to renegotiation by both the governor and governed; authority is 
not static but a dynamic, almost living thing” (Lake 2010, 589, emphasis mine). In contrast to 
structural and agency approaches, this project takes conflict over authority in rebel held zones as 
a constant feature of politics in rebel-held zones. In this way, the project answers Timothy 
Raeymaekers’ call for academics and policy-makers to pay “more attention to the struggle these 
war-to-peace transitions generate over the right to govern in environments characterized by 
violent political competition” (Raeymaekers 2013, 613, emphasis mine). By focusing on rebel 
social control, this study moves beyond an exclusive focus on civilian support for armed 
movements and instead directs analytic attention to difference in the mix of support and 




Armed Group Behaviour 
A second literature examines the strategies that armed groups employ in order to win the support 
of civilian populations. From this perspective, the extent to which armed movements control the 
use of violence and provide public goods shapes the extent to which they mobilize support for 
their cause. These approaches emphasize variation in either the strategies groups adopt to control 
the organized use of violence (Reno 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Metelits 2010) 
or, alternatively, in how groups legitimize the use of violence (Wickham-Crowley 1992; 
Schlichte 2009; Mampilly 2011). Armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and, most recently, Syria, represent high profile cases of civil war 
where high levels of violence have been directed at civilian populations by armed movements. 
Nonetheless, indiscriminate violence can be a self-defeating strategy for armed movements 
because it “engenders discontent among civilian populations, creates higher levels of resistance to 
rebel advances, and damages the reputation of a rebel group both within the country and outside 
of it” (Weinstein 2007, 206, see also Kalyvas 2006, 141-145).6 Overall, armed movements 
confront powerful incentives to minimize the levels of violence directed at civilian populations. 
Beyond simply managing the use of violence, armed movements can legitimize their actions 
through a variety of democratic, secessionist, nationalist or other ideological appeals to both 
domestic and international audiences (Schlichte 2009). The provision of public goods 
(educational, financial or health services) beyond security by armed movements in lieu of the 
state can also go far in bolstering support (Mampilly 2011). Studies that focus on armed group 
behaviour – either in terms of controlling violence, or the ways in which groups legitimize its use 
– emphasis rebel actions and strategies as the main factors influencing whether armed movements 
mobilize support. While they point to the array of factors that condition which strategy armed 
                                                 
6 Similarly, Kalyvas argues that civilian collaboration is important because it is the only way by which armed 
movements can gain information about suspected government opponents. In this way, indiscriminate violence “is 
much less likely to achieve its aims in the midst of civil war, where the presence of a rival makes defection (of 
civilians) possible” (2006, 143). Mass violence directed against civilian populations can run at cross-purposes with 
the larger political aims of armed combatants because it can encourage others to support and join the opposing side. 
Overall, these approaches share the assumption that (a) controlling rebel violence is central to winning the support of 
unarmed groups and (b) that the extent to which armed groups gain civilian support explains the survival and 
military success of these movements. 
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movements can or will follow, these perspectives downplay other potential variables that 
influence the actual effectiveness of the mobilization strategies groups employ. 
One problem associated with this tendency is behavioral approaches tend to emphasize 
and explain only group-wide aspects of rebel behavior. This is why patterns of behaviour are 
typically thought to be consistent spatially and over time. Weinstein makes this point explicitly in 
Inside Rebellion, suggesting that his theory predicts that:   
 
The character of violence will remain fairly constant across time and in different 
geographic regions of each conflict. That is, groups that kill indiscriminately, destroy 
villages, and loot property are likely to do so at the beginning of the conflict as well as at 
the end and will tend to do so in every region in which they operate (Weinstein 2007, 207-
208).  
 
The assumption that group behaviour is spatially and temporally consistent is a product of the 
analytic strategies of behavioural approaches. Research focusing on the behaviour of armed 
movements explain variation by pointing to different exogenous variables (the absence or 
presence of natural resources, conflict dynamics or differences in the exercise of state power) that 
shape rebel behaviour (in terms of whether armed movements choose to target civilian 
populations or provide public goods). These causal factors are thought to have important group-
wide effects on the behaviour and overall character of armed movements. This tendency is 
problematic for two reasons. First, by focusing on different causal factors influencing rebel 
behavior and the group-wide character of armed movements, scholars have overlooked variations 
in interactions between civilians and rebels in different regions under the military control of the 
same group (Arouna 2010, 2014; Staniland 2012). Second, in concentrating on spatially 
consistent elements of rebel behavior, scholars have unnecessarily ignored other aspects of 
behavior to be explained.  By shifting analytical attention to different localities under the control 
of the same armed movement, this study highlights coalition-building between rebel leaders and 
pre-conflict elites as a key feature of feature of rebel behavior. I follow Timothy Raeymaekers’ 
(2013, 614) suggestion that “it might be worthwhile paying more attention to the clients of armed 
protection during wartime – rather than exclusively focusing on armed groups and their strategies 
of political and economic mobilization”. Overall, in focusing on coalition-formation, this study 
significantly broadens aspects of rebel behavior to be explained and offers an explanation of 
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differences in patterns of rebel-civilian relations that vary across regions governed by the same 
armed group.  
 Coalitions are important because they influence how other aspects of rebel behaviour 
emphasized by existing scholarship (using violence, taxation, providing public goods) might 
‘reverberate’ differently across diverse local contexts. Coalitions mediate whatever impact rebel 
strategies might have in terms of mobilizing support or prompting resistance from civilian 
populations under different circumstances. In focusing on coalitions, as well as those causal 
factors that influence coalitional choices, this study highlights how other aspects of rebel 
behavior can simultaneously promote or discourage mobilization. The case of the FN in Northern 
Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the limits of explanations of rebel-civilian relations that assume invariant 
effects of spatially consistent rebel behaviour. Under the FN, mass violence in the north was rare. 
In some cases, local commanders initiated a number of local development projects (see Chapter 
5, Korhogo). Yet many FN members, particularly its leadership, developed significant economic 
stakes in the continuation of the political crisis. Many in the north complained about the burden 
of the extensive system of checkpoints and taxes the FN set up to finance the rebellion. 
Theoretically, should scholars expect high or low levels of support under these circumstances? In 
the case of the FN, the similar – albeit ‘mixed’ – behaviour of the rebellion ultimately prompted 
very different reactions from local communities. In Bouna, Lobi youth organized a revolt against 
the FN and many of the town’s residents deeply resented the presence of the rebels up until the 
end of the conflict. In Ouangolodougou, local traders supported rebels in efforts to defend their 
claims to authority over taxation. In Korhogo, conflict was primarily factional. Some elite 
factions support the rebels while others opposed them. Arguments emphasizing group wide 
factors shaping group behaviour cannot explain this variation. Reactions to how rebels rule and 
how coalitions and pre-existing political configurations structure these reactions figure 
prominently in the different kinds of rebel-civilian relations described in this study. In 
emphasizing coalitions as an important aspect of rebel strategy, this study focuses on the 
outcomes of other, group-wide aspects of rebel behavior (using violence, taxation, providing 
public goods) across diverse local contexts.   
 Studies that privilege military control in explanations of rebel-civilian relations are the 
exception to this critique; they do not assume spatial and temporal invariance. For example, 
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Kalyvas (2006) argues that shifts in military control over people and territory during the course 
of the conflict influences levels of support armed groups receive. Broad support from civilian 
populations is more likely when the movements have absolute or uncontested territorial control 
because in these instances, civilians do not have the choice to support rebel opponents 
(particularly government forces). Civilians support dominant military groups to ensure their 
survival. However, Kalyvas does not assume levels of military control to be fixed. It can change 
over time and across space. In contrast to levels of military control, the absence or presence of 
natural resources (Weinstein 2007) or pre-conflict ties to the state (Reno 2005, 2007 and 
Mampilly 2011) are typically thought to have constant, group-wide effects on the overall 
character of armed movements. This dissertation acknowledges levels of military control as 
potentially significant explanatory factor, but argues that it is not the only factor influencing the 
levels of support shown to armed groups. My approach shows how these relationships can vary 
dramatically in a host of imaginable ways across territories where levels of military control 
remain constant. To highlight spatial variation in the relationship between armed movements and 
civilian populations, this study treats military control as “a key background condition” that is 
held constant across each of the three cases examined (Staniland 2012, 247). Groups can draw on 
broad or narrow support from the communities they govern. They can monopolize authority over 
different issue areas or they can share authority with an array of different actors (Arjona 2008). 
Overall, this dissertation agrees with Staniland (2012, 247) that armed conflicts represent 
“heterogeneous landscapes of authority,” rather than uniformity, even where levels of military 
control remain constant.    
 My approach complements existing research focusing on civilian support and rebel 
behaviour. Scholarship focusing on civilians in armed conflict either ignores civilian contestation 
or treats contestation as part of a set of potential strategic choices available to unarmed groups. In 
focusing on questions surrounding authority, I view contestation as a constant feature of 
relationships between armed movements and civilian populations. The degree of contestation 
varies across cases. By focusing on the coalitions that form between pre-conflict elites and armed 
movements, this project highlights how very similar mobilizing or legitimizing strategies can 
result in varying levels of control and contestation. In explaining these differences, this study 
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draws attention to the significance of local-level coalition building in civil war. I explain my 
framework in greater detail below.  
Coalitions and Conflict in Rebellion: The Argument 
This study explains differences in the patterns of conflict and cooperation between rebel leaders 
and elites at local levels. Specifically, it explains two related aspects of these relationships: the 
coalitions that form between rebel leaders and local elites and the level of political control armed 
movements establish.  
My explanation proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that the extent to which local elites 
function as brokers with the state during the pre-conflict period influences the alliances formed 
between rebels and segments of local elite groups. Local political arenas are comprised of 
multiple elites. Elites that function as brokers between local communities and the state are less 
likely to become the political partners of armed movements (and are more likely to be in 
opposition to the rebellion at local levels). Second, I argue that relative levels of social hierarchy 
within broker groups (local opponents of rebels) and rebel ally groups influences rebel control. I 
express differences in relative levels of social hierarchy as competing ‘hierarchical 
configurations’. Decisions surrounding coalition-building shape the kinds of conflicts that 
emerge in civil war because authority is distributed differently between local elites within local 
communities. Whether elites are organized more or less hierarchically influences the political 
clout these actors wield. Hierarchical configuration shapes the level of control exercised by rebels 
by shaping the relative capacity of their allies at local levels to mobilize support. In sum, 
brokerage conditions influence the alliances that emerge between armed movements and 
segments of the local elite, while hierarchical configurations influence the levels of contestation 
and the degree of political control established by rebels as a result of coalition-building.  
Theoretically, my explanation builds on existing approaches that emphasize variation in 
the political authority of local elites. In Political Topographies of the African State, Catherine 
Boone (2003) argues that differences in the authority enjoyed by local-level elites shaped the 
institution-building strategies employed by African states during the early post-colonial period. 
Boone explains the institutional choices of African states in terms of two variables that influence 
the political capacity of rural elites: the absence or presence of social hierarchy and the capacity 
of rural elites to mobilize resources independently of the central state. These two variables 
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influence the institutional choices of states and how states share power with local elites. 
Outcomes are described through four ideal type ‘institutional choice’ scenarios. For Boone, 
power-sharing refers to situations where the state devolves decision-making (largely over land 
and other material resources) to local elites. Power-sharing occurs when local hierarchies are 
present and elites depend on resources derived from their relationship with the state. Usurpation 
refers to cases where states seek to attack and undercut the social authority of local elites. States 
attempt usurpation when hierarchies are present, but elites have access to resources independent 
of their relationship with the state. Administrative occupation refers to instances where national-
level actors rule directly, through a set of political actors flown in from the capital or other 
localities. Administrative occupation occurs in cash-crop producing zones where local hierarchies 
are non-existent and elites depend on resources derived from their relationship with the state. 
Finally, non-incorporation describes instances where national-level leaders do not seek to 
incorporate localities into the administrative structure of the state. These choices are predicted in 
zones that lack both extensive cash-crop agriculture and local social hierarchy. 
My approach, like that of Boone, privileges differences in the local-level authority of 
elites as an important causal variable. It breaks with Boone, however, in three significant ways. 
First, it downplays questions probing the causes of the different kinds of state-society 
relationships. Rather, this study emphasizes the effects of these differences on the ability of rebel 
leaders to build coalitions in rural areas. The analytical strategy employed in this dissertation 
more closely resembles Beck’s (2008) study of the role of brokers in shaping patterns of political 
competition and participation in Senegal. Beck argues that the extent to which brokers enjoy 
social authority and autonomy determines how clientelist relations, linking capital cities to 
peripheral areas, shape levels of political competition and participation. Like Beck, I emphasize 
the mediating influence of local elites – given their varying levels of authority and autonomy 
from national-level actors – rather than focusing explicitly on historical processes and factors that 
explain how these differences emerge. 
Second, my approach views local arenas as comprised of multiple sets of elites. As 
Olivier de Sardan (2005, 177) puts it, “rarely ever,” are local arenas defined by the “exclusive 
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domination by one single power.”7 In the case studies that follow, FN commanders chose to ally 
with some segments of the local elite while simultaneously challenging others. Rebels confront 
constrained choices regarding potential allies in different contexts. The ways that power was 
distributed among different elites and across overlapping “fields of public authority” (Lund 2001, 
53) influenced decisions to ally with an actor or set of actors and oppose others. Boone 
characterizes authority relationships in local communities as being hierarchical or decentralized. 
Obviously, we should expect to find multiple actors exercising authority in decentralized 
contexts. However, even in cases of centralized authority there can still be competing poles of 
power. An authority structure comprised of two competing factions could still be considered a 
relatively hierarchical system. Moreover, centralized and decentralized systems of authority can 
coexist within the same locality. 
   Third, the variables used in this study also differ from those developed by Boone. I 
evaluate: (1) the extent to which local elites function as brokers with the state during the pre-
conflict period and (2) differences in hierarchical configurations. Each of these factors borrows 
from Boone, but is modified to fit my argument. I explain these differences below.    
 
Brokerage Relations 
This study argues that the extent to which pre-conflict elites function as brokers between local 
communities and the central state influences patterns of coalition-building during the conflict 
period. The political significance of brokers is widely recognized (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Beck 
2008; McGovern 2011; Koter 2013a). Drawing on the work of the anthropologist Max 
Gluckman, Mike McGovern describes these kinds of actors as “intercalaries” who “do the work 
necessary to align the interests and strategies of high-level state actors and those of local actors, 
down to the level of the farmers in villages” (2011, 191). Linda Beck (2008, 2) shows how 
brokers fulfill important political functions in linking local arenas to broader national-level 
political networks. Brokering is challenging but important work for local elites. Their political 
                                                 
7 Oliver de Sardan defines arenas as spaces where “heterogeneous strategic groups confront each other, driven by 
more or less compatible (material or symbolic) interests, the actors being endowed with a greater or lesser level of 
influence and power. But one also encounters centres of instituted local power: an emir, a district chiefs , a sous-
préfet, an imam, the head of a fraternity, all have specific powers, linked to their functions and recognized as such” 
(2005, 186).  
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survival often depends on how well they fulfill this role. Elites at regional and local levels 
generally require the support of both their political bosses at the national level and their principal 
political constituencies within local communities. But the interests of these groups often run at 
direct cross-purposes. The challenges confronting different kinds of ‘traditional’ leaders under 
colonialism illustrate these tensions. For these actors, maintaining their position depended on 
their performance of certain functions for the colonial project, namely, mobilizing labour and 
collecting taxes from communities under their authority. Nonetheless, their collaboration with the 
colonial state commonly jeopardized their ability to function as legitimate representatives of local 
communities. Meeting the demands of either European administrators or local communities 
almost inevitably meant alienating the other group, thereby jeopardizing the political survival of 
this set of actors.8 Similar sets of challenges exist for local elites in the contemporary period as 
well (see Migdal 2001, 88-92; Moore 1978). 
I distinguish between two types of brokers: those based on state dependence and 
autonomous elites who chose to politically align themselves with the state. State dependence 
refers to the extent to which leaders rely on their relationships with the state for the reproduction 
of their local level authority. Elites who are highly dependent on the state have little choice but to 
act as brokers for it; otherwise, they risk losing the political and material support from their 
national level patrons on whom they depend. In other instances, elites choose to become brokers, 
even if their authority is derived autonomously from the state.  
Dependence is heightened when access to resources rests on decisions made by national-
level politicians. Will Reno (2005, 2007) highlights how national level leaders in Africa grant 
political control over markets to local elites as a strategy for sustaining ruling coalitions. 
Accumulation by local elites becomes almost entirely dependent on staying in the good graces of 
national-level politicians rather than the fostering and maintenance of broad political support 
within local communities. Elites have more autonomy from the state when they derive resources 
                                                 
8 In this sense, colonial chiefs, as an arm of the colonial state, often represented a threat as well as an agent of 
resistance to European administrators for rural communities. While many used their position to accumulate wealth 
and further colonial ambitions, they also at times functioned as a ‘resource’ for social subordinates, shielding 
individuals from the arbitrary coercive power of the formal institutions of the colonial state (Schneider 2006, 99; see 
also Berman 1998, 329-330).  
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from sources beyond state patronage networks, such as local economic production, trade and/or 
informal taxation. 
Resource dependence is reinforced by the degree to which the maintenance of local 
institutional orders depends on support from capital-based politicians. For example, Boone 
(2007a, 2013) refers to cases where the central state is the principal institution defining property 
rights and governing access to land as statist land regimes. When the state grants ownership or 
user rights to land to migrants or ethnic strangers, it directly challenges indigenous customary 
institutions for the allocation of land. Elites who benefit from these interventions (i.e. wealthy 
migrant farmers) depend heavily on the support of the state for the maintenance of private 
property rights in rural areas. In places like the cocoa-growing regions of Southwestern Côte 
d’Ivoire or the Rift Valley in Kenya, the security of migrant farmers remains entirely bound up 
with the political support they receive from national capitals in Abidjan and Nairobi. Conversely, 
autonomy is enhanced when rules governing different aspects of social life – such as the 
allocation of land and labor, marriage or taxation – operate independently of any intervention by 
the state. 
How does the relative dependence of pre-conflict elites on the state shape wartime 
coalition-building? For Boone, relative dependence on the state shapes whether local elites 
position themselves as allies or opponents of their national level counterparts. In the context of 
post-colonial state-building, Boone argues (2003, 29, 2013) that, where dependence on the state 
is high (such as in those instances of statist land regimes described above), local elites side with 
those in power because they fear being challenged or even dispossessed in the event of a power 
transfer. This dynamic influences civil war processes as well. In contexts where the position of 
local elites is, for the most part, a product of the intervention of the state into rural areas, they are 
viewed as functionaries and allies of the state by leaders of armed movements. The interests of 
rebel leaders and the former beneficiaries of state interventions are likely to be fundamentally in 
conflict with each other in these scenarios. Local elites and armed groups are less likely to be at 
odds when local elites enjoy more autonomy from the state.   
 In Uganda for example, Buganda elites in the Luwero Triangle enjoyed high levels of 
autonomy from the state. Their authority was not a product of state interventions. Rather, it was 
the target of land reforms introduced by Amin and Obote in the 1970’s and 80’s (Apter 1995, 
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161-162; Hunt 2004, 176). During the Ugandan civil war, Yoweri Museveni and the NRA easily 
mobilized the support of Buganda notables. As one high ranking NRA member put it, Museveni 
drew on Buganda elite’s existing rivalries with the state and promised that “he would remain 
loyal to the Buganda after the war, would restore the Buganda state, restore the kingdom and 
return the properties of Buganda” (quoted in Kasfir 2005, 283). Similarly, William Minter 
highlights the significance of relative levels of dependence in different regions under the control 
of RENAMO during Mozambique’s civil war. Minter explains that, in Nampula province 
(Northern Mozambique), local chiefs were commonly sympathetic to the RENAMO fighters, 
given government attempts to undercut chiefly authority through state sponsored ‘villagization’. 
As a result:   
 
The implicit contract between Renamo and the chiefs who invited Renamo to set up 
bases on their land was that Renamo would block government interference with their 
way of life and enable them to remain on their land. In return, the chiefs would serve 
as administrators for Renamo, taking the Renamo title of mambos and mobilizing the 
population to provide for food and collaborators to serve as police (1994, 208).  
 
By contrast, in Gaza (Southern Mozambique), where villagization programs were far more 
advanced and traditional authority structures long ago dismantled, RENAMO found “less social 
space for penetration” (1994, 212). Overall, Gaza’s elites enjoyed far less autonomy from the 
state than their counterparts in Nampula and as a result, were far more likely to support the state 
(and not the rebels) during the civil war. In sum, dependence eliminates some elites as potential 
local partners for armed movements.  
Nonetheless, dependence on the state does not explain all of the alliance patterns observed 
in this study. Even where local elites enjoy some autonomy from the state, they may choose to 
align with those in power at the national level. Brokering relationships, in this sense, are not 
defined strictly in structural terms. Consider the case of Kassoum Coulibaly, who was one of if 
not the central rival to the FN in Korhogo during the conflict period (see Chapter 5). The 
legitimacy Kassoum enjoyed, as a grandson of Korhogo’s founder, Gbon Coulibaly contributed 
to his elite status. Gbon was immensely popular because of his successful fight against the forced 
labor regime installed by the French during the colonial period (see Chapter 5). Since the period 
of Gbon’s rule, the Coulibaly family represented the principal group through which the old 
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single-party, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), mobilized support in the Korhogo 
region of Northern Côte d’Ivoire. Leading up to and during the conflict period, Kassoum was one 
of a number of Senoufo elites with familial ties to Gbon. Like other members of the Coulibaly 
family, Kassoum’s authority was derived from social relationships formed independent of his 
relationship with the central state.  
To some extent, Kassoum represented someone with whom the FN would want to ally. 
Why did the FN decide not to ally with Kassoum? Political choices to align with the pre-conflict 
state, despite the autonomy of his authority from the state, eliminated Kassoum as a potential ally 
for the FN. Leading up to the 1995 elections, Kassoum remained part of the PDCI rather than 
throwing his support behind the PDCI’s main opponent in the north at this time, the RDR. The 
PDCI was seen to be supportive of the nativist policies espoused by the then Ivoirian President, 
Laurent Gbagbo. Kassoum’s flight from Korhogo, after the beginning of the conflict, confirmed 
the FN’s suspicions about his true loyalties. Later, Kassoum attempted to improve his relative 
standing within the Coulibaly hierarchy and become Korhogo’s cantonal chief. Because of his 
earlier actions, many viewed his efforts as an attack on the authority of the faction supportive of 
the rebels led by Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Overall, choices to ally with different national-level 
parties leading up to the conflict shaped the alliance patterns that emerged after fighting began. 
Kassoum’s decision to remain with the PDCI despite changes in the political environment 
leading up to conflict shaped the alliance patterns observed in Korhogo during the conflict.  
Together, these two types of brokerage – based on either elite dependence or alignment by 
autonomous elites – influence the alliances that emerge between local leaders of armed 
movements and pre-conflict elites. Irrespective of the reasons for alignment with the central state, 
brokerage relations with the state affects the availability of local elites as potential political 
partners for leaders of armed movements. I conceptualize the brokerage variable dichotomously: 
either elites are brokers at the time civil war onset or they are not. Brokerage shapes the strategic 
decision made by rebels to ally with certain elites and not others, as well as the decisions made 
by local elites to side with armed groups or the state. Both types of brokers are unlikely to 
function as local allies of armed movements. Local leaders of armed movements view local elites 
as potential allies only when they were not brokers at the time of civil war onset. That brokerage 
relations shape the choice of allies is important because, as I explain in greater detail below, 
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authority is distributed in highly uneven ways within local communities. The brokerage roles of 
some elites can force rebels to ally with other elites who have limited political clout within local 
communities. This would be the case when brokers themselves exert high levels of political 
authority (over land, taxation etc.) and there are few other pre-conflict elites with comparable 
levels of political influence. In these instances, armed movements are forced to ally with actors 
who lack the authority of those elites aligned with the state. Variation in political clout stems 
from the social hierarchy of rebel allies relative to other local elites, which I refer to as 
hierarchical configurations. Below, I expand on my conceptualization of social hierarchy and 
hierarchical configurations.  
 
Hierarchical Configuration 
For Boone, social hierarchy refers to the degree to which authority and control over material 
resources is concentrated or dispersed within a locality. Social hierarchy is high when elites have 
authority over many people (moving from individual families to larger towns or urban areas) with 
respect to many issue areas (governing taxation, land, labor, or bride-wealth). Where such control 
is dispersed (amongst village chiefs rather than paramount chiefs, or small versus large 
landholders), social hierarchy is reduced. Authority is hierarchical when “it is broad in its 
functional scope, broad in geographic extent, and concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
individuals” (Boone 2003, 27). Social hierarchy matters because it influences the bargaining 
position of rural elites vis-à-vis the central state. For Boone, the absence or presence of social 
hierarchy shapes the institutional choices states make in terms of governing rural areas.  
 This study shares Boone’s basic understanding of social hierarchy with one important 
caveat. Boone ignores non-indigenous elites, including those elites implanted by the state into 
local communities, largely because she explains their very presence as a result of the absence of 
any indigenous social hierarchy in rural communities (see the description of administrative 
occupation above). Take the example of Southwestern Côte d’Ivoire (one of Boone’s cases). 
Here, politicians in Abidjan pursued a strategy of administrative occupation largely because of 
the absence of social hierarchy and the overall impotence of local elites in the southwest. 
National-level politicians ignored customary rules governing land tenure. They channeled 
resources through state agents ‘parachuted in’ from Abidjan. Migrants from other parts of Côte 
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d’Ivoire and West Africa represented the central beneficiaries of the state’s decision to rule the 
southwest ‘directly’ in this way, because it circumscribed the already limited power of local 
authorities to restrict access to land for migrant farmers. For Boone, the absence of any prior, 
effective structures of authority dictated the institution-building strategy followed by Abidjan. 
Nonetheless, local elites empowered by these state-building strategies – bureaucrats, wealthy 
migrant farmers - did have substantial pull in the southwest. They controlled resources, 
influenced who could gain access to land, and received the political support of a sizable political 
constituency (migrant farmers). Despite the status of these elites as strangers to this part of Côte 
d’Ivoire, some groups recognized their authority (albeit the breadth of support varied). Thus, 
while there may be differences between ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ elites, there is no obvious 
reason why non-indigenous elites would necessarily enjoy less authority than their indigenous 
counterparts. In short, outside of instances of what Boone calls non-incorporation (for which 
Boone does not provide a case), this study considers all the cases examined in Political 
Topographies as instances where social hierarchy is both present and absent because all the cases 
she describes are comprised of multiple sets of elites whose political authority varies 
dramatically. This alternative understanding of social hierarchy reflects larger differences in how 
elites are conceptualized in this study, compared to in Political Topographies. For Boone, social 
hierarchy describes the authority relationships present within specific localities, whereas I use 
social hierarchy to describe the authority of specific groups of elites within local communities.    
Social hierarchies themselves are sustained in a variety of ways. Access to resources and 
economic differentiation (i.e. class formation) enhance the clout of elites. These factors influence 
the ability of patrons to distribute resources through patron-client relationships and create 
material dependencies that heighten political control of elites over subordinate groups. Access to 
material resources does not necessarily mean that group hierarchies are present. In West Africa, 
Dyula traders, often known as ‘strangers’ to local communities, have long controlled substantial 
resources through market networks but were often incapable of using these economic assets to 
establish durable political hierarchies (see Chapter 5). Social hierarchy also reflects the extent to 
which local elites are embedded in social relationships with members of the broader community. 
Elites are embedded within broader frameworks of community relations when they are members 
of groups such as churches, community organizations, farmers’ cooperatives, or informal social 
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networks (Tsai 2007, 96). Local level social ties and networks can empower local elites by 
enhancing their social control and monitoring over other community members (Tilly 1964, 87; 
Hechter 2000, Ch.6). Hierarchies reflect the extent to which local elites exercise social control 
through the enforcement of different sets of social or political rules (Migdal 1988, 25, 2001, 67). 
In rural Africa, varying constellations of actors enforce rules covering a wide variety of issue 
areas, including local citizenship, property rights, taxation, marriage, bride-wealth and the labor 
power of young men (Isaacman 1990; Berry 1992, 2002; Boone 2003).  
  The ability of local elites to ensure some degree of social order represents one reason 
why armed movements choose to ally with local elites in the first place. Nonetheless, levels of 
social hierarchy vary within and across local communities. Some elites monopolize authority 
across a wide array of issue areas, while others possess little capacity to control and regulate the 
lives of other community members. Given that there can be multiple elites within a local 
community, levels of social hierarchy influence the political clout of both those elites with whom 
rebels choose to ally as well as those pre-conflict elites who functioned as brokers (and oppose 
rebellion). I describe differences in the relative levels of social hierarchy within groups as 
competing types of hierarchical configurations. Although differences in hierarchical 
configurations do not shape the choices of local partners, they shape the level of political control 
rebels are able to establish. Rebels sometimes establish political partnerships with elites with 
relatively limited authority given that alliances are determined mainly by the status of pre-conflict 
elites as brokers.   
Local contexts vary according to whether some or all groups within a given locality are 
organized hierarchically. Where groups represented by brokers are organized hierarchically and 
others are not, rebels confront serious challenges in mobilizing support and establishing political 
control. In these cases, rebel elite allies lack authority comparable to their broker counterparts. As 
a result, brokers are far more capable of mobilizing resistance against the rebellion. Rebels are 
the targets of widespread resistance led by powerful elites with close ties to the state in the pre-
conflict period (see the box in the upper right-hand corner in Figure 1.1). Conversely, when rebel 
allies are organized hierarchically and brokers are not, rebels can draw on the clout of their local 
partners to mobilize support for their wartime control over local communities. The outcome of 
the first scenario is reversed: rebels are able to mobilize a sizable portion of the elite and wider 
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local population against the state (see the box in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1.1). In 
instances where broker and non-broker groups are organized hierarchically, contestation over 
authority should occur in the form of ongoing factional conflict, as competing sides use their 
relationship to the rebels or the state to gain advantage in these local struggles (see the box in the 
top left-hand corner of Figure 1.1). Finally, contexts that would fall in the bottom right-hand box 
of Figure 1.1 were omitted from this study. This box represents cases where there are no 
hierarchically organized groups. Local-level rebel-elite conflicts are presumed to be absent in 
these instances because there are no elites embedded in local communities for rebels to either 
confront or work with. The implications of omitting these scenarios will be discussed in greater 
detail in the conclusion of this dissertation.    
 
Social hierarchy of pre-
conflict state brokers 
Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers) 
High Low  
High Moderate social control.  
Indirect resistance against 
rebels. Ongoing factional 
conflict between pre-conflict 
elites 
Low social control. 
Substantial resistance against 
rebels 
Low  High social control. Limited 
or weak resistance against 
rebels.  
 
Absence of local elites. 
Absence of indigenous elite 
and limited state presence. 
 Table 1.1: Levels of Social Control in Rebel Zones 
 
To summarize, this dissertation explains patterns of conflict and cooperation between 
local level rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites. It explains the coalitions that emerge between 
rebel leaders and segments of the local elite, and the level of political control rebels are able to 
enact in particular localities. My central argument is that patterns of conflict and cooperation 
between rebels and pre-conflict elites are influenced by the (1) extent to which local elites 
function as brokers with the state during the pre-conflict period and (2) differences in hierarchical 
configurations. I characterize elites as brokers when they are politically and economically 
dependent on the state or when local elites choose to align with politicians in power at the 
national level. Together, these variables constitute a framework for understanding variation in the 
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patterns of political contestation observed in each of the three case studies examined in Part II of 
this dissertation. 
Authority and the War to Peace Transition in Côte d’Ivoire 
This study explains variation in levels of political control established by armed movements in 
local arenas during violent conflict. In all of the cases included in this study, local leaders of 
armed movements directly challenged the authority of pre-conflict elites. In doing so, rebels 
relied on the support of other local actors as means of buttressing their claims to authority. This 
illustrates the contested nature of authority relations highlighted earlier in this chapter. Authority 
relations are at their core fundamentally contested social relationships because the rules that 
comprise them almost always benefit some groups at the expense of others. This section briefly 
discusses a different set of ontological and methodological questions surrounding authority from 
those raised earlier in the chapter. Specifically, there may be a host of different reasons why 
subordinate groups might support relations of political inequality. In this study, civilians 
supportive of local FN leadership might have expressed support for any number of reasons 
including coercion, self-interest or legitimacy. Existing approaches in the literature on civil wars 
have focused overwhelmingly on coercion in explaining why civilians support armed 
movements. In focusing on questions of authority, rather than relationships defined strictly in 
terms of power or domination (where compliance is induced through coercion alone), I argue for 
a broader consideration of the motivations that compel compliance in violent conflict. At their 
core, authority relations represent an ongoing, competitive process of legitimization and de-
legitimization led by actors occupying different positions within prevailing political hierarchies. 
Nonetheless, efforts at legitimization do not always elicit support solely because actors view 
these relationships as just or good. Claims to legitimacy may fall on deaf ears; or actors may 
decide to give support for reasons other than legitimacy (self-interest, coercion, etc.). 
 The analytical challenge is distinguishing from amongst the diversity of motivations (such 
as self-interest, coercion or legitimacy) as to why any actor might accept a relationship of 
political inequality. Rarely do different modes of compliance operate exclusively of one another. 
Weber’s (1919/2009, 77) notion of the monopolization of the legitimate use of physical force 
captures the complex interrelationship between different modes of compliance. Actors coerced to 
follow rules may simultaneously recognize the right of the state to uphold and enforce them 
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through coercive means. Drawing sharp distinctions between reasons for compliance based on 
self-interest and legitimacy is equally challenging because rules can themselves constitute 
individual preferences. For constructivist scholars, “constitutive frameworks” (Ruggie 1998, 871) 
or socially defined “boundaries of the legitimate” (Williams 2004, 101) go far in defining or 
constituting individual ‘self-interest’. Thus, is it a fruitful or chimerical exercise to untangle, 
conceptually and empirically, competing motivations for compliance?  
 Efforts at unbundling different reasons for compliance highlight a litany of potential 
reasons for accepting rules and the political hierarchies that underpin them. In the literature on 
civil wars, scholars have tended to privilege coercion to the expense of other potential reasons 
why actors might support political inequalities generated by armed conflict (see Kriger 1992;  
Kalyvas 2006). This tendency reflects the challenges of distinguishing different modes of 
compliance. For example, one’s decision to join an armed movement, contribute food and other 
resources to soldiers, or provide information about enemy targets may reflect a spectrum of 
attitudes ranging from legitimacy to fear of reprisals (Kalyvas 2006, 91-104). Moreover, in civil 
war, perceived threats provide powerful incentives to conceal one’s true preferences or 
motivations. For this reason, Stathis Kalyvas (2006) warns against focusing on popular support 
for rebellion as a cause of civil war. Nonetheless, to assume that physical threats and coercion are 
the sole motivation driving support for armed movements is no less problematic than simply 
assuming legitimacy (Hurd 1999, 392). Methodologically, how can researchers capture the 
spectrum of reasons for compliance in any given case?   
 Ian Hurd (1999, 391, see also Elster 2007, 63) suggests that one way of testing for 
legitimacy-driven compliance is by evaluating whether “other centers of power come to the aid of 
an institution under threat…If few come to the defence of a crumbling institution, we might 
reasonably infer that it possessed little legitimacy”. This strategy offers a useful means of 
discerning motivations for wartime support other than coercion. Kalyvas (2006) argues that 
wartime support for armed movements more often reflects the threat of coercion than other 
potential reasons for lending support (e.g., self-interest, personal beliefs, legitimacy, etc.). 
According to this perspective, levels of support induced by coercion should not vary when armed 
movements monopolize military control over rebel-held zones because levels of rebel control is 
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viewed as the principal determinant of changes in civilian support.9 Support shown to groups in 
the context of post-conflict transitions might result from a range of potential reasons beyond 
coercion because (a) the coercive power enjoyed by rebel leaders should, in principle, be ending 
in the near future and (b), as a result, the support received by armed movements during post-
conflict transitions can vary. This study uses Hurd’s method to evaluate authority in rebel-held 
zones by focusing on the politics of the post-conflict transition in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2007, the 
Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) introduced changes designed specifically to undercut the 
political networks constructed by the rebels, including the authority of the local-level rebel 
leaders who had remained in place since the beginning of the conflict. The political transition 
initiated by the signing of the OPA in 2007 worked towards opening up new spaces for political 
contestation at local levels.  
This claim is admittedly contentious because, on the surface, the signing of the OPA 
resulted in little actual meaningful political change in the regions controlled by the FN. The 
overall difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire speaks to the 
challenges in drawing clean-cut distinctions between contexts of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ that all 
researchers studying civil war confront.  This is a particularly daunting problem in the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire. Despite the country’s bifurcation – between the rebel-held north and the 
government-controlled south – for nearly ten years (2002-2011), Côte d’Ivoire’s status as a case 
of ‘civil war’ is contestable. Compared to conflicts in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire’s de facto partition resulted in far less violence. Most Ivoirians 
themselves do not even refer to this period as one of civil war. Many describe it as being a 
condition of “neither war, nor peace” (ni guerre, ni paix) or as a social or political crisis (une 
crise sociale, une crise politique) rather than a full blown civil war. Scholars have made similar 
observations. Referring to the relative absence of violence during this period, Mike McGovern 
claims that “the Ivoirian civil war has not yet happened” (2011, 3). This ambiguity is reinforced 
by the fact that the uninterrupted control of the north by the FN between 2002 and 2011 was 
punctuated by what would prove to be a series of failed peace agreements, beginning in 2003. 
                                                 
9 This is in contrast to instances where territorial control is incomplete and contested by rebel and government 
military forces.  
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Finally, the fact that President Laurent Gbagbo was forcibly removed from power in 2011 
suggests that the OPA did little to transition the country from ‘war’ to ‘peace’.    
 Given the lack of an objective break, my decision to privilege this moment requires some 
justification. I argue that what distinguished the period following the signing of the OPA was the 
way in which political elites began to speak about ‘peace’. Thus, rather than drawing these 
distinctions myself, this dissertation takes seriously the viewpoints of the actors engaged in the 
collective projects of making peace or war. The OPA represented the last and most concerted 
effort to peaceably resolve the conflict. Many observers note the uniqueness of the OPA 
compared to earlier political efforts aimed at ending the impasse (International Crisis Group 
[ICG] 2007; Bah 2010; Mitchell 2012). What were the larger political effects of the OPA? To 
answer this question, I draw from theoretical approaches that highlight the effects on legitimacy 
of alternative discursive environments (Gamsen and Meyer 1996; Koopmans and Statham 1999; 
Schmidt 2008). Changes in prevailing discursive environments, or simply how actors talk about 
politics, cast new light on the legitimacy of the existing political order. They heighten or lower 
the costs of political action by influencing the legitimacy of perceived political choices and/or 
outcomes. As I explain in more detail in the next chapter, although the OPA did very little to 
reverse the political changes initiated by the conflict (for example, undercutting the authority of 
the FN through administrative reunification), it did change the ways in which elites on either side 
of the conflict began to speak about being ‘at peace’.  In this way, collective understandings 
about being ‘at peace’ created openings for actors at the local level by facilitating claims of 
authority that could not credibly be made prior to the signing of the OPA. This broader discursive 
shift goes far in explaining the timing of the cross-case variation in the levels of support and the 
breadth of coalitions underpinning local-level authority that this dissertation seeks to explain.  
This dissertation examines the wave of political contention that followed the OPA in three 
towns in Northern Côte d’Ivoire: Bouna, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo. To evaluate support for 
rebel leaders in these three towns, I examine two interrelated processes linked to the ‘post-
conflict’ transition precipitated by the OPA in Côte d’Ivoire: (a) the emergence of relationships 
between rebel commanders tied to the FN and other local-level elites and (b) conflicts over who 
has authority over local-level taxation. The formation of diverse relationships between different 
sets of established northern elites and the FN’s zone commanders characterized the post-OPA 
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time period. On one hand, the arrival of the FN’s political leadership represented a credible 
political threat to many established northern elites. Many FN local zone commanders established 
control over substantial material resources as a result of the rebellion. By the terminal stages of 
the conflict, many had already begun to assume prominent political positions as local 
administrators and party representatives, or at the national level within the new integrated armed 
forces. Despite the threat FN zone commanders seemed to pose, different kinds of relationships 
between these actors and pre-conflict elites emerged. In some cases, the FN’s local leadership 
garnered substantial support from local elites. In others, these relationships were far more 
antagonistic. In most localities, both kinds of relationships were present. During the conflict 
period, local elites could use relationships formed with the rebels to gain advantage over their 
political opponents within local political arenas. Relationships formed during the conflict period 
between the FN’s local leadership and the local pre-conflict elite continued into the post-conflict 
period after the signing of the OPA in 2007. Overall, the breadth of the elite coalitions that FN 
commanders built reflected variation in the extent to which FN commanders were able draw 
support for their wartime positions of authority.  
Authority over taxation became a hotly contested issue between the FN’s local leadership 
and pre-conflict elites across Northern Côte d’Ivoire in the wake of the OPA. Government 
initiated reforms aimed to put an end to the political and fiscal powers of the administrative 
Com’zones installed by the rebels and reassert the authority of the central state. Efforts to reinstall 
state functionaries across the north after 2007 heightened political struggles between the rebels 
and other actors over who should control taxation in the post-conflict period. Support for rebel 
control over local level taxation varied considerably. In response to local opposition, some former 
FN administrators conceded authority over taxation to other institutions and political actors. In 
other places, they retained it, and in some cases taxation was a far less significant political issue.  
 
Moving Forward: Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation proceeds in three broad parts. Part I (includes this chapter, as well as Chapters 2 
and 3) situates the dissertation theoretically, methodologically and historically. Part II presents 
the case material. Part III presents the conclusions and central findings of this study.  
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Chapter 2 provides a historical background to the Ivoirian conflict and is comprised of 
three sections. Section 1 outlines a concise macro-level political history of Côte d’Ivoire and 
provides an overview of the politics of the northern rebellion more specifically. Section 2 
examines the the Ivoirian peace process leading up to the signing of Ouagadougou Peace Accords 
(OPA). This section argues that the OPA enflamed factional conflicts between the political and 
military wings of the FN. Given their control over taxation and commodity markets in the north, 
many of the FN’s zone commanders had a strong incentive to hold up the process of 
administrative reunification, which was one of the central political aims of the OPA. This is an 
important reason why the OPA brought only limited political change in the northern zones under 
the control of the rebels. Section 3 elaborates my argument that the signing of the OPA in 2007 
had significant effects on political conflicts at the local level in communities controlled by the 
FN. Others have noted that the ‘direct dialogue’ with the leader of the FN, Guillaume Soro, 
initiated by Gbagbo in the discussions leading up the signing of the OPA distinguished this peace 
process from its predecessors (Yabi and Goodwin 2009; Bah 2010; Mitchell 2012). I argue that 
the ways in which national-level elites began to speak about peace opened up the political space 
required for the expression of the different grievances and conflicts under scrutiny in the case 
chapters. Chapter 3 explains the research design, methodologies and data collection strategies. 
 Part II presents the principal empirical content of the dissertation. To support my 
theoretical argument, this study focuses on empirical cases of rebel administration in three sub-
national regions in Northern Côte d’Ivoire. Bouna (Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire), Korhogo (the 
largest city in the north, Central-Northern Côte d’Ivoire) and Ouangolodougou (Central-Northern 
Côte d’Ivoire, on the border with Burkina Faso and Mali) all fell under the control of the FN after 
the beginning of the conflict in September 2002. The first part of each chapter examines the 
historical processes shaping the authority of pre-conflict elites. To support my central argument, 
the second half of each chapter details (a) the kinds of relationships that emerged between local 
FN commanders and other, pre-conflict elites, as well as (b) how these coalitions informed 
debates over local-level authority.  
Chapter 4 examines the case of Bouna in Zanzan province, in Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire. 
Bouna’s local politics were shaped by significant demographic, economic and political changes 
stemming from the pre-colonial military defeat of the Koulongo kingdom based in Bouna by the 
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great West African empire builder, Samory Touré. By the beginning of the civil war, Lobi 
migrants from Burkina Faso comprised approximately 80% of the population in the rural areas 
around Bouna, controlled the majority of the land and had become the dominant group 
economically. Wealthy Lobi lineage heads also became the principal representatives of the old 
single-party, the PDCI, in Bouna. The local authority of the emergent Lobi political class was 
reinforced by their relations to the old single party. These political and economic changes 
increasingly strained the relationship between the native Koulongo and Lobi migrants. After the 
beginning of the conflict in September 2002 and the FN’s subsequent control over Bouna, the 
local FN administration quickly began to regard the Lobi with some suspicion. Open hostility 
emerged between the zone commander in Bouna, Morou Ouattara, and the long-time PDCI 
politician in Bouna, Palé Dimaté. Additionally, many Lobi felt that the native Koulongo were 
using their newly established ties to the FN to check the imbalance in economic and political 
power that had been growing between these groups. These tensions led to violent clashes over 
local-level taxation between Bouna’s zone commander, Morou Ouattara, and a number of Lobi 
youth in October 2007, described earlier in this introduction. Bouna represents a case of low 
social control because state brokers (the Lobi) were organized hierarchically relative to the FN’s 
allies (the Koulongo).  
Chapter 5 examines the case of the largest city in the north, Korhogo. Unlike in Bouna, 
the FN confronted a set of elites, the Coulibaly family, whose authority was drawn from their 
authority over Senoufo peoples in Korhogo, as well as their recognition as community leaders 
from the state. During the post-colonial period, political conflict in Korhogo was organized 
around competing Coulibaly family factions. Competing elites struggled to become the central 
broker of the central state and ally of national-level elites based in Abidjan. Factional competition 
continued unabated into the conflict period. During the civil war, the key conflict was not 
between the rebels and local groups, or even between the FN and the state, but between elites 
jockeying for position within the Coulibaly family hierarchy. Competing members of the 
Coulibaly family allied themselves with different sides of the armed conflict. Factional struggles 
within the Coulibaly family intensified after the death of Korhogo’s cantonal chief, Drissa 
Coulibaly in 2008. Kassoum Coulibaly’s (discussed above) decision to proclaim himself as the 
next cantonal chief represented a direct attack on the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family 
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(from which the FN drew much of their support). With the backing of the conservative faction, 
the FN’s zone commander in Korhogo, Fofié Martin, approached Kassoum to convince him to 
withdraw his challenge.  Korhogo represents a case of moderate social control because the rebels 
confronted and drew support from elites enmeshed in existing social hierarchies.   
Finally, Chapter 6 explores the case of Ouangolodougou (commonly referred to as simply 
‘Ouangolo’), a small town on Côte d’Ivoire’s border with Mali and Burkina Faso. In Ouangolo, 
the FN confronted an actor who drew on his position as the head of a regional network of traders. 
Issaka Sawadogo (known by most in Ouangolo as ‘Potcho’) was the president of a regional 
trading network that regulated and promoted national and regional trade in livestock. Despite 
Sawadogo’s prominence in Ouangolo, he was often at odds with national-level politicians based 
in Abidjan. Sawadogo became the chief intermediary between traders based in Ouangolodougou 
and the FN. He played a central role in fixing tax rates and prices for livestock to be shipped from 
Mali and Burkina Faso through Ouangolodougou and across the north-south division of the 
country towards Abidjan. Yet, the political clout Sawadogo enjoyed as an intermediary between 
the rebels and Ouangolo’s community of traders was continually under threat from the state as a 
result of his own status as a foreigner. As a result, the advantages of the conflict for many of 
these traders (lower tax rates, fewer hassles regarding citizenship) meant that there was some 
resistance to the reinstallation of state powers, particularly those over taxation. Thus, in 2008, 
when the mayor of Ouangolodougou attempted to reassert control over local taxation, traders 
supported the FN’s counterclaims that that these powers should remain under their control. 
Ultimately (and in stark contrast with Bouna), the FN drew much more support in 
Ouangolodougou from the most powerful actors in the city. Ouangolo represents a case of high 
social control because rebels allied with a hierarchically organized community of traders whose 
elites did not function as brokers in the pre-conflict period and there were no hierarchically 
organized brokers to challenge them.  
Part III of this dissertation is comprised of the concluding chapter. It restates the principal 
argument advanced in this dissertation and summarizes its main findings. It examines what might 
be the potential limitations of this approach. Finally, it offers some final thoughts regarding the 
larger theoretical and policy implications of this study. 
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Chapter 2. Côte d’Ivoire’s Conflict in Historical 
Perspective 
Côte d’Ivoire’s almost ten year long political crisis (2002-2011) provides the national-level 
context to the local-level narratives detailed in the case-study section of this dissertation. Côte 
d’Ivoire was once a model for political stability and economic development in West Africa. 
However, years of growing political instability followed the death of the country’s long-time 
President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, in 1993. The country was split in two after a failed coup 
d’état in 2002 that left the northern half of the country under control of a rebel movement and the 
south under the control of the government, then led by Laurent Gbagbo. The first part of this 
chapter reviews the events leading up to the 2002 civil war and examines the principal rebel 
group involved in the 2002 uprising, the Forces Nouvelles (FN). It details the social origins of the 
leadership of the movement as well as the organizational structures developed by the FN to 
govern civilian populations in the north and control recruits.   
 The second and third sections of this chapter makes two distinct claims related to the 
Ivoirian peace process and the larger argument advanced in this dissertation. The second section 
argues that the Ivoirian peace process, leading up to the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace 
Accords (OPA) in 2007, significantly heightened factional conflicts between the political and 
military wings of the FN. While the signing of the OPA and the peace process more generally 
advanced the interests of the ‘political’ or ‘administrative’ side of the FN, it simultaneously 
threatened the control over taxation and different commodity markets established by many on the 
military side of the movement, specifically the FN’s zone commanders (commandants des zones). 
Thus, FN zone commanders had strong incentives to slow down or block efforts at reinstalling 
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the state beginning after 2007. Not surprisingly, the signing of the OPA resulted in few tangible 
changes to how the north was governed after 2007.  Most zone commanders did not see their 
political and economic powers curtailed in any meaningful way. The third part of this chapter 
also suggests that, while the national-level peace process did not result in any substantial changes 
on the ground (in terms of restricting the FN’s control over the north), the discourse surrounding 
‘peace’ that accompanied the signing of the OPA created opportunities for contestation over 
local-level authority. Changes in the ways national-level elites spoke about peace challenged the 
legitimacy of the political order established by the FN in the north. The tentative outcomes of 
some of these debates are discussed in the case study section.  
  
The Ivoirian Crisis in Historical Perspective 
Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960. Over the next two decades, the ‘Ivoirian 
miracle’ became a well known African success story characterized by relative economic growth 
and political stability. The country’s post-colonial achievements were in large part a product of 
the leadership of Côte d’Ivoire’s long reigning President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993). 
Houphouët-Boigny was an ethnic Baoulé and former medical doctor and big cocoa planter before 
he gained fame as the leader of the Syndicat Agricole Africaine (SAA)/Parti Démocratique de la 
Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and the movement against the French imposed forced labour regime during 
the late colonial period.  
Despite his early opposition to colonial rule and his role as the widely recognized leader 
of the nationalist movement in Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny’s reign as President was 
reinforced by his enduring close relationship with French political and economic interests. By the 
late colonial period, the French state had created strong ties to the emergent metropolitan 
economy in Côte d’Ivoire by ensuring privileged access to French capital markets for Ivoirian 
firms, establishing guaranteed purchasing prices for Ivorian commodities, and integrating Côte 
d’Ivoire into the Franc monetary zone. These policies all functioned to incorporate the Ivorian 
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economy into the global (or French) market (Campbell 1985, 276-278). Houphouët-Boigny 
reinforced these ties during the post-colonial period (Campbell 1985, 278-286).10  
 Houphouët-Boigny developed the economy of post-colonial Côte d’Ivoire through an 
‘open-door’ policy towards migration to the cocoa growing regions in the southwest. Migration 
to this part of Côte d’Ivoire began in earnest after the abolition of forced labour in 1946. Leading 
up to independence, smallholders (less than 5 hectares of land) represented approximately 75% of 
all cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire (Zolberg 1964, 67; Campbell 1985, 274). The majority of these 
were migrants from either the centre or northern parts of the country (Chappell 1989, 681-684). 
Migrant smallholders ultimately became a key political constituency of the SAA/PDCI (Zolberg 
1964, 67). The reciprocal relationship between migrant farmers and the PDCI continued into the 
post-colonial period. Houphouët-Boigny welcomed migrants from surrounding African countries, 
particularly Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. In famously stating that “the land belongs to the one 
who cultivates it” (la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur) Houphouët-Boigny directly 
challenged customary/community level authority over land in the cocoa growing regions of the 
southwest, opening it up to cultivation by ethnic ‘strangers’ (Ivoirian or otherwise).  Supporting 
migration in the cocoa regions worked as a political strategy for Houphouët-Boigny for a number 
of reasons. Granting migrants access to land garnered the PDCI unwavering political support 
from immigrant communities as long as the positions of ethnic minorities in southern 
communities remained dependent on the support of the party to cultivate cocoa in the southwest. 
As Boone (2003, 209) argues, irrespective of the wealth accumulated by migrant planters and 
traders in the Ivorian south, their ‘foreign’ status in many southern communities ensured that this 
wealth did not translate into the development of any local political base.   
 Groups indigenous to the southwest welcomed ongoing migration as long as the economy 
was growing, education was accessible and government jobs remained plentiful. By 1990, 
however, Côte d’Ivoire faced a dire economic crisis: reduced global commodity prices, over-
borrowing from international lenders and an overall decline in commodity production culminated 
                                                 
10 Zolberg wrote that, in acknowledging the “major dislocations and readjustments” that the Ivorian economy would 
require if “left to its own devices,” Houphouet-Boigny actively sought the further integration of the two economies. 




in the reluctant acceptance of an IMF loan that carried the usual demands for structural 
adjustment. The Ivoirian government was forced to radically restructure the public sector: wages 
were cut by up to 40 per cent; some parastatals were privatized and sold off; many higher level 
bureaucrats deemed expendable by Houphouet-Boigny were sacked. The overall effect was 
“catastrophic” (Crook 1990, 666) because these reforms undercut the capacity of the old single 
party to mollify disaffected elites and groups through their integration into the state apparatus 
(Boone 2003, 205). The old methods of social control that Houphouet-Boigny relied upon to 
maintain political order soon became untenable given the growing fiscal crisis of the state 
(Woods 1998, 218-220; see also Crook 1989, 215).  
The shrinking pool of resources the PDCI had at its disposal to ‘buy off’ the support of different 
social groups revealed cleavages within the ruling coalition that had henceforth been carefully 
managed. Pressure from the international community to hold multiparty elections also 
contributed to the fragmentation of Houphouet-Boigny’s political base.  
The PDCI handily won the 1990 presidential elections, receiving 81.7 per cent of the 
vote. Rather than pacifying growing tensions within the country, this victory exacerbated them. 
During this round of elections, the primary opposition to the PDCI, the Front Populaire Ivoirian 
(FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo, set itself up as the defender of the rights of ‘indigenous’ Ivoirians. 
The FPI attacked the PDCI for favouring its principal ethnic support base – the Baoulé – at the 
expense of other groups in the country and for using votes from non-Ivoirians to steal the 1990 
election (Fauré 1993, 326; Crook 1997, 222; Woods 2003, 649). Divisions also emerged within 
the ruling party itself. Leading up to the 1990 elections, Houphouët-Boigny’s Prime Minister, 
Alassane Ouattara, began to gain some support as the figurehead of the ‘reformist’ faction within 
the PDCI (including bureaucrats, younger members of the party). Reforms proposed by Ouattara 
threatened to dismantle the PDCI patronage machine and attack the interests of the old guard 
within the party, led by Houphouet-Boigny’s constitutionally appointed presidential heir and 
fellow Baoulé, Henri Konan Bedié. 
These debates intensified after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December of 1993, 
when Bedié assumed the Presidency. Soon after, a number of former PDCI members supportive 
of Ouattara, led by Djeny Kobina formed a new opposition party, the Rassemblement des 
républicains (RDR). The party’s loyalty to Ouattara represented an immediate threat to Bedié and 
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the PDCI. Even though he had accepted a post with the IMF in early 1994, Ouattara and the RDR 
were viewed as capable of mobilizing ‘northerners’ – based in the south as well as the north – 
against the old single party.11 In response to the emergence of the RDR, Bedié took decisive steps 
to block this challenge and prevent Ouattara from competing against him. Bedié began to 
promote a highly exclusive form of Ivoirian nationalism labelled ivoirité. This represented a 
complete reversal of the political strategies pursued by the PDCI under Houphouët-Boigny. 
Specifically, ivoirité called for the exclusion of ‘foreigners’ from the electoral process and 
required that political candidates reside in Côte d’Ivoire and have parents who are both ‘native’ 
Ivorians. These restrictions constituted deliberate and poorly veiled attacks on Ouattara, whose 
origins subsequently became the subject of vigorous debate.12  
Bedié complemented this narrowing of Ivorian citizenship with other political measures 
targeting what he viewed to be his ‘foreign’ opponents. He purged the civil service of suspected 
Ouattara loyalists. Unable to ‘buy out’ potential rivals to his government as Houphouët-Boigny 
had done, Bedié increasingly relied upon state security forces to deal with the increasing number 
of opponents to his rule. However, these actions, coupled with the increasing international 
dissatisfaction with his regime, left Bedié with little support (Toungara 2001, 67-68; Bassett 
2004, 39; Akindés 2004, 20). On December 24th, 1999, Bedié was ousted in bloodless coup led 
by Gen. Robert Guëi.    
Gen. Guëi came to power with the stated intent of reforming Ivorian political life. He 
promised to “sweep the house clean” and return to the barracks after overseeing democratic 
elections and establishing Côte d’Ivoire’s next civilian government (quoted in Kohler 2003, 20). 
Initially, Guëi seemed to be living up to his word. He made overtures to national reconciliation 
by restoring the citizenship of Alassane Ouattara and reaffirming the rights of immigrant 
                                                 
11 It should be stated that the RDR, at the time of its foundation, was not necessarily a ‘northern’ party. As Crook 
writes, “if the original RDR faction is examined in detail, it was not in fact an exclusively northern party and did not 
have a sectarian or regionalist message” (1997, 226). Djeny Kobina himself was from the southeast. And of the nine 
original Deputies convinced to quit the PDCI, only five were from the north (Crook 1997, 226).  
12 Numerous elements of Ouattara’s past have been invoked in this debate, primarily: whether his father was born in 
northern Côte d’Ivoire or Burkina Faso, his past use of a Burkinabé passport, his acceptance of a Burkinabé 
scholarship to study in the United States, and, finally, his long absence from the Ivorian political stage as a result of 
his occupational commitments to the IMF have been oft cited as evidence as his non-Ivoirian status. For a summary 
of this debate see “Ouattara is an Ivorian” West Africa, 15th- 21st July 2002 and “Ouattara: end of the road?” West 
Africa, 20th- 26th November 2000.    
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populations throughout the country. Guëi also followed through on his promise of a democratic 
transition to civilian rule by scheduling presidential elections for October 2000. However, Guëi’s 
behaviour quickly began to resemble the actions of the civilian politicians he had earlier 
criticized. After expressing interest in staying in power and running in the 2000 elections, Guëi 
appropriated the nationalist discourse used by both Gbagbo in 1990 and Bedié in 1995. Guëi 
introduced Article 35 to the Ivoirian Constitution, which required that both parents be born in 
Côte d’Ivoire in order to stand as a candidate for President. This again, was seen a poorly veiled 
attack on Guëi’s principal opponent in the 2000 elections, Alassane Ouattara. Additionally, Guëi 
purged many of the 2002 rebellion’s future leaders from the military at this time for their 
suspected ties to Ouattara and the RDR and their suspected roles in a September 2000 plot 
against Guëi, the complot de cheval blanc (plot of the white horse). In the end, the Supreme 
Court disqualified both Ouattara and Bedié, preventing them from running in this round of 
presidential elections.13 
Despite Guëi’s efforts at controlling the opposition, Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI won the 
2000 elections. In response, Guëi dissolved the National Electoral Commission, cancelled the 
elections, and proclaimed himself the winner. Afterwards, tens of thousands of protestors with 
allegiances to the various political parties participating or disqualified from the elections 
descended upon downtown Abidjan to protest Guëi’s decision. After these protests underlined 
Guëi’s growing illegitimacy, the military and police both abandoned him and Guëi promptly fled 
to Benin. On the 25th of October 2000, one day after Guëi’s departure, the FPI candidate, Laurent 
Gbagbo, declared himself President of Côte d’Ivoire (ICG 2003, 7).  
Many opposition parties immediately called for new elections in which all of the parties’ 
candidates could run. In the wake of these calls, violence between supporters of the FPI and the 
RDR quickly escalated. In November 2000, a mass grave containing 57 bodies was discovered in 
the Abidjan neighbourhood of Yopougon. Most were identified as RDR supporters killed by pro-
FPI armed groups. As a result, the RDR boycotted the December 2000 legislative elections. After 
a failed coup attempt against Gbagbo in January 2001, the complot de Mercedes noir (plot of the 
black Mercedes), the crackdown on northerners and perceived Ouattara supporters continued. 
                                                 
13 In contrast to Ouattara, Bedié was barred from running as a result of charges of embezzlement and corruption.  
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During this time, many RDR supporters were assaulted, killed or arrested (ICG 2003, 7-8). 
Gbagbo’s contested electoral victory and nearly two years of persecution of his northern 
opponents ultimately led to another attempted coup d’état and coordinated attack on three of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s principal cities: Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo on September 19th 2002. Forces loyal to 
Gbagbo repelled the attacks on Abidjan. However, the rebels gained control over Bouaké and 
Korhogo. Instead of a coup d’état, Côte d’Ivoire found itself embroiled in a civil war for the first 
time in its history. The rebels assumed effective control over the northern half of the country 
while the government retained its position in the south.   
 
Rebel Leadership and Recruitment in the Early Days of the Rebellion 
The September 19, 2002 attempted-coup d’état-turned-rebellion was planned and organized by a 
group of Ivoirian exiles based largely in Burkina Faso. This group had grown substantially 
following successive political crackdowns against ‘northerners’ led first by the government of 
Guëi and then, after 2000, by Laurent Gbagbo. The precise date of the birth of the original 
movement, the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) is unclear, although its founders 
began to circulate publications related to its inception in Abidjan as early as September 2001 
(Soro 2005, 79).  
The leadership of the movement – those responsible for organizing the original 2002 
attacks and maintaining the rebellion over its nearly ten-year duration – came from diverse 
backgrounds. A large group consisted of former officers of the Ivoirian armed forces, many of 
whom had been purged from the military as a result of suspicions that they were organizing 
against the government. Some prominent future rebel leaders and future commandants de zones – 
such as Chérif Fofana, Chérif Ousmane, and Ouattara Issiaka (‘Wattao’) – were tortured or exiled 
during these anti-northern purges. Other prominent former military personnel who participated in 
the planning and execution of the 2002 coup attempt included Tuo Fozié, Massamba Koné, as 
well as the future chief of staff of the rebellion’s armed forces FAFN (Forces Armées des Forces 
Nouvelles), Soumaila Bakayoko. The widely acknowledged mastermind of the rebellion in 
Burkina Faso was the former head of the Presidential Guard, Ibrahim Coulibaly (or ‘IB’) (see 
ICG 2003,10; Balint-Kurti 2007, 12-14; Boutellis 2011, 4). Former elements of the Ivoirian 
military were also heavily involved in leading two movements that formed in western Côte 
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d’Ivoire and joined the fighting later in November 2002: the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix 
(MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO). MPIGO was led by the 
former Guëi aide, N’dri N’guessan (more commonly known as ‘Felix Doh’). The MJP was 
organized by Adama Coulibaly, a former member of the armed forces accused of plotting against 
Guëi during the complot de cheval blanc (Balint-Kurti 2007, 16). 
 Beyond former members of the Ivoirian military, two other groups assumed leading roles 
in the organization of the MPCI. First, much of the MPCI’s leadership consisted of former 
university student leaders involved in campus politics during the 1990s. During this time, the 
principal organization involved in the Ivoirian student movement, FESCI (Fédération 
Estudiantine Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire), became increasingly factionalized along partisan-cum-
ethnic lines, which largely mirrored cleavages underpinning political competition at the national-
level. By May 2000, openly ‘dissident’ (aligned with the RDR) and ‘loyalist’ (tied to the ruling 
Guëi’s junta/FPI) factions of FESCI emerged on university campuses in Abidjan and Bouaké.14 
Contests over the leadership of the organization resulted in a series of bloody clashes between 
these groups on the streets and on university campuses (commonly referred to as the ‘war of 
machetes’). Many survivors on the ‘dissident’ side found themselves jailed or forced into exile. 
At this time, these former FESCI members faced difficult questions about whether to accept what 
they viewed as the ‘exclusionary’ political system Gbagbo was establishing or to fight against it 
militarily (interview, FN member, Korhogo, January 4, 2011). A number of former student 
leaders of this ‘dissident’ faction, including former FESCI president Guillaume Soro, featured as 
prominent actors in the 2002 rebellion. Many former FESCI members formed the administrative 
core of the FN during its decade-long control of the north (HRW 2008, 29-30).15  
Finally, the rebellion initially also drew on the support of a number of Gbagbo’s factional 
rivals, some with past ties to the ruling FPI. The most prominent was the former Gbagbo ally and 
FPI bigwig Louis Dacoury-Tabley. Although it was unclear how much of a role Dacoury-Tabley 
                                                 
14 Gbagbo himself was the former Director of the Institute of History, Art and African Archaeology at the University 
of Abidjan.   
15 Human Rights Watch suggests that there was an explicit connection between the 2002 rebellion and the student 
politics of the 1990s and 2000s for many on the government/loyalist side. They write that “in the eyes of many 
FESCI loyalists, the rebellion was but a continuation of the dissident insurgency they thought they had vanquished 
on the university campus some 18 months prior” (HRW 2008, 30). 
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played in planning the 2002 attacks, his close relationship to Burkinabé President Blaise 
Compaoré made him a valuable ally for the MPCI in the early days of the rebellion (ICG 2003, 8, 
10).               
 The MPCI began the rebellion with a membership of approximately 800 people. 
However, its membership quickly swelled after the movement consolidated its control over the 
north. By 2005, estimated membership grew to anywhere between 35,000 and 43,000 (Banégas 
and Marshall-Fratani 2007, 93-94; Balant-Kurti 2007, 18). The reasons for joining the fighting 
changed as the conflict wore on. At the early stages of the civil war, political and economic 
marginalization was widely cited as justification for joining the northern rebellion by the MPCI 
rank-and-file. According to Moussa Fofana, many saw themselves as ‘noble warriors’ who were 
fighting against an unjust, xenophobic and exclusionary system established by the Gbagbo 
government that, in the end, severely constrained the life chances of those of ‘northern’ (or 
Burnikabé or Malian) heritage (2011a, 55-62). Economic motivations were also important, if 
only because joining the rebellion became one of the last remaining economic opportunities for 
young men after the beginning of the conflict (Fofana 2011a, 65). 
In contrast to the MPCI, the rank and file of each of the two Western-based movements – 
the MJP and the MPIGO – was comprised overwhelmingly of Liberian mercenaries politically 
and military backed by that country’s then President, Charles Taylor. In contrast to the MPCI, the 
MJP and MPIGO employed violence indiscriminately against civilian populations, suggesting 
that economic motivations might have been a more prominent factor in influencing participation 
for the members of these groups (see HRW 2005; Weinstein 2007). The growing indiscipline of 
these movements resulted in a growing political gulf between them and the leadership of the 
MPCI. In early 2003, Guillaume Soro sent the MPCI commandant of zone 3, Chérif Ousmane, 
from Bouaké to lead a force that pushed the Liberian elements within these groups back across 
Côte d’Ivoire’s western border. This left the parts of the west controlled by the rebels under a 
unified command. In December 2003, the MJP, MPIGO and the MPCI formed a formal coalition 
under the banner the Forces Nouvelles (FN) (Balant-Kurti 2007, 17; Soro 2005, 87). 
 The different groups that comprised the leadership of the armed movement in its earliest 
days left enduring cleavages within the FN. One of the first and most prominent divisions to 
emerge within the FN involved factional conflicts between FN partisans loyal to Ibrahim 
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Coulibaly (‘IB’) and those loyal to the former FESCI leader and student activist Guillaume Soro. 
As indicated above, ‘IB’ was widely regarded as a central organizer of the September 2002 
planned coup d’état. He also played a prominent role in the coup that brought former President 
Gen. Robert Guëi to power in 1999. Yet, despite IB’s central role in the planning of the 2002 
attacks, the fact that he remained in Burkina Faso during the initial days of the fighting 
significantly weakened his position within the armed movement. This may have lost IB some 
credibility in the eyes of others who had participated in the initial attacks. IB’s position was 
further weakened following his arrest in Paris in August 2003 under suspicion that he was 
plotting another coup against the Ivoirian government. IB’s absence gave valuable time to Soro 
to consolidate his own position within the movement.16 By 2004, divisions between pro-IB and 
pro-Soro forces within the FN came to the forefront. On July 20-21 2004, violent factional 
clashes in Korhogo and Bouaké left 22 dead (see Chapter 5). Many of these victims were IB 
loyalists. In the end, these events helped Soro and his supporters consolidate their control over 
the movement.  
War Economies and Organization of Rebellion in the Ivoirian North 
At the onset of the rebellion, the Forces Nouvelles enjoyed modest popular support from northern 
populations. A growing hostility to Gbagbo and his supporters in the south, who were seen as 
unjustly marginalizing and persecuting Ivoirians of northern origin since coming to power after 
                                                 
16 Soro himself comments on IB’s decision to remain in Burkina Faso during these crucial moments. He writes: « Je 
sais qu’il dit être le père de la rébellion ivoirienne. Pourtant, le 19 septembre 2002, IB était bien loin d’Abidjan et de 
Bouaké. Je le sais présomptueux, mais quand même. Zaga-Zaga était bien à Bouaké; il a péri sur le champ de 
bataille. Tuo Fozié, Chérif Ousmane, Wattao étaient présents. Même moi, le civil, j’étais au cœur des opérations à 
Abidjan. IB préférait visiblement vivre prudemment, loin du front. 
Depuis lors, IB n’a jamais voulu revenir sur le terrain. Lui qui a été dans l’armée un garde du corps de 
personnalités plutôt qu’un commando, n’a jamais trouvé l’occasion de montrer son courage…Autre affabulation, IB 
affirme sans vergogne qu’il a personnellement désigne ceux qui ont été nommés pour représenter les Forces 
nouvelles au sein du gouvernement ivoirien de réconciliation. Bien entendu, la seule liste que le Premier ministre ait 
jamais recue est venue de moi. IB ne connaît même pas certains de ces ministres comme Dosso. Quant à Tuo Fozié, 
nommé ministre de la Jeunesse, beaucoup savent les rapports exécrables entre les deux hommes. 
C’est dans ce contexte que, appelés de Paris par notre camarade, alors sous contrôle judicaire, nous avons 
été estomaqués de l’entendre exiger d’être sans délai nommé leader de la rébellion. Par égard pour lui, nous avons 
bien voulu en discuter, mais, entre sa légitimité limitée et sa situation judicaire problématique, nous avons 
naturellement décidé de ne pas donner suite. 
Á partir de ce moment, IB s’est mué en adversaire des Forces Nouvelles… » (2005, 110-111).       
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the 2000 elections, enhanced the popular backing of the FN. The legitimacy of the FN was also 
buttressed by its ability to maintain a degree of political order during the early stages of the 
rebellion. After gaining control over the north, the rebels were initially praised for their behavior 
and the positive relationships they forged with civilian populations.  
After the rebels seized Bouaké, HRW reported that “the MPCI were sympathetic to 
civilians and offered food, medicine and other aid to civilians in need” (2003, 25). Aid workers 
and journalists confirmed “the positive behavior of the MPCI troops towards civilians in the first 
months” (HRW 2003, 25). Yet not long after the beginning of the rebellion, indiscipline within 
the movement rose sharply. Reports of theft, economic racketeering and violence used against 
civilians in the north steadily increased (HRW 2003, 35; 2005, 19-20; Soro 2005, 106-107). The 
discipline of foot soldiers that had characterized the early days of the rebellion slowly declined as 
reports of economic predation increased. Many high-ranking FN members were able to use the 
rebellion as a pretext to carve out control over the lucrative trade routes running through northern 
zones. As a result, as the war dragged on, fatigue with the rebellion grew and relations between 
northern populations and the rebels gradually deteriorated.  
Many of the FN’s zone commanders used their new source of authority to establish 
personalized control over local war economies. In Bouaké, commandant Issiaka (‘Wattao’) 
Ouattara charged trucks 5,000 CFA17 for a “ticket Wattao” and passage through his zone. 
Similarly, for passage through the corridor south of Bouaké, commandant Soro (“Doctor”) 
Dramane required a payment of 2500 CFA (ICG 2008, 19). Before his removal in 2008, 
commandant de zone Koné Zakaria personally controlled all tax revenue derived from cocoa 
exports leaving Séguéla (Global Witness 2007, 34). As the conflict wore on, the commandant de 
zone in Korhogo, Fofié Martin amassed a personal fortune from a variety of sources (see Chapter 
5). Yet, despite these exactions, many FN foot soldiers were not regularly paid by the local rebel 
leadership. As a result, foot soldiers themselves increasingly used their minor positions of 
authority to extract resources from civilians. FN soldiers used roadblocks on roads and pathways 
to demand payments from northern populations (HRW 2005, 19-20). 
                                                 
17 In 2010-2011, at the time of my fieldwork, 500 CFAs equaled approximately $1USD. 
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After the elimination of the IB threat, controlling the actions of FN agents on the ground – 
both the rebellion’s local commanders and foot soldiers – became an important priority for Soro 
and the rest of the political leadership of the movement. Part of the impetus to do so came from 
the increasing divergence between the rhetoric of the movement’s political representatives, 
including Soro, and the behaviour of FN soldiers on the ground. Not unlike other armed 
movements across Africa and elsewhere, the FN’s leadership confronted significant 
organizational challenges in controlling its members.  
 In response to these challenges, the FN’s leadership began to radically restructure its 
relationship with its local command and foot soldiers. By 2004, the FN had begun to develop a 
series of political, military and financial institutions that connected the national administrative 
centre of the rebellion in Bouaké to the regional administrative offices in the cities and towns 
under their control. By 2006, the FN had established its own army, the Forces Armée de Forces 
Nouvelles (FAFN), which was headed by a chef d'état-major, Soumaïla Bakayoko. Under FAFN, 
the military wing of the movement was itself divided into a number of distinct branches: la 
direction général de la police et la gendarmerie (DGPG), headed by Tuo Fozié, la direction 
général des forces paramilitaires (DGFPM), under Koné Massamba, la direction centrale du 
commissariat des armées (DCCA), under Adama Ouattara, and l’inspection général des armées 
(IGA), headed by Seydou Ouattara (Fofana 2011a, 4).  
Another key component to the organization of the rebellion on the military side was the 
system of territorial control established through the administration of ten distinct Com’zones. 
Each Com’zone was headed by a commandant de zone who was solely responsible for its 
security. For the most part, former members of the Ivoirian military staffed and headed the 
Com’zones. As explained above, they comprised a significant portion of the group responsible for 
organizing the original 2002 attacks. Many of the commandants de zone used their administrative 
powers to tax and benefit from control of the commodity markets (cocoa, coffee, diamonds, 
yams, etc.) running through the regions under their control. Many also had personalized control 
over military units or factions within the FN that were demarcated by unique titles (Guépard, 
Cobra, Force Pure, Battalion mystique, Costa Nostra, Ninja noir, Delta Force, Anaconda and 




Com’zone City Commandants de zone 
Zone 1 Bouna Marou Ouattara 
Zone 2 Katiola Touré Pélikan Hervé 
Zone 3 Bouaké Chérif Ousmane 
Zone 4 Mankono Ouattara Zoumana 
Zone 5 Séguéla Koné Zakaria18 
Zone 6 Man Losseni Fofana 
Zone 7 Touba Daouda Doumbia  
Zone 8 Odienné Coulibaly Ousmane 
Zone 9 Boundiali Koné Gaoussou 
Zone 10 Korhogo Fofié Kouakou Martin 
Table 2.1: The FN’s ten Com’zones Source: Fofana 2011a, 5. 
 
Across most of the regions under the control of the rebels after the September 2002 
uprising, the Com’zones were generally the first, and for a long time, the only institution 
established by the FN. The failed 2002 coup attempt and the military stalemate that followed 
required the FN to establish at least a minimal military presence over the vast territory they now 
controlled. This posed a challenge for the leaders of the armed movement because the 2002 
attacks were planned principally as a putsch. Prior to the original attacks, leaders gave little 
thought to how to govern rebel controlled zones in the case of a drawn out conflict. Thus, for a 
long time, the Com’zones represented the only administrative structure installed by the rebels. 
But they remained poorly monitored (if at all) by the national level political and military leaders 
of the movement. Soro in particular, appeared more than willing to grant autonomy to those 
regional commanders who remained loyal to him during the 2004 conflicts between the pro-Soro 
and pro-IB factions of the FN. As a result, many of the FN’s zone commanders established and 
maintained some autonomous control over the economic resources in their respective zones.  
 In order to enhance control over the military side of the movement represented by the 
Com’zones, the FN also developed distinct political and financial bodies. The secrétariat général 
(also referred to as the cabinet civil des Forces Nouvelles) was the principal political or 
administrative wing of the rebellion. The secrétariat général was headed by the secrétaire 
général and political leader of the movement, Guillaume Soro. The secrétariat général was 
                                                 




represented at the level of the Com’zone by a local representative, a délégant général. As 
indicated above, much of this administrative wing of the movement was filled by former students 
involved in campus politics through FESCI. The functions of the secrétariat général were 
diverse, but were broadly related to relationships between the rebellion and other civil society 
groups and organizations based in the north. It commonly functioned as an intermediary between 
local actors and the military leadership of the FN (particularly the Com’zones). The secrétariat 
général filled the void left when bureaucrats either fled the north after the beginning of the 
conflict or, if they did stay, simply did not have the resources necessary to fulfill their 
administrative functions in any meaningful way. FN administrators fulfilled a number of different 
responsibilities that included: working with international organizations supplying aid or 
social/health services in the north, keeping schools open and ensuring the holding of final exams, 
communicating the aims and political positions of the movement to the populations under the 
FN’s control, regulating problems between the civilian population and the military wing of the 
movement as well as those conflicts which emerged between different groups within society 
itself, and finally, after 2007, establishing relations with state agents looking to re-establish their 
offices after the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA). The goal of the secrétariat 
général was to give the political leadership of the movement a direct link with the civilian 
populations the rebels were forced to govern. Nonetheless, despite this stated mandate, the FN’s 
leaders generally remained hesitant to expand their role in everyday governance over explicitly 
‘political’ issues such as local conflicts over land, gender relations, and/or chiefly succession. It is 
for this reason that others have described FN rule as an example of local-level power sharing: 
although arbitrary in many respects, many domains of governance remained in the hands of other 
actors who retained some authority over specific issue areas, even after the beginning of the civil 
war and the retreat of the formal institutions of the state (Heitz 2009; Förster 2010).  
 Finally, the national level leaders of the rebellion sought to regulate the relationships 
between the movement and the civilian populations under its control through the direct 
management and regulation of economic activity in the north. The first institutional body built by 
the FN to manage finances in Northern Côte d’Ivoire was Dirmob (Direction de la Mobilisation 
des Ressources Humaines), which was an organization controlled largely by supporters of Soro’s 
primary factional rival, ‘IB,’ during the initial stages of the rebellion. After 2004, the FN’s new 
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leadership under Soro constructed a complex and extensive financial institutional structure in 
order to shift control over the northern economy away from Dirmob and IB’s backers. The 
overarching umbrella institution responsible for the FN’s finances was the Secrétariat National 
chargé de l’economie et des finances. However, the autonomous body, la Centrale économique, 
was responsible for decisions related to revenues and expenditures for the FN. These decisions 
were made principally by la Centrale’s Management Council which was staffed by a number of 
prominent FN members including Soro, Moussa Dossa (the FN’s National Secretary in Charge of 
Economy and Finances), André Ouattara (the head of la Centrale), the FN military chief of staff, 
and all of the commandants des zones (Balint-Kurti 2007, 23). Through la Centrale, the FN 
extended its reach over the entirety of the north, taxing and regulating much of economic life in 
northern zones.19 The UN’s Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reported that la Centrale  
managed five principal revenue generating activities: the taxation of transported goods through a 
system of checkpoints on major roads; budget contributions (budget de contribution), which were 
taxes levied on all major companies doing business in the north; service charges for utilities such 
as water and electricity; the taxation of extractive industries, particularly natural resources such 
as diamonds and gold; and the ownership and taxation of fuel depots in the north (United Nations 
Security Council 2009a,  47-50). Much of the responsibility for the local day-to-day management 
of tax collection rested on the shoulders of tax-officials positioned in each Com’zone called 
régisseurs.    
Estimating the total amount derived from each of these sources is difficult given that the 
FN never provided reliable statistics on total revenues and expenditures. Whatever the total 
amount, much of the FN’s revenue was derived from two key sectors: cocoa and other natural 
resources, including gold and diamonds (Global Witness 2007, 33-45; United Nations Security 
Council 2009a, 55-58). Although many of the principal cocoa producing regions of the south-
west remained under the control of government forces, the FN did control substantial cocoa 
producing areas in the western part of the country, particularly the region around Vavoua-
Séguéla. In 2006/2007, the UN estimated, Northern Côte d’Ivoire produced 128,000 tons of 
                                                 
19 Efforts to formalize and centralize control over resource extraction in the rebel-held north through La Central, ran 
into resistance from some zone commanders, many of whom were able to establish personalized regimes of fiscal 
extraction in local areas after the beginning of the conflict. They fiercely guarded their authority from Bouaké’s 
efforts to centralize control over resources and taxations in the north. 
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cocoa, which amounted to almost 4% of global production of this commodity (United Nations 
Security Council 2009a, 55).20 The American NGO Global Witness estimated that between 2004 
and 2007, the FN averaged US $30 million per year from the cocoa trade (Global Witness 2007, 
33). Revenues from cocoa were procured through a series of taxes administered by La Centrale. 
The FN levied an export tax on outgoing shipments of cocoa of 125-150 CFA (US$ 30 cents) per 
kilogram (Global Witness 2007, 34; Balint-Kurti 2007, 23). Despite the war, a handful of cocoa 
buying companies continued to broker deals between producers and large multinational 
corporations (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 55). The FN charged companies 100 
million CFA (US$193,500) for cocoa purchasing agreements (Global Witness 2007, 34). Finally, 
the FN charged 15,000 CFA (US$29) per truck per trip for a laissez-passer, permitting travel in 
northern zones and 5,000 CFA (approx. US$10) per truck per trip for an escort tax that provided 
a security escort along major northern routes between Mali/Burkina Faso and Southern Côte 
d’Ivoire (Global Witness 2007, 34). Mineral extraction also comprised a large portion of the FN’s 
tax revenue. There are two large diamond mines in northern Côte d’Ivoire: Tortiya (100 km south 
of Korhogo) and Séguéla (125 km west of Bouaké). Although the exact value of this market is 
unclear, the FN profited from its growth either through direct participation in the marketing of 
Ivoirian diamonds or by taxing diamond miners (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 58-65).   
 
Towards a Fledgling Peace? From Civil War to Linas Marcoussis 
Initial efforts at restoring peace after the failed September 2002 coup attempt were compromised 
from the start by conflicts between the Gbagbo’s supporters and Côte d’Ivoire’s former colonial 
power, France. France was the first international actor to intervene in the conflict, primarily for 
the purpose of protecting and evacuating the large number of French expatriates and other foreign 
nationals living in the country at the time. However, France’s ongoing involvement in the crisis 
was quickly complicated by the ambiguous and, at times, contradictory position it took vis-à-vis 
the different parties to the conflict. First, in light of the historic weakness of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
armed forces, France’s early military involvement in the crisis enabled Gbagbo to retain power at 
                                                 




this critical moment. Well trained and better equipped French forces repelled the rebels as they 
moved southward approaching Abidjan and forced them back to Bouaké, behind the eventual 
‘zone de confiance’ that partitioned the country in two (ICG 2003, 29). Gbagbo used this reprieve 
to build up his military in the subsequent months. Yet, despite the initial actions by French 
forces, France was seen by many Gbagbo hardliners as tacitly supporting the rebellion. France’s 
insistence on its role as a neutral mediator and peacekeeper in the conflict (rather than simply 
backing Gbagbo’s government), its reluctance to frame the rebellion as merely an “external 
terrorist attack,” and its refusal to hand Ouattara over to Ivoirian security forces all contributed to 
suspicions shared by many within the Gbagbo camp that the French were complicit with the 
rebellion (ICG 2003, 29-30). For others, France’s refusal to support Gbagbo’s government was 
tantamount to treason in light of France’s historic role of militarily supporting leaders in Côte 
d’Ivoire and its other former African colonies (Piccolino 2012, 7; see also Bovcon 2009). For 
Gbagbo, by not intervening on his behalf, France was denying him the status and legitimacy 
accorded to past Ivoirian heads of state, particularly Houphouët-Boigny, and other contemporary 
French African leaders such as Omar Bongo in Gabon or Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, with 
whom the French had continued to maintain close relations.  
Political tensions between the French and Gbagbo’s government were further strained 
during the first round of peace talks in the Parisian suburb of Linas-Marcoussis. Spearheaded by 
then French president Jacques Chirac, the peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis resulted in an 
ambitious and comprehensive power sharing agreement. The agreement included provisions 
establishing a transitional government of national reconciliation that included members of all the 
signatories to the agreement, the installation of a consensus prime minister with full executive 
powers, reforms to national citizenship laws, a tentative timetable for the holding of the next 
round of presidential elections and stipulations pertaining to eligibility of presidential candidates, 
and land reform (Yabi and Goodwin 2009, 10). Despite the fact that the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement explicitly addressed some of the key contentious political issues that were at the heart 
of the conflict, the agreement itself was fundamentally limited in its capacity to establish and 
maintain an enduring peace for a number of reasons. 
First, by including the FN in the power-sharing talks, the French and the Linas-
Marcoussis accords ultimately forced Gbagbo to recognize the rebels as legitimate political 
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players with legitimate grievances that should be taken into account. For many within Gbagbo’s 
camp, this was just too much to bear. Widely viewed by Gbagbo and his supporters as “kids with 
pistols” and “houseboys turned rebels,” the Gbagbo camp felt that the Linas-Marcoussis accords 
elevated the rebels to an undeserved status within national-level political circles (ICG 2003, i). 
These sentiments were further entrenched by the views of many that Linas-Marcoussis 
disproportionately shifted the balance of power between Gbagbo’s camp and his opponents. 
Referring to the distribution of seats in the transitional government established at Linas-
Marcoussis, Andreas Mehler has written that “it was simply unacceptable to Abidjan (and 
particularly the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defense and the Interior portfolios, 
ministries that would give them preponderance on all security issues” (2009, 466). Not only did 
Linas-Marcoussis work to entrench the position of the rebels on the national political scene, it 
also directly aimed to radically restrict the autonomous powers of the President. The consensus 
Prime Minister agreed upon at Linas-Marcoussis, Seydou Diarra, was selected under the 
assumption that he would assume full executive powers until the next round of presidential 
elections in 2005. Clearly reluctant to share power, Gbagbo and his supporters used their 
advantage as political insiders to block Diarra at every opportunity (ICG 2003, 36). Overall, 
many within the FPI viewed Linas-Marcoussis as a ‘constitutional coup d’état’ whose outcome 
was largely in line with the original political goals of the rebels.     
In the end, many on the government side refused to accept the political outcome of the 
French initiated peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis. Even in the midst of negotiations, Gbagbo gave 
the green light to FPI youth leaders to organize anti-French rallies in Abidjan. After the 
installation of Diarra’s power-sharing government, the prominent FPI politician Mamadou 
Koulibaly called for acts of “civil disobedience” to protest the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement. Ultimately, Gbagbo simply refused to implement some of the central components of 
the agreement. In particular, his refusal to appoint the agreed upon candidate for the defence 
portfolio, Koné Ouassenan, signalled to the FN that Gbagbo was uninterested in negotiating a 
peace within the confines of the agreement signed at Linas-Marcoussis (ICG 2003, 3-5). In 




The security situation and the prospects for sustained peace degenerated quickly after the 
collapse of the transitional government. By early 2004, the Gbagbo government had stepped up 
its repression of ‘northerners’ and other suspected political opponents. In July 2004, the 
signatories met again in Accra, Ghana to restart peace talks and sign a new agreement. Despite 
these diplomatic efforts, implementation of an agreement based on talks held in Accra began to 
stall as early as September 2004. In light of the failure of this latest round of peace talks, Gbagbo 
renewed his military offensive against the northern-based rebellion. On November 4, Gbagbo 
initiated ‘Operation Dignité,’ which included a sustained aerial bombardment of selected targets 
in rebel-held northern zones. When the bombings hit French military barracks, killing nine 
French soldiers and one American, the French responded in kind by attacking and destroying the 
entirety of Côte d’Ivoire’s air force. This in turn sparked three days of anti-French riots, where 
bands of pro-Gbagbo youth looted property and beat and raped French citizens and other expats 
of suspected European descent. By November 9, 9,000 foreigners were airlifted out of Abidjan by 
French forces (ICG 2005, 12). Despite UN sanctions against suspected human rights abusers, 
Gbagbo’s decision to repeal Article 35 of the Constitution (the nationality clause which 
prevented Ouattara from running in the 2000 elections) and another round of political 
negotiations hosted by South African President Thebo Mbeki in Pretoria in March 2005, tensions 
remained. ECOWAS, the AU, the EU and the domestic political opposition agreed to extend 
Gbagbo’s presidential mandate into 2006, after the installation of a new transitional government 
under former head of ECOWAS, Charles Konan Banny. Buoyed by international support, Banny, 
like Diarra before him, was expected to manage the transitional government, implement the peace 
process, and prepare the country for elections in October 2006 (ICG 2005, 12; McGovern 2011, 
24). 
Continuity and Change in the Ivoirian Peace Process: The Ouagadougou Peace Accords 
The nomination of Banny as the new PM in Gabgbo’s newly prolonged government did little to 
restrict the autonomous powers of the President. Immediately after the signing of UN Resolution 
1721, which confirmed the consensus choice of Banny as PM, Gbagbo refused to implement 
those aspects of the resolution that contravened aspects of Ivoirian law. In this way, Gbagbo 
justified resistance to efforts by Banny to assert his authority as PM, and ultimately his ability to 
push the peace process forward (ICG 2007, 2). Yet in December 2006, Gbagbo surprised the 
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international community again, this time by announcing a plan out of the current political malaise 
through ‘direct dialogue’ with the rebels themselves. The talks between Soro and Gbagbo were 
hosted in Ouagadougou by the then ECOWAS Chair and Burkina Faso President Blaise 
Compaoré in January 2007. The Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) were signed on March 4, 
2007.  
The push for ‘direct dialogue’ between Soro and Gbagbo and the eventual signing of the 
OPA resulted from the domestic and international political pressures these actors confronted. 
Through cooperation with each other, both Soro and Gbagbo temporarily stemmed the sense of 
growing frustration felt by the variety of domestic and international-level actors involved in the 
peace process (ICG 2005, 14-16; Yabi and Goodwin 2009, 21). Ultimately, ECOWAS, the AU, 
the UN and France all accepted Gbagbo’s proposal as part of a modified framework for the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1721. However, the reformed proposal looked entirely different 
from the UN resolution and the number of agreements that came before it in terms of its 
substance. Now, as the ICG put it, the “responsibility for the conduct of the transition has been 
transferred to the protagonists themselves” (ICG 2007, 7). The OPA contained four key 
provisions pertaining to: (a) national identification and electoral registration; (b) disarmament and 
the reunification of the national armed forces; (c) national reunification through the redeployment 
of the public administration and finally; (d) the organization of clear and fair elections where all 
parties are able to put forth the candidate of their choice (within 10 months of the signing of the 
OPA). Bah argues that it was the content of the OPA – that it included provisions which directly 
addressed issues pertaining to citizenship and national belonging that were at the heart of the 
conflict – that created far more optimism regarding its potentially successful implementation 
compared to earlier efforts at solving the crisis (Bah 2010, 398). The inclusion of these 
provisions was an important part of the reason why there was so much optimism – in Côte 
d’Ivoire and within the international community – about it contributing to lasting peace, but it 
was not the only one. The fact that the signing of the agreement itself was initiated by Ivoirians 
and the Gbagbo-Soro partnership were the central political reasons why there was so much broad 
support for the OPA.     
The other important feature of the OPA was that, while it offered tangible reasons for 
optimism in terms of peaceably resolving the conflict, it also worked to exacerbate lingering 
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divisions within the FN itself.21 As indicated above, many of the commandants de zone were 
former officers in Côte d’Ivoire’s armed forces. In contrast, many of those who comprised the 
political wing of the movement were former FESCI student activists who participated in the 
heated university campus politics in Abidjan and elsewhere during the 1990’s. Many of the 
commandants des zones viewed the peace process as disproportionately advancing the interests of 
Soro and others comprising the political wing of FN. For this group, the OPA seriously 
threatened to undercut the control over many aspects of the northern economy they had 
established during the conflict. Not surprisingly, a number of prominent Com’zone leaders – 
including Cherif Ousmane in Bouaké, Hervé Touré in Katiola, and Koné Zakaria in Séguéla – 
expressed public scepticism about the OPA (ICG 2008, 13). After the signing of the agreement, 
most commandants resisted any attacks on their authority, subverting efforts at administrative 
and military reunification in the process.  
Towards the terminal stages of the conflict, specifically after the signing of the OPA, 
tensions between Soro and the military wing of the movement manifested themselves in a variety 
of ways. First, conflicts emerged within the FN over the decision to name Soro as the Prime 
Minister (PM), replacing Charles Konan Banny. As explained above, Banny was the former 
Governor of the Bank of West African States (ECOWAS) and was originally named interim PM 
in 2005. Gbagbo sought to neutralize Banny from the outset in order to reinforce his own 
political authority. Banny, lacking a real power base of his own, found his authority as PM 
drastically curtailed (ICG 2007, 2). The relationship between the PM and President Gbagbo 
changed with the nomination of Soro. In contrast to Banny, Soro could draw on significant 
material resources and political support derived from his position as head of the FN. With Soro as 
the PM, Gbagbo now confronted an opponent who wielded comparable political influence and 
clout.    
However, many within the FN became suspicious of Soro’s nomination as PM and the 
close relationship between Soro and Gbagbo after the signing of the OPA (see ICG 2007, 4; 
                                                 
21 This problem was also confronted by Gbagbo. Divisions emerged because many hardliners felt that the President 
had given up too much and they still preferred a military option for dealing with the former rebels. Rumours of a 




Allard 2008; Coulibaly 2008; Depry 2008). For some, the removal of Gbagbo was the aim of the 
rebellion and aligning with him at this point was just too much to bear (ICG 2007, 4). In a similar 
vein, others suggested that the political deal struck with the signing of the OPA was at cross-
purposes with the general political values and interests that underpinned the northern rebellion. 
For some, the process of national identification contravened notions of equality of citizenship for 
which the war was fought. Formulating some criterion for establishing Ivoirian citizenship was a 
sticking point for many within Gbagbo’s camp, however this concession left many FN foot 
soldiers exposed because they lacked the necessary documents for recognition as Ivoirian 
citizens. Leading up to the signing of the OPA, Commandant Cherif Ousmane criticized the 
peace process, stating that “you can’t share four years with soldiers who offered you their lives, 
and then overnight, throw them into the wild, without pieces of identification, without projects 
for professional reinsertion and in deplorable conditions of security” (Adeva 2006).  
Comments such as these from some within the FN appeared to reflect an emergent 
division within the movement between those looking to push the peace process forward and those 
more sceptical of the intentions of its authors (and hence more reluctant to disarm). Another 
illustration was the 2008 public spat between André Dakoury Tabley, the then assistant to 
Guillaume Soro, and the commandant de zone in Bouaké, Issiaka (‘Wattao’) Ouattara. The basis 
of this conflict revolved around a 2008 RDR congress, where RDR president Alassane Ouattara 
underscored many of the commonalities between his party and the stated aims of the FN. In 
wrapping up his speech, Ouattara made a general invitation to all FN members to join the RDR as 
a strategy for continuing their struggle against Laurent Gbagbo. Dakoury Tabley called 
Ouattara’s invitation “courageous” (Allard 2008). Wattao reacted sharply to this overture, “we 
are the arbiters in the peace process. Dakoury came to eat. If he eats he’ll keep quiet. If he wants 
to leave, he’ll leave. Indeed, he is an opportunist who doesn’t know how the FN was created” 
(Allard 2008). For Wattao, Dakoury Tabley did not represent the broader interests of the FN. His 
acceptance of Ouattara’s overtures represented an effort to advance the agenda of a small cadre 
within the FN that, to Wattao, was largely out of sync with many military actors on the ground 
who still had a stake in the continuation of the conflict and FN control over the north. The 
conflict between Wattao and Dakoury Tabley was not an isolated incident – it seemed to reflect a 
broader schism running through the heart of the FN about the political future of the movement. 
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By 2009, these conflicts resulted in urgent calls from within the FN for Soro to step down as the 
PM in the transitional government – suggesting that the OPA power-sharing agreement did not 
sufficiently advance the interests of the movement (Kouamé 2009). Soro even mused that some 
within the FN were responsible for the June 2007 assassination attempt on his life, when rockets 
were fired on a plane carrying him and some of his closest aides (Koffi and Essis 2007).  
After the signing of the OPA, the removal of the military, administrative and fiscal 
powers of the Com’zones and the reinstallation of state institutions in the north became a central 
goal of the camp presidential, as well as one of the more contentious political issues in the post-
conflict period. Two of the central elements of the OPA – disarmament and administrative 
unification – directly addressed the problem of the ongoing military and political presence of the 
FN in the north, and a third – the holding of free and fair elections – ultimately became entirely 
contingent on the dismantling of the Com’zones. The interconnected issues of disarmament and 
administrative reunification at times strained the seemingly cordial post-OPA political 
relationship between the old rivals Gbagbo and Soro. The crux of the conflict was simple. For 
Soro, the dismantling of the FN’s military and fiscal networks was predicated first on the holding 
of free and fair elections. Conversely, for Gbagbo elections could not be held until all fiscal, 
military and administrative powers were transferred back to the state (Jeune Afrique 2009a, 
2009b).  
Soro himself was caught in a delicate position. On the one hand, Soro’s legitimacy as a 
broker within national and international level political circles rested on his capacity to push the 
peace process forward. For Soro, administrative reunification needed to advance on some level to 
show that he was indeed a credible and committed partner in the peace process. On the other 
hand, Soro needed to manage growing criticisms of his leadership and the sizeable divisions that 
had grown within the FN, which were themselves exacerbated by the advancement of the OPA 
and the process of disarmament and administrative reunification. In the end, Soro did put sizeable 
public pressure on the military wing of the FN to hasten these processes (Bakayoko 2007; 
Armand Didi 2008; Stanislas 2008). Yet for a sizeable group within the FN, particularly many 
commandants des zones, the peace process represented a serious threat to their economic 
interests. Most recognized that not all the military elites on the FN side would benefit from the 
reunification of the armed forces (ICG 2008, 15).  
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Given these divisions within the FN over the direction of the peace process, it is not 
surprising that, according to most observers, efforts at administrative reunification in the north 
went largely unfulfilled. Redeployment of administrative personal was initiated by a series of 
presidential decrees made between April and July 2007 that appointed new préfets, sous-preféts 
and magistrates to their respective jurisdictions in the north (United Nations Security Council 
2007, 6). In order to reclaim control over the taxation of trans-border trade, the government 
initiated the first integrated customs post in Ouangolodougou on May 12th, 2008 (United Nations 
Security Council 2009a, 6). On March 4th, 2009, Soro introduced the first ‘guichet unique’ in 
Bouaké, which integrated customs, financial and registration services (United Nations Security 
Council 2009b, 3). Despite these efforts, the Com’zones did not officially hand over local 
administrative powers until a May 2009 ceremony in Bouaké that formally marked the transition. 
Even then, the extent to which these declarative and symbolic gestures actually transformed 
political relations on the ground is highly debatable. First, only one zone commander, Fofié 
Martin, actually attended the ceremony in Bouaké, suggesting that many Com’zone leaders were 
not really interested in the process of administration reunification. More concretely, actual efforts 
at reinstating the powers of civil servants at local levels were circumscribed. For the most part, 
the Com’zones simply continued to control local tax revenue including taxes levied through 
roadblocks and those derived from their administration of trans-local commodity trade. This 
denied state actors the resources required to fulfill their duties and made the former FN the 
ultimate arbiter in the use and distribution of resources. Even by 2010, many mayors, mayoral 
assistants and civil servants complained to me that they had neither the resources nor the 
authority to fulfill their duty in any meaningful way. The FN administration, particularly the 
commandants de zone, generally remained the dominant political actor in local arenas. As 
Kathrin Heitz has written in reference to Man in Western Côte d’Ivoire, the “real force in zone 6 
are [sic] the ex-rebels” (Heitz 2009, 127). This was the case for much of the north throughout the 
post-OPA period.  
In the end, the FN retained control over the northern half of the country for the better part 
of the decade, leading up to the 2010 Presidential elections. Buoyed by the support given to him 
by Bedié and the PDCI, Ouattara emerged as the victor in the second round of these elections, 
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garnering 54% of the vote.22 However, soon after the announcement of Ouattara’s victory by 
Côte d’Ivoire’s independent electoral commission, the courts nullified the results, citing voting 
irregularities in the north that had skewed the results in Ouattara’s favour. Votes cast in the 
northern departments under question were subtracted from the original total, which then swung in 
favour of Gbagbo with 51.45% of the vote. Gbagbo was subsequently sworn in as President by 
the courts on December 4th, 2010. After a four month stalemate following Gbagbo’s refusal to 
cede power, on March 28, 2011, the rebels, newly named the FRCI (Forces Républicaines de 
Côte d’Ivoire), with support from ONUCI (Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire) and 
French forces, launched an attack on the southern half of the country. By April 3rd, the FRCI 
controlled the entirety of the country. Ouattara gained sole control over the Presidency on April 
11th, 2011 (Bassett 2011a, 472-478; Fofana 2011b).     
 
Performing Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 
The resistance of the FN’s local commanders to administrative reunification, and the limited 
extent to which reforms actually eroded the wartime authority of these actors, suggest that the 
post-OPA period was marked more by continuity than change. However, the political struggles 
between Soro and the military wing of the movement, and the overall skepticism of the peace 
process represented only part of the story of peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire. What remains is how 
peace was subsequently ‘made’ through a series of interconnected symbolic and discursive 
practices by national-level elites which underwrote Côte d’Ivoire’s transition from war to peace 
in the post-OPA period. I argue that even in speaking about ‘peace’ rather than ‘war’ after the 
signing of the OPA, national-level elites created significant political openings for some groups at 
local levels, while closing off possibilities for others. Beyond being simply empty rhetoric, what I 
call the ‘performance of peace’ by national level elites created a discursive environment that 
structure local debates about power and authority. Rebel actions carried out and legitimated 
through discursive strategies that foreground ‘being at war’ are subject to greater challenge in 
                                                 
22 As part of a strategy for defeating Laurent Gbagbo, the main opposition parties had formed a pre-electoral 
coalition in 2005 called the RHDP (Rassemblement des houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la paix). The RHDP 
included the RDR, the PDCI, the UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire) and the MFA 
(Mouvement des Forces de L’Avenir). 
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‘post-conflict’ contexts, even if peace does not radically transform local environments after the 
cessation of conflict (as is often the case). The challenge for this research project is seeing how 
local and national level factors work together to determine political outcomes on the ground.  
To address these ambiguities this project builds on perspectives critical of arbitrary 
distinctions between of war and peace used in much social science scholarship (for general 
criticisms see Mbembé 2001; Richards 2005; Mundy 2011). Scholars relying on positivist 
methodologies have themselves debated definitions of civil war along a number of criteria 
including: its spatial delimitations (the distinction between civil wars and inter-state wars), its 
organizational basis (to what extent do formal government forces need to be involved), numerical 
thresholds of violence, as well as the beginnings and endings of civil war (for a summary see 
Sambinas 2004; Mundy 2011). Beyond debates surrounding definitions, cut-off points and the 
coding of specific cases, other scholars have revealed deeper problems with these approaches. 
One is that the naming of civil wars by scholars often does not capture, or even sidelines the 
views of those living through violent conflict.23 As Mundy argues, whether or not mass violence 
is understood as a condition of ‘civil war’ is often hotly contested by actors on different sides of 
the conflict. In reference to the Algerian experience, he (2011, 293) writes that:  
 
Although the new school of civil war studies has not been able to obtain a consensus definition of 
civil war, it has never doubted that Algeria experienced a civil war in the 1990s. Nevertheless, a 
survey of the domestic and international discourse of the conflict shows that the term civil war was 
often treated as a problematic description of what was happening in Algeria. The fact that the term 
civil war had become politicized with the political discourse of the Algerian conflict is perhaps not 
surprising. Where rebels often embrace the moniker civil war (war as legitimate violence), 
governments tend to deny the legitimacy of insurgent violence by labelling insurgents terrorists 
(Kalyvas 2006:17). To some degree, this observation fits with the Algerian case, especially the way 
in which the Algerian regime framed the conflict throughout the 1990s. A change of tone seemingly 
occurred in 1999, when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Algerian leader to use the 
term civil war (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1999). However, this was more the exception than the 
rule. Official Algerian documents, such as the 2005 Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation 
nationale (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation), use euphemisms such as ‘national 
tragedy’. Members of Algeria’s civil society and opposition convey just as much contention and 
hesitancy in their deployment or exclusion of the term civil war. However, the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) never seemed to embrace the term civil war wholeheartedly, perhaps out of a preference 
for an Islamic vocabulary of jihād (Moussaoui, 2006: 436). Even when it seemed that the violence 
                                                 
23 Charles King (2004, 250) writes that “the point is that where any instance of collective violence begins and ends, 
whether it is a single riot or an entire civil war, can be determined only from within the cognitive landscape of those 
who are engaged in it. Marking off events as discrete by fiat of the researcher will not do the trick.”   
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in Algeria could not get any worse, in early 1997 an exiled FIS leader, Kamar Edienne Kherbane, 
was still reluctant to say that the conflict had crossed into civil war (Dennis, 1997). 
 
In ‘post-conflict’ contexts however, where formerly opposing elites have accepted the terms of a 
peace agreement, we should expect to see the opposite: elites should struggle to ‘sell’ the peace in 
order to legitimize and naturalize the incipient post-conflict political order. This is similar to what 
Séverine Autesserre (2010, 66-67) describes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
Here, the understanding shared by much of the international community that the DRC had shifted 
to a “post-conflict” environment, after the signing of peace agreements in 2002, shaped the kinds 
of policies peace-builders pursued. This framing of the situation sustained itself despite high 
levels of ongoing violence in the eastern part of the country. Cedric Jourde (2007, 489) has 
underscored how small neo-authoritarian states in West Africa have ‘performed’ political 
stability in order to meet the political expectations of more powerful international patrons. In 
Mauritania for example, state elites use public arrests of actors they defined as “Islamic radicals” 
or “pan-Arab nationalists” as a way of hitting “right at the centre of Western states’ 
representations of politics in the developing world” and reducing international pressures for 
democratization. 
How do these discourses at national levels shape outcomes on the ground? Some 
approaches examine how differences or changes in discursive fields create openings (or closures) 
for political action. In this vein, Koopmans and Statham (1999, 228) used what they termed a 
“discursive opportunity structure” to explain the varying success of parties on the extreme right 
in Italy and Germany. Discursive opportunity structures refer to sets of variables which “may be 
seen as determining which ideas are considered ‘sensible’, which constructions of reality are seen 
as realistic, and which claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a certain time” 
(Koopmans and Statham 1999, 228). Similarly, “national moods” and “prevailing cultural 
climates” are other ways of conceptualizing meso-level changes in discursive structures that can 
legitimate and enable political movements in some specific contexts, and close off opportunities 
in others (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 279). “Symbolic events,” such as political crises, court 
hearings and dramaturgical performances by national level elites are parts of national discourse 
that are the most prone to change. Symbolic events are important because they “recast or 
challenge prevailing definitions of the situation, thus changing the perceptions of costs and 
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benefits of policies and programs and the perception of injustice of the status quo.” (Zald 1996, 
quoted in Joachim 2003, 251). In short, symbolic events cast new light on the political legitimacy 
of the existing political order, or alternatively, options for political change. All of these elements 
heighten or lower the costs of political action because of how they influence the legitimacy of 
perceived political choices and/or outcomes. 
Such changes in the surrounding discursive field filter down to local levels and open up 
opportunities for political challenges and change. In the context of the political transition in Côte 
d’Ivoire, peacemaking by national level elites can work to legitimize their position, but also 
subjects them to new challenges given the expectations about what such ‘peace’ talk might entail. 
James Scott’s (1990, 102)  Domination and the Arts of Resistance highlights how dominant 
discourses propagated by dominant actors can be used by subordinate groups and enable social 
struggle and resistance. Even if the terms of the debate are structured by the powerful, the 
meaning, interpretation and implications of the dominant discursive forms remain up for grabs 
and function as a point of struggle between dominant and subordinate groups. Thus, just as the 
shift towards peace in Côte d’Ivoire might legitimize the position of wartime actors, it may also 
offer fodder to subordinates looking to improve their position vis-à-vis dominant groups (Lund 
2006, 687). The key question remains exactly how changes in the discursive opportunity 
structure at national levels reinforce localized political orders already in place or whether they 
“allow(s) for a reshuffling of the cards, either in the form of a reduction of inequality or in terms 
of the emergence of new ‘elites’” (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 98; see also Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 2003, 152). I argue that these changes opened up some spaces for debate over local level 
order between competing elites after the signing of the OPA in 2007. However, whether these 
shifts resulted in a “reshuffling of the cards” or not depend on the coalitions between local rebel 
leaders and pre-conflict formed during the conflict, which are themselves determined by pre-
conflict brokerage relations and existing hierarchical configurations rebels confront.  
I ‘dramatize’ political power in post-OPA Côte d’Ivoire in this way by briefly examining 
some of the dominant narratives of elite political discourse used after the signing of the OPA 
through the lens of a series of interrelated dramatic events performed by elites. I show how 
Ivoirian elites used the peace process to legitimize and naturalize their role within it (as peace’s 
legitimate brokers) and to delegitimize any subsequent political challenges to their authority and 
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political position (as a challenge to the peace process itself). Indeed, the ease with which actors 
on either side of the conflict who once so vehemently defended the legitimacy of their use of 
violence became the defenders of ‘peace’ in Côte d’Ivoire speaks to the political significance of 
these rhetorical acts. Specifically, I draw out two themes that emerge from these performative 
acts: the treatment of ‘peace’ as a declarative act and the idea of the newly won reunification and 
indivisibility of the Ivoirian nation. I suggest that, through these two narratives, political leaders 
attempted to delegitimize the episodic violence the former rebels confronted after the signing of 
the OPA. My analysis breaks with earlier uses of political dramas in that it downplays how these 
symbolic acts merely reproduce the power and authority of national-level elites. I view this 
socially constructed transition as a shifting discursive field that, while functioning to legitimize 
the remade national level coalition formed after the OPA, also created spaces used by subordinate 
groups to politically challenge dominant actors from below.  
Casual conversations with Ivoirians about peace and conflict in Côte d’Ivoire generally 
revealed, on the one hand, deep aspirations for a return to the peace and prosperity experienced 
by older generations under Houphouët-Boigny, yet on the other, a marked hesitancy about 
discussing the specific political problems (conflicts over land, citizenship) that both led to the 
conflict and which should be addressed if a lasting peace is to be attained.24 For everyday 
Ivoirians, such reluctance is certainly, in part, a reflection of the ongoing precariousness of the 
security situation across the country. For elites, this reluctance is perhaps better explained as an 
outcome of the potential political divisiveness of discussing some of these issues publically. For 
actors who have just crafted a highly tenuous political coalition emerging from the OPA, limiting 
public discussion over contentious issues would obviously seem prudent. What then emerges, 
however, from this collective hesitancy is a form of public discourse about ‘peace’ that was 
divorced from the everyday political and social realities experienced by most Ivoirians.    
Rather than a set of objective conditions loosely linked to the absence of violence, ‘peace’ 
in the Ivoirian context might be better understood as what Lisa Wedeen has referred to as an “as 
if” condition, where all are expected to reproduce the dominant discourse no matter how far 
                                                 
24 In Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, Mike McGovern (2011, 54) makes a similar point about the hesitancy of most 
Ivoirians to blame contemporary problems facing the country on the legacy of Houphouët-Boigny. He writes: “for 
most Ivoirians it remains unsayable (if not unthinkable) to blame today’s predicament on what some saw from the 
1960s onward as the inevitable collapse of the house (of cards) that Houphouët-Boigny built.”  
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removed it appears from the reality it purportedly describes. The divorcing between rhetoric and 
reality regarding peace in Côte d’Ivoire can be seen in elite discourse surrounding symbolic 
events that celebrated peace after the signing of the OPA. The first is the flame de la paix, which 
was the national celebration of peace held after the signing of the OPA on the 30th and 31st of 
July 2007 in Bouaké in central Côte d’Ivoire, on the northern side of the old zone de confiance 
that had divided the country in two. The official ceremony included all of the principal actors in 
Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war, as well as a host of other international actors, including France, the UN, 
Thabo Mbeki, Blaise Compaoré and the Presidents or representatives of a number of other 
African countries. Approximately 25,000 people were on hand to watch the ceremony at the 
Stade de Bouaké (or, in its subsequent incarnation, the Stade de la Paix). The second group of 
events, les caravans de la paix, was a series of nation-wide tours, organized by prominent 
politicians on either side of the old lines of the conflict, for the purpose of promoting peace 
between rival communities.  
Official discourse surrounding ‘peace’ during the flame de la paix celebration suggested 
such expectations. 25 Addressing the thousands in attendance, Soro emphatically declared that “I 
want to make peace with all of you. Peace is here. Peace is here in Bouaké!” Additionally, “if 
yesterday we made war, today, with our common determination, we will build peace!” Finally, 
“just as there is a time to make war, there is a time to make peace, there is a time to fight, there is 
a time to reconcile with one another, there is a time to take up arms, and there is a time let them 
go…Peace is here!” Gbagbo echoed similar sentiments, stating that “we are heading towards 
peace! We are at peace!” At another point in his speech, Gbagbo emphatically proclaimed that 
“the war is finished,” repeating this evocative phrase six times in front the raucous crowd. The 
symbolic content of Gbagbo’s and Soro’s performances reaffirmed the dominant discourse 
surrounding peace developed throughout the daylong ceremony. After the Speeches by Soro and 
                                                 









Gbagbo, la flamme de la paix was itself run into the stadium, passed from carrier to carrier 
leading to its final destination. Afterwards, led by Gen. Bakayoko and Gen. Mangou, a number of 
FAFN and FANCI military members symbolically dismantled a canon to be piled with another 
2,000 arms that were set aflame. Gen. Bakayoko and Gen. Mangou subsequently gave up their 
arms to their political counterparts, Soro and Gbagbo. Both Gbagbo and Soro raised their arms in 
celebration holding the deposed arms. La flamme de la paix was then passed through the hands of 
a number of prominent international actors on the central stage and finally on to Soro and 
Gbagbo. Finally, the stockpile of arms held at the stadium was dramatically put to flame using la 
flamme de la paix, symbolically ending the five-year long conflict.  
The theme of peace in the official discourse after the signing of the OPA was also evident 
in the series of ‘caravans de la paix’ organized by a number of prominent politicians on either 
side of the conflict. Of these, the most prominent was led and organized by the former leader of 
the jeunes patriotes, Charles Blé Goudé. Goudé was named an “ambassadeur de la réconciliation 
et de la paix” by the minister in charge of national reconciliation in the transitional government, 
Sébatien Dano (AFP 2007a). The aim of these tours was to “announce the return of peace” across 
ten different cities in Côte d’Ivoire, including those under the control of the FN (AFP 2007b). 
Not long after his nomination as a peace ambassador, Goudé also announced the planned creation 
of more than two hundred “comités de paix” that were to be constructed across all parts of Côte 
d’Ivoire. The aim of these committees was to promote non-violence, support the ongoing peace 
process and prevent the beginning of another political and social crisis (AFP 2007c). 
Another prominent discursive theme which emerged from these events was the image of 
the Ivoirian nation as reunited and indivisible. Throughout the flamme de la paix, the city of 
Bouaké, the host of these celebrations, featured prominently in this respect. Bouaké mattered 
symbolically because of its geographic location (in the centre of the country), its place within the 
collective national imagination (as centre of the Baoulé heartland, ethnic group of father of the 
nation, Houphouët-Boigny), and its role as the administrative centre of the FN during the 
conflict. Bouaké’s symbolic significance was additionally heightened given that these ceremonies 
represented the first time that Gbagbo had stepped onto ‘northern’ soil since the beginning of the 
conflict. Acknowledging Bouaké’s significance in these respects, Soro emphatically declared that 
“peace is here. Peace is here in Bouaké.” Later, he re-emphasized that “Bouaké was the capital of 
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peace!” He would again reiterate this point, suggesting that while “Abidjan was the economic 
capital of our country, and Yamoussoukro was the administrative, we declare that Bouaké is the 
capital of peace!” More explicitly, Soro concluded that “Côte d’Ivoire was reunited, we are at 
peace.” Soro ended his speech by asking all in attendance to hold hands and pray to god for peace 
in Côte d’Ivoire.” Gbagbo too appealed to god, thanking him for unifying Côte d’Ivoire. 
Respective references to one’s old antagonists in the conflict also reflected the contemporary 
collective belief in the indivisibility of Côte d’Ivoire. Once enemies, ‘rebels’ and ‘patriots’ on 
either side of the conflict now publically celebrated each other as ‘brothers’ and ‘partners’. 
Referring to his old adversaries at a meeting in Yopougon, former FN spokesperson Sidiki 
Konaté stated that “it is a partnership for peace that has no other objective other than to search, 
hand in hand, for peace” (AFP 2007d) Similarly, Blé Goudé too referred to his old enemies in 
familial ways, calling Soro “his brother” and instructing audiences to “no longer see your 
brothers from the north as rebels” (AFP 2007d). 
  These symbolic events had a mixed effect on the legitimacy of Ivoirian elites. As 
discussed above, changes in discursive fields can simultaneously legitimize the position of elites 
and present opportunities for the contestation of authority for subordinate groups. One 
consequence of the ways in which Ivoirian elites began to talk about peace in Côte d’Ivoire after 
the signing of the OPA was to throw into question the legitimacy of the FN’s ongoing control 
over the north. If, as many FN leaders themselves claimed, peace had returned to Côte d’Ivoire, 
then how could the ongoing political and economic control over the north by the rebels be 
justified? Across the rebel-held north – in Bouaké (centre), Bouna (northeast, chapter 4), and 
Vavoua/Séguéla (west) – the FN confronted a series of episodic movements contesting their 
authority after the signing of the OPA. These movements were complex. They involved a number 
of different groups: former combatants, youth, and different ethnic groups.  
 FN leaders responded to these political challenges in familiar ways. FN elites used the 
same discursive frames – peace as a declarative act, and the image of a singular reunified nation – 
to ward off these challenges to their authority. In many cases, these two discursive strategies were 
used in concert to show that those who have chosen to take up arms against Côte d’Ivoire have 
done so fruitlessly against a now unified, undivided country. They suggested that irrespective of 
localized acts of violence, Côte d’Ivoire remained at ‘peace’ after the signing of the OPA. 
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Referring to these uprisings, FN bigwig Issiaka (‘Wattao’) Ouattara suggested that these “sabre 
rattlers are the enemies of peace. They are not like most Ivoirians,” and that despite these threats, 
“peace is unavoidable in Côte d’Ivoire” (Gbané 2008). Referring to those who would consider 
taking up arms in the post-OPA period, FN spokesperson Konaté Sidiki suggested that “those 
who will take up arms and fire upon someone is a bandit. Because he does not defend a cause. All 
of our problems were addressed at Ouagadougou” (Gbané 2008). Finally, an ongoing theme of 
the political discourse in post-OPA Côte d’Ivoire was the potential threat and influence of 
external manipulators, particularly the influence emanating from some former high-ranking FN 
members, such as Ibrahim Coulibaly (‘IB’) and Koné Zakaria. One FN member responded to the 
recurrent uprisings in Bouaké, stating that “we ask the secretary general of the FN to be firm on 
the issue of manipulators of our demobilized fighters and the destabilizers of the ongoing peace 
process” (Tayaro 2008). In each of these cases, the FN used images of ‘peace’ and ‘unity’ to 
delegitimize political challenges to the new post-conflict political order established by the OPA.  
Conclusion 
This chapter presented a national-level background to the Ivoirian crisis that is necessary for 
understanding the local cases presented in the second part of this dissertation. Beyond this 
however, this chapter also advanced two important arguments regarding the Ivoirian peace 
process and the OPA in particular, linked to the larger theoretical argument. First, while the OPA 
ushered in greater security throughout Côte d’Ivoire, including the north, it did little to 
fundamentally challenge the authority of the rebel leaders or reform the administrative system 
installed by the rebels. Attempts to implement the stipulations of the agreement laid bare the 
varied extent to which different segments of the FN were indeed committed to advancing the 
peace. Soro and other former FESCI activists that formed the bulk of the administrative side of 
the FN had strong incentives to advance the implementation of the OPA. Their political futures – 
their reintegration into national-level political circles – more-or-less depended on it. Members of 
the FAFN, particularly the FN’s zone commanders, had far more to lose from the OPA’s goal of 
administrative reunification. The power to tax wielded by many of the FN’s zone commanders 
was indeed the target of these proposed administrative reforms.  
Second, although the goal of administrative reunification proposed by the OPA did not 
materialize, I argue that the way national level elites began to speak about peace after the signing 
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of the OPA attacked the legitimacy of any claims to authority made by FN members at local-
levels. The national-level peace produced by the OPA threw into question the legitimacy of the 
FN’s ongoing control of the north. The result was heightened contestation over authority in those 
areas controlled by the rebels. This dissertation focuses on these political struggles over authority 
in three northern towns: Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou. These cases illustrate the variety 
of episodic movements confronting the rebels throughout the north leading up to the 2010 
Presidential elections. Before examining these cases in more detail, the next chapter explains the 
methods and data collection strategies employed in this dissertation, as well the logic behind my 




Chapter 3. Methodology and Case Selection 
This study explains the coalitions that form between local-level rebel leadership and pre-conflict 
elites during periods of armed conflict as well as how coalitions influence the level of social 
control armed movements are able to establish in local arenas. As outlined in chapter 1, I argue 
that pre-conflict brokerage relations between local-level elites and the state influence coalition 
formation. Differences in local level hierarchical configurations influence the degree of social 
control armed movements establish. In order to demonstrate my argument, I assess the 
relationships of different pre-conflict elites to the state, as well as the historical processes that 
impact the basis of their authority at local levels. During the conflict period, I examine how these 
variables influence both the choice of coalitional partners and the patterns of political conflict 
over authority.  
 This chapter lays out the empirical strategy employed in this dissertation. It is divided into 
three sections. The first explains my research design and the logic behind my case selection. It 
justifies a country focus on Côte d’Ivoire, the selection of the three cases included in this study – 
Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou, and the non-random sampling of the selected cases. The 
second section explains my indicators and the operationalization of my variables. The third 
section focuses on data collection and sources.   
 
Case Selection and Research Design 
A country focus on Côte d’Ivoire makes sense, given my research objectives, for a number of 
reasons. First, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a civil war (and a subsequent enduring political crisis) 
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in which an armed movement gained and retained control over the northern half of the country 
for nearly ten years (2002-2011). The lengthy period the principal armed movement involved in 
the conflict (the FN) controlled northern Côte d’Ivoire permitted the study of interactions 
between rebels and unarmed actors over time. Second, the territory controlled by the FN 
demonstrated variation on the values of my independent and dependent variables. The territory 
controlled by the FN incorporated parts of northern Côte d’Ivoire that exhibited marked 
differences in brokerage relations and hierarchical configurations during the pre-conflict period. 
Finally, political struggles over authority during the FN’s occupation of the north demonstrated 
spatial differences in the extent to which rebels could control local communities politically.  
 The selected cases within Côte d’Ivoire – Bouna (in the administrative region of Zanzan, 
in Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire), Korhogo (in the administrative region of Savanes, in North-
Central Côte d’Ivoire), and Ouangolodougou (also in the administrative region of Savanes, in 
North-Central Côte d’Ivoire, on Côte d’Ivoire’s border with Mali and Burkina Faso) – 
demonstrate variation in the pre-conflict authority of local elites, as well as the political 
relationships these actors formed with the FN during the de facto division of the country between 
2002 and 2011. Random sampling is generally thought not to be an effective strategy in small-n 
studies because it cannot guarantee sufficient variation on the dependent variable (King, Keohane 
and Verba 1994, 126). The potential for selection bias was minimized because cases were 
selected without full knowledge of their values on either the independent variables (social 
hierarchy and brokerage) or the dependent variables (coalitions between rebel leadership and pre-
conflict elites). Although values on the independent or dependent variables informed the selection 
of cases, for no case did I know the values of both the independent and dependent variables prior 
to conducting field research. Incomplete prior knowledge of sub-national and sub-group 
dynamics made it impossible for the cases included in this study to correspond to my argument in 
a pre-determined way. Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou demonstrate significant variation 
in the coalitions that emerged between the rebels and pre-conflict elites, as well as the lines of 
contestation around which conflicts over authority were fought. Although these cases 
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demonstrate significant sub-national and sub-group variation in Northern Côte d’Ivoire, I make 
no claim about their representativeness.26  
 The study provides a detailed controlled comparison of three localities that fell under the 
control of a single rebel group during Côte d’Ivoire’s almost ten year long armed conflict (2002-
2011).27 As explained in chapter 2, the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) 
organized the original September 2002 attacks. Two western-based movements, the Mouvement 
pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), 
joined the fighting soon after. Under the banner of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the MPCI 
ultimately absorbed the western-based movements into a unified command structure. All of the 
cases included in this study are parts of the territory originally controlled by the MPCI, and later 
the FN. The organization of the FN into distinct administrative Com’zones facilitated 
comparisons across the different localities controlled by this armed movement. Each Com’zone 
was headed by a specific zone commander, and these commanders developed distinct 
relationships with different pre-conflict elites in the areas under their military control. The 
administrative organization of the FN into distinctive Com’zones influenced what I determined to 
be a sub-national or sub-group ‘case’ of rebel-civilian relations.28 
Given the questions motivating this study, comparing different localities under the control 
of the same armed movement represents an effective research strategy because it can control for 
confounding factors emphasized by alternative theoretical approaches (Snyder 2001). This study 
controls for factors that are thought to influence rebel behavior such as the breakdown of state-
centered patronage networks (Reno 2005, 2007) and the interests of group members (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Weinstein 2007). The factors emphasized by these alternative approaches remain 
constant across the three cases included in this study. Level of military control (Kalyvas 2006; 
Metelits 2010) presents a challenge despite this research design because military control can 
                                                 
26 This is a problem confronting all sub-national research designs in peace and conflict studies. The extent to which 
causal claims derived from small-n sub-national designs apply to the broader universe of cases is difficult to establish 
because the information regarding specific cases is generally not known prior to case selection (Simons and Zanker 
2012, 5). 
27 2002-2011 represents the time in which the FN formally controlled the north. However, the case material included 
in this dissertation discusses events up until 2013.  
28 However, as indicated above, two of my cases, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo were part of the same com’zone.   
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change over time during the course of a conflict. To confront this potential problem, my research 
design includes localities where, for the most part, levels of military contestation and control by 
the FN did not vary across space and over time. After the establishment the French enforced zone 
de confiance in 2004 that split the country in two, levels of military control remained fairly 
constant throughout the rebel controlled north. All three research sites were well behind this 
administrative division of the country. Bouna and Ouangolodougou were within 100km of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s northern border with Burkina Faso. Ouangolodougou and Korhogo were part of the 
same administrative com’zone. Thus, factors such as the breakdown of state patronage networks, 
rebel interests and levels of rebel control do not easily account for cross-regional differences in 
relationships established between civilians and rebels under control of the same rebel movement. 
Overall, this study employs a research strategy similar to Mill's method of difference (see Ragin 
1987, 38; George and Bennett 2005, 156) and what Przeworski and Teune (1970, 32-33) refer to 
as “most similar systems” research design where the cases under study are similar in many 
theoretically relevant ways (levels of military control, the absence or presence of natural 
resources, rebel organization, ‘state-failure’), except for differences in the causal variable of 
interest.  
Despite these efforts to control for cross-regional variation in rebel leadership and 
administration across the northern territory controlled by the rebels, there are some important 
differences between Bouna (part of Com’zone 1), Korhogo and Ouangolodougou (which were 
both part of Com’zone 10). Compared to Korhogo and Ouangolodougou, Bouna was unique 
because actors representing the political wing of the FN were not installed until well after the 
beginning of the conflict. This might suggest that organizational differences (Weinstein 2007; 
Johnson 2008), rather than the pre-conflict authority of local elites, were responsible for the 
different outcomes observed in Bouna, compared to Ouangolodougou and Korhogo. Similarly, 
Korhogo was the site of bloody clashes between pro-IB and pro-Soro factions of the FN (see 
chapter 2). Bouna and Ouangolodougou were spared from this factional fighting. I evaluate the 
relative causal influence of these other factors in the case chapters that follow.   
Scholars have observed a number of significant limitations to research strategies relying 
solely on controlled comparison (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 128; Ragin 1987:39; 
George and Bennett 2005, 156-162; Van Evera 1997, 47). These strategies are limited in the 
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extent to which they can account and control for all possible causal factors, as well as problems 
related to multiple causation (equifinality). In order to mitigate some of these problems, this 
study also employs process-tracing. Process-tracing aims to link different types of evidence to 
illustrate the processes by which causal factors influence the outcome of interest (Tarrow 2004, 
173; Bennett and George 2005, 206). Process-tracing requires in-depth knowledge of specific 
cases. An intimate familiarity with one or a few cases allows researchers to unpack the complex 
relationships between different causal factors, causal processes and the outcome to be explained. 
The narratives provided in each of the case studies are “deliberatively selective” (Bennett and 
George 2005, 211). They explain outcomes by purposely privileging the proposed set of causal 
factors and relationships outlined in the first part of this dissertation, specifically the relationship 
between the pre-conflict political authority of local elites and coalition-building. Process-tracing 
also allows me to consider some of the other potential causal factors not acknowledged or 
controlled for through cross-case comparison, such as differences in levels of violence or rebel 
organization building. I weigh the potential causal influence of any unique features of the cases 
that might also explain the outcomes observed. Overall, mapping the causal mechanisms through 
which pre-conflict brokerage relations and the political authority of local elites shapes processes 
on the ground will strengthen the inferences drawn from cross-case analysis. 
Some cases considered for inclusion in the study, such as Man, Séguéla and Vavoua in 
the parts of Western Côte d’Ivoire controlled by the FN, were ultimately excluded because of 
security concerns. As became apparent after my arrival in Côte d’Ivoire, heightened violence and 
political tensions after the beginning of the 2010 electoral crisis made research in the western part 
of the country extremely difficult and risky. Of those remaining cases where field work remained 
possible, I included cases that demonstrated variation on either the values of independent or 
dependent variables. As a result, cases were selected during the course of my field-work as I 
began to grasp better the spatial and temporal variation in the relationships that had developed 
between the FN and civilian populations under their control. 
Korhogo (chapter 5) was chosen because I had some familiarity with the political history 
of this region before arriving in the country. There is a substantial secondary literature in history, 
geography and political science focusing on the Korhogo region (Coulibaly 1964; Gunderson 
1975; Launay 1982, 1992; Bassett 1988, 2001; Boone 2003). Korhogo was the only case for 
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which I had some prior understanding of the pre-conflict position of local elites as brokers. 
However, I knew little regarding the quality of the political order established by the FN in this 
part of the north prior to my field work. I selected two other field sites based on preliminary 
archival research and discussions with acquaintances and interviewees in Abidjan and Korhogo.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Côte d’Ivoire: Bouna, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo (original map source: 




I included Bouna (chapter 4) as a case after initial newspaper and archival research 
suggested that the political order established by the FN was potentially far more fragile and 
contested there than in other parts of the north. Although newspaper and archival research 
provided some idea of the limited extent to which the FN mobilized political support around 
Bouna, I had no prior knowledge of the history of local politics in this part of Northern Côte 
d’Ivoire. Ouangolodougou (chapter 6) was selected in a similar way, with incomplete prior 
knowledge of the political authority of local elites and the coalitions and conflicts that emerged 
during the course of the conflict. After I explained my research project to a friend in Korhogo, he 
suggested that I include Ouangolodougou as a potential case because, in his opinion, 
relationships between elites and FN leadership were very different in Ouangolodougou than they 
were in Korhogo. Beyond this single conversation, I had little understanding of how 
Ouangolodougou compared to Korhogo and Bouna in terms of the pre-conflict political authority 
of elites or the political relationships established between the rebels and these actors during the 
conflict. Overall, the absence of prior knowledge of the value of one or both of the independent 
and dependent variables for each of the cases included in this study limited selection bias. If 
selecting cases on the values of both the dependent and independent variables causes problems 
because the results may match hypotheses in a predetermined ways (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994, 142-143), my case selection strategy avoids such problems. 
The causal narratives in the case chapters demonstrate how brokerage relations and 
hierarchical configurations shape coalition formation and political struggles over local-level 
authority in each case. The first part of each chapter looks at the social, political and economic 
processes that influenced the political authority of local elites and their relations with the pre-
conflict state. The second half of each chapter examines how these differences informed 
coalition-building, as well as the local-level struggles over authority ignited by the rebellion.  
 
Operationalization and Indicators 
This study examines the relationship between the political authority of pre-conflict elites and the 
kinds of coalitions and struggles over authority that emerge in rebel-controlled zones. To evaluate 
the political authority of pre-conflict elites, I privilege two variables: elite brokerage relations 
with the state and hierarchical configurations of elite groups. In the case chapters, I distinguish 
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groups according to a mix of different overlapping political and socio-economic categories: 
faction, ethnicity, class or stranger/native distinctions. In each case, groups are defined according 
to the predominant socio-political cleavages around which political contests are fought in each 
locality. In some cases political conflict was based on stranger-native distinctions; in others, 
factional divisions distinguished different groups.   
My first independent variable is elite brokerage relations. As explained in Chapter 1, I 
understand brokerage relations as having two sources: dependence on the state and alignment. 
State dependence refers to the extent to which leaders are dependent on their relationships with 
the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. Alignment refers to whether leaders 
are political partners of the state, even if their authority is derived autonomously from it.  
I operationalize brokerage relations by examining different aspects of the relationship 
between local elites and the central state. First, are local elites dependent on national-level actors 
to establish and maintain rules and institutions at local-levels? For instance, are the rules 
governing property the result of state settlement schemes? Does the enforcement of these rules 
depend on the coercive capabilities of the state (police, armed forces)? Does the maintenance of 
these rules depend on national level political support and the resources elites derive from their 
connections to the central state? Also, can local elites mobilize resources independently of the 
state? Or are they reliant on their relationship with national-level actors to gain access to 
resources through grants, subsidies, political rents and other kinds of resource transfers between 
national and local governments? Politically, are local elites members of ruling parties? Do they 
have official state titles? I consider elites ‘brokers’ at the time of civil war onset if elites exhibit 
any one of the following characteristics: they represent the ruling party, coalition, or state in some 
official capacity, they enforce institutions and rules produced by the state (such as private 
property rights regimes) or they are dependent on the state for gaining access to resources. 
Different broker attributes or combinations of attributes point to differences in brokerage 
relationships discussed above: dependence on the state and alignment. Dependent brokers will 
generally exhibit the last two characteristics (enforcement of rules produced by the state and 
reliance on the state for resources), while elites who are brokers through alignment, will only 
exhibit the first (formal representation of the state or government). In contrast to brokers, non-
broker elites do not represent the ruling party or the state politically, they enforce local 
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institutions and rules independently of the state, and they have autonomous access to resources. 
In some of the cases included in this study, local elites were brokers in the past, but did not play 
this role at the time of civil war onset.  I define elites as brokers for the sake of my analysis only 
if they play this role at the time of civil war onset.  
To measure ‘hierarchical configurations’, I need to evaluate the social hierarchy of each 
group then compare the social hierarchy of each group within a given locality. I first categorize 
elite groups as having either ‘high’ or ‘low’ levels of social hierarchy. The concept social 
hierarchy is multidimensional. In this study, I consider three dimensions of social hierarchy: 
economic differentiation, political authority and levels of concentration. On the economic 
dimension, I code elite groups as having high levels of social hierarchy when elites have access to 
material resources and assume dominant positions in local economies. Elites exercise economic 
dominance when they control the commanding heights of the economy, as indicated by capital 
accumulation (land, factories and other factors of production) and the percentage of total local 
economic production attributed to elite groups.  On the political dimension, I code groups as 
being hierarchical when subordinate groups follow political and social rules enforced by elites. 
Finally, in terms of relative concentration of authority, I consider elite groups as having high 
levels of social hierarchy when elites enforcing rules are relatively few in number and these rules 
apply to many people. The social hierarchy of elite groups is highest when authority is 
concentrated in the hands of a few, elites play prominent roles in local economies, and they have 
the capacity to enforce political and social rules over a large number of people. Conversely, elites 
in groups where social hierarchy is low play restricted roles in local economies and will have 
limited capacity to enforce rules. These groups typically feature a large number of elites, with 
each elite exerting relatively limited influence. In this study, I categorize groups as having high 
social hierarchy when they have high levels of social hierarchy on any two of these three 
dimensions. The social hierarchy of elite groups is considered to be low, when only one or none 
of these dimensions is coded as being high.     
 Hierarchical configurations reflect the relative social hierarchy of broker and rebel ally 
groups (non-brokers) within the same locality. Possible configurations are high/high, high/low 
and low/low (see Figure 3.1). The bottom right-hand cell of figure 3.1 represents those localities 
that are loosely governed by any group or the state. In these cases there is an absence of any elite 
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group (tied to the state or otherwise). These might be zones with very low population densities 
and highly decentralized forms of political organization. For these reasons we are unlikely to see 
coalition-building and so I have excluded this cell from my analysis. 
 
 
Social hierarchy of pre-
conflict state brokers 
Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers) 
High Low  
High Moderate social control.  
Indirect resistance against 
rebels. Ongoing factional 
conflict between pre-conflict 
elites 
Low social control. 
Substantial resistance against 
rebels 
Low  High social control. Limited 
or weak resistance against 
rebels.  
 
Absence of local elites. 
Absence of indigenous elite 
and limited state presence. 
 Table. 3.1: Levels of Social Control in Rebel Zones 
 
As its dependent variables, this study explains two related aspects of patterns of political 
conflict: coalitions and levels of control armed movements establish in local arenas. In the 
context of civil war, coalitions are not easily observed (unlike in electoral competition where 
coalitions between political parties are often formally and publically declared). I consider a 
coalition to be present when the rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites express similar views or 
positions regarding political conflicts at local-level. To evaluate whether coalitions are present, I 
look at whether or not pre-conflict elites and rebels make public (in newspapers) or private (in 
interviews) statements that indicate whether they are supportive of each other regarding locally 
contentious issues (i.e. the authority to tax, chiefly succession). I consider coalitions to be absent 
when rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites express opposing positions regarding political conflicts 
at the local-level or when these actors express direct criticisms of one another.  
 I capture differences in levels of social control along a simple ordinal scale. Rebels 
exhibit either ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ levels of social control in particular localities. In this 
study, I conceptualize social control as having two dimensions: levels of elite conflict and 
acceptance of rules governing social life (taxation, land use, etc.) by subordinate groups. 
Distinguishing levels of elite conflict and support for social rules is conceptually challenging 
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because, as discussed in chapter 1, all authority relationships are, to a degree, contested and open 
to renegotiation. Nonetheless, where levels of elite conflict are high, we should see intense 
competition between elites over authority and resources, manifest as prolonged public criticism 
of each other and even participation in or organization of social movements or episodic violence 
targeted at one another.  Where elite conflict is low, heated, public conflict will be absent or 
episodic. In these cases, elite conflicts over authority and resources are resolved through mix of 
dialogue and coercion/political pressure. Where the acceptance of social rules is low, we should 
expect widespread disagreement over the basic rules and institutions that govern social life (land 
rights, taxation). Disagreement would be evident when there is widespread criticism and episodic 
violence directed at actors responsible for enforcing different social rules by non-elites or 
subordinate groups. Where the acceptance of social rules is high, there should be little resistance 
against rebels and widespread compliance to the rules enforced by armed groups or their pre-
conflict elite allies. Instances of high levels of social control are those cases where there are low 
levels of elite conflict and widespread acceptance of rules. Low levels of social control are cases 
where the inverse is observed, where there are high levels of elite conflict and widespread 
rejection of the social rules. Medium levels of social control represent those cases where there is 
either high levels of elite conflict and widespread acceptance of rules or there is low levels of 
elite conflict and extensive rejection of rules. 
I examine coalitions and control as two related aspects of political contestation by 
focusing on the power struggles precipitated by Côte d’Ivoire’s post-conflict transition over local 
taxation. After the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords in 2007, authority over taxation in 
the north emerged as one of the most contentious political issues. Many hardliners on the 
government side felt that issues such as disarmament, national identification and the fiscal and 
administrative reunification of the country should proceed before the holding of elections. 
However, resistance to change from many of the FN’s zone commanders limited the impact of 
efforts at administrative unification, particularly in regards to the transferring of fiscal authority 
over taxation (see chapter 2).   
Why focus on taxation? The politics of taxation has featured prominently in histories of 
comparative state building. Karl Marx (quoted in Campbell 1993, 164) suggested that taxes were 
the state’s “source of life”. Margaret Levi (1988, 1) wrote that “the history of state revenue 
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production is the history of the evolution of the state”. Charles Tilly (1985, 1992) famously 
highlighted the intimate relationships between war, the collection of tax revenues and state 
building in the European experience. International political competition and war-making drove 
political leaders to ratchet up their effort and capacity to mobilize revenue. Generally, elites were 
forced to shift from a reliance on revenues derived from tax farming and private estates to those 
managed directly by the state and derived from increasingly broad segments of the population. 
The informational requirements for improving the legibility (and ‘taxability’) of subject 
populations demanded highly educated state agents and a professionalized bureaucracy 
characteristic of many contemporary developed states. Conversely, in Africa, states were 
generally relieved from the pressure to efficiently raise resources because of the international 
protection afforded to them by norms of non-intervention advanced by international institutions 
such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Herbst 2000). 
Resources derived from the international community through ties to commercial firms, 
international aid organizations and foreign governments all provided a further disincentive for 
African leaders to mobilize resources and build states akin to the European model (Guyer 1992; 
Clapham 1996; Moore 1998; Herbst 2000). Overall, across diverse state building experiences, 
taxes have played a central role in shaping the relationship between states and citizens.  
 This study joins more recent work that recognizes taxation by non-state actors and 
questions why citizens are willing to pay taxes to some authority figures and not others.  Kristine 
Juul (2006, 823) tackles this question in rural Senegal where, in the aftermath of the 2000 
presidential elections, “the Socialist Party lost its hegemonic position in the country, leaving local 
inhabitants uncertain as to who was worthy of their allegiance, and hence to whom it was safe to 
pay a tax”. As an example of what von Benda-Beckmann (1981) termed “forum shopping,” the 
decision to pay taxes to particular groups (and not to others) can confer both legitimacy on the 
authority relationship in question and create a set of obligations running from authorities to actors 
willing to pay taxes (Lund 2006; Juul 2006). In the case of Senegal, Juul shows how herders 
originally from the Fuuta region along the Senegal River Basin used the payment of taxes to local 
notables to signify their allegiance to these leaders and ensure that they be counted as citizens in 
the rural communities around Barkedji. The paying of taxes created a set of obligations 
surrounding citizen rights demanded by the herders. Nonetheless, these claims were still hotly 
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contested by some indigenous groups (2006, 838-839). Of course, the payment of taxes to 
dominant actors also works to confirm their claim to authority. Scholars in this literature have 
drawn broad distinctions between taxes procured through coercive means, and those gained 
through some social consensus or bargaining (Tilly 1992; Moore 2004). Most tax regimes fall 
between these two extremes. All taxes require some level of legitimation because social actors 
generally retain some autonomy regarding their decision to comply with tax demands 
(Braithwaite 2003). 
 Political struggles over the authority to tax direct attention to coalition formation. In this 
study, rebel leaders politically challenged some pre-conflict elites and forged alliances with 
others in order to buttress their claims to fiscal authority. Coalitional choices shaped the extent to 
which rebels could draw on popular support to defend their authority over taxation. In some 
cases, the rebels aligned with powerful elites to restrict the authority of the state. In others, the 
pre-conflict elite allies of the rebels were weaker. Here, the fiscal authority of the FN was far 
more effectively challenged by other groups mobilized against it.   
 
Data Collection and Sources 
This project requires observations demonstrating the causal relationship between brokerage 
relations and wartime coalition-building and the relationship between hierarchical configurations 
and levels of rebel control. To assess these relationships, this study analyzes data from a variety 
of sources including secondary materials, ‘grey’ documents (government and unpublished reports 
and theses), NGO reports, newspapers and interviews. Most of the material covering the civil war 
period was collected during an approximately six month field-trip to Côte d’Ivoire from August 
2010 to March 2011. In this section, I discuss my data sources and the challenges associated with 
them.   
The first section of each case chapter examines the regional academic and ‘grey’ 
literatures in political science, sociology and anthropology to reconstruct the social processes 
shaping brokerage relations and the political authority of local elites. My evaluations of wartime 
authority relations and levels of political support draw on data from two principal sources: 
Ivoirian daily newspapers (either in print or on-line) and field interviews. Newspapers were 
critical to selecting cases, as described above. My fieldwork began in Abidjan, where I spent over 
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a month collecting newspaper articles at the Bibliothèque Nationale, focusing primarily on the 
conflict period that began in 2002. The goal at this time was to accumulate materials that would 
highlight the sub-national variation of interest to this study. Topics included: local and regional 
politics in different parts of the north, protest movements, the then upcoming Presidential 
elections (which took place in October and November 2010), violence, factional conflict within 
the FN, economic issues, and specific prominent political actors in the FN or in Northern Côte 
d’Ivoire more generally.   
Many newspapers in Côte d’Ivoire explicitly represent ‘pro-government’ or ‘pro-
opposition’ sides of national-level political cleavages or are tied to specific political parties and 
political actors.29 In sifting through the vast amount of available newspaper materials, I made a 
conscious effort to use newspapers representing all of the sides surrounding specific political 
issues. For example, when I required information on a certain political event, I searched for 
articles from newspapers on different sides of Côte d’Ivoire’s political spectrum to get competing 
perspectives on the issue. In some cases, this was challenging given that regional identities 
underscored the dominant cleavages in Ivoiran political life. In particular, papers that focused 
more on local and regional issues in the north (such as Nord-Sud Quotidien for example) were 
also supportive of the northern-based opposition, namely the FN and the RDR. Where possible, 
however, I triangulated data derived from different newspapers, NGO documents and field 
interviews.  
 After the completion of my field interviews in Northern Côte d’Ivoire (in Korhogo, 
Ouangolodougou and Bouna) in March 2011, I spent another three weeks at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale to catch up on coverage during my stay in these regions. During this second round of 
archival research, I intentionally sought articles about events and political debates drawn to my 
attention during field interviews. After my return to Canada, I conducted internet research, 
                                                 
29 Lori-Anne Théroux-Benoni groups the dailies in Côte d’Ivoire into three broad categories including “pro-
government or ‘blue newspapers,’” “opposition or ‘G7 newspapers,’” and “independent newspapers or ‘Tightrope 
walkers.’” Pro-government newspapers include the state-owned Fraternité Matin, as well as Notre Voie, Le Temps, 
Le Courier d’Abidjan, Le Matin d’Abidjan and L’Oeil du People, which all have close ties to former President 
Gbagbo’s party the FPI. Opposition parties have affiliations to a broader set of groups. Le Patriote, Le Jour +, 24 
heures, Nord-Sud Quotidien, Dernières Nouvelles d’Abidjan all have close ties to the RDR. Le Nouveau Réveil 
and L’Événement have links to the PDCI-RDA. Le Front and Dernières Heures Express have direct connections to 
the rebellion itself. Independent newspapers include Soir Info, L’Inter and L’intelligent d’Abidjan (2009, 126).  
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primarily through Abidjan.net, to follow pertinent unfolding events such as the post-conflict 
appointments of former FN officials and the 2013 regional and municipal elections.30 Thus, in 
addition to guiding case selection, articles from Ivoirian dailies provided much of the empirical 
material used to analyze the conflicts over authority described in each of the case chapters. They 
allowed me to fill in some of the gaps in information gleaned from secondary materials or NGO 
reports. Additionally, they helped to structure interview questions and corroborate testimonies 
provided in interview settings.   
Field interviews and newspapers sources were critical in providing necessary descriptive 
material on which to base the inferences in this study. Outside of the case of Korhogo (see 
Förster 2010, 2012, forthcoming), there is very little academic research examining war-time 
political processes in the sub-national regions examined in this dissertation. Where geographic 
variation during Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war has been considered at all, the focus has generally been 
on differences between the north (the territory under control of the FN) and the cocoa-growing 
regions of the southwest and the only differences examined have been relative levels of violence. 
I conducted 59 interviews (around 20 at each research site) with a variety of actors, 
including international and local NGO workers, youth leaders, customary authorities (chiefs, 
kings or religious leaders), members of mayoral offices, local journalists, and actors representing 
the administrative, military and fiscal wings of the FN, as well as young men and women who 
joined the northern rebel movement (see appendix for list of interviews conducted). I conducted 
interviews in all three of the localities under focus in this study: Bouna, Korhogo, 
Ouangolodougou, as well as a small number of interviews in Abidjan. Most interviews were 
conducted in these major cities. Others took place in small villages in the peri-urban areas 
surrounding them. Time and financial constraints and, at times, security concerns limited my 
ability to conduct research in rural areas far from urban centers.    
Field interviews supplemented data derived from newspaper sources. Two types of 
information were derived from interviews. First, they provided important insight into the types of 
conflicts over authority discussed in each case. In two of the cases – Korhogo and 
Ouangolodougou – my examination of local-level conflicts over authority was based entirely on 
                                                 
30 Abidjan.net is an online source which presents articles printed by the entire spectrum of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
newspapers. Most of the major newspapers themselves do not have online databases.  
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information derived from interviews. Second, in combination with newspapers, field interviews 
were used to reconstruct wartime narratives for each of the sub-national cases, construct causal 
stories out of ostensibly distinct dynamics, and link differences in the political authority of pre-
conflict elites to the observed variation in elite-rebel relationships established during the conflict 
period.  
Conducting field interviews in highly politicized research settings such as Côte d’Ivoire 
can present a unique set of challenges for researchers (King 2009; Norman 2009; Thomson 
2010). Insecurity and lingering suspicions about the reliability and true intentions of those asking 
questions in these types of contexts can make finding interviewees and conducting interviews 
difficult. Speaking about politics to anyone, let alone a stranger, can represent a substantial risk 
for participants. The time period of my field-work largely overlapped with Côte d’Ivoire’s 
‘electoral crisis’ and the subsequent military stalemate which followed (see Chapter 2). As a 
result, political tensions were particularly high. I employed a number of strategies to gain access 
to potential interviewees and to assuage any fears participants might have had about speaking to 
me.   
Central to these strategies was my relationship with my host at each of the three research 
sites. Upon my arrival at a new research site, my host was always my initial contact and worked 
to facilitate my research in a variety of ways. They commonly provided basic amenities such as 
food and shelter (and even nursed me back to health during periods of illness!). They also 
represented my first contact into the social universes into which I was stepping. Robert Launay 
eloquently describes his experience as a ‘stranger,’ and his relationship with his host during the 
time of his research on Dyula traders in northern Côte d’Ivoire (Korhogo and Kadioha), 
paralleling my own experience:  
 
Anyone spending any time in a Dyula community necessarily has a host; it is a first and 
necessary step towards any meaningful integration into the community, in the short as well 
as the long term. It is the responsibility of the host to mediate between the incoming 
individual, his stranger, and the community at large. During my stay in the field in Korhogo 
and Kadioha, I was constantly relying on my hosts to establish contacts between myself and 
other members of the community. At times, the situation was constraining; I was identified 
with my hosts for the worse as well as for the better, at least in those instances where they 
were themselves in conflict with other members of the community. But it would have been 
unthinkable to try and work myself out of the situation by dissociating myself from my 
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hosts: who could trust a stranger who would try and stab his host in the back? I hasten that I 
had no reason to complain, as my hosts repeatedly went to a great deal of trouble in trying 
to help me with all the various aspects of my research, however incomprehensible my 
motives may have seemed; without them, I would have considerable difficulty 
accomplishing anything at all in the field (Launay 1979, 76). 
 
In Korhogo and Bouna, I established contact with the persons who would become my host only 
upon my arrival. In Korhogo, I met my host while looking for a room to rent. In Bouna, I was 
introduced to my host while being detained by the FN at a checkpoint on the outskirts of the city. 
In both cases, the social background of my host was very similar: they were both male, Senoufo, 
Muslim, in their mid-30s, and small businessmen. My host in Korhogo was politically active. He 
was an RDR member and community organizer for the party. My host in Bouna was self-
employed and was not politically active. In Ouangolodougou, my relationship with my host was 
established beforehand (by my host in Korhogo). In contrast to my hosts in Bouna and Korhogo, 
my host in Ouangolodougou was an important political actor in the city. He was from 
Ferkessédougou and had fought for the FN in Western Côte d’Ivoire during the early stages of 
the conflict (see Chapter 2). During my time in Ouangolodougou, he worked as part of the FN’s 
financial wing. Close ties to an actor such as this could have had potentially negative 
consequences for my research. For instance, this relationship could make interviewees think 
twice about expressing any negative sentiments regarding the FN’s management of the city. 
However, I found my relationship with my host encouraged interviewees to speak critically 
because they knew that he approved of my presence in the city. My host’s approval of my 
presence reassured my interviewees that there would not be any negative consequences resulting 
from their participation in my research.  
My hosts helped me establish relationships with actors whose permission I required to 
begin field-work. These were either local political actors (mayors or traditional leaders, chefs des 
quartiers) or members of the FN. In some cases, all I needed was verbal confirmation that I was 
permitted to stay; in others, written authorization was provided. Being able to show participants 
that I was authorized to conduct interviews by these different actors often went far in easing any 
concerns they might have had about speaking with me (see Thompson 2010, 23). These 
relationships were also important in scheduling interviews themselves as they were often deeply 
embedded in the network of people with whom I was interested in speaking. They were often 
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more than willing to point to the buildings or offices where I could find someone or even give out 
the cell phone numbers of potential interviewees.  
More generally, my research strategy entailed building on the webs of social relationships 
in which my hosts were embedded.31  Participants who had established relationships with my 
host were almost always willing to speak with me. Sometimes my hosts would use these 
relationships to help me schedule interviews with individuals whom they did not directly know. 
More often than not, they had a cousin, colleague or a neighbor who knew someone who could 
schedule an appointment with someone with whom I wanted to speak. In other cases, I let them 
more directly guide my interview schedule. Fears of potential bias were assuaged when I felt that 
my hosts had a good sense of the diversity of actors I wanted to interview and it became evident 
they were introducing me to actors with opposing views on local and national politics (for 
example, members of all the major political parties). My hosts often recommended speaking with 
individuals about whom I had no prior knowledge, but who proved to be invaluable sources of 
information (e.g., specific NGO workers or local journalists).  
Finally, simply making an effort to be part of everyday life in these settings went far in 
gaining the confidence of participants. While in the field, I always tried to go to church32, play 
soccer, walk to the market, or have dinner at friends’ (or friends’ of friends) homes whenever I 
was invited. On a four day bus ride from Ferkessédougou to Bouna (which was scheduled to take 
six hours), I never complained and always helped ‘push start’ the small bus we were travelling on 
whenever it broke down. I can safely say that the notoriety I earned in Bouna as a result of this 
voyage furthered my research. The net impact of these everyday acts was to build genuine human 
relationships based on trust and mutual respect. This in turn encouraged individuals to speak their 
mind in interview settings without the fear of reprisals or any other negative consequences 
(Thompson 2010, 25). Guarantees of confidentiality given at the beginning of each interview also 
worked to assuage any lingering fears that participants might have had about speaking to me.            
                                                 
31 This is a form of “Snowball Sampling,” or “link-tracing” methodologies “which use social networks of 
interviewees to expand the researcher’s contacts” (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 427).  
32 Although Northern Côte d’Ivoire is predominantly Muslim, many of the families that I stayed with were mixed in 
terms of religious affiliation. I was often asked to accompany Christian family members to church on Sundays.  
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 The interviews themselves were structured around a series of questions tailored around 
the specific roles of the interviewees. The principal objective of interview questions was to probe 
actors regarding what they thought were the prominent local-level debates and conflicts in their 
sub-region during the civil war period, the reactions of different actors and groups to these 
conflicts, and the tentative outcomes of these contests. Other questions focused on personal 
histories, institutional dynamics (examining the rise and decline of state and rebel authority in the 
north), and opinions regarding a host of local and national-level political processes. Responses to 
these questions gave me important insight into the nature of the cleavages which underwrote 
contestations over authority in each of the three research sites while under control of the FN. 
Interviews themselves were conducted in different settings. In some instances, interviews took 
place as a one-on-one discussion, including just me and the participant. In other instances, 
participants indicated that they would feel more comfortable with my host present in the room. In 
these cases, interviews often devolved into very informal small group discussions. In a minority 
of instances, interviews took place in larger group contexts. For example, some local level leaders 
often had a group of advisors who commonly surrounded them during discussions about politics. 
Debates that emerged within these groups were often fruitful in themselves for my research.   
The following case chapters – focusing on the conflicts over authority in Bouna, Korhogo 
and Ouangolodougou during the FN’s time in control of the north – build on the theoretical 
argument introduced in Part I of this dissertation and draw on the diverse empirical material 
introduced above. In each case, I focus on the coalitions formed between the local rebel 
leadership and segments of the pre-conflict elite, as well as how these alliances informed political 
contestations over the authority to tax during the post-OPA period. This study provides 
compelling evidence of the causal impact of differences in the pre-conflict authority of local 
elites on the coalitions and political conflicts that emerge in regions under rebel control during 

























Chapter 4. Rebellion and Revolt in Bouna’s Contested 
Com’zone 
Of all the regions under the control of the FN after the failed coup d’état in 2002, Bouna was the 
place where the authority of the rebels was arguably the most contested. The region’s largest 
ethnic group, the Lobi community, generally viewed the FN with great disdain. Many Lobi felt 
that the new tax regime installed by the rebels specifically targeted them as a group. Tensions 
quickly emerged between the region’s zone commander, Morou Ouattara and the prominent Lobi 
politician, Palé Dimaté. These tensions culminated in a 2007 tax revolt organized by some 
segments of the city’s Lobi youth, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1. This chapter suggests that 
the limited capacity of Morou Ouattara and the rest of the FN in Bouna to mobilize support for 
their local-level authority stemmed from a lack of any strong social partner. In Bouna, Lobi elites 
were by far the most influential group. However, their status as state brokers precluded this group 
as a potential local ally of the rebels. The hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN 
restricted their efforts to politically control local populations. Based on my framework, this 
chapter identifies Bouna as a case where the rebels established limited social control.  
Beginning during the colonial period, diverse state interventions in northeastern Côte 
d’Ivoire politically supported the Lobi as a group. Lobi migration to Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire 
began prior to the onset of French colonialism and intensified over the course of the 20th century 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Prior to their migration to Côte d’Ivoire, Lobi 
social organization was highly decentralized (Savonnet 1962, 86-87; Fiéloux 1980, 41-43 de 
Rouville 1987, 14). Diverse economic and social practices inhibited the development of social 
hierarchies within Lobi communities. To this day, hierarchies running through Lobi communities 
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appear far less pronounced compared to other cases examined in this study (the Senoufo in 
Korhogo or Ouangolo’s traders). The key factor differentiating Bouna from the other cases in this 
study was that in Côte d’Ivoire’s northeast, state interventions worked to directly produce or 
constitute social hierarchies that emerged within Lobi communities. State interventions during 
the colonial and post-colonial periods restructured social relations in a number of significant 
ways. State efforts at settling the Lobi and ensuring Lobi access to land facilitated economic 
development and class differentiation.  
State interventions also altered the relationship between the Lobi and the Koulongo, the 
ethnic group native to Bouna and its surrounding rural areas. As a group, the Koulongo witnessed 
it’s relative political and economic clout decline dramatically after the turn of the 20th century. In 
particular, as a result of increasing state sanctioned Lobi migration, elites representing the old 
Koulongo monarchy in Bouna witnessed a precipitous decline in their control over the allocation 
and use of land. Consequently, the Lobi fared much better economically than the Koulongo 
during this time. Many Lobi male lineage heads became wealthy through the cultivation and 
export of yam to markets in Abidjan and elsewhere in the south. Over the course of the post-
colonial period, wealthy Lobi family heads eventually began to displace the old Koulongo elite as 
representatives of the then single party, the PDCI, in Bouna and the surrounding region. Lobi 
elites simultaneously became the principal enforcers (as the key representatives of the party-state 
apparatus) and beneficiaries (as wealthy farmers) of the institutional order imposed by the 
PDCI’s national-level leadership in Abidjan.     
Although their relationship with the PDCI effectively consolidated the position of the 
Lobi elites as the principal set of interlocutors between state and society in the Ivoirian northeast, 
hierarchies within the Lobi community and the relative status of the Lobi and the Koulongo in 
Bouna remained highly dependent on the ongoing support of the state. Without this backing, Lobi 
elites possessed few autonomous means of controlling or subordinating other community 
members. The lingering threat of national level leaders reversing the institutional order through 
which they ruled this part of the north necessitated that Lobi elites retained the good graces of 
national-level elites.33 As a result, Lobi dominance remains contingent upon their sustained 
                                                 
33 The threat of reversal is, in a sense, a problem confronting different kinds of institutional orders. The local status 
quo can be challenged anywhere by reforms introduced from above. The argument here is that reform is far more 
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relationship with national-level political actors. This is not to say that the Lobi politicians 
discussed in this chapter did not draw or benefit from local support for their positions of 
authority. Rather, this support itself stemmed from the fact that all Lobi (not just elites) depended 
on the continuation of the institutional order enforced by the state (for example, for access to 
land).  
 Strong ties between Lobi elites and the central state meant that, at the onset of the 
conflict, the most numerous and politically and economically influential group in the northeast 
was immediately placed in a position of opposition to the rebellion. Moreover, rebels viewed 
Lobi elites such as Palé Dimaté, a prominent long-time PDCI politician, as government 
sponsored opponents to the rebellion. Overall, many Lobi felt the rebellion represented a direct 
threat to their interests. Close ties established between the FN and elites linked to the old 
Koulongo monarchy contributed to the unpopularity of the FN because they supported the view 
held by many in Bouna’s Lobi community that they were unfairly bearing the brunt of the 
rebellion. Rightly or wrongly, these feelings were reinforced by the perception that FN 
management of day-to-day life in Bouna (management of aid projects, conflicts over land) 
unfairly benefited the Koulongo as a group. Resistance to the rebellion from the Lobi – 
culminating in a 2007 tax revolt – ultimately stemmed from the unequal balance of power 
between those elites with whom the rebels chose to ally (Koulongo elites) and the state brokers 
whom they opposed (Lobi elites).   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
likely in cases such as Bouna because the political institutions governing social and political life are themselves very 




 Figure  4.1. Map of the administrative Region of Zanzan, Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire 
(original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara).  
 
The events observed in Bouna could plausibly support other explanations as to why 
armed movements might confront difficulties in mobilizing support. One could make the claim 
that, because members of the FN were primarily interested in accumulating material wealth 
(rather than advancing the ideological claims of the movement, or larger community goals), its 
relationship with Bouna’s population not surprisingly deteriorated over time. Quite simply, the 
case of FN in Bouna might accurately represent a case of what Weinstein (2007) termed 
“opportunistic rebellions”. This explanation has some merit but does not explain the whole 
picture. Taxation was a common complaint across the north. In Bouna, rebel interventions that 
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were interpreted as unevenly targeting one group over the other were also important sources of 
popular discontent with the movement. Rather than focusing on rebel behavior, this chapter 
contends that the high level of resistance confronted by the rebellion was a product of the specific 
ways in which local elites mediated state/society relationships in the Ivoirian northeast prior to 
the conflict. 
The first part of this chapter provides greater detail on the colonial and post-colonial 
historical origins and organizational characteristics of the two principal ethnic communities in 
Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire – the Koulongo and Lobi – as well their interactions. It explains how 
Lobi elites, rather than the ‘indigenous’ Koulongo, became the principal intermediaries between 
state and society in this part of the north. The second half of the chapter shows how the status of 
the Lobi elite as brokers obstructed the FN’s efforts to build local support and establish control.    
 
State-Building and the Dynamics of Lobi-Koulongo Relations in Pre-Conflict Bouna 
Bouna was one of a handful of powerful West African city-states that emerged beginning in the 
13th century after the expansion of Mandé dominated networks, which connected trans-Sahelian 
trade to the forest zones of West Africa. Bouna itself was established later in the 16th century in 
reaction to the increase in inter-African and Afro-European trade in gold. Its importance stemmed 
from its function as a central node within this regional trade network linking other city-states to 
its north (Djenné, Sya and Timbuktu), east (Wa, Tamalé and Daboya), west (Nassian, Kong, 
Dabakala and Bouaké) and south (Bondoukou, and later, European coastal traders). Political 
centralization and the formation of the Koulongo dynasty in Bouna represented a political 
response to the spread of Mandé traders (also known as Wangala or Dyula) and increased 
regional commercial activity. Political and military centralization was deemed necessary to 
protect trade caravans from marauders between the urban nodes in these trading networks 
(Boutillier 1969, 4, 8; 1993, 22-24). 
Bouna was founded in the mid-16th century by Bunkani, the son of a hunter/slave raider 
from the adjacent Wa kingdom and the sister of a local Goro chief. Bunkani’s founding of Bouna 
had nefarious beginnings: Bunkani usurped chiefly power from his uncle, killed his brother, 
attempted to kill his mother, and used gold stolen from his family to buy horses for his growing 
political coterie in order to impose his dominance on neighbouring chieftaincies (Boutillier 1993, 
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29-31). The limited military capacity of surrounding chieftaincies facilitated the political 
expansion of Bunkani’s incipient monarchy (Boutillier 1993, 53). Prior to the dynasty’s 
founding, the territory of present-day Bouna was inhabited by a mixed population comprised of 
recently arrived Mandé-Dyula traders and the indigenous Loron. The label ‘Koulongo’ was 
largely a colonial invention first used by the French army lieutenant Braulot to describe the 
language spoken in the region. Anthropological debates continue regarding the origins of 
Koulongo as a ‘people’ (Boutillier 1993, 32-38). ‘Koulongo’ can also simply refer to members of 
the aristocratic class in Bouna, who are descendents of the founding dynastic family. Other non-
dynastic family members began to identify themselves as ‘Koulongo’ as the kingdom slowly 
eroded other previously autonomous local-level sources of authority and belonging that 
structured the social life of indigenous groups (Boutillier 1993, 42-43).34  
 Pre-colonial dynastic Bouna was socially organized in strict hierarchical terms: there 
existed clear distinctions between the relatively small number of royal family members who were 
direct descendants of Bunkani, and a numerically larger plebeian class who had no direct ties to 
the royal family. The king, the Bouna isié, maintained centralized control and political cohesion 
of the monarchy using a number of organizational mechanisms. The most important of these 
concerned elite power-sharing and the monarchy’s relationship with strangers.   
First, the monarchy was designed to ensure the sharing of political, economic and military 
power so as to prevent challenges from within the aristocratic class. Specifically, three founding 
lineages (Gago, Piawari, and Koungan) descending from Bunkani shared monarchical authority. 
The entire administrative system was set up in a way to share the benefits of political power 
between these lineages, through rotational kingship and the sharing of other prominent political 
positions (Boutillier 1993, 263). The other important organizational characteristic of the 
monarchy was the politico-administrative system it established, particularly in the rural areas 
surrounding Bouna. The kingdom was hierarchically organized according to a nested set of 
chiefdoms. Members of the royal family occupied provincial chieftaincies. Territorial 
chieftaincies were occupied by royal family members as well, but not those derived from the 
three founding lineages (such as those claiming descendence from Bunkani’s siblings, but not 
                                                 
34 Boutillier explains that the term ‘Koulango’ actually refers to vassals or subjects of the aristocracy while members 
of the aristocratic or princely class were referred to as ‘ibuo’ (1993, 160).  
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from Bunkani himself). There were also a number of chieftaincies directly controlled by the King 
(Boutillier 1993, 214-215). Yet the key organizational feature of the kingdom was that, unlike 
many feudal social systems, these chieftaincies were not hereditary. Local chiefs could be moved 
from one chieftaincy to another. They could be promoted and demoted by the king, and 
descendants were never guaranteed local positions after the death of ancestors. Decisions could 
be based on merit or political exigencies. This enhanced the king’s authority over local level 
actors and centralized control over the administration of justice, the distribution of land, and 
taxation at local levels (Boutillier 1993, 211-218).  
Second, the kingdom regulated its relationship with strangers in ways that helped prop up 
its centralized political system. Not unlike other Sahelian city-states, slavery was prominent in 
Bouna, and trade in slaves represented an important component of the material base underpinning 
the monarchy. Slaves were procured either through capture in war or through markets controlled 
by Dyula traders. Slaves performed the majority of agricultural and infrastructural labour. 
Nonetheless, while newly captured or purchased slaves (djon) had few rights and could easily be 
resold, the descendents of slaves (uruso) could have substantial economic and social rights and 
could fully integrate into dominant lineages after some generations (Boutillier 1993, 320). Dyula 
traders occupied a unique place within the monarchy that appealed to their interests as traders but 
limited any political threat they may have represented. Bouna’s monarchy always attempted to 
lessen the fiscal demands on the Dyula community in order to attract them to Bouna. There were 
a number of important social bridges between the Dyula and the native Koulongo: members of 
these different groups often intermarried and in many cases, Dyula traders were relied upon as 
political advisors because they were often highly educated, experienced and well-traveled. Yet, at 
the end of the day, these two communities had distinct functions that enabled their coexistence. 
The Dyula comprised much of the commercial class in Bouna. Koulongo elites formed the 
political class, occupying most of the administrative positions in Bouna and the surrounding rural 
areas. They were responsible for all legal and security related issues. Dyula traders were 
ultimately expected to behave in ways that were strictly ‘non-Jihadist’ and non-political. Traders 
were not in a position to confront their Koulongo hosts because, for one reason, they were hardly 
a unified group. More importantly, their dependence on the king for dispute resolution, the 
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enforcement of the rule of law, security, and access to land ensured that Dyula traders had a 
vested interest in propping up, not challenging royal authority (Boutillier 1993, 336-346). 
The Lobi: A History of a ‘Shatter Zone’  
By the end of the 19th century, the political future of the Koulongo monarchy in Bouna would be 
significantly shaped by a number of interrelated historical processes. The emergence of Samory 
Touré’s sofa army, the spectre of European colonization, and increased Lobi migration to what 
would become Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire all served to substantially circumscribe the political 
clout Koulongo elites had previously enjoyed. All three processes worked to reshape the 
relationship between the Koulongo and the Lobi. Historically, ‘Le pays Lobi’ represented an 
amorphous geographic zone breaching the contemporary borders of Ghana, Burkina Faso and 
Côte d’Ivoire. The shifting territory inhabited by the Lobi represents a striking example of what 
James Scott has termed a “shatter zone” (2009, 7). For Scott, shatter-zones are non-state spaces 
characterized by the peopling of territories by social groups seeking to escape and check the 
development of centralized political authority. Much like the ‘hill-peoples’ of South-East Asia 
examined by Scott, the Lobi communities of West Africa have struggled to mitigate a series of 
indigenous and foreign sponsored state-building projects. This sub-section draws on Scott and 
suggests that the key aspects of Lobi history, social organization, familial relations, and 
agricultural production collectively reflect resistance to both the external imposition of political 
hierarchies onto Lobi communities as well as the development of such hierarchies within them.  
Most of the Lobi currently situated in Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire arrived beginning in the 
early 20th century from Burkina Faso. Although they share many linguistic characteristics with 
neighbouring groups, particularly the Birifor (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire) and the Dagara 
(Ghana), the Lobi do represent a distinct linguistic group (lobiri). Nonetheless, the specific social 
boundaries of the Lobi community as an ethnic or cultural group have been contested and 
obscured by competing definitions of what being ‘Lobi’ represents. The Mossi of what is now 
Burkina Faso use the term Lobi in a broad sense to demarcate themselves from ethnic strangers 
living within the ‘pays lobi’, which constituted the stretch of territory between Dano and 
Burkina’s southern border with Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, the British anthropologist Jack Goody 
suggested that the Lobi did not represent a distinct ethno-cultural group but rather that the term 
Lobi (specifically the prefix ‘lo’) was used by local groups as a label for societies which organize 
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themselves in terms of bilinear rather than patrilineal descent. The term ‘Lobi’ in this usage 
actually encompassed and overlapped with a number of diverse cultural groups, including the 
Dagara, Birifor, Dian, Gan, Dorossié and Téguessié (de Rouville 1987, 15-23).  
Lobi history has been one of constant movement and migration. Lobi origins have been 
traced back to what is now Ghana, on the eastern side of the Black Volta. Since the late 18th 
century, the Lobi have migrated from Ghana into Burkina Faso and subsequently on to Côte 
d’Ivoire. Lobi migration to Northern Côte d’Ivoire did not commence until the late 19th century 
after the Franco-Samory war (1882-1898) and the onset of French colonialism in Burkina Faso 
and Côte d’Ivoire (Fiéloux 1980, 17). Colonialism was a significant reason for the migration of 
the Lobi into Côte d’Ivoire at the turn of the 20th century. The pays lobi surrounding Gaoua (in 
Southern Burkina Faso) was one of the last regions to resist French colonialism. Despite gaining 
formal control over this part of West Africa in 1898, by 1915 the French still had little 
administrative presence in the region. Lobi communities refused to pay taxes or obey French 
colonial law and continued to ambush trade caravans running through French territory in West 
Africa (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 17; Fiéloux 1980, 27). In response, the French head colonial 
officer (and cultural anthropologist) Henri Labouret began a harsh pacification program against 
the Lobi (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 85-86). This prompted Lobi movement southward into Côte 
d’Ivoire where the colonial presence remained limited and far less severe (Fiéloux 1980, 25). 
Although French colonial practice was an important reason for the Lobi’s push southward into 
Côte d’Ivoire at the end of the 19th century, political and social conflicts within Lobi communities 
(explained in more detail below) and economic incentives (searching for new lands or work in 
southern plantations) were also important factors (de Rouville 1987, 51; Savonnet 1986, 5). 
Conflicts within Lobi communities and individual and collective decisions to migrate 
reflect in large part the absence of legitimate authority capable of resolving social conflict above 
the village level. Other Ivoirians perceived the Lobi as being tenacious workers, independent and 
fiercely defensive of their autonomy. Savonnet cites the common Lobi proverb “a monkey cannot 
order another monkey” (une singe ne peut commander une autre singe) as highlighting the firm 
belief held by many Lobi that, when in opposition to decisions made by others, individuals have 
little obligation to obey (Savonnet 1986, 12). Reflecting this belief, Lobi society includes few 
sources of authority above the village level, making social mobilization, social control and the 
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resolution of conflicts between and within villages challenging. At the regional level, comprising 
of groups of small villages, the Didar (di=land, dar=master or chief) plays the most significant 
role. Formally, the Didar is responsible for fulfilling diverse functions including the allocation of 
land and the setting up of religious-cum-sacrificial sites in newly established villages, as well as 
the management of everyday social conflicts (bride wealth payments, violence between and 
within communities) (de Rouville 1987, 114-115; Savonnet 1986, 11-12). The Dithildar (dithil= 
land alter, dar=master or chief) is expected to fulfill a very similar role but at the level of the 
village (de Rouville 1987, 128). Yet, as a number of observers have noted, there are important 
limitations to the actual powers of both the Didar and the Dithildar. Since the end of the 19th 
century the authority of these actors have declined significantly over time due to various political 
and social factors (Savonnet 1962, 87, 1986, 12; de Rouville 1987, 14). The capacity of the Didar 
and the Dithildar to resolve social conflicts at the village level is limited. Inter- and intra-clan 
conflicts were typically resolved through acts of vengeance equivalent to the crime committed 
(Bonnafé and Fiéloux 1993, 110). The legitimacy of interventions by these authorities into family 
matters remains hotly contested by community members. Generally, collective decision-making 
is only possible through the fashioning of consensus between family heads (Savonnet 1986, 12). 
And rather than submitting, losers in the court of public opinion typically just picked up and left 
(Savonnet 1962, 87). Finally, over the 20th century, increased integration into crop markets, the 
decline in the availability of virgin lands, increasing migration, and government sponsored 
settlement schemes all weakened further the authority of village and regional actors vis-à-vis 
others, such as family heads and agents of the colonial and post-colonial state (de Rouville 1987, 
14).   
 Conflict is further inscribed into the social order of Lobi communities in rural areas 
through their system of bilinear descent. All Lobi identify themselves in terms of both their 
patrilineal and matrilineal lineages. Different social rights and economic assets are granted to 
community members according to their matrilineal and patrilineal lineage. For the purposes of 
this section, there are two important consequences of this form of social organization. The first is 
that, because different, contrasting rights are granted according to affiliation with each of these 
groups, conflicts between descendants are commonplace after the death of family heads. For 
instance, after the death of a family head, rights granting access to land are accorded to the sons 
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of the deceased while all economic assets (cattle, money) are granted agnatically, to the sons of 
the deceased father’s sister. This system of inheritance significantly constrains the reproduction 
and growth of founding villages for two reasons. First, because members of the founders’ 
matriclan do not have access to land according to this system of descent, they are generally 
forced to go elsewhere for land. Second, because members of the founders’ matriclan do not 
inherit economic assets beyond land, the stakes and rivalries over inheriting and controlling land 
between sons of deceased male village heads are significantly heightened. Such conflicts over 
succession were an important reason why Lobi villages broke apart after the death of village 
heads (Savonnet 1986, 5). The other important aspect of this bilinear descent system is that 
identification with patrilineal and matrilineal lines is highly unequal; most Lobi identify 
themselves predominantly in terms of their matrilineal line. All Lobi belong to one of four large 
matriclans (tyar) and over sixty patriclans (kuon). As Fiéloux has shown though, the 
acknowledgement of patrimonial descent (stemming from male village founders) is strictly 
frowned upon in Lobi society (Fiéloux 1980, 41-43, see also Savonnet 1962, 86-87). As a 
strategy for eschewing the development of social hierarchy, these features of social organization 
support James Scott’s general claim that “if, then, lineage histories are abbreviated or ignored 
altogether, it amounts to something of a cultural discouragement, if not prohibition, of historical 
claims to superiority. To have little or no history is, implicitly, to put every kin group on roughly 
the same footing” (2009, 276). In Lobi society, prohibiting the reference of one’s kuon in the 
public sphere also functions as another means by which the Lobi disconnect themselves from any 
authority or set of hierarchical social relationships beyond the village level. The result has been a 
shared collective amnesia regarding patrilineal descent (Fiéloux 1980, 41-42).  
Another factor influencing the decision to migrate that impedes the development and 
imposition of hierarchical political forms is the dominant agricultural practices employed by Lobi 
communities. In the past, the Lobi have produced a number of different cereals including 
sorghum, millet and corn. More recently, Lobi producers have concentrated more and more on 
export crops, specifically yam (discussed in more detail in the next section). Lobi agricultural 
systems are land intensive and rely upon few technological inputs. Crop fields are in use for 
relatively long periods of times – between five and six years – and are left fallow for a relatively 
101 
 
short time – between six and eight.35 Lobi farming practices originally developed in a context of 
land abundance where, once existing plots were used up, individuals and communities could just 
move on to adjacent land. By the early independence period, these practices contributed to 
increasing environmental degradation and heightened land scarcity (Savonnet 1962, 86). 
Growing desertification, population growth and political processes (the civil war and its 
aftermath) may close off migration as a solution to these problems in the future. As access to 
available land diminishes, the ability of everyday Lobi to escape power relations through 
migration is restricted.  
Bouna’s Fall: Samory Touré, French Colonialism and Lobi migration 
By the late 1880s the kingdom of Bouna found itself in a delicate political position, 
simultaneously confronting the French and English colonial empires as well as the armed 
resistance to European forces led by Samory Touré. Touré represented a formidable foe for the 
French in what would become Northern Côte d’Ivoire. The fate of many of West-African city-
states – including Bouna – would ultimately be determined by the position taken by their leaders 
vis-à-vis the three sides of the politico-military struggle between the French, English and Samory 
Touré’s forces. Although Bouna would ultimately become part of France’s colonial empire, its 
first European contact was the British envoy Georges Ferguson. The kingdom’s initial decision to 
side with the British rather than the French stemmed largely from the fact that Samory had 
already gained control of a number of other urban centres – Kong, Dabakala, Mango, Bobo-
Dioulasso – along trade routes previously connected to Bouna from the west. Although the 
French continued their struggle against Samory, Bouna sided with the British in order to 
safeguard its remaining connections to trade networks towards the east (Boutillier 1993, 116-
117). In the end, this would not save the kingdom from Samory’s war machine.36 Bouna was 
                                                 
35 Georges Savonnet contrasts the Lobi agricultural system to that of the indigenous Koulongo, where fields were in 
use for very short periods of time, a maximum of two years, and were left fallow between thirty and forty years 
(1968, 100). 
36 Why did Bouna become a military target of Samory’s sofa army? This is an important question because, as I 
discuss in the next chapter, the origins of Korhogo’s strength during the colonial and post-colonial periods is 
explained, in part, as the result of the original alliance forged between the old paramount chief in Korhogo, Gbon 
Coulibaly and Samory Touré. Moreover, as in Korhogo, Bouna’s king, Degbango, and Samory maintained a fairly 
amicable relationship right up until his army’s invasion in 1896. Boutillier offers three reasons for the fairly sudden 
change in relations between Samory and Bouna’s monarchy (Boutillier 1993, 125-132). The first contributing factor 
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taken by Samory’s forces in December 1896. Tacitly supported by Bouna’s Dyula-Muslim 
community, which was for the most part spared from the violence, Samory put an effective end to 
whatever autonomous political and economic power the kingdom still enjoyed. Much of the 
aristocratic class, including the king, was killed in the attack. Bouna’s population dropped from 
an estimated 10,000 inhabitants before the conflict to no more than an estimated 1,000 
inhabitants in 1904. The majority of the surrounding villages simply ceased to exist after 
Samory’s attack; the overall drop in population in Bouna’s surrounding rural areas was equally 
precipitous (Boutillier 1993, 135-137). In the end, Bouna ultimately became part of French West 
Africa, as a result of bilateral accords signed between France and Britain in June of 1898 
(Boutillier 1993, 141-155).  
Not surprisingly, the overall effect of Samory’s military conquest of Bouna and its 
subsequent formal colonization by the French drastically weakened the autonomous political 
position of the old Koulongo monarchy. By putting an end to the slave trade and destroying 
networks of trade that connected Bouna to surrounding city-states, Samory’s war and French 
colonialism effectively robbed the kingdom of any autonomous economic base (Boutillier 1971, 
246-253). Drastic depopulation challenged the capacity of the French to integrate this part of 
Côte d’Ivoire into the colonial economy and presented difficult choices for French administrators 
vis-à-vis the question of Lobi migration and settlement. Encouraging the settlement of Lobi 
migrants was, on the one hand, necessary economically given Bouna’s depopulation after 
Samory’s invasion. Yet, on the other hand, politically controlling the Lobi and integrating them 
into colonial markets came with its own set of challenges. Indeed, Lobi migration into this part of 
Côte d’Ivoire initially threatened the colonial project. The Lobi took advantage of the absence of 
any credible political authority immediately following Samory’s invasion to enact revenge on 
                                                                                                                                                              
was the king’s decision to enslave two soldiers (les captifs de Tiéba) sent by Samory to accompany the imam Saléa 
Cissé back to Bouna after a meeting with Samory in Bondoukou. Samory demanded their immediate release, but 
Degbango refused. A second reason was the number of commerçants tied to Samory who were attacked or taken 
prisoner while passing through territories controlled by Bouna. There is some debate as to whether these attacks were 
sanctioned by Degbango. However, in the end, this did not seem to matter in terms of swaying Samory’s decision to 
invade Bouna. A third reason was the kingdom’s decision to buy guns and ammunition in preparation for future 
conflict. Whether this preparation was in reaction to Samory’s approach to Bouna or not, it gave the impression to 
Samory’s commanders that Bouna was decidedly pro-French. The larger sum effect of these events was the political 
divisions they created in Bouna vis-à-vis Touré’s forces. Many Dyula based in Bouna remained supportive of 
Samory right up until his decision to invade the city. Indeed, much of Bouna’s Dyula population was spared the 
worst of the violence directed towards this region during Samory’s invasion in 1896 (Boutillier 1993, 125-132).            
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former Koulongo and Dyula slave traders and began raiding for slaves themselves (Boutillier 
1993, 358). More generally, the Lobi hindered the development of the colonial economy by using 
violence to attack trade caravans, kill ethnic enemies (the Koulongo and the Dyula), and seize 
cattle, slaves and other economic assets (Boutillier 1969, 13-14).   
European colonizers responded to the challenge of politically controlling the Lobi in a 
variety of sometimes contradictory ways. First, the French undertook an extensive village-to-
village military campaign to disarm the Lobi and pacify the countryside surrounding Bouna 
(Boutillier 1993, 365; Fiéloux 1980, 27). The mixed results of the French pacification program,37 
coupled with the growing realization that it was only through encouragement of further Lobi 
migration that the colonial project could be economically viable, demanded other solutions to the 
problem of controlling the Lobi. Another strategy was to regroup the Lobi into larger settlements 
so that they could be more easily monitored, controlled and taxed (Fiéloux 1980, 26). In the 
1960s and 1970s, the post-colonial state continued this policy of Lobi resettlement through the 
creation of ZKB (Zone Kolodio-Binéda), located near Doropo, just southwest of Bouna. ZKB 
was a state led villagization plan which aimed to stem the tide of Lobi migration southward and 
promote economic growth. The appeal of ZKB for colonial administrators was that these lands, 
between the Kolodio and Binéda rivers, were ‘empty’ in the sense that they were scarcely 
populated. As a result, Lobi settlement in ZKB lessened conflicts over land between immigrants 
and the native Koulongo. Lobi villages created by the state in ZKB were for the most part larger 
than Lobi villages found elsewhere in the Ivoirian Northeast, averaging between 1,000 and 2,000 
individuals (Chalèard and N’Daw 1992, 1; Chalèard 1998, 479). 
The colonial and post-colonial state also strengthened its control over Lobi settlers by 
relying on the Koulongo as political intermediaries. Despite the fact that Samory’s invasion and 
subsequent French colonization drastically weakened the kingdom’s internal mechanisms of 
social control, the Koulongo still retained some bases of political power that could be harnessed 
by the colonial administration. As Boutillier has argued, although the Lobi universally resisted 
the imposition of French colonization, they did submit to the Koulongo rather easily. 
Ideologically, the authority of the Koulongo was underpinned by the widely held view – by both 
                                                 
37 Boutillier details how, after the French colonial administrator himself was ambushed by the Lobi, he ordered the 
colonial service to stop trying to collect taxes from Lobi villages (1993, 361; see also Fiéloux 1980, 26). 
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Lobi and Koulongo – that they were the economically, educationally, and militarily superior 
group, and as indigenes, retained rightful control over the land (Boutillier 1993, 362). In addition, 
the Koulongo fulfilled a number of institutional roles within the new colonial order that 
underpinned their continued political dominance. They were used to collect taxes directly from 
Lobi villages (Boutillier 1969, 15). In terms of land, Koulongo land chiefs (sako tesié) played an 
important role in the installation of new Lobi villages. In Koulongo territory, the sako tesié 
supplanted the role previously played by the didar in the creation of villages. The sako tesié 
became responsible for blessing and installing the dithil in new villages. This enhanced the 
ability of Koulongo authorities to make demands on Lobi communities because the sako tesié had 
the power to remove the dithil, an action which was believed to have significant supernatural 
effects (Fiéloux 1980, 141). In usurping the role previously played by the didar, Koulongo land 
chiefs also played a prominent role in mediating social conflicts within Lobi communities and 
performing ceremonial rites of passage. For all of these functions, Koulongo chiefs could and 
often did demand payment (Fiéloux 1980, 142; Savonnet 1986, 24; 1968, 96; Boutillier 1993, 
361-363). 
Despite the hierarchy between these groups that was inscribed within the heart of the 
colonial (and post-colonial) order, the relationship between the Koulongo and the Lobi was not 
always contentious. Georges Savonnet has labelled the period between 1900 and 1965 as one of 
‘complementarity’ between these two groups: the Lobi required the blessing of the Koulongo to 
remain on their land and the Koulongo required Lobi settlement in order to finance the 
kingdom’s social and political functions (Savonnet 1986, 23-24). Yet, after 1965, there was a 
marked deterioration in the relationship between the Lobi and their hosts. The change resulted 
from a number of inter-related factors, including heightened competition over land, increased 
demographic pressures (as a result of the cumulative number of migrants that had settled in the 
region, particularly the Lobi), land degradation (stemming from over-use) and environmental 
change, particularly drought (Savonnet 1986, 25-26). Increasing Lobi migration from Burkina 
Faso after 1965 magnified the influence of these changes (Savonnet 1986, 51). Together, these 
factors contributed to increasing conflicts between these communities, particularly over land. 
Chalèard (1998, 482) reported that in Nassian, the Koulongo successfully chased the Lobi from 
living in the city after increasing tension over land use. In a number of cases, the dithil was 
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removed from Lobi villages as punishment for using lands left fallow by Koulongo communities. 
In others, the Koulongo prevented the Lobi from expanding their villages or blocked off access to 
roads, which prevented Lobi farmers from bringing their crops to market (Savonnet 1986, 52; 
Chalèard 1998, 482). The tension between these communities was particularly acute where 
drought and land degradation were extensive and in contexts where Lobi and Koulongo villages 
were geographically situated proximate to each other (Savonnet 1986, 50-51; Chalèard 1996, 
421-422). 
Significant demographic and economic changes during the 20th century also heightened 
the political tensions between these two groups. During this time, the demographic make-up of 
the northeast gradually shifted, resulting in the ascendency of the Lobi as the numerically 
dominant group. Boutillier estimated (1993, 370) that between 1904 and 1980, the 
Koulongo/Dyula population in the region of Bouna increased incrementally from 5,250 to 7,000. 
During this same period, the number of Lobi living in the region rose far more dramatically, from 
5,000 to 45,000.38 The reasons for this growing imbalance are numerous. Lobi migration grew 
consistently throughout the 20th century. Relative land abundance and a comparative lack of 
political administration in the northeast compared to other parts of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina 
Faso drew Lobi migrants to this part of the north. Koulongo families were simply not having as 
many children as their Lobi counterparts. Additionally, many young Koulongo left rural areas in 
search of jobs and a more comfortable lifestyle in urban centres such as Bouna and Abidjan in the 
south. In many cases, Lobi migrants just assumed control of empty Koulongo villages left behind 
(Boutiller 1993, 371-372; Savonnet 1962, 98). 
These demographic shifts paralleled significant economic changes in this part of Côte 
d’Ivoire. Over the 20th century, the Lobi also became the dominant economic group, largely 
because of their demographic weight in the countryside. This dominance is most starkly reflected 
in the production and export of yam in the Ivoirian northeast. In 1990, Chalèard reported that the 
Lobi accounted for approximately 98% of all profits derived from yam sales. Yam sales by Lobi 
farmers were sixteen times greater than sales by Koulongo farmers (1990b, 133). At the turn of 
the century, yam represented an important commercial crop for the Koulongo; however, their 
                                                 
38 For Bouna-Téhini, Georges Savonnet estimated that in 1975 there were ten times more Lobi living in the region 
than Koulongo, putting the numbers at 75,000 to 80,000 for the Lobi, versus 7,500 for the Koulongo (1986, 23). 
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dominance in this sector was abruptly undercut when colonialism put an end to their system of 
forced labor (Chalèard 1993, 135). Subsequent efforts to renew economic development in this 
part of Côte d’Ivoire focused on the development of other crops, such as rice or cotton, because 
of how the production of these crops, unlike yam cultivation, can contribute to heightened 
political control over peasant populations.39 In the 1980s, with the financial assistance of the 
World Bank, the Ivoirian government embarked on an extensive state-led development plan that 
drastically increased agricultural inputs to the region. The aim, argued Chalèard, was as political 
as it was economic: to “stabilize the Lobi” (1990a, 19). Investment in cotton production – 
fertilizer subsidies, the building of roads, bridges, and extensive irrigation systems – all sought to 
geographically fix Lobi economic production by rendering them dependent on inputs provided by 
the state. Economically, the development of cotton in the northeast ultimately failed, largely 
because of high labor requirements, low crop prices, and the rising costs of inputs (Chalèard and 
N’Daw 1992, 20). Politically, the state-led development of cotton did not radically transform 
agricultural production in the northeast because of the absence of any political intermediary 
above the village level. There were no actors capable of mobilizing the labor and resources 
necessary for the development of a labor intensive crop such as cotton (Savonnet 1962, 65-66).40  
Yam exports, on the other hand, grew at very high rates without any substantial 
government support. Yam, unlike sorghum or millet, was not considered a ‘sacred product’ in the 
Lobi moral universe and thus could be sold on the market without any cultural restrictions 
(Chalèard 1990b, 133). In addition, numerical superiority allowed the Lobi to fulfill the labor 
requirements for the production of this crop. The Lobi relied on their numbers and a system of 
mutual aid to clear land, remove weeds and plant yams far more efficiently than other groups, 
                                                 
39 James Scott makes this point in the Art of Not Being Governed. He writes: “Particular crops have characteristics 
that make them more or less resistant to appropriation. Cultivars that cannot be stored long without spoiling, such as 
fresh fruits and vegetables, or that have low value per unit weight and volume, such as most gourds, rootcrops, and 
tubers, will not repay the efforts of a tax gatherer.  
 In, general, roots and tubers such as yams, sweet potatoes, potatoes and cassava/manioc/yucca are nearly 
appropriation-proof. After they ripen, they can be safely left in the ground for up to two years and dug up piecemeal 
as needed. There is thus no granary to plunder. If the army or the taxmen wants your potatoes, for example, they will 
have to dig them up one by one” (2009, 195).   
40 Catherine Boone has made a similar argument regarding the decision of the French to initiate the production of 
cotton in central Côte d’Ivoire around Bouaké. Only in the north (around Korhogo) was there a social system in 
place that could mobilize labor at the price and quality required by French exporters (2003, 274-276).  
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particularly the Koulongo (Chalèard 1996, 428). The growth of yam sales also worked to 
undercut Koulongo authority over land. Expanding yam cultivation fuelled Lobi encroachment 
onto Koulongo lands. Growth in the sale of yam provided the material resources that allowed 
Lobi migrants to challenge Koulongo chiefs politically. In some cases, Lobi settlers simply 
refused to pay Koulongo authorities. In others, Lobi chiefs began installing the village dithil 
themselves, thereby subverting the role played by Koulongo chiefs in the allocation of land 
(Chalèard 1998, 482-483).  
 In addition to economic development through yam production and the growing 
demographic imbalance between the Lobi and the Koulongo, growing connections between the 
Lobi and national level political circles greatly enhanced the ability of this community to 
challenge Bouna’s old aristocratic class for political supremacy. The wealth gained from yam 
sales allowed aspiring Lobi politicians to build connections with national-level actors and further 
circumvent the authority of Koulongo chiefs. Although yam production proceeded without 
extensive state intervention in the countryside, the political backing of national-level actors was 
important for the Lobi community in the northeast given their position as ‘strangers’ (or non-
natives) to this region. By the late 1980s, middle aged Lobi family heads who were capable of 
supporting larger family units through yam sales controlled a growing share of the most 
prominent local political positions such as village chiefs, heads of collective work projects 
(GVC’s, Groupements à Vocation Coopérative), and the local branches of the then single party, 
the PDCI (Chalèard 1996, 425).  
 Despite these changes, political conflict in this region did not always revolve around 
native/stranger distinctions (between the Koulongo, the Lobi and other settler groups). Complex 
conflicts over land and authority revealed shifting alliances within and across stranger/native 
distinctions. In the ZKB for example (described above), where Koulongo presence was limited, 
intense political conflicts developed between Lobi elites. Chalèard (1998, 484; 1996, 446-447) 
provides the example of the village Kpamidouo, just south of Bouna (in the ZKB). Kpamidouo 
was founded by a Lobi settler, Kpami, in 1972. Under the PDCI one-party system, Kpami was 
forced to share power with the largest of the Lobi farmers in the region, Kimate, who was also 
the secretary of the local branch of the PDCI. In 1989, Kimate sought to further entrench his 
power and authority by replacing Kpami as chief with his father, Mebo. Kimate used the sizable 
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material resources that were at his disposal to build a political clientele, including some 
Koulongo who agreed to support his rival claim. Accompanied by their Koulongo supporters, 
Kimate and Mebo installed the dithil in order to publically confirm Mebo’s claim to the 
chieftainship. Kpami fought back by drawing on his connections with the local préfet. He 
mobilized support amongst Kpamidouo’s Christian population in order delegitimize Mebo’s 
‘traditional’ claim to authority (through the installation of the dithil). These local political 
conflicts interacted with party politics. With the onset of multiparty politics in Côte d’Ivoire in 
1990, Kpami stayed loyal to the PDCI while Kimate decided to break off and join the political 
opposition (Chalèard 1998, 484; 1996, 446-447).   
 Overall, the social and political changes described in this section have had two significant 
interrelated effects, given the purposes of this study. First, in contrast to the other cases examined 
in this dissertation, the strategies employed by national-level leaders to consolidate state power in 
the Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire worked to directly produce social hierarchies linking elites to 
subordinate groups. Historically, Lobi society included few institutionalized measures through 
which elites could control subordinate groups. The enforcement of user rights to land by the 
central state formed the basis of the institutional order that underpinned class differentiation 
within Lobi communities. The position of all Lobi – elites and masses (representing the majority 
of the population in the northeast) – was rendered dependent on the institutional order enforced 
by the central state. Second and not surprisingly, heads of large Lobi lineages increasingly 
became the central representatives of the old single party, the PDCI, in Bouna. This drastically 
undercut the authority once held by the Koulongo monarchy, and the Koulongo elite in Bouna. 
Overall, as brokers, Lobi elites were far more dependent on the institutional order enforced by the 
state than other examples of brokers examined in this dissertation. Put another way, social 
hierarchies in Bouna were not produced independently of the state (and then absorbed into state 
structures, as in cases of ‘indirect’ rule). They were a direct product of state interventions in rural 
areas. The implications of these changes for the wartime order established by the FN in Bouna 




Rebellion and Resistance in Bouna 
One of the striking features of the FN in Bouna, compared to elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire, was 
how the movement positioned itself very differently vis-à-vis local struggles surrounding 
autochthony and belonging. For much of the movements’ leadership, armed opposition to 
Laurent Gbagbo was originally justified as a strategy for defending immigrants targeted by 
government-led efforts at restricting Ivoirian citizenship. In other parts of the country, 
autochthones were commonly the political targets of the northern rebellion because these were 
the constituencies from which Gbagbo drew much of his support. In the region around Man 
(Western Côte d’Ivoire), native groups such as the Guéré and the Wobé were commonly viewed 
with suspicion by the rebels. Not surprisingly, these groups often demonstrated reluctance to 
support the rebellion, and in some instances, organized armed resistance directly against it (Heitz 
2013, 64, 204-205). In contrast to Man, in Bouna the cleavages driving the conflict at the national 
level aligned with local debates over belonging in a far more counterintuitive way. Overall, the 
FN appeared to target the Lobi and other non-native groups in Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire. During 
the conflict period, many in the Lobi community felt that the conflict and the installation of the 
FN administration burdened their community disproportionately. The Lobi viewed the rebellion 
as a means by which the Koulongo could temporarily limit or reverse the gap in political and 
economic power that had been growing between these two communities since before 
independence. Part of this stemmed from the ethnic makeup of the FN in Bouna. Although most 
of the movements’ leadership was Senoufo (from the central part of the north, around Korhogo), 
Morou Ouattara, the region’s zone commander, was a Koulongo from Doropo, just north of 
Bouna. Yet, similar to the case of Man, it appears unlikely that the FN was driven by ‘ethnic’ 
considerations per se (Heitz 2014, 204), but rather, they were responding the fact that the Lobi 
were the demographically and economically dominant group and the political affiliation of many  
prominent Lobi elites to the PDCI.41 Overall, it seems that strategic considerations trumped the 
                                                 
41 Although much of the PDCI would ultimately side with the Ouattara and the RDR after the first round of the 
presidential elections in 2010, it is important to remember that Bedié was one of the principal political architects of 
the policy of ivoirité during the 1990’s. Only after the formation of the RHDP in 2005 was it fairly certain, on which 
side of this conflict, Bedié and the rest of the PDCI would position itself. Leading up to the 2010 elections, Bedié 
embarked on a tour of the north in an effort to distance himself from the nationalist agenda now advanced by Gbagbo 
(Ignace 2009, Jacob 2009).  
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position taken by the rebels on debates surrounding political community and belonging in this 
part of the north. This section briefly explores the political implications resulting from the FN’s 
alliance-building strategy in this part of the north.   
In many ways, the Com’zone headed by Morou Ouattara was not entirely different from 
those established in other parts of the north. In Bouna, as in some other localities, garbage 
collection stopped, schools closed, and health services were limited. For what was already one of 
the more economically disadvantaged parts of the country, the overall economic impact of the 
conflict was dramatic (Kouamé 2007a).42 And, as in other parts of the north, complaints about the 
tax regime enforced by the rebels were commonplace. However, the political order established by 
the FN in Bouna was distinct in that it was perceived to unfairly privilege specific groups at the 
expense of others. During the conflict period, many in the Lobi community felt that the conflict 
and the installation of the FN administration in Bouna burdened their community 
disproportionately. Firmly established ties between wealthy Lobi family heads and the former 
single party, the PDCI (Chaléard 1996, 425), ensured that many of these actors became the 
principal targets of the rebellion. Coalition formation between the local FN administration and 
the Lobi elite in Bouna was inhibited as a result of the pre-conflict relationship between these 
actors and the state. Additionally, Lobi farmers in the rural areas surrounding Bouna had been the 
primary beneficiaries of state efforts to promote migration and settlement in the northeast. As a 
result, this group retained powerful motivations to resist the authority of the rebels throughout the 
conflict. The rebels were seen as a direct threat to an institutional order of which the Lobi 
community was the principal beneficiaries. Collectively, the sections that follow explore Lobi 
grievances vis-à-vis the northern rebellion in more detail. 
Not unlike in other parts of Côte d’Ivoire that fell under FN military control, a common 
target of criticism of the rebels in Bouna was the extensive set of roadblocks and taxes they had 
put in place. Shopkeepers occupying booths in the city’s commercial areas were expected to pay 
8,000 CFA per month to the rebels (Kouamé 2007a).43 At checkpoints set up around the 
                                                 
42 This is a feature of the rebellion Bouna shares with other parts of the north, including Ouangolodougou, which is 
the subject of chapter 6. Korhogo escaped these problems largely as result of the substantial presence of international 
NGO’s, which sponsored the provision of many basic public services.  
43 During the time of my fieldwork (2010-2011), 1 $USD equaled approximately 500CFA.  
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perimeter of the city, individuals paid between 200 CFA and 1,000 CFA in order to enter or exit 
the city (Abalo 2007). Trucks carrying cashews leaving Bouna were required to pay an exit fee of 
400,000 CFA. Those carrying yams were expected to pay an amount of 205,000 CFA (Abalo 
2007).44 Tax rates at these levels are high, especially for a region that had been economically 
depressed before the war and especially during it.  
The system of taxation installed by the FN in this part of the north became one of the 
principal sources of contention between the former rebels and the civilian population not only 
because of the high cost of these demands, but also because of how it was perceived to unfairly 
target the Lobi community. It is difficult to say if this interpretation derived from the intention of 
the FN in Bouna to target the Lobi community or simply that, as explained in previous sections, 
the Lobi were by far the dominant economic and demographic group. Regardless, a number of 
interviewees and observers have suggested that it was the Lobi who were specifically targeted:  
 
When they come into the city today it is the Lobi as a group who are against the 
rebels, since it is the rebels who are present in the corridor45 and it is the Lobi who 
have the money. It is the Lobi who have suffered a lot by the presence of the 
rebellion, as a result of the rebellion. They have been broken, bullied and exploited 
by the rebellion (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11). 
 
Since the beginning of the rebellion, the Lobi, who come to the market every 
Sunday pay much more, because each time they have to pay 100 CFA or 200 CFA. 
They even have to pay twice [on their way into market and on their way out] and if 
they don’t have the money they [the FN] will just take two yams. This has been the 
cause of the problem (interview, local politician, Bouna, 01.25.11). 
                                                 
44 Incomplete data sources make comparing tax rates across different Com’zones extremely challenging. 
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the cost of taxes were comparable to other parts of Northern Côte d’Ivoire 
controlled by the FN (see chapters 2 and 5 in this study for comparisons). Bassett (2011b) describes the experience 
of one cashew merchant in Korhogo (see chapter 5). He writes “The merchant sent buying agents to rural towns 
across the north to buy nuts from farmers whose orchards averaged five hectares in size. After filling a forty-ton 
truck, each driver headed south to the Port of Abidjan via Bouaké. The merchant paid road taxes and rackets that 
amounted to 615,000 CFA francs ($1,305.00) per truck. Forty percent of these receipts went to the New Forces’ 
Centrale. Another 20% was collected in Katiola for the benefit of the ten Com’zones. In Bouaké, the center of New 
Forces operations, the merchant paid three separate “tickets” to pass through the city, accounting for 20% of total 
costs.” In terms of the marketing of cashews, the total costs documented by Bassett exceed the values documented 
above in Bouna. However, these costs were born across different territorial and administrative jurisdictions.  
45 There are two principal routes leading in and out of Bouna. Corridor nord refers to the northward route leading 
from Bouna to Doropo, and ultimately Burkina Faso. Corridor sud refers to the southward route leading from Bouna 




The Lobi did not create the rebellion, but they have the impression that the rebels 
have come to humiliate them (Abalo 2007). 
 
Many within the Lobi community have expressed frustration with the specific means by which 
the FN extracted money and goods. A common complaint in Bouna was that, for passage through 
this part of the north, the FN required the presentation of Ivorian identity cards. In late 2010 and 
early 2011, this author observed a number of individuals who were pulled off of buses because 
they lacked adequate national identification. Payment was often required if identification could 
not be provided. This was at the very least a puzzling feature of the rural order established by the 
FN in this part of the north, given that strict definition and enforcement of Ivoirian citizenship 
was one of the principal reasons cited by FN leadership for beginning the rebellion in the first 
place. As some suggested, rather than reflecting a commitment to the enforcement of national 
citizenship, demanding proper identification represented just another means of extracting 
resources from the local population (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11, Radio station manager, 
Bouna, 01.19.11). Yet for the Lobi community (particularly those in rural areas), demanding 
identification represented a direct attack on a population who, despite their long time residency in 
Côte d’Ivoire, had never acquired the necessary documents for proof of national citizenship and 
were in fact hardly aware of what Ivoirian citizenship was. One NGO worker explaining his work 
to me emphasized the important task of “approaching the (Lobi) population and explaining to 
them that the times have changed and that you can no longer live with being identified by the état 
civil and thus help them obtain a birth certificate for the first time in sixty years” (NGO Worker, 
Bouna, 01.27.11). 
Opposition also grew because the FN often targeted some of the most vulnerable of the 
Lobi community, specifically women carrying yams to the market on the pathways linking Bouna 
to the surrounding countryside:  
 
When a poor woman who comes with the yams she is going to sell at the market for 
1000 CFA or 1500 CFA, they take 1000 CFA or 500 CFA or they take some of her 
yam. Thus, young people from one neighbourhood…opposed this and returned to 




When there are women who come to the market with their products, they (the FN) 
take a yam or two, and in all the cases it was the young soldiers. Therefore the youth 
tell them [the soldiers] that things are difficult and that they are putting a lot of 
pressure on the peasants (interview, radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.2011). 
 
As for women with yams, at each roadblock, they are obliged to give up two yams 
per woman and per bowl (of yams) when they happen not to have enough money 
(Abalo 2007, see also Arouna 2007). 
 
Preying on women in these ways illustrates the informal extractions that existed side-by-side with 
the formalized/institutionalized set of taxes enforced by the FN. To target women, FN members 
would often position themselves along many of the narrow pathways surrounding Bouna that 
women take to bring their yams to market. Most Lobi women do not have a strong command of 
French and thus they were hard pressed to negotiate their position with sometimes intimidating 
FN combatants. Many Lobi saw these tactics as morally incomprehensible because the FN 
appeared to target the most vulnerable of the Lobi population.  
The issue of taxation was arguably the most important issue underpinning the contentious 
relationship between the Lobi and the FN throughout the conflict, but it was not the only factor. 
At the onset of the conflict, many complained about the decision of the rebels to meet with the 
current Koulongo King after they first gained control over the city:  
 
Because when the rebels came, they were welcomed by the Koulongo and then after 
by the Malinké who were also there, and this is why the Lobi rejected the rebellion. 
Also, the rebels pushed the Peul and the Koulongo to attack and bully the Lobi 
community (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11). 
 
As I was saying earlier, here in Bouna there is a group who are the customary 
landowners and that group is the Koulongo. Thus, it is logical that if the FN would 
want to install themselves in a city they have to officially address the customary 
land owners, and thus, what happened was that they addressed the Koulongo and 
automatically it was seen as if Koulongo was welcoming the FN because they are 
the customary land owners. You can’t set up in a place without first addressing the 
customary land owners, who are the Koulongo (interview, NGO worker, Bouna 
01.26.11). 
 
Other complaints revolved around the provision and consumption of collective goods. Some 
objected to the fact that, under the FN, the Lobi were paying the lion’s share for community 
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projects. In the past, costs for the construction and maintenance of new housing, health clinics, 
schools and stores were shared between the Koulongo, Lobi and Peul communities. However, 
under the FN, many Lobi felt that they were the only ones paying for these projects; the 
Koulongo and Peul were paying very little, yet everyone benefitted from them. Nonetheless, the 
Lobi have remained hesitant to state these complaints publically because “around their homes 
there is only the FN, who has the guns. They are for the Koulongo and against them” (interview, 
NGO worker, Bouna 01.27.11). 
There were also some complaints about how the Koulongo used their customary authority 
over land to derive a disproportionate share of the benefits of international relief efforts. It was 
widely perceived that the Koulongo were empowered to make these claims because of the 
political and coercive backing they received from the FN. This was the case in Bania, a small 
village southwest of Bouna. Soon after the beginning of the conflict, UNICEF initiated an 
agricultural production project in Bania to which all community members contributed equally 
during its initial stages. However, when it came time to harvest, Koulongo chiefs, citing their 
position as the customary owners of the land, claimed a disproportionate share for themselves. In 
other cases, the Koulongo used the context of the war to push Lobi back from lands that 
encroached onto Koulongo villages. One observer explained that “all these frustrations piled on 
to each other, and as a result the Lobi cut all ties to the Koulongo: no more funerals together, no 
governance together, and no funding the constructions of schools and voila, that’s how things 
began to change and the Koulongo even threatened to chase away the Lobi from their 
communities” (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11).  
All of this contributed to a growing frustration with the rebels. This frustration was 
evident on October 21, 2007 when a number of young people from the Lobi community violently 
confronted the FN after they were informed that a number of Lobi women were harassed for 
money on their way to the market. This group of sixteen Lobi youth first lodged their complaint 
with the FN at a checkpoint leading southward out of the city towards Bondoukou on the 
government side of the old ‘zone de confiance’. Not satisfied with the response of the rebels, the 
group left the checkpoint and headed towards the UNOCI (United Nations Operations in Côte 
d’Ivoire) base in Bouna, which was manned by a Ghanaian contingent. Together, the Ghanaian 
General and the group left the UNOCI headquarters to discuss the situation with three members 
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of the local FN military hierarchy. Frustrated with the progress of this meeting, some of the group 
of Lobi youth armed themselves and attacked the FN checkpoint controlling the corridor-nord 
between Bouna and Doropo in the direction of Ghana to put an end to the system of exactions the 
FN had put in place. The FN responded by opening fire on this group of Lobi youth and chasing 
them back to Bouna. Some ultimately fled eastward to Ghana or to the south in the direction of 
Bondoukou. The attacks resulted in a number of injuries and one death for the Lobi youth. Bouna 
residents commonly refer to this day as the ‘dimanche noir’ (Radio station manager, Bouna, 
01.19.11; Local politician, Bouna 01.17.11; Arouna 2007). 
 
Authority and Elite Politics 
At the core of the conflict between the FN and Lobi community in Bouna during the conflict 
period was that the Lobi had few actors or institutions they could turn to who could credibly 
represent their interests in any fair way. Until Gbagbo’s removal in 2011, there remained a 
profound distrust between the Lobi community in Bouna and the FN. In addition, the 2002 civil 
war and the subsequent political stalemate also had the effect of politically marginalizing elites 
who were willing and capable of defending Lobi interests. Before the onset of the civil war, 
changing demographics and the increasing economic clout of the Lobi community in Bouna 
allowed the Lobi to augment their power and cement their position in the northeast by capturing 
an increasing number of local level political positions, particularly the local branches of the 
former single party, the PDCI. But with the beginning of the civil war, the security of the Lobi at 
the local level became seriously compromised as a result of Lobi elites’ pre-conflict connections 
to national-level political circles. Most Lobi politicians with national level ties to the PDCI were 
either prevented from returning to Bouna from Abidjan due to security concerns or just no longer 
had access to the resources necessary to enact their authority in any meaningful way. Ultimately, 
the absence of any political actors representing Lobi interests on the ground, ongoing conflicts 
between the state (and hence most Lobi politicians) and the FN hierarchy in Bouna, and the 
appearance that the rebels were siding with and militarily backing the native Koulongo, all 
collectively worked to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the rebellion in the eyes of many Lobi 
living in this part of the north. This section compliments the previous; it highlights how the 
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everyday actions of the rebel administration in Bouna were linked to larger debates over authority 
relations during the war, as well as the post-conflict period over state reconstruction.  
Insecurity, uncertainty and apprehension by parties on both sides of the conflict 
characterized the initial days of the civil war in Bouna. Sorting out the interests of the different 
parties involved and who supported who was a delicate process that took time. Initially, there 
were many suspicions and accusations regarding who supported the different sides of the national 
level conflict. Notre Voie, one of the ‘blue’ or pro-government newspapers in Côte d’Ivoire made 
quick work of deciphering the ‘sides’ of the civil war in Bouna, accusing Bouna’s 1st assistant to 
the mayor, a Lobi, of openly supporting the rebels: 
 
The specificity of the attack on Bouna resides in the welcome that was reserved for 
the assailants. At the head of the people happy to welcome the insurgents was Mr. 
Hien Kodio Wailley, the 1st assistant to the mayor and resident mayor of the 
commune of Bouna…The mayor offered them breakfast at the maquis46 Lababa and 
offered them beef at his home (L.B 2002).47  
 
Similarly, another local level Lobi politician described how he was initially accused of siding 
with the government by the FN leadership during the early stages of the conflict:  
 
Me for example, he (the commandant de zone, Morou Ouattara) said that I was part 
of the gendarmerie! I was not part of the gendarmerie! Those guys, they knew exactly 
who the gendarmerie was. The guys that came, they didn’t understand many things 
before we started to meet with them…there you go, the relationship between us, there 
was little confidence, really, you know, you doubt, you doubt and you doubt, it was a 
bit difficult. But now, everyone knows who is who, and voila, we understand now. 
Everyone understands (Local politician, Bouna, 02.01.11). 
 
                                                 
46 Maquis’ are small restaurants where you can order food and drinks that are popular throughout Côte d’Ivoire.  
47 This article was described to me by members of the mayor’s office as being an outright lie (interview, member of 
mayor’s office, Bouna, 17.01.2011). It was pointed out to me that the photo attached to the article, which is 
supposedly of the 1st assistant to the mayor, is a fabrication; the man who is said to be the 1st assistant is far too 
young and skinny to be the actual 1st assistant. However it remains useful in highlighting the lies and accusations 
thrown around during the initial stages of the conflict.  
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And although there were accusations and uncertainties on both sides of the conflict, attacks on 
Lobi politicians appeared more common because their political power and authority was derived 
largely from their relationship to the central state.  
One of the more prominent examples of elite conflict lasting throughout the duration of 
the FN occupation of Bouna was the conflict between the commandant de zone, Morou Ouattara 
and the Lobi politician, PDCI member, deputy and president of the conseil general, and National 
Assembly member, Palé Dimaté. Dimaté, saw his powers drastically cut by the beginning of civil 
war. The civil war precipitated a sharp decline in the resources made available to National 
Assembly members, and at some points during the conflict Dimaté was allegedly not permitted to 
return to Bouna from Abidjan by the FN. This obviously put him at odds with Ouattara, who had 
some political and economic interests in maintaining control over Bouna and prolonging the de 
facto partition of the country. These conflicts came to the forefront during the visit of the former 
US ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire, Aubrey Hooks, to Bouna during his 2006 tour of the rebel-held 
north. The embassy report describing Hooks’ brief stay in Bouna highlights the political conflicts 
between Ouattara and Dimaté during private conversations with the ambassador: 
 
In separate conversations with the Econ Chief, Dimaté expressed anger over the 
FN’s high-handed administration of the region. Accusing them of pocketing 
money levied from merchants and real estate, as well as funnelling the cashew 
crop through their hands, without spending anything on civil works or 
administration, Dimaté said that the Com’zone and his immediate entourage gets 
wealthy while average FN soldiers are exploited for their loyalty to the northern 
cause. Dimaté said that the FN have been a bane in the areas they control, that 
everyone feels that way, but were intimidated to say so in the public meeting. 
Dimaté also said that the FN has been hostile to the Lobi (some 45% of the 
region’s population) who are more heavily taxed as a result…Mayor Ouattara 
agreed with much of what Dimaté had to say concerning the FN’s management of 
the region, while also castigating Dimaté himself for failing to aid the region, in 
his sixteen years as the region’s representative in Parliament and obliquely 
accusing him of corruption. The Com’zone repeatedly made the same accusations 
about Dimaté to the Ambassador during the course of the visit (US Embassy 
Abidjan 2006).  
 
Perhaps more important was how Dimaté was implicated by the FN in the planning and staging 
of the attacks on the FN on dimanche noir. No one interviewed by this author, except members of 
the FN, suggested that Dimaté had anything to do with the planning of dimanche noir. Moreover, 
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the FN leadership in Bouna has not presented any evidence they might have proving that Dimaté 
was involved. Nonetheless, the FN military leadership in Bouna has been adamant in claiming 
that “the youth were manipulated,” (Kouamé 2007b) and that “it (dimanche noir) was organized 
by the politicians, with the objective of destabilizing the regime of the FN in Bouna. They created 
a problem out of nothing” (FN member, Bouna, 01.26.11). In a communiqué issued by the FN in 
Bouaké, the former rebels claimed that that attack was organized by a small number of youth 
leaders in Bouna who had direct ties to Dimaté (Kouamé 2007c). The significance of this strategy 
of explicitly tying Dimaté to dimanche noir was twofold. First, this strategy obviously functioned 
as an attempt to delegitimize the political position of Dimaté; it rendered him an external actor 
situated on the other side of the zone de confiance, just like the other enemies in government that 
the rebels have fought. But perhaps more importantly, it delegitimized the anti-FN movement 
itself, implying that it was exclusively externally sponsored, with no legitimate grievances 
underpinning it locally. Indeed, this strategy has strong parallels with government efforts to 
delegitimize the 2002 rebellion in the early stages of war by claiming it was merely an externally 
sponsored movement backed by its patrons in Burkina Faso.   
The marginalization by the FN of Lobi politicians such as Dimaté created a context where 
there were few political actors on the ground capable of legitimately representing the Lobi 
community. This was explained to me by one NGO worker and youth organizer in terms of the 
problem of taxes:  
 
They (the Lobi) are without a voice, they are a people without a voice, thus the 
intellectuals, the politicians can’t defend their cause. Sadly, for them it isn’t that 
way. They say everything is OK? Meanwhile, the peasants are still suffering 
(NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11).    
 
The larger consequence of the marginalization of Lobi political representatives was that the FN 
itself was forced to play some role in the management of everyday social conflicts such as those 
over land, marital disputes and the distribution of aid. Some NGO workers in Bouna explained to 
me that the capacity and legitimacy of the rebels to play this role was limited:  
 
In fact, the FN, for when they arrived, they did not have the aptitude for 
understanding these relations (between the Koulongo and the Lobi); they came 
because of the war. They managed security issues, how to advance or how to 
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secure the territory. That was their competence. For the rest they didn’t have a lot 
of competence. In this zone there was some sort of organization that used to exist, 
but now the authority of the chief is gone, the authority of the prefect isn’t there; 
the authority of the judge isn’t there. Thus, the population had to rapidly invent 
new mechanisms, but all of that had to be made under the authority of the FN 
(NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11).   
 
At the beginning, the FN even had to manage land issues, and they did that, but 
after they ceded to the pressure because when the Koulongo kingdom was 
reestablished, the problems over the land question, women problems, all of that 
returned to the customary chief. But at the beginning, the rebels managed 
everything, land problems, any problems; they managed everything (NGO worker, 
Bouna, 01.22.11). 
 
In Bouna, the rebels were effectively thrust into a ‘political’ role they themselves felt very 
uncomfortable playing. One former rebel commander consistently reaffirmed the military 
mandate of the movement in the early days of the rebellion (FN member, Bouna, 01.26.11). 
Nonetheless, in the eyes of the local population, many decisions taken by the rebels – over land, 
women and divorce, and tax payments – appeared to be ad hoc and self-interested. In many cases, 
rebel decisions resulted in the exacerbation of these conflicts rather than their resolution (NGO 
worker, Bouna, 01.27.11). The military presence of the FN in Bouna heightened tension between 
themselves and local populations and between the different ethnic groups in the region, not only 
because the demands they placed on this community were high (this would describe much of the 
north), but because they lacked any credible set of intermediaries with whom they could govern. 
Koulongo elites lacked authority and the Lobi community opposed the rebellion altogether.  
After ‘Dimanche Noir’: Reconfiguring Authority in Post-Conflict Bouna 
After dimanche noir, the FN administration, at both the local and national levels, recognized the 
challenge Bouna posed in terms of governance and the maintenance of political stability, as well 
as the subsequent need for organizational reform. One of the more pronounced changes was the 
reform to the organizational structure of the rebellion in Bouna initiated by Soro at the national 
level. Since the signing of the OPA in 2007, Soro had put substantial public pressure on the 
military wing of the FN to hasten the dual political processes of military demobilization and 
administrative reunification in the territory under FN control (Bakayoko 2007; Didi 2008; 
Stanislas 2008).  
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Occurring not long after the signing of the OPA, the events in Bouna represented a stark 
reminder that Soro’s calls to push the peace process forward in northern zones were being 
resisted by some groups within the FN. Dimanche noir drew attention to the fact that some 
elements within the FN were still using their political position in the north as a strategy for self-
enrichment. Minimally then, the confrontation between Lobi youth and the local FN in Bouna 
showed that Soro did not have complete control over certain elements within the movement. The 
burdensome tax system installed by the rebels, particularly “le racket sur la routes” – the system 
of checkpoints manned by the FN across the north – remained in place despite Soro’s calls for 
their abolition. However, far more problematically for Soro, these events suugested to others, 
both in the international community and in Gbagbo’s camp, that either Soro was himself not fully 
committed to the peace process or that he could not credibly commit to the peace process on 
behalf of the military wing of the movement, particularly the commandants des zones.  
As a way of correcting this image, Soro committed to re-organizing the rebellion in this 
part of the north. As explained in Chapter 2, the FN extended its reach over local areas through 
its three principal organizational bodies: the Forces Armée de Forces Nouvelles (FAFN), the 
Etat-major and La Centrale. In practice however, these bodies were unevenly inscribed across 
the northern zones under the control of the FN. The failed 2002 coup attempt and the military 
stalemate that followed often required that the FN establish at least minimal military control over 
the vast territory it now controlled. The Com’zones were generally the first institutions put in 
place. For a long time, Com’zones remained poorly monitored (if at all) by the national level 
political and military leaders of the movement. Like other regions in the north, the Com’zone in 
Bouna remained largely autonomous from national level leaders throughout the conflict. The 
FN’s minimal effort to politically mobilize this part of the country in support of the rebellion 
contributed to the perception of rebel control over the northeast as an occupation, rather than a 
liberation movement. As stated above, one reason for this was that the local FN leadership in 
Bouna was drawn largely from other parts of the north, particularly from the Senoufo heartland 
around Korhogo. However, another equally important reason was that the FN administration in 
this part of the north was comprised solely of its military wing – headed by the commandant de 
zone Morou Ouattara. Offices for La Centrale and the etat major were not established until after 
2007, and only after Bouna’s dimanche noir. Indeed, one way of reading the ultimate installation 
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of La Centrale and the etat major was that they were in fact organizational responses to the 
eroding legitimacy of the FN in this part of the north that had culminated in dimanche noir.  
The very absence of these institutions also contributed to the confrontation between the 
Lobi community and the FN in Bouna, and the overall illegitimacy of the FN in the northeast 
more generally. In other parts of the north, the Délégant General (the representative of the état 
major in each com’zone) played a vital role in politically mobilizing civilian populations and 
legitimizing the movement. Interviews in Korhogo, for instance, revealed that the Délégant 
General fulfilled a number of important administrative and political functions. These included: 
addressing questions regarding public welfare, including problems related to healthcare 
provision, education and agricultural production, establishing external relations with NGOs and 
foreign governments working in Korhogo and the surrounding rural areas and communicating to 
the public the aims and strategies of the movement (through television and radio broadcasts). The 
distinctly ‘political’ function played by the Délégant General in Korhogo was absent in Bouna. 
Military leaders positioned in Bouna since the beginning of the rebellion understood their 
position as concerned strictly with military issues and problems, which had very little to do with 
the political aims of the movement. This had two implications for the legitimacy of the rebellion 
in this part of the north. First, the FN made little effort to mobilize support and explain the aims 
of the rebellion.48 This was particularly problematic in a part of the country where ideas about 
citizenship, nationalism and the national level cleavages driving the conflict were poorly 
understood, particularly within the rural areas surrounding Bouna. As a result, the FN confronted 
a political environment where fear of and scepticism about the rebellion predominated (NGO 
worker, Bouna, 01.27.11). The absence of a Délégant General, as part of the movement, also 
forced its military wing to function ‘politically’ in ways that they viewed as being well beyond 
their strict military mandate.  
Between ‘dimanche noir’ in October and the end of 2007, the FN established offices for 
both La Centrale and the état major in Bouna. Representatives for these distinct wings of the FN 
expressed mandates directly related to improving the relations between the FN and the local 
                                                 
48 For instance, in contrast to Korhogo, the radio station was looted and rendered inoperable by FN soldiers during 
the early days of the rebellion. This drastically weakened the ability of Ouattara to convey any political message 
justifying the presence of the rebels in Bouna. Radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.11. 
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population, particularly the Lobi community. For agents of La Centrale, regulating the taxes 
imposed on goods and services in Bouna functioned as a strategy for depoliticizing their 
application. This included decisions on what could be taxed. Although difficult to verify, there 
was a prominent perception that the tax demands of the FN in Bouna prior to these changes were 
particularly high (FN member, Bouna, 01.28.11).49 By establishing La Centrale’s authority in 
Bouna, the FN sought to alter the perception that tax levels for goods and services in Bouna were 
not in line with rates in other regions under control of the FN.50 
Likewise, the intended function of the Délégant General in Bouna was to play an 
intermediary role both between the FN and the local population, and between different segments 
within this population. Soon after their arrival, members of the office of the Délégant General 
met with the representatives of the key constituencies in Bouna: the King (Koulango), the Imams 
(Dyula, Mossi) and the Lobi chief. They also met with a number of youth leaders in the 
community, even some involved in the organization of the fight against the FN. These meetings 
aimed to both provide a forum for the expression of grievances against the FN and also to 
facilitate the expression of the larger local and national level aims of the rebellion to local 
community members. The Délégant General also functioned as a mouthpiece for the local 
population vis-à-vis the military wing of the movement. One member of the office for the 
Délégant General suggested that some of the most complained about taxes, like the levies on 
motorcycles passing between Bouna and the surrounding countryside, had declined or been 
abolished as a result of their insistence  vis-à-vis commandant Ouattara (FN member, Bouna, 
01.22.11). This political wing of the FN has also functioned as a forum for the resolution of 
disputes within local populations. After 2007, the office of the Délégant General assumed some 
responsibilities for regulating conflict over the payment of bride-wealth and divorce. The branch 
of the FN was also responsible for resolving land use conflicts in rural areas. Here, the FN helped 
negotiate the adequate payment of compensation to Koulango and Lobi landholders whose farms 
had been damaged by cattle owned and managed by Peul pastoralists (FN member, Bouna, 
02.06.11). 
                                                 
49 While this was certainly the perception in Bouna, it is difficult to establish whether this was actually the case. See 
footnote 43.   
50 Efforts at institutional reform were common is other localities controlled by the FN. See chapter 5, pg. 155.  
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The sum of these institutional reforms represented what I believe to be a concerted effort 
at resolving the tensions that emerged between the FN and the Lobi community in Bouna during 
the conflict period. Additionally, the organizational dynamics described above might also suggest 
that organizational factors themselves played a role in shaping the relationships that emerged 
between the rebels and Bouna’s Lobi community over time; that the initial absence of any 
political arm of the FN limited its capacity to mobilize political support. As explained above, this 
is certainly an important part of the story in Bouna, but it remains incomplete for two central 
reasons. First, as I suggest above, as well as in more detail in chapter 2, the incomplete and 
uneven character the FN’s organization building strategies was the norm throughout the north. 
The military side of the movement, the Com’zones, was typically the first, and for some time the 
only, organizational body implanted in the liberated zones controlled by the FN. These reforms 
were emphasized in this chapter because they represented both a recognition of and a response 
from the FN to their declining legitimacy in Bouna; the root of which was, as this chapter 
suggests, the structural position of the Lobi elite as intermediaries for the pre-conflict state. 
Second, as I discuss in greater detail below, despite these reforms, many within the Lobi 
community in Bouna retained a deep resentment towards the rebels. The debatable extent to 
which organizational reform placated these grievances suggest that their underlying structural 
roots were not, or could not, be fundamentally addressed by changes to the organizational 
makeup of the movement itself.                
 
Contentious State-Making in Post-Conflict Northeastern Côte d’Ivoire 
During fieldwork in January 2011 soon after the contested presidential elections in late 2010, it 
became clear that many in the Lobi community retained a heavy resentment towards the former 
rebels. Leading up to the elections, representatives of the Lobi community in Bouna repeatedly 
expressed their desire for the FN to give up their control over this part of the north (Abalo 2007; 
Arouna 2007; Kouamé 2007a). Soon after dimanche noir, a prominent Lobi youth leader in 
Bouna claimed that “since they have not won their war against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, we 
are going to make them leave Bouna” (Kouamé 2007a). Another stated that “if the FN does not 
find a solution to all the problems raised by the people, next time, it will be all of Bouna who will 
revolt to request that the FN leave” (Abalo 2007). These public statements reflect the general 
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sentiments held by the majority of Bouna’s Lobi community. The views of the Koulongo were 
less clear. As a group, the Koulongo benefitted from the rebellion because of how it temporarily 
checked the political clout of prominent Lobi politicians such as Dimaté. However, the Koulongo 
and Lobi both recognized that regulating the tensions between them generated by the rebellion 
required the strengthening of state institutions. As explained above, the rebels themselves lacked 
the legitimacy and capacity required to manage these conflicts. The authority of the Koulongo, 
particularly their authority over the management of land use, declined dramatically over the post-
colonial period. The fact that the FN was doing little to expedite the process of administrative 
reunification reinforced collective feelings of frustration in Bouna. The office of the préfet, 
headed by Kouassi Aka Bio officially opened in September 2007, soon after the signing of the 
OPA. In order to enact his authority, Bio initiated a political structure that he calls the “summit of 
the authorities” as a forum through which all of the key political actors in Bouna – all elected 
officials, bureaucrats, and the FN – could work to collectively solve the important problems 
confronting the city. Despite these efforts, Bio, like most other political actors outside of the FN 
in Bouna, recognized that power still lay in the hands of the former rebels. The fact that the FN 
still controlled the lion’s share of the tax revenue greatly restricted the autonomy of other 
political groups and actors (AFP 2009b). 
Towards these terminal stages of the conflict, the most prominent political challenge to 
Morou Ouattara and the position of the FN in the northeast came from Dimaté. The already tense 
relationship between Ouattara and Dimaté reached new heights in October 2010 after the first 
round of the Presidential elections, when Dimaté publically stated his support for Gbagbo 
heading into the second round. The controversy began after President Gbagbo’s decision to name 
Dimaté the Haute autorité chargée du développement du Zanzan Nord.  According to Dimaté, in 
accepting this post, he was subsequently charged with supporting Gbagbo and kicked out of the 
PDCI. It was only after being sidelined from his old party that Dimaté actually publically stated 
his intention to support Gbagbo in the second round of elections (‘Je dis que je suis Pdci mais je 
vote pour Gbagbo’) instead of Alassane Ouattara, the candidate backed by Henri Bedié and the 
rest of the PDCI (Doualy 2011).  
What are the implications of Dimaté’s decision to side with Gbagbo for the argument 
presented in this chapter? These dynamics might suggest Dimaté and other Lobi elites were less 
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dependent on a single set of national level actors than suggested earlier in this chapter. If Dimaté 
was able to break with Bedié and the PDCI and side with Gbagbo, why could he have not as 
easily shifted alliances and sided with the FN earlier in the conflict? Dimaté’s decision to side 
with Gbagbo require explanation. However, they largely confirm rather than contradict the basic 
logic of the argument presented in this chapter. Dimaté’s strategic alliance with Gbagbo does not 
reflect lessened dependence on the state, but rather, shifting coalitional arrangements between 
different political actors and groups at the national level. As discussed in chapter 2, despite the 
introduction of multiparty politics in 1990, the PDCI remained in power until the 1999 military 
coup led by General Robert Guéï, which removed former President Bédié from power. After the 
contested 2000 elections through which Gbagbo gained the Presidency, Bédié and the rest of 
PDCI were put in a difficult position. Allying with Alassane Ouattara and the RDR had obvious 
strategic advantages. Both Dyula and Baoulé planters in the cocoa growing regions of 
Southwestern Côte d’Ivoire (the principal ‘ethnic’ constituencies of the RDR and PDCI 
respectively) were the target of the anti-immigrant rhetoric espoused by the FPI, Gbagbo and his 
supporters. Yet, Bédié himself was no stranger to playing up these kinds of divisions to his own 
advantage. He was one of the principal architects of ivoirité, the ultra-nationalist discourse used 
to exclude Alassane Ouattara from the 1995 elections.  
Nonetheless, strategic considerations, and the shared goal of defeating Gbagbo appeared 
to trump ideology as the political crisis wore on. In 2005, a pre-electoral coalition, des 
Houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), was formed between four political 
parties: the RDR, the PDCI, L’Union pour la democratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), 
and Le Mouvement des Forces de L’Avenir (MFA). And leading up the 2010 presidential 
elections, Bédié embarked on a tour of the north, disavowing his past association with the 
nationalist, discriminatory policies now embraced by Gbagbo and his supporters (Ignace 2009; 
Jacob 2009). All the parties agreed to vote for the party and candidate that advanced to the 
second round of the presidential elections. After Ouattara finished second (to Gbagbo) in the first 
round of the elections, questions about the strength of this new alliance were laid to rest when 
Bédié called upon his supporters to vote “‘massively’ for Ouattara” (Bassett 2011a, 472). Yet the 
PDCI’s shift from party in power to opposition put someone like Dimaté in a very vulnerable 
political position. On the one hand, as this chapter suggests, Lobi politicians gained substantial 
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political protection from their alliance with the PDCI over the course of the post-colonial period. 
On the other hand, through its membership in the RHDP, Bédié and the rest of the PDCI had 
joined a group largely sympathetic to the political mission advanced by the FN. Remember, many 
FN members had joined the movement to fight for the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara. Dimaté, it 
seemed, was forced to choose between Bédié and his old PDCI patrons, and the Lobi community 
in Bouna, who had so vehemently opposed the presence of the rebels. In siding with Gbagbo, 
Dimaté appeared to side with the latter. The fact that the PDCI swung its allegiance to the 
political opposition in Côte d’Ivoire meant that they could no longer provide the political 
protections on which the Lobi community has relied upon in the past. In fact, quite the opposite, 
the PDCI had shifted its support to the national coalition that supported nativist politics in Bouna.  
In sum, although the identity of Dimaté’s national level partner changed (from the PDCI to the 
FPI), the dependence of the Lobi on the state remained.            
Initially, Dimaté payed a heavy price for his decision. In addition to being marginalized 
within his old party, his homes in Abidjan, Bondoukou, Bouna and Doropo were all attacked and 
pillaged by pro-Ouattara militants after the removal Gbagbo in April 2011. Between April and 
December 2011, Dimaté was exiled in Paris, largely because of ongoing threats from Ouattara 
supporters stemming from his decision to side with Gbagbo during the presidential elections 
(Baikeh 2010; Tété 2010; Doualy 2011; Hyacinthe 2011). In December 2011, Dimaté returned 
and ran as an independent in legislative elections, ultimately losing the seat to a member of the 
RDR. And, in part of the country where they had enjoyed continued success since the transition 
to multiparty politics in 1993, the PDCI was for the first time shut out of the region of Bunkani 
(Bouna, Doropo, Nassian and Tehini). This suggests that the success of the PDCI in the northeast 
depended at least in part on Dimaté’s political pull in the region.    
 Nonetheless, by the summer of 2012, Bedié and other party leaders subsequently 
permitted Dimaté to rejoin the PDCI. Despite some ongoing sentiments that Dimaté’s support 
was ‘bought’ by Gbagbo during the Presidential Elections, many high-ranking PDCI members 
continue to acknowledge Dimaté’s enduring political pull in the northeast. “Palé Dimaté is the 
leader of our region,” commented one PDCI member. Another suggested that Bedié gave Dimaté 
another opportunity to join the PDCI ranks because of his role as a “unifier” (“Dimaté est un 
rassembleur”) (Didi 2012; N’Guessan 2012). Dimaté’s acceptance back into the PDCI represents 
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an important step in regenerating the party whose popularity has declined significantly since his 
departure. Subsequently, Dimaté and some of the PDCI’s national-level leadership including 
Bedié and Alphonse Djédjé Mady toured the northeast hoping to bring this region back into the 
PDCI fold. The re-inclusion of Dimaté represented an important part of the party’s efforts to 
remobilize its supporters in preparation for the municipal and regional elections in early 2013 
(L’intelligent d’Abidjan 2012; N’Guessan 2012; Le Mandat 2012).   
In contrast to Dimaté, Ouattara and the local branch of the FN in Bouna have shown some 
willingness to disentangle the movement from the local level conflicts that had been the source of 
so much criticism from Bouna residents, particularly from members of the Lobi community. One 
important move in this respect was that soon after dimanche noir, the powers of taxation over the 
local market were officially granted back to the mayor’s office rather than to agents of the FN. 
Although the former rebels retained control over the most lucrative tax bases in the city, 
specifically those on long distance trade, this delegation of authority represented an important 
political move. The reason for this move was simple: it signalled to local populations 
(specifically the Lobi and Lobi women) that goods brought to the market on market day will not 
be taxed by the rebels. Overall, in recognizing their declining legitimacy, the rebels began to limit 
their role as part of the system of everyday governance in Bouna. Maybe the more telling sign in 
this respect was Morou Ouattara’s early admission that he did not plan to seek a political position 
in Bouna after his work with the FN was over. In an interview with the Ivoirian daily Nord-Sud, 
Ouattara claimed that “he is fighting for the development of Bouna, not for a political position,” 
and that “I am not at all interested by an elected post in Bouna” (Kouamé 2007b). Ouattara would 
later accept a position within the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) as the 
commandant de l’Unité d’Attingué, stationed just northwest of Abidjan. In a last attempt to 
control ongoing violence and economic predation in the Ivoirian Northeast, Tuo Fozié, the old 
head of the police and gendarmerie for the FN during the conflict, was named le chef de l’Unité 
de lute contre le racket and administrative préfet for the region of Zanzan by the Ivoirian 
government (Bamba 2012). It remains unclear whether the government’s decision to appoint an 
FN member not stationed in Bouna during the conflict has placated resentment against the rebels 





The case of Bouna could easily support explanations of rebel-civilian relations other than the one 
presented in this dissertation. The FN in Bouna did not create any novel institutional structures. 
They did not engage or seek to mobilize Bouna residents in any meaningful way. They did 
however go to great length to extract resources from the groups under their control. In Bouna, 
payment to the rebels was required at roadblocks entering and exiting the city. If an Ivoirian 
identity card could not be provided, more was expected. Trucks exporting yams and agricultural 
products were taxed heavily, as were the stores and venders in the cities’ central market. Women 
carrying yams between the city and the surrounding countryside were also required to pay. The 
resulting tensions that developed between the rebels and Bouna’s civilian population, particularly 
the Lobi community, might be explained simply by the fact that the FN had significant economic 
stakes in keeping the rebellion alive and that economic motivations trumped any political or 
ideological goals the movement might have had.  
However, the key point to take away from this chapter is that this was only part of the 
explanation of why the rebellion generated so much resistance in this part of the north. As the 
other two case chapters will make clear, the tax demands on civilian populations were a constant 
throughout the north while under rebel occupation. The fact that the FN confronted such 
resistance to their wartime authority is not easily explained by interests or motivations at the root 
of the actions themselves. This chapter shows that the coalitional choices made by the FN in 
Bouna worked to heighten resistance against it. These choices were shaped by the fact that the 
most powerful group in Bouna, the Lobi, brokered Bouna’s relationship with the central state in 
the pre-conflict period. The position of the Lobi community and the power of Lobi elites 
remained conditional on the state’s protection of user rights to land in Côte d’Ivoire’s northeast. 
For the purposes of this study, this had two significant implications.  
First, the sense that the Lobi community was being targeted by the rebels stemmed from 
the fact that representatives of the Lobi community were viewed as agents of the very state that 
the rebels had committed to fighting. As a result, the rebel tax regime, as well as other actions 
taken by the FN, appeared to unevenly target the Lobi as a group. Taxes seemed to target the 
Lobi because they were the dominant economic group and the primary cultivator and exporter of 
yams. Fines levied for not having appropriate national identification were seen to be directed at 
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the Lobi and other migrants or non-native populations (of which the Lobi were the largest group). 
Conversely, the Koulongo stopped contributing to community infrastructural projects. Many Lobi 
felt the Koulongo could do so because they were politically and military backed by the rebels. 
Together, these actions convinced many Lobi that they were the target of the rebellion. Feelings 
of resentment ultimately led to a revolt against the FN led by a number of Lobi youth in Bouna.  
Second, the dependence of the Lobi on the state meant that the FN had few credible 
intermediaries through which to control this part of the north. An underlying cause of the 
contentious relationship between the rebels and the civilian population in Bouna was that the FN 
had no credible social intermediary through which they could draw support. In the first part of 
this chapter I explained how the autonomous political power of the Koulongo monarchy had 
gradually eroded beginning around the colonial period. The migration of the Lobi furthered this 
process. In siding with the Koulongo, the rebels allied with a group that exhibited little capacity 
to enforce rules (particularly those surrounding land) and political order. Overall, neither the 
monarchy nor the emergent Lobi elite (who were tied to the PDCI) could fulfill this role, absent 
the political backing of the state. Consequently, Morou Ouattara, the zone commander in Bouna, 
could draw on little popular support. He did not have a strong social base from which to launch a 
political challenge against the likes of Pale Dimaté. In the cases that follow, hierarchical 
configurations that favored rebel allies (non-broker elites) directly lessened the conflict between 





Chapter 5. Civil War and Enduring Factionalism in 
Korhogo 
After the failed coup d’état in 2002, rebels established control over the northern half of Côte 
d’Ivoire including the major cities of Korhogo and Bouaké. Situated in the middle of the country 
and on the border of the zone de confiance dividing north and south, Bouaké quickly emerged as 
the administrative capital of the northern rebellion. Korhogo played an equally important 
strategic role as a showcase to others – to other northerners, the government in the south, as well 
as international observers (especially inquiring researchers!) – of the quality of governance 
delivered by the FN. One FN administrator emphatically challenged me to compare what the FN 
had done administratively in Korhogo and the north more broadly to other cases of civil war in 
West Africa (particularly in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone). To a degree, my interviewee 
had a point. The rebels had embarked on an extensive campaign to clean up the city, sponsored a 
number of public art projects and repaired a number of buildings that had been damaged in the 
early stages of the conflict. With the aid of a number of international NGOs in the city, public 
services such as health care, education and garbage collection continued to be provided. Given 
the significant steps taken by the FN to try and normalize life during the conflict, it is not 
surprising that the commandant de zone in charge of the city, Fofié Kouakou Martin, gained 
some support for his authority amongst certain groups in Korhogo. After the removal from power 
of former President Laurent Gbagbo in 2011, Martin drew on this support and was named by 
Alassane Ouattara to the new position of commandant de la Compagnie Territoriale in Korhogo.  




Figure 5.1: Map of the administrative Region of Savanes, North-Central Côte d’Ivoire 
(original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara). 
 
Yet this was only part of the story in Korhogo during the conflict period. Although the FN 
as a whole directed relatively limited violence at civilians during the conflict, Martin was the 
only FN member charged with human rights violations by the UN. In fact, Martin was the only 
actor tied to the movement accused of human rights abuses. The political order established by the 
FN in Korhogo was unique compared to the other cases included in this dissertation in terms of 
the quality of wartime governance (which was comparatively superior to other cases) and the 
levels of violence witnessed (which was comparatively higher than in other cases).     
In this chapter, I argue that the level of support garnered by the FN in Korhogo was not 
reducible solely to the behavior of the rebels, which on the surface seemed both conducive and 
counterproductive to mobilizing support. Instead, this chapter suggests that the political 
environment in Korhogo created a distinct set of political opportunities for the rebellion’s local-
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level leadership. These opportunities were themselves a function of the specific position of pre-
conflict elites in Korhogo as brokers between local and national arenas prior to the start of the 
2002 civil war. Since the late 1960s, the Senoufo elite functioned as the principal intermediaries 
through which competing national-level political actors have mobilized support in this part of the 
north. As Boone (2003, ch.5) argues, decisions by national governments to mobilize support 
through Senoufo intermediaries was a direct reflection of the high level of ongoing influence – 
over land, over labour, and over blocks of voters – this group wields up until the present day.  
According to my framework, pre-conflict state brokers are unlikely to ally with rebels 
during armed conflict. Does the fact that the Senoufo elite functioned as brokers during much of 
post-colonial period contradict my argument? I argue that the fact that Senoufo elites have 
historically functioned as brokers in Korhogo does not contradict my argument for two important 
reasons.  
First, since independence, state recognition significantly heightened factional conflict 
between would-be brokers within Senoufo society. In contrast to their Lobi counterparts in 
Bouna, Senoufo elites in Korhogo derived their authority from both an autonomous set of social 
institutions governing land and labour as well as their recognition as local authorities by national-
level political networks based in Abidjan. Lobi elites in Bouna and Senoufo elites in Korhogo 
both benefitted from relatively broad support from the communities they represented. However, 
the fact the Senoufo elites sat atop social hierarchies formed independently of state interventions 
meant that elites in Korhogo could at least potentially function as allies of the rebels after they 
established military control over the city. This potential existed as a result of this group’s 
autonomy from the state and also because state recognition of Senoufo custom promoted conflict 
between competing elite factions who derived their authority from their customary control over 
land and labour. Additionally, the hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN was more 
balanced in Korhogo than in Bouna because competing factions derived their political authority 
from the same set of hierarchical social relationships between elites and subordinate groups. 
Second, beginning in the 1990s, the shift to multiparty politics in Côte d’Ivoire 
fundamentally altered the political landscape in Korhogo. Prior to the 1990s, competing elite 
factions struggled to become the principal set of brokers representing the old single party, the 
PDCI, in Korhogo. Beginning in the 1990s, political liberalization presented opportunities for 
133 
 
Senoufo factions to align themselves with incumbents or competing opposition parties, 
specifically the RDR, whose principal ethno-regional base of support was the north. In the 1995 
presidential elections for example, popular support in Korhogo and the allegiance of different 
Senoufo factions was evenly split between the RDR and the PDCI. By the beginning of the civil 
war, some segments of the Senoufo elite had already distanced themselves from those national-
level politicians whom the FN had committed to removing from power. As this chapter explains, 
zone commander Fofié Martin aligned with the ‘conservative faction’ of the Senoufo elite, a 
group that largely aligned itself with the RDR prior to the beginning of the civil war (such as 
Amadou Gon Coulibaly). Conversely, the ruling FPI sought to mobilize support through elites 
tied to the ‘reformist faction’ of the Senoufo elite (such as Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly and 
Kassoum Coulibaly). Based on my framework, this chapter identifies Korhogo as a case where 
the FN established moderate social control. The rebels confronted resistance and obtained 
support from a set of elites who derived their authority from pre-existing social hierarchies.  
The first half of this chapter examines the history of state-society relations in the Senoufo 
heartland around Korhogo. Specifically, it focuses on two aspects of this history. First, it 
examines the historical processes by which Senoufo elites emerged as brokers in the Korhogo 
region. Resistance to European colonialism, the ultimate imposition of colonial rule, the politics 
of the independence period and the processes of post-colonial state-building all conditioned the 
relationship of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo with communities under their authority and national 
level political circles. The second half of this chapter focuses explicitly on the effects of these 
conflicts on the ability of the FN to garner support for its authority in this part of the north during 
the conflict period (2002-2011). Factional conflict between pre-conflict Senoufo elites in 
Korhogo presented a distinct set of opportunities and constraints that shaped the extent to which 
the FN could build support for its authority in and around Korhogo. As with the other case 
chapters included in this dissertation, the focus of this chapter is on how the unique constellations 
of pre-conflict power and authority confronted by the FN in Korhogo shaped the ability of the 
rebels to garner support.51  
                                                 
51 The case of Korhogo differs from the other cases included in this study in terms of how closely these conflicts 
overlap with other forms of political conflict and competition, including conflict between different FN factions as 
well as electoral competition occurring at both local and national-levels. Does the presence of these sorts of conflicts 
detract from the argument made in this dissertation? I argue that it does not. Others have suggested that heightened 
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Despite the litany of shifting, overlapping conflicts presented in this chapter, the other 
characteristic of Korhogo that stands out is that conflicts over taxation – the principal source of 
conflict in the other two cases discussed in this dissertation – were comparatively muted. In 
Bouna (chapter 4) and Ouangolodougou (chapter 6), conflicts over the authority to tax were 
waged largely between state actors and the rebels challenging them (and the constituencies 
supporting each side). In Bouna, conflicts emerged between the FN and the principal 
intermediaries through which the state governed the northeast, the Lobi elites. And, as the next 
chapter illustrates, the FN allied with a group of prominent traders in Ouangolodougou to block 
efforts made by the mayor’s office to reclaim their authority over local taxation. Conflicts waged 
directly between the state and rebel forces were absent in the case of Korhogo. Instead, the most 
prominent political debate that emerged during the conflict was between competing coalitions 
that were each comprised of different segments of the FN and factions of the pre-conflict Senoufo 
elite. Rather than taxation, questions of succession divided competing elite factions after the 
death of Korhogo’s cantonal chief in 2008.  
 
The Historical Origins of Korhogo’s Senoufo Elite 
Since its submission to French rule at the turn of the 20th century, Korhogo has remained the 
heart of Senoufo society as well as the broader administrative, political and economic center of 
Northern Côte d’Ivoire. Yet, unlike Bouna, which had relatively deep historical roots going back 
to the 16th century, Korhogo’s existence was a direct product of the sweeping changes wrought by 
French colonialism and resistance to it led by Samory Touré’s sofa army. Over the last quarter of 
the 19th century, three competing empires controlled Korhogo at different moments: the 
Kénédugu empire (based in Sikasso, in what is now Southern Mali) between 1883 and 1894, the 
Wassoulou empire (founded by Samory Touré) between 1894 and 1898, and the French 
                                                                                                                                                              
factional conflict at the local level could also shape patterns of cooperation and conflict in these distinct political 
arenas (electoral completion, and rebel group organization and fragmentation). There is an extensive literature 
examining the link between cleavage structures and national party systems. See Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
Zuckerman (1982), Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and Deegan-Krause (2006). Regarding the organization of 
rebellion, Paul Staniland (2012, 148) argues that “the structure of social ties on which an organization was originally 
built shapes the new institutions that emerge. Social divisions and cleavages that existed at the time of organizational 
founding create enduring internal fissures and indiscipline, whereas overlapping social networks makes it possible to 
create new institutions able to control violence”. 
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following Samory’s capture in 1898. In contrast to Bouna – which had its autonomous political 
powers drastically curtailed as a result of Samory’s invasion and subsequent French colonialism 
– the cumulative effect of this series of external occupations was the expansion and 
reinforcement of the social bases of political power enjoyed by the political class in Korhogo. 
Gbon Coulibaly, Korhogo’s old paramount chief, consolidated the political position of his 
descendants through a strategic alliance formed during the late colonial period with future 
President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Although the colonial and post-colonial history of Korhogo 
might be considered a representative case of “indirect rule,” the ability of the Coulibaly family to 
fill this role during this extended period also testifies to the enduring local-level legitimacy this 
group enjoyed leading up to the beginning of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war in 2002.  
Historically, the political clout of Senoufo elites stems from their social control over land 
as well as the labour power of young men. In pre-colonial Senoufo society, farmers employed the 
majority of their labour working large communal fields called segnon or segbo that were 
controlled by senior male lineage (katiolo) heads (Bassett 2001, 98). Access rights – either 
through the opening up of new land or the establishment of new villages by strangers to Senoufo 
communities – required the permission of Senoufo land (tarfolo) chiefs, who were typically 
senior male lineage heads (Coulibaly 1964, 22; Boone 2003, 249). Land in Senoufo villages 
remained perpetually under the control of tarfalo chiefs, who could at any time use their authority 
to reallocate rights and access to land. After the death of village founders, descendants of 
founding lineages were required to get renewed permission to remain on land distributed by 
tarfalo chiefs (Coulibaly 1964, 23-24). This ensured the ongoing authority of tarfalo land chiefs 
over the descendants of settlers within Senoufo communities. 
The authority of elders in traditional Senoufo society was also underwritten by their 
control over the labour power of young men. This control was maintained through a number of 
social institutions, the most prominent of which was the age-grade society, Poro. Poro was an 
initiation process whereby young males passed through successive seven-year stages in order to 
prepare them for senior adult status. During the final stage, junior males were generally expected 
to work the fields of lineage heads and village chiefs. Young men had few choices in terms of 
fulfilling the obligations placed on them by elders during Poro. Through fines or outright 
expulsion from Poro initiation, elders could penalize young men who were unwilling or 
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incapable of fulfilling the duties expected of them. The inability to fulfill these obligations could 
also be met with larger social opprobrium. Not progressing through initiation stages meant that 
young men would never be granted the privileges and esteem reserved exclusively for senior 
males in Senoufo society (Coulibaly 1964, 28-29; Gunderson 1975, 31; Bassett 2001, 98). 
Ultimately, however, what legitimized Poro in the eyes of Senoufo youth was that eventually all 
men who successively passed through all the stages of Poro initiation would be rewarded with 
the status of seniority and the control over the labour of juniors that came with senior status 
(Boone 2003, 251).  
A related mechanism by which elders in Senoufo society could control junior members 
was through their authority over arranged marriage. Bassett suggests that control over women 
and the institution of marriage was the “principal trump card” in the ongoing control over the 
labour power of young men for senior community members (2001, 102). Although there were a 
number of different means by which young men could obtain a wife, all marriages were arranged 
by senior males (usually chiefs or lineage heads). The different means of obtaining a wife were 
all tied to the fulfillment of agricultural work (Bassett 2001, 99). As long as elders were able to 
manage marriage and the access to women for young men, they retained sufficient leverage to 
force young males to labour on collective fields. Bassett suggests that, in instances where more 
direct means of controlling rural labour waned, Senoufo elders could always “recapture the 
labour of young men through their control of marriage arrangements” (2001, 102).52     
By the late 19th century, however, social relations in the Senoufo heartland around 
Korhogo began to change as a result of geopolitical struggles occurring throughout West Africa. 
In particular, village level leaders (lineage heads and village chiefs) confronted challenges to 
their authority over land and labour. Fighting between the Kénédugu leader Babemba Traoré and 
Samory, and later between Samory and the French, exacted a great toll on the rural communities 
surrounding Korhogo. During the fighting, warring parties burnt villages, looting rose, and many 
in rural areas fled their homes. After forming a brief alliance with Babemba Traoré against the 
                                                 
52 For example, Bassett explains that this was the case during the era of forced labour in Côte d’Ivoire when relations 
between senior and junior males came under intense strain. In many cases, changes in the resulting labour 
requirements demanded by Poro or the outright dissolution of Poro societies themselves seriously threatened social 
powers previously enjoyed by senior males in Senoufo society. Labour requirements tied to marriages arranged by 
senior males were a means by which these actors could mitigate these changes (Bassett 2001, 102-103).     
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French, Samory eventually gained total control over the Korhogo region by 1896. Gbon 
Coulibaly, the head of the Tiembara chiefdom near Korhogo, used these geopolitical shifts to 
extend the reach of his own authority. Coulibaly met with Samory and explained that he had no 
intention of challenging Samory’s military ascendency in the region. Samory’s acceptance of 
Gbon’s submission formed the basis of a strategic alliance between these two actors. Korhogo 
would eventually become an important source of slaves and food for Samory’s army. In 
exchange, Korhogo was spared the worst of the violence resulting from Samory’s war-making.  
Overall, this alliance would have significant implications for the spatial distribution of 
human settlement around Korhogo, as well as the quality of authority relations in the city and its 
surrounding rural areas (Gunderson 1975, 38; Bassett 2001, 34-44; Boone 2003, 248). Korhogo’s 
status as a safe zone from Samory’s war efforts made the city an attractive destination for 
migrants from the surrounding countryside looking to escape insecurity. As a result, what had 
been a previously scattered rural population surrounding Korhogo became increasingly 
concentrated in the 15 km circle, or ‘zone dense,’ around Korhogo and the rural villages to the 
south and west of the city. Korhogo’s population became far more concentrated than what could 
be found in other parts of Côte d’Ivoire (Fauré and Labazée 2002, 315; Boone 2003, 248). By 
1975, 60-80% of the villages surrounding Korhogo had more than 700 inhabitants (Bassett 2001, 
47). The significant political implication of these demographic changes was that migrants who 
were looking to settle in the safe zone around Korhogo were forced to submit to the authority of 
Gbon and his subordinate chiefs. Previously, political authority over land and rural labour in 
Senoufo communities had resided solely in the hands of village elders. However, for new arrivals 
to Korhogo, these Senoufo “were thrown into a strange environment where a hierarchy of chiefs 
determined what lands were to be worked and whose granaries should be filled” (Gunderson 
1975, 40). In this emerging local political order, Gbon and his auxiliaries at the village level 
controlled the distribution of land and an increasing share of the rents derived from the economic 
surpluses produced by the labour of young men (Gunderson 1975, 40-42; Fauré and Labazée 
2002, 315). Overall, the changes in authority relations associated with Samory’s wars in the 
Korhogo region contrasted greatly with the experience of Bouna. In Bouna, drastic population 
decline and displacement significantly limited the autonomy of the old kingdom. In Korhogo, 
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Samory’s occupation enhanced the political power of the chiefly establishment headed by the 
patriarch of the Coulibaly family, Gbon.       
Colonialism and the Threatened Legitimacy of the Chiefly Class in Korhogo 
Korhogo was officially brought under colonial rule soon after Samory Touré’s defeat and capture 
by French forces in 1898. In reaction, and sensing the inevitability of French dominance at this 
moment, Samory’s former ally in Korhogo, Gbon Coulibaly, switched his allegiance to the 
emerging colonial power and welcomed them “as liberators” of the Ivoirian North (Lawler 1993, 
207, quoted in Boone 2003, 252). France responded positively to this overture. Gbon was named 
as the Paramount Chief in Korhogo. Administrative units were drawn largely in line with the 
boundaries established by the pre-existing chiefly hierarchy. As Paramount Chief, Gbon retained 
the powers to name chiefs in colonial cantons and villages under his control. Overall, as Boone 
writes, the French sought “to harness Senoufo chiefly hierarchies to the colonial cause” (Boone 
2003, 252).  
Alliances with the chiefly establishment in the Senoufo heartland were particularly 
important in terms of colonial efforts in expanding cotton production in this part of the north. 
French colonial administrators drew on pre-existing chiefly administrative structures to mobilize 
resources and labour and stimulate cotton production. Material incentives won the allegiances of 
Senoufo chiefs and align their interests with that of the colonial state. Colonial chiefs were 
permitted to keep 10% of the head taxes they collected from the villages they controlled (Bassett 
1988, 272). Chiefs were also given credit extensions and gifts from European merchant houses to 
stimulate the demand for commercial goods and provide increased incentives for chiefs to 
ultimately find ways to ratchet up cotton production (Bassett 1988, 273). In addition, chiefs who 
did not meet production or revenue demands set by the colonial state were commonly beaten and 
publically humiliated by French administrators (Bassett 1988, 273; 2001, 61-62). Together, these 
features of colonial polity ensured that chiefs and their subordinates would, for the most part, 
follow French directives. These political arrangements underpinned the development of the 
cotton sector in the Senoufo heartland during the first quarter century of colonial rule (Bassett 
2001, 80-81). 
Yet the legitimacy of this political system and the place of the Senoufo chiefly hierarchy 
within it became seriously jeopardized as the colonial project wore on. Seemingly irresolvable 
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conflicts quickly emerged between the economic interests of the colonial state and the political 
system colonial administrators used to control and manage cotton production in the north (Fauré 
and Labazée 2002, 316). The declining legitimacy of the chiefly hierarchy in Korhogo was 
caused by two specific aspects of the system of land and labour allocation put in place by the 
colonial state. First, as a result of the global economic downturn in the 1920s and subsequent 
increased French dependence on American cotton, French administrators began to increase cotton 
production requirements for rural producers. As a strategy for furthering cotton production, 
French administrators increased head taxes to force famers to produce more (in order to pay 
them). They also built a number of official market places where farmers were forced to sell their 
cotton in the hopes of stemming sales through black market channels where prices for cotton 
were typically higher (Bassett 1988, 276). In 1926, colonial administrators also increased the 
labour obligations of young men working on public infrastructure projects and the rapidly 
growing southern cocoa-growing zone. Since establishing colonial rule at the turn of the 19th 
century, French officials widely viewed the north as an important source of labour for southern 
plantations. The French relied on local intermediaries tied to the colonial state to mobilize the 
labor power of young men.  In the 1920s, these colonial labour requirements began to increase 
dramatically. In 1928, 7,803 young men from the Korhogo region were sent to work in the south 
(Bassett 1988, 277). In the 1930s, the colonial state forced 6,000 men to leave their villages every 
six months as conscripted labourers to work on southern plantations (Bassett 1988, 279-280).  
The cumulative effect of these labour obligations on the Senoufo heartland was 
disastrous. The labour requirements of the colonial state directly challenged the capacity of 
northern communities to produce adequate food crops. By 1929, food shortages were reported in 
many parts of the north. Food costs skyrocketed. Bassett writes that there were some reports in 
Korhogo and Boundiali of individuals selling themselves into slavery for 100 francs as a strategy 
for dealing with the inflated cost of food (Bassett 2001, 77). Forced labour and the resulting food 
shortage also directly undermined the traditional social basis of production in Senoufo society. 
Bassett reports that by 1930 many katiolo (production units controlled by senior male lineage 
heads) began to dissolve and break into smaller units of production comprised of maternal 
brothers and their families. Food production was managed by these smaller social groupings 
while cotton continued to be cultivated on communal fields controlled by colonial chiefs. Simply 
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put, the excesses of the French forced-labour regime enforced by the chiefly hierarchy were 
undermining the very institutions on which the system itself depended. The crisis in food 
production severely undercut any remaining legitimacy enjoyed by colonial chiefs. Conflicts 
emerged between village elders and chiefs tied to the colonial state over control over economic 
surpluses generated by the labour of village youth. Overall, colonial administrators increasingly 
complained about “the declining authority of village chiefs, which ‘too often’ required 
administrators to intervene to ensure their orders were being carried out” (Bassett 1988, 278). 
Together, the intertwined crises of food production and rural leadership in the Senoufo region 
seriously threatened colonial economic interests in the region. In the Kong district, south of 
Korhogo, cotton production was abandoned in 1931 and 1932. Cotton exports from Côte d’Ivoire 
as a whole in 1932 represented only one quarter of the tonnage exported in 1927 and 1928 
(Bassett 2001, 78). 
By the 1930’s, in recognizing the declining legitimacy enjoyed by the cantonal chiefs, 
France enacted some reforms to the system of native rule in the Korhogo region. First, colonial 
administrators reorganized the marketing of cotton production in ways that largely bypassed the 
chiefs. Lineage heads and village elders began to play a more prominent role in this respect. 
Harvests were purchased directly from village-level leaders. Inputs such as seeds were also 
distributed directly to these actors. The goal was to create incentives for producers to increase 
output and improve the quality of cotton. To meet these objectives, colonialists aimed to bolster 
the legitimacy of customary institutions on which cotton production so heavily relied. French 
administrators provided cantonal chiefs monthly salaries to limit the arbitrary amounts they 
appropriated directly from peasant production. While the aim was to enhance the legitimacy of 
these actors, this move had mixed effects in this respect because it ultimately rendered chiefs 
almost entirely dependent on resources derived from the state for their political survival (Boone 
2003, 256-257).        
Not surprisingly, many of the cantonal chiefs openly supported France during the 
nationalist period beginning in the 1940s (Gunderson 1975, 81). Their colonial-era dependence 
on the French made cantonal chiefs, as a group, generally hesitant to openly support the 
nationalist movement led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny and the Ivoirian branch of the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire 
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(PDCI). The important exception here was the widely revered Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly. 
Once the strategic ally of both Samory Touré and the French in the region, Gbon finally broke 
with the French and the rest of the chiefly establishment in Korhogo in 1945 as a result of the 
growing excesses of the French forced labour regime. Gbon’s call to support the ascendant 
Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI against the French won most Senoufo over to the nationalist 
side. The PDCI relied heavily on the political support from the Korhogo region to win seats in the 
French National Assembly in 1945 and 1946. When forced labour ended in 1946, Houphouët-
Boigny and his local ally, Gbon Coulibaly, gained celebrity status, particularly in the Senoufo 
heartland around Korhogo (Boone 2003, 258-259). 
With the exception of Gbon, the chiefly establishment in this part of the north supported 
France’s initial opposition to the nationalist movement led by the PDCI-RDA. For these actors, 
the old system of forced labour represented one of the last remaining mechanisms of 
accumulating resources independently of the colonial state. Many colonial chiefs recognized that 
supporting the growing nationalist movement would jeopardize the backing they received from 
the colonial state for their local positions of authority. Colonial chiefs had much to lose largely 
because they enjoyed little legitimacy amongst the broader northern population. But the 
exception again was Gbon. For his unwavering support of Houphouët-Boigny, Gbon was 
removed from his position as Paramount Chief in Korhogo by the French and replaced by his 
son, Bema Coulibaly (Labazée 1993a, 228; Boone 2003, 260). Thus, while the autonomous 
power of much of the Senoufo elite declined dramatically as result of abuses during the colonial 
period, two groups appeared to retain significant political influence in the region. First, Gbon 
Coulibaly remains revered to this day by the Senoufo for his stance against the forced-labour 
regime imposed by the French. His descendants too, have benefitted from this legitimacy. 
Second, male lineage heads retained significant social control over land and labour and, at this 
moment, represented the central partners through which the French sought to economically 
‘develop’ the Senoufo heartland.      
Nonetheless, the PDCI chose to build its base of support around a variety of disaffected, 
‘anti-elite’ forces in the Korhogo region. Gunderson (1975, 83) writes that, “during most of the 
1950s, PDCI militants recruited from the ranks of the civil service, the Dyula community and 
disaffected Senoufo who used the memory and abuses of the colonial era, such as forced labour, 
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to advance their cause among the general population”. In 1962, the PDCI designated another one 
of Gbon’s sons, Dramane Coulibaly, as their key representative in the region. In sharp contrast to 
Bema, however, Dramane, who was eighth in the line of succession, had little opportunity to 
advance in the local political arena without external support (Gunderson 1975, 85).53 As a result, 
Dramane and the PDCI built up a political network of support from other politically marginalized 
groups, particularly Dyula traders based in Korhogo and elsewhere in the North (Gunderson 
1975, 81; Boone 2003, 260-261). These constituencies would form the basis of PDCI’s emerging 
political order in the Korhogo region leading into the early post-colonial period.   
 
Marginalizing the Dyula Community in Early Post-Colonial Korhogo    
In the context of the late colonial period, the PDCI’s strategy of mobilizing support through 
Dramane and Korhogo’s community of Dyula traders made sense. Chiefly opposition to the 
PDCI, as well as the declining legitimacy of this group as a whole, necessitated that Houphouët-
Boigny mobilize support through an alternative set of actors. Yet the underlying assumption of 
this strategy was that the Senoufo elite was uniformly threatened by this legitimacy crisis. This 
sub-section highlights that this was clearly not the case. The descendants of Gbon benefited from 
the legitimacy bestowed upon them as result of the reverence for Korhogo’s founder that 
continues to this day. Senior male lineage heads in the Senoufo region surrounding Korhogo also 
enjoyed ongoing authority over land and labour. Enduring support for these actors ultimately 
meant that any effort to bypass or restrict the political clout of this group as intermediaries would 
provoke significant resistance. This sub-section describes these dynamics and suggests that, 
while the authority of these groups was indeed threatened during this period, they ultimately 
emerged as the key brokerage group bridging Korhogo with national-level political circles.   
Throughout the north, Dyula merchants have played prominent roles within local political 
and economic landscapes. The word Dyula can mean a number of things. For most observers, 
Dyula as a social category refers to Manding speaking Muslim traders who have migrated 
throughout West Africa from what is now Mali, beginning as far back as the 13th century. In 
                                                 
53 Although Bema was originally installed by the French after their removal of Gbon Coulibaly as the Korhogo 
Paramount Chief, he was Gbon’s eldest son, and thus widely recognized as the legitimate heir to the Paramount 
Chieftaincy after Gbon’s death.  
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some cases, Dyula can also refer to a distinct cultural or ethnic category, describing people who 
are Malinké (Launay 1982, 1-3). Overall, the label ‘Dyula’ can refer to social, religious, 
occupational, or linguistic differences depending on the context in which the reference is used.  
In Northern Côte d’Ivoire, Dyula relationships to their Senoufo hosts varied. In some 
cases, as in Kadioha or Boron to the south of Korhogo, or Nielle to the north, Dyula migrants 
founded chiefdoms that were largely independent of their Senoufo hosts (Launay 1982, 20; 
1988). In other cases, such as Koko, the principal Dyula neighbourhood in Korhogo, Dyula 
traders established themselves as clients of Senoufo chiefs. Not unlike in pre-colonial Bouna, 
coexistence between these groups was predicated on the different occupational functions they 
fulfilled. While most Senoufo are widely considered to be “a farming people,” most Dyula were 
preoccupied with one of three principal pursuits: warfare, Islamic scholarship or trade (Launay 
1982, 19, 41).  
Despite their prominent position in Korhogo as nodes in regional trading networks, the 
political influence of Dyula traders was typically restricted in a variety of ways. Most important, 
and in contrast to their Senoufo hosts, Dyula authority was far more decentralized. While 
Senoufo elders drew upon a host of shared organizational mechanisms (Poro, arranged marriage) 
to support their local positions of authority, Dyula communities were commonly divided 
internally along a number of different horizontal and vertical cleavages. Dyula communities (in 
Koko in Korhogo and elsewhere) are traditionally organized according to distinct kabilas, or 
extended family units, headed by a senior male and constituted by attached wives, slaves and 
children. Dyula communities could be made up of a number of different kabilas defined 
according to occupational categories (trade, warfare, scholarship). They are also divided at the 
leadership level. Individual kabilas have both a religious/intellectual head (imam) and a political 
chief (mansa), which despite their distinct functions, “both assumed leadership over the entire 
community” (Launay 1982, 29). Additionally, Dyula communities could also be divided 
according to waves of migration. In Koko, Imams from Kadioha and Boron (Dyula villages to the 
south of Korhogo), Kong, Dia, Nioro, Siakasso and Bobo-Dioulasso have all come to Korhogo 
and competed for religious and political dominance. Labazée writes that, by actively promoting 
rivalries amongst these different factions, Gbon Coulibaly limited the political threat of Dyula 
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elites. After Samory’s capture, this was one important reason why there was no “Islamic 
resistance” to colonialism in Korhogo (1993a, 224; 1993b, 130).  
Moreover, Dyula traders and religious figure heads had little incentive to resist the 
colonial project largely because they, along with the chiefly class in Korhogo, were the principal 
beneficiaries of European rule. Dyula traders used their position within existing regional trade 
networks, as well as their access to capital to exploit new economic opportunities that the 
development of the colonial cotton sector opened up. Many Dyula played significant roles in the 
growth of the cotton sector either directly as producers of cotton or as intermediaries purchasing 
crops for export (Gunderson 1975, 63; Boone 2003, 260). However, in contrast to the colonial 
chiefs who eventually became direct political targets of the nationalist movement, the Dyula 
community in Korhogo saw their privileged position protected, or arguably enhanced, during the 
late colonial period. During this period, the Dyula community became the central ally of the local 
branch of the PDCI and the reformist, anti-chief faction of the Coulibaly family led by Dramane 
Coulibaly (Gunderson 1975, 80-81; Boone 2003, 260). Alliances with national level PDCI 
politicians provided the Dyula community some political autonomy vis-à-vis traditional power 
brokers (namely Senoufo chiefs) at the local level. 
One important implication of this alliance was that many Dyula and other ethnic 
“strangers” to the Korhogo region began to use their ties to the PDCI to challenge the traditional 
Senoufo hierarchy for local-level authority and control. Gunderson (1975, 86) explains how, 
during the run-up to National Assembly elections of 1956, “the harassment of village chiefs 
intensified. Party secretaries at the subprefecture and village level began to replace chiefs as the 
major intermediaries between the government and the people”. The political challenge to the 
Senoufo establishment intensified in the early post-colonial period. Cissé Mory Kounandi, a 
prominent Dyula politician from Koko became the PDCI Secretary General of the Korhogo sub-
section (Labazée 1993b, 133). Dramane Coulibaly remained the key political intermediary 
between Korhogo and the national-level PDCI (Boone 2003, 261). Pierre-Koblan Huberson, a 
key ally of Dramane and a PDCI central-committee member since the 1940s, was appointed as 
the departmental prefect of Korhogo (Gunderson 1975, 112-113). Conversely, the mobilization 
strategies employed by the PDCI in Korhogo politically excluded many prominent Senoufo 
notables. In 1963, National Assembly member Gon Coulibaly (grandson of Gbon) and others 
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were charged with plotting against the government of Houphouët-Boigny. Paramount chief Bema 
Coulibaly was also implicated. Although his rivals were eventually acquitted of these charges, 
Dramane used this context to politically side-line many within the Senoufo establishment. 
Gbon’s eldest son Bema chose self-imposed exile over continued persecution by the local 
branches of the PDCI (Gunderson 1975, 114-115). Dramane used the legal and coercive backing 
of his allies in Abidjan to punish any behaviour that was deemed to inhibit “economic and social 
development” in the North, thereby furthering the marginalization of the conservative faction of 
the Senoufo elite (Gunderson 1975, 115; see also 124-125).   
 As Boone explains, Abidjan’s attempts at ‘usurping’ the political and social privileges 
that were previously reserved for lineage heads and senior males in Senoufo society ultimately 
had a number of significant political and economic costs (2003, 262). This was because key 
segments of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo still retained significant influence (particularly the 
Coulibaly family and senior lineage heads). Dyula dominance of the local branches of the PDCI 
resulted in increasing resentment from the majority Senoufo population, who began to feel that 
these ‘strangers’ were effectively blocking their own avenue for success (Gunderson 1975, 121).   
The strategy of marginalizing Senoufo notables also ran at cross-purposes with the goal of 
promoting economic development in the north. After independence, the post-colonial state aimed 
to expand cotton production to encourage economic development in this part of the north. 
Extension agents recognized early on that the key to achieving this goal was stemming the tide of 
emigration of young Senoufo men.  This had remained a significant ongoing problem since the 
colonial period. PDCI leaders agreed that gaining the support of village elders and customary 
authorities was central to this goal. Unlike the Dyula administrators within the local branch of the 
PDCI, the elders in Senoufo could potentially limit the outflow of young men by drawing on the 
authority they continued to wield at the community level. The crux of the problem was that “the 
Korhogo PDCI was antagonizing and fomenting discontent among the old Senoufo elite just 
when the agricultural services were attempting to work through the old social institutions to 
expand commodity production in this region” (Boone 2003, 267). 
By 1970, the national-level PDCI announced that the party leadership would be touring 
the country to discuss upcoming elections at the sub-section and village committee level. The 
goal of these elections was to renew local party leadership at the sub-section and village 
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committee levels to quell political dissent in Korhogo and elsewhere (Gunderson 1975, 129). In 
the Korhogo region, the national party took drastic measures to address political tensions 
generated by the party’s policy of sidelining the Senoufo nobility.  The result of these changes 
was a stark reversal in power relations between competing factions at the local level. National 
level party leaders removed Dramane and the majority of his subordinates in the villages 
surrounding Korhogo from their administrative positions. In contrast, national elites promoted 
members of the old Senoufo establishment to positions of local leadership within the PDCI party-
state. These changes started in 1970 when the PDCI replaced Pierre-Koblan Huberson as prefect 
with the high-ranking PDCI politician Fily Cissoko. Cissoko was charged with reconciling the 
competing Korhogo factions. Soon after Cissoko’s appointment, the national party ramped up the 
pace and scope of reform. Gon Coulibaly (the grandson of Gbon, and victim of the party purges 
in the 1960s) became one of three Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly during the Fifth 
Party Congress in October 1970 (Gunderson 1975, 130). Lanzeni Coulibaly, a close friend of 
Gon and Korhogo native, was appointed to the PDCI political bureau. Poro Silué, a close friend 
of Houphouët-Boigny and native of the town Sirasso (40 miles southwest of Korhogo) succeeded 
in getting the important Senoufo town of Sirasso, rather than neighbouring Kanaroba, named as 
the site of a newly created sub-prefecture. Silué also successfully spearheaded a movement to 
replace a Dramane lieutenant residing in Kanaroba as the new Secretary General of the new 
prefecture (Gunderson 1975, 131). Bema Coulibaly, who, like Gbon before him, had once been a 
powerful ally of the French, returned from exile and gained renewed popularity as the cantonal 
chief in Korhogo. Overall, the PDCI completely overhauled the political machine they had 
originally implanted in the Korhogo region led by Dramane and comprised of many Dyula and 
other traditional political ‘outsiders’. The party replaced this group with members the old 
Senoufo aristocracy. Rather than confronting the village establishment, political leaders began to 
work with Senoufo elders. In effect, the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite headed by Gon 
and Bema Coulibaly captured the local branch of PDCI. The political influence of Dyula notables 
linked to Dramane was substantially circumscribed at this time. From this point on, the Senoufo 
elite has functioned as the state’s principal brokers in Korhogo. 
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Factional Conflict in Post-Colonial Korhogo 
The re-ascendance of the Senoufo notables and their incorporation into the local branches of the 
PDCI party-state did not quell political conflict in the Senoufo heartland. While this group, 
specifically the direct descendants of the old Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly, would emerge as 
the dominant set of actors over the coming decades within the local Korhogo political milieu, 
their ascendency would not lessen factional conflicts within this group. Even the political 
conflicts that led to the 1970 reforms to local-level leadership were, at their core, conflicts 
between opposing Senoufo factions looking to gain advantage vis-à-vis each other through 
appeals to different national (the colonial and post-colonial state) and local level constituencies 
(the Dyula, marginal Senoufo elites or the Senoufo establishment). During the late colonial and 
the early independence periods, the Dyula community in Korhogo supported one of these 
Senoufo factions (the reformist faction led by Dramane) over another (the conservative faction 
led by Bema and Gon).  
Factional conflicts between Gbon’s descendants endured largely as a result of three 
factors. First, because of the limited historical depth of the Paramount Chiefdom in Korhogo, 
rules over succession and inheritance from one generation to another were hardly clear. There 
were few broadly accepted rules, norms or social institutions capable of resolving these conflicts 
at the local level. As a consequence, contests over the rules governing succession were typically 
resolved through the intervention of national-level actors based in Abidjan. Thus, a common 
feature of Korhogo politics during the post-colonial period was how local level actors used 
relationships with national-level actors to gain advantage over rivals (Labazée 1993a, 220, 234). 
Second, authority gradually dispersed itself amongst Gbon’s descendants. As Labazée explains, 
Gbon’s sons and grandsons used their privileged social positions to gain economic, political and 
educational prominence. Throughout the post-colonial period, Coulibaly family members used 
their footings in these different backgrounds to establish some autonomy from one another and 
the hierarchical gerontocratic order first established by Gbon (Labazée 1993a, 220).54 Finally, 
                                                 
54 Lenardo Villalon (1999, 134) describes similar processes related to maraboutic authority in Senegal. He writes:  
“In the 1990s, new tensions have arisen as the transition to the third generation approaches. The large number of 
potential heirs among the grandsons of the founders, uncertainties about seniority and ambiguities in the rules of 
succession have fueled intense competition among the younger generation for the allegiance of disciples of the order. 
In the Mouride order, the transition to the next generation is imminent, as only one living son of the founder remains 
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factionalism between rival elements within the Coulibaly family heightened as the political 
system in Côte d’Ivoire gradually opened up through the holding of municipal and legislative 
elections, beginning in the 1980s. Electoral competition created space for heightened conflict at 
the local-level because (a) it legitimized political competition at the local-level that was not 
directly regulated by the Coulibaly hierarchy itself and (b) because local level politicians could 
enhance their autonomy vis-à-vis (or jump ahead of others in) the Coulibaly family hierarchy by 
seeking protection from other potential political patrons based in Abidjan.    
By 1980, the PDCI was already under domestic and international pressure to democratize 
the political system that had been tightly controlled by the party-state since independence. The 
1980 municipal and legislative elections represented an important turning point in Korhogo as 
well, because it was the first time that the Coulibaly family was not able to completely informally 
regulate the selection of candidates behind closed doors.55 From this point on, electoral success 
would depend on the extent to which Coulibaly family members could mobilize broad local 
support for their candidatures. In the 1980 municipal and legislative elections, there were two 
principal candidates, the young lawyer Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, who represented the reformist 
tradition inherited from Dramane, and the more experienced Gon-Pilé Coulibaly, who embodied 
the conservative faction. The key themes and bases of support of the respective candidates also 
echoed these older divisions. Lanciné Gon ran under the banner Korhogo nouveau and drew 
support from educated but disaffected Dyula and Senoufo youth. Gon-Pilé, of course, drew 
heavily on support from the conservative faction of Senoufo elite (Gaye 1998, 126). Although 
Lanciné Gon emerged victorious in both the municipal and legislative elections in 1980, the 
implications of these victories were short-lived because of interventions by Gon-Pilé’s capital-
based allies.  
The national PDCI displayed dissatisfaction with the political instability caused by these 
conflicts. As a result, and not unlike the politico-administrative reforms introduced in 1970, in 
                                                                                                                                                              
in addition to the aged reigning caliph. The Tijanis in Tivaouane faced the transition to the third generation at the 
death of the caliph in September 1998. In both of these cases, the generational tensions surrounding succession have 
had important consequences in terms of the movements I will discuss below.” 
55 Gaye writes that “ …on observe de façon générale que cette ouverture politique, même, contrôlée, bouleverse la 
hiérarchie et surtout des habitudes déjà bien établie. Ensuite, la chefferie n’a pu empêcher l’émergence de 
candidatures ‘sauvages’ et éviter un conflit fratricide dans la famille Gon Coulibaly. La violence des affrontements 
n’avait aucune motivation idéologique entre des candidates se réclament de même parti de la famille” (1998, 119).  
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1980 and 1981, the national party sent a number of delegations (missions de réconciliations) to 
localities across Côte d’Ivoire in an attempt to quell the factionalism unleashed by the 1980 
municipal and legislative single party elections. Proposed reforms aimed to mitigate the 
perceived threat Lanciné Gon and his supporters posed to the Korhogo political machine that had 
been relied upon by the state to mobilize support and resources in this part of the north since the 
1960s. In August of 1981, the PDCI replaced two figures – Jean Baptiste Elloh (the Korhogo 
prefect), and Mamadou Sylla (the head of the Korhogo sub-prefect), both of whom had strong 
ties to Lanciné Gon – with actors that were more acceptable to the national party and the chiefly 
establishment in Korhogo. Lanciné Gon found himself in a precarious position. Hostilities came 
to the forefront when the newly elected mayor refused to meet high ranking PDCI minister Balla 
Keïta at the Korhogo airstrip during his visit to the north. Lanciné Gon was ultimately removed 
as mayor for alleged corruption and replaced by Yéo Ténéna Victor (Gaye 1998, 135-137). Not 
forgetting the lessons learned in 1980, the national party worked closely with the Korhogo 
cantonal chief, Tiémoko Coulibaly, leading up the 1985 municipal and legislative elections to 
devise an electoral list (Union pour la paix et le progress de Korhogo) deemed acceptable by the 
national PDCI as well as the conservative faction in Korhogo. This list was imposed on Korhogo 
voters rather than allowing different family members to run against each other (Gaye 1998, 139-
142). In order to heal the divisions within the Coulibaly family holding over from the 1980 
elections, Lanciné Gon was on the ticket for one of the two Korhogo seats in the National 
Assembly in 1985 (Gaye 1998, 140-141). Nonetheless, the message was clear: after a brief 
opening, the single party had effectively clamped back down on political competition because of 
the perceived risks to political order it presented.  
Nonetheless, the national PDCI could not prevent the re-emergence of these conflicts 
forever. By the 1990s, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI conceded to intense domestic and 
international pressure and committed to hold democratic elections. Political competition revived 
factional rivalries that had been briefly contained by the PDCI and the Korhogo establishment 
during the 1980s. Lanciné Gon once again figured prominently in these debates. In 1990, the 
initial opposition rose from a coalition of political parties (Coordination de la Gauche 
Démocratique), which included the Parti Ivoirian des Travaillers (PIT), L’Union des Sociaux 
Démocratique, the Parti Socialiste Ivoirien (PSI) and the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) led by 
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future Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo. The FPI represented the principal party in the 
Coordination. Lanciné Gon’s decision to join the FPI radically altered the Korhogo political 
landscape and earned the scorn of much of the Korhogo establishment, which still 
overwhelmingly supported the old single-party. As a result, Lanciné Gon soon found himself 
again ostracized from both the Senoufo elite in Korhogo and the national-level PDCI; so much so 
that, by the time of the elections in November 1990, he switched sides again and made his way 
back to the PDCI. This ultimately left the FPI without any real local footing in Korhogo. Despite 
his decision to return, many PDCI loyalists doubted Lanciné Gon’s loyalty to the ruling party 
(Gaye 1998, 168-170, 190, 194, 200).  
More than the ‘controlled’ democratic openings in 1980, 1985 and 1990, the presidential 
elections in 1995 significantly heightened factional conflict between Coulibaly family members 
for one important reason. The founding of the Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR), led by 
Alassane Ouattara in 1994 represented a strong, credible political alternative to the PDCI for 
northern voters. Although the RDR did not begin necessarily as a ‘northern’ party, the north 
quickly became the base for the RDR’s opposition to the PDCI largely because of Henri Bedié’s 
efforts to marginalize Ouattara from competing in the 1995 elections through the promotion of 
ivoirité (Crook 1997, 226-229). Overnight, the citizenship status of many ‘northerners’ 
(particularly those living in the southern part of the country) was thrown into question. For 
northerners, the RDR was widely perceived as the one party defending equal citizenship rights 
for all Ivoirians. Moreover, the presence of two credible political alternatives, the PDCI and the 
RDR (as well as the FPI) drastically weakened the ability of the Coulibaly hierarchy to control 
factional divisions between its members (Gaye 1998, 230). The challenge for political rivals 
within the Coulibaly family, as well as for the voting public, was to pick and side with the 
winning party of the elections at the national level.  
To make inroads into Korhogo political networks, Ouattara chose to ally with a relative 
upstart in Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Amadou was young, under 40 at the time, and the son of the 
long-time National Assembly member in Korhogo, Gon-Pilé Coulibaly (see above). The PDCI 
leader Henri Bedié sided with Kassoum Coulibaly. Like Amadou Gon, Kassoum was grandson 
the old Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly. However, unlike Amadou Gon, Kassoum gained his 
wealth and notoriety as a businessman and head of the Syndicat National des Transporteurs et 
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Marchandises et Voyageurs de Côte d’Ivoire (SYNTMVCI). Lanciné Gon was overlooked by 
each of the two major parties largely because of his breaks with the Coulibaly family (in 1980) 
and the PDCI (in 1990), and the resultant decline in his credibility with the population in 
Korhogo (Gaye 1998, 229-230, 256). In the end, the battle for the Korhogo vote pitted Kassoum 
and his running mate, Kafana Coulibaly against Amadou Gon and his running mate Adama 
Coulibaly. The FPI fielded a slate of political ‘nobodies’ and had little impact on the outcome of 
the vote in this part of the north. Amadou Gon, Adama and the RDR eventually won the 
legisltative elections.56 In the election for the Korhogo prefecture, the candidate tied to Amadou 
Gon emerged victorious. In the 1996 municipal elections, Adama Coulibaly ran and was elected 
mayor of Korhogo (Gaye 1998, 262-264). Amadou Gon Coulibaly was voted in as mayor during 
Côte d’Ivoire’s 2001 municipal elections, just prior to the beginning of the 2002 civil war. 
Overall, the emergence of the RDR and the ascendency of Amadou Gon during this election 
represented a dramatic shift in terms of factional and party politics in the Korhogo region. The 
alliance between the RDR and the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite meant that some 
elements of the Senoufo elite could potentially ally with the rebels during the conflict because 
they did not function as brokers immediately prior to the civil war.  
 
The Civil War in Korhogo 
During numerous frank conversations, Bouna residents listed a variety of criticisms related to the 
northern rebellion and the quality of governance provided by the FN, often contrasting and 
comparing the city’s situation to that of Korhogo. Many in Bouna and elsewhere across the north 
suggested that Korhogo represented an exceptional case of rebel governance compared to 
elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire and in West Africa more broadly (specifically the civil wars in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia). Surely any observer in Korhogo, particularly during the later stages of the 
rebel occupation, would be struck by the level of investment, at least at a superficial level, that 
the rebel leadership headed by commandant Fofié Martin Kouakou put into the city.  
                                                 
56 The RDR won the Korhogo commune with 56.56% of the vote. The PDCI received 46.11% and the FPI 1.33% 
(Gaye 1998, 362).   
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Commandant Fofié’s policy of ‘developing the city’ included a variety of things. The FN 
under his command invested in the city’s infrastructure (Förster 2010, 715). Fofié built a new 
vegetable market for women selling their produce in the central commercial area in Korhogo (see 
fig. 7.2). He also established a new cultural center in the downtown area and repaired the building 
housing the mayor’s office, which had been heavily damaged during the initial stages of the 
conflict (see fig. 7.3). In terms of basic services and public goods, Fofié’s initial legitimacy 
emerged from his capacity to control crime and violence in the city, which had been a growing 
problem even before the beginning of the civil war (see below). During the partition of the 
country, electricity was free for Korhogo residents and water supplies remained fairly reliable. 
The creation of the comité de surveillance des examens ensured the functioning of schools and 
the holding of exams for students in Korhogo (Molle-Laurencon 2007). While the city was under 
his control, Fofié also invited popular participation in a movement to clean-up the city through 
the picking up and removal of trash. Finally, Fofié oversaw a number of cultural projects in the 
city. The “Monument to the Unknown Soldier” (monument du soldat inconnu) was erected in 
2009 during celebrations of the sixth anniversary of the rebellion and depicted a rebel with a 
Kalashnikov and grenade in hand (fig. 7.4, Förster 2012). The FN in Korhogo also erected 
monuments to celebrate Senoufo culture and the important social roles of women in Ivoirian 
society (fig. 7.5). Fofié Martin sponsored the painting of several murals on the walls lining major 
roads. Each image captured themes related to Senoufo culture, youth, gender or the northern 
rebellion itself (see Figures 7.6 and 7.7 as examples).  
Despite these contributions, the Com’zone headed by Fofié Martin in Korhogo did 
generate some dissatisfaction regarding its management of the city, not unlike elsewhere in the 
north. During the decade-long de facto partition of the country, Fofié was the only leader on the 
FN side to have sanctions imposed on him by the UN Security Council.  The charges against him 
were many: recruitment and use of child soldiers, imposition of forced labour, sexual violence 
against women, and arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings. Additionally, Fofié became the 
principal beneficiary of the lucrative war economies controlled by the FN in this part of the north. 
Korhogo and Com’zone 10 more broadly (of which Ouangolodougou was a part, see the 
following chapter) represented central nodes in the commercial networks in cocoa, coffee, 
diamonds and other natural resources running through the territory under the FN’s control. 
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According to the NGO Global Witness, Fofié “exploited to the full the strategic location of 
Korhogo” (2007, 38). Fofié had interests in almost every aspect of the Korhogo and broader 
northern economies. He had investments in real estate, mining, telecommunications, transport 
and fuel. He owned a total of twelve homes, including two in Bouaké as well as a number in 
Burkina Faso and Korhogo. Additionally, he owned a number of bars, hotels and dance-clubs in 
Korhogo and elsewhere. From his assets in real estate, hotels, bars and diamonds, the UN 
Security Council’s Group of Exports on Côte d’Ivoire reported that in 2011 Fofié earned an 
estimated 439,900,000 CFAs, or approximately 860,500 USD (United Nations Security Council 
2011, 67; Global Witness 2007, 38). 
An elaborate local system of taxation contributed greatly to the wealth accumulated by 
Fofié and the rest of the rebel leadership in Korhogo. In this sense, the Com’zone headed by Fofié 
was not entirely different from other administrative Com’zones established by the FN elsewhere 
in Northern Côte d’Ivoire. During the conflict, the local administration as well as the national 
level leadership in Bouaké through La Centrale, increasingly regulated the set of taxes demanded 
by the FN in Korhogo. Amounts required for passage through Korhogo for trucks, as well as 
amounts for individual cars and motorcycles, were maintained at rates comparable to elsewhere 
in the north. Residents paid 7000 CFAs per truck, or 16 USD and 400 to 500 CFAs per car and 
200 to 300 CFAs per motorcycle (Förster, forthcoming, 20).57 Bassett (2011b) writes that cashew 
trucks leaving Korhogo for ports in Southern Côte d’Ivoire paid a total 490,000 CFAs in taxes to 
the rebels (plus 125,000 CFAs to government agents in the south).58 Locally, Fofié tried to 
control the resources procured by soldiers at military checkpoints by naming a series of 
administratively recognized checkpoints (distinguished from informal ones established by 
elements within the rebellion looking to earn some extra money) and by fixing the amount that 
was demanded at each one (Förster, forthcoming, 20; Mazola 2005).Yet, as the rebellion wore on 
                                                 
 57 For individuals, these rates were comparable to those observed in Bouna where individuals entering and exiting 
the city were taxed anywhere between 200-1000 CFAs. Women bringing yams to market were charged 500-1000 
CFAs.     
58 Tax rates for trucks exporting agricultural commodities in Korhogo were also similar to those found in Bouna. In 
Bouna trucks carrying yams were charged an exit fee of 205,000 CFA. The FN charged an exit fee of 400,000 CFA 
for trucks carrying cashews. This is lower than the amount listed above trucks carrying cashews in Korhogo. 
However this total represents all the taxes paid to the rebels during the course of an average trip across FN controlled 
territory, including an exit fee (paid La Centrale agents in Korhogo) and personal ‘tickets’ enforced by different FN 
leaders in Korhogo and elsewhere (see chapter 2).  
154 
 
and soldiers fighting for the FN began to increasingly recognize the disparities in wealth that 
were emerging between themselves and the rebel leadership, they started to use their relatively 
minor positions of authority to demand money for themselves. As a result, by 2009, Förster 
(forthcoming, 24) suggests that “more and more unofficial checkpoints were erected… [and] the 
‘fees’ collected were much more arbitrary again and often higher than what many drivers could 
afford to pay”. As a result of this increasing financial toll, many in Korhogo became increasingly 
resentful towards Fofié’s management of the city. Yet, unlike what transpired in Bouna, there 
was no popular backlash against the rebels in Korhogo. Quite the opposite, Fofié Martin remains 
a political force to this day as the head of the military company (Compagnie territoriale) in 
Korhogo. 
Fofié’s efforts at ‘developing’ the city, as well as the absence of any popular resistance to 
the increasing arbitrariness of his rule – can both be explained by a similar set of factors linked to 
the interaction between factional conflicts emerging from within the rebel movement and the 
lasting schisms within the Coulibaly family described above. One plausible reason why the FN in 
Korhogo invested so much into the city was that Fofié faced – more than the other local leaders 
included in this study (and probably compared to most other local level commanders) – a number 
of threats emanating from within the FN. At the initial stages of the conflict, Korhogo (along with 
Bouaké) was the site of intense factional fighting between groups loyal to the original founder of 
the movement, Ibrahim Coulibaly (‘IB’), and soldiers supporting the political wing of the 





































Figure 5.3: Korhogo 
mayor’s office. Photo by J. 
Speight 
Figure 5.5: Monument en 
hommage à femme noire. 
Photo by J. Speight.  
Figure 5.4: Monument du 
soldat inconnu. Photo by J. 
Speight 
Figure 5.2: Korhogo 
vegetable market. Photo by 
J. Speight 
Figure 5.6: Korhogo wall 
mural. Photo by J. Speight  
Figure 5.7: Korhogo wall 
mural. Photo by J. Speight 
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This chapter argues that Fofié Martin’s ability to establish social control in Korhogo was 
enhanced as a result of the hierarchical configuration they confronted. The following section 
briefly diverges from my argument and shifts analytical attention to FN factional violence that 
occurred in Korhogo in 2004. This brief shift in focus is necessary for two reasons. First, FN 
factional conflict is an important part of the larger historical narrative explaining the political rise 
of the FN zone commander, Fofié Martin. Second, this section is significant because it presents 
an important challenge to my argument. In the section that follows, I show how factions within 
the FN allied with competing groups and actors within the local Korhogo political arena, 
including those allied with the state in the pre-conflict period. I consider the implications of this 
evidence for my argument in greater detail later in this chapter and in the conclusion.  
FN Factionalism in Korhogo and the emergence of Fofié Martin 
Fofié Martin emerged as a key political actor within the local Korhogo milieu amidst factional 
fighting that engulfed the city in mid-2004, almost two years after the failed coup turned northern 
based rebellion. These conflicts were the products of the interaction of cleavages within the FN 
and local socio-political cleavages that had been the basis of local political life in Korhogo since 
the nationalist period leading up to independence in 1960. This section will focus on the 
relationship between the conflicts within the FN and historical tensions between the Senoufo and 
Dyula communities in Korhogo. The subsequent section will examine the interplay between the 
FN, Martin’s ascendency in the region, and factional conflict between the Coulibaly family 
during the conflict and post-conflict period.   
Fofié Martin’s politico-military rise in Korhogo was a product of a conjuncture of a number 
of national and local developments. Martin was not the original commandant de zone in Korhogo 
(which was the center of the administrative Com’zone zone 10). Fofié was first stationed in the 
city as the chief of security for the FN. The first commandant charged with managing Korhogo 
on behalf of the rebels was Koné Messemba. Messemba was a high-ranking member within the 
FN and owed his position to his close ties to the founder of the northern rebellion, Ibrahim 
Coulibaly (‘IB’). Messemba’s standing within the movement in its early days became evident 
when he was named as minister responsible for the Victims of War, the Displaced and Exiled 
(minister des Victimes de guerre, des Déplacés et Exilés) in the transitional government 
established by the Linas-Marcoussis peace accords in 2003 (Touré 2003; Arouna 2004; see 
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Chapter 2 on the peace process). Quickly, political debates emerged within the FN and in 
Korhogo about who would become Messemba’s successor. Fofié had gained some level of 
credibility and legitimacy as the chief of security for the FN in Korhogo and rose as a contender 
for the position (interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011). Long before the civil war 
began, Korhogo and the north more generally were suffering under conditions of increased 
insecurity and banditry. Crime had grown in the north (as well as elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire) as a 
result of the deterioration of the formal economy beginning in the 1980s. After the FN gained 
control of the city, the security climate improved, as described by Till Förster:  
 
Soon after they took control of the city, the rebels established a curfew and aimed at 
putting an end to the repeated robberies that had marked civic life for so long. If 
somebody was caught red-handed, they did not hesitate to shoot him on the spot. 
Though there were abuses of power, the rebels were seen as just or at least as fair-
minded social actors who brought a new and better social order. The central point 
was that they did not allow criminals to get away with what they had done – a stark 
contrast to police officers who were making a living from the bribes that they 
received from the criminals: ‘Whether or not you take a thief to [the police office], it 
does not matter. He slips money to the policeman, and the next day, you will see 
him in the same spot you saw him before. It doesn’t make sense – one has to kill 
them, that’s the only solution’ (2010, 706).   
 
However, Fofié’s growing popularity in Korhogo created some reservations among other FN 
brass, including Messemba himself, about promoting him as a replacement when Messemba 
entered the transitional government in 2003.  Messemba’s choice was another local commander 
named Yssouf Diarrassouba. As one local reporter explained to me, because Diarrassouba lacked 
the charisma and autonomous military legitimacy and control Fofié enjoyed in the eyes of his 
troops as well as the wider community in Korhogo, he became the more desirable choice because 
he could be more easily controlled by Messemba and the rest of the FN hierarchy from 
Bouaké/Abidjan (interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011). Again, as it was explained to 
me, control over Korhogo was left in the hands of Diarrassouba largely because many within the 
FN remained fearful of appearing to oppose the wishes of IB or his agents like Messemba 
(interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011). 
Nonetheless, Fofié’s standing locally shifted with the relative balance of power between 
competing factions within the FN. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Ibrahim Coulibaly 
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(or ‘IB’) was the widely recognized mastermind behind the 2002 coup d’état attempt. However, 
IB’s clout within the FN declined for two reasons. The first factor was IB’s decision to remain in 
Burkina Faso and not directly participate in the fighting. Additionally, on August 27th 2003, IB 
was arrested in France on suspicion of planning another coup against the government of national 
reconciliation established through the negotiations at Linas-Marcoussis (Mohamed 2003; ICG 
2004, 22). Each of these factors contributed to the isolation of IB from other FN leaders and foot-
soldiers who directly participated in the fighting during the initial stages of the conflict. The final 
straw for the pro-IB faction came after an alleged assassination attempt on the life of Guillaume 
Soro as he was travelling between Bouaké and Korhogo. A number of parties was thought to be 
behind the attempted assassination of Soro, including the then president of Guinea, Lansana 
Conté, the president of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo and one high-ranking FN leader, Kassoum 
Bamba (‘Kass’), who himself was a close ally of IB.59  
The attempted assassination prompted Soro to take drastic measures to “get his house in 
order” (“mettre de l’ordre dans la maison,” Depeyla 2004a). On June 20th and 21st 2004, attacks 
led by pro-Soro forces against the pro-IB faction of the FN in Bouaké and Korhogo left a total of 
22, including Kassoum Bamba, dead (14 in Korhogo and 8 in Bouaké) (ICG 2004, 22; Depeyla 
2004a; Depeyla 2004b; Bouabre 2004). A violent purge of IB supporters from the FN followed. 
Moreover, given that IB drew much of his support from Dyula elements within the rebellion, 
these purges paralleled ethnic divisions running through the support base of the movement. As a 
result, many Dyula FN leaders and supporters of the movement with supposed ties to IB were 
arrested or killed during this time (Depeyla 2004b).60 
In Korhogo, the elimination of the Dyula, pro-IB faction from the FN was particularly 
gruesome. In February 2004 (well before the June purges), a local commander in Korhogo with 
strong ties to IB, Adama Coulibaly (‘Adams’), was assassinated by pro-Soro forces. Moreover, in 
                                                 
59 After IB’s arrest in France and his subsequent falling out with Guillaume Soro, he began to develop close ties with 
his former enemy, Laurent Gbagbo. Leading up to the 2007 peace talks, Gbagbo dropped the charges against IB for 
his participation in the 2002 attacks. IB was also invited by President Gbagbo to take part in the peace talks 
themselves, presumably as a way of dividing his political opponents and encouraging further conflict within the FN 
(Bamba 2008).  
60 It should be noted that Koné Messemba, the old military commandant in Korhogo was also suspected of planning 
the attacks on Soro, if only because of his close relationship to IB. He avoided arrest and remained with the FN until 
the final days of the rebellion. In 2012, he was named the prefect of the region of Guiglo by Alassane Ouattara 
(Arouna 2004; Nimaga 2012). Yssouf Diarrassouba also survived these purges. 
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addition to the 14 dead in Korhogo resulting from the factional fighting in June 2004, on August 
2nd of the same year, ONUCI investigators confirmed the discovery of mass graves in the city 
containing 99 bodies. Many had been shot; others were believed to have died from asphyxiation 
and dehydration after being detained in large shipping containers for several days. The 
international community viewed Fofié Martin and the pro-Soro faction he commanded 
(FANSANA 110, named after the prison cell he was kept in before the rebellion) as being 
responsible for these acts (Global Witness 2007, 38). The majority of the victims found in these 
graves were Dyula youth; many were from the neighbourhood of Koko in Korhogo. Given their 
marginalization from the existing social order (see part I of this chapter), many youth from Koko 
were drawn to IB during the initial stages of the war as a patron who could potentially promise 
them employment and social/political mobility. Once the balance of power between pro-IB and 
pro-Soro factions of the movement shifted, however, many from Koko were left in a vulnerable 
position. Fofié Martin and other pro-Soro elements of the FN viewed Dyula youth from Koko as 
political opponents (interview, Korhogo, FN soldier, 13.02.2011).61 The enduring tensions 
between the pro-Soro faction of the FN led by Fofié Martin and Korhogo’s Dyula population 
remained palpable right up until the presidential elections in 2010 and 2011. Many in Koko 
remained very hesitant to speak of the violence during this stage of the conflict (author 
observations). Moreover, IB’s marginalization from the dominant leadership group within the FN 
did not diminish the connections forged between him and many Dyula youth from Koko. It was 
rumoured that many left Korhogo for Abidjan during the terminal stages of the civil war to join 
IB in the fight to dislodge Laurent Gbagbo from power.62       
 
                                                 
61 It could be argued more broadly, that the Dyula community was largely against the rebellion, particularly after the 
conclusion of the factional conflict between pro-IB and pro-Soro forces. In discussing differing responses to the 
ceremonial unveiling of the Monument for the Unknown Soldier in 2008, Till Förster (2012, 15) writes that “the 
Muslim traders, however were far more critical (than others in Korhogo of the ceremony and Fofié’s order more 
general). They saw this and other, similar events much more as a kind of annexation of statehood by actors who were 
not authorized to do so”.    
62 IB re-emerged on the Ivoirian political scene after Gbagbo’s refusal to step down after the contested 2011 
elections. During the final assault on Abidjan in March and April 2011 by the French military and armed forces loyal 
to Alassane Ouattara, IB – who was then only recognized as the “invisible commando” (commando invisible) – 
gathered troops still loyal to him and organized attacks from his base in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Abobo. After 
the forced removal of Gbagbo, IB was killed by armed forces loyal to Ouattara and Guillaume Soro (see Le Monde 
2011).    
160 
 
Senoufo factionalism, Presidential Politics and Political Order in Korhogo under the FN 
The interplay between ethnic cleavages (Dyula, Senoufo) and those premised on factional 
allegiances within the FN (pro-Soro, pro-IB) only tell part of the story of the nature of the 
coalition underpinning Fofié’s position of authority in the city. Unlike the situation confronted by 
Marou Ouattara in Bouna, in Korhogo, segments of the powerful local Senoufo elite were 
available as potential allies of Fofié Martin because of the autonomy they enjoyed from the state 
during the pre-conflict period. One of Fofié Martin’s most powerful allies was the late cantonal 
chief in Korhogo, Drissa Coulibaly.  
Even after Fofié’s service to the pro-Soro faction of the FN in mitigating the threat of forces 
loyal to IB, many within the FN apparently remained fearful of appointing Fofié as commandant 
because of the autonomous political, economic and military power he commanded. Despite the 
violence for which Fofié was directly responsible, his record of fighting crime and his success in 
suppressing Dyula pro-IB elements in Korhogo won over the chiefly class in Korhogo, 
particularly Drissa Coulibaly. Drissa’s support was potentially the key reason why Fofié gained 
the position of commandant in Korhogo. As one journalist explained to me:  
 
After these events, there was a lot of pressure, and remember his seat [Fofié’s] was 
one from which he could easily be removed. It was Chief Drissa Coulibaly who 
warned Guillaume Soro and said that ‘if you remove Fofié [from Korhogo] you will 
no longer have our moral support. We think he is the man given the current 
situation.’ And so at this moment, the FN ceded, because there were a lot of rumours 
going around that Drissa had thrown his support squarely behind Fofié [interview, 
journalist, Korhogo, 11.02.2011].  
 
From this moment on, Fofié retained a close relationship with Drissa (and much of the Senoufo 
chiefly establishment) until the cantonal chief’s death in 2008.  
I argue that there were two key consequences of the alliance that formed between Fofié and 
Drissa soon after the factional conflicts and violence that consumed the city in June 2004. Both 
are linked to the limited extent to which the rebels attacked or attempted to undercut existing 
social hierarchies and social relations in Korhogo and the surrounding rural areas. The first refers 
to the social and political domains actually affected by the new forms of governance introduced 
by the FN in the Senoufo heartland. In Bouna, it was suggested that, because of the absence of 
the state and the inability of either Lobi or Koloungo elites to manage social conflict at the local 
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level (particularly those over land and other resources), the rebels were forced to play a far more 
interventionist role in attempting to resolve them, especially in the early stages of the civil war 
(see chapter 4 pg. 121). While there were certainly functional roles previously played by the state 
that the rebels were forced to fill (in policing and the administration of justice for instance), the 
FN in Korhogo took a hands off approach when it came to issues that were typically regulated by 
Senoufo elites, especially land and bride-wealth/divorce. Deference to existing elites over these 
issues was particularly noticeable in rural areas. According to a village chief with whom I spoke, 
the people in his village had very little interaction with the rebels, if they had contact with them at 
all (interview, village chief, Nahouokama, 24.10.10). This is largely in line with Till Förster’s 
(forthcoming, 14) observation that “rebel governance is characterized by what I call partial 
presence. It is a kind of governance that links the bigger cities in the area, but often leaves rural 
villages aside”. A spokesperson for the Coulibaly family and the cantonal chief highlighted the 
respect the rebels had for the authority of ‘traditional’ actors such as village chiefs and elders: 
 
There is not a land problem here. The process starts, and then we call them [those 
involved in land conflicts] so they can hear what we have to say, we make a 
judgement and that’s it, it’s done. There are not land conflicts here. Normally, it is 
us who regulate them. But in the other regions [of Côte d’Ivoire], you see these 
kinds of problems over there, land conflicts. And then with the FN, we really tipped 
our hats to them because they said that they have come to manage other problems, 
they didn’t come because of problems related to land, or social disintegration or 
even water. For them, they were concerned with problems related to crime and theft, 
but we still regulated the issue of land (interview, Coulibaly family member, 
Korhogo, 12.10.2010).           
 
Again, the positive relationship between the local traditional Senoufo hierarchy and the rebels 
contrasts greatly with the observed efforts of the FN in Bouna to marginalize or mitigate the 
autonomous authority of leaders in the Lobi community, particularly the PDCI politician Palé 
Dimaté. Although there are parallels between the conflicts witnessed in each case (Dyula versus 
Senoufo, Lobi versus Koulongo), what distinguished Bouna and Korhogo was that in Korhogo, 
there was a hierarchically organized group with which the rebels could potentially ally.  
As shown through Fofié’s close ties with Drissa Coulibaly, the FN’s political strategy 
largely mimicked the post-1970 strategy employed by the PDCI single-party state of aligning 
itself with elements of the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite (in the tradition of Bema, Gon 
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and Amadou Gon), rather than reformists looking to upset the status quo (in the tradition of 
Dramane). However, the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite were available as allies 
because of the fact they had politically repositioned themselves against the PDCI and FPI 
governments in the 1990s and early 2000s. The political relationship between this group and the 
FN in Korhogo was evident towards the terminal stages of the conflict by the position taken by 
the FN in the successional disputes that were ignited by Drissa Coulibaly’s death in 2008.  
There were two sides to the conflict over who would succeed Drissa as the Korhogo 
cantonal chief. Some of the central actors in this drama figured prominently in the intra-Coulibaly 
factional struggles before the beginning of the 2002 civil war. In addition to Drissa, Kassoum 
Coulibaly was one of the key actors involved in this conflict. Kassoum was a grandson to the old 
Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly, the former head of the Syndicat National des Transporteurs et 
Marchandises et Voyageurs de Côte d’Ivoire (SYNTMVCI), and a PDCI party member. In the 
1990s, he was thwarted in his efforts to become Korhogo’s mayor by the RDR representatives in 
the city, Amadou Gon Coulibaly and Adama Coulibaly.63 By the beginning of the civil war, 
Kassoum was undoubtedly one of the more powerful and prominent Coulibaly family members. 
He drew support from an extensive network of Dyula traders (Förster 2010, 714). His authority 
was rooted in his expansive economic interests as well as the prerogatives granted to him as one 
of Gbon’s grandsons. Till Förster (2010, 714) highlights how Kassoum exploited “the privileges 
his father’s social status afforded him,” including the highly criticized “habit of claiming any plot 
and strip of land in the city if it was to his advantage”. Indeed, by all accounts Kassoum was a 
master at drawing on resources derived from ‘customary’ and ‘modern’ social universes.  
To expand his already substantial political influence, Kassoum attempted to proclaim 
himself cantonal chief after the death of the former chief Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. This sparked 
an intense debate between different segments of the Korhogo elite. Some interviewees who 
obviously opposed Kassoum claimed that he could never legitimately become the cantonal chief 
in Korhogo according to the rules and procedures governing succession. In principle, the position 
of cantonal chief in Korhogo is passed down through a system of agnatic succession, whereby 
authority is granted to the brothers of the existing chief (before his sons), from oldest to youngest. 
                                                 
63 Kassoum Coulibaly was elected as a PDCI national assembly member in 2001.  
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For Kassoum’s opponents, Drissa’s younger brother Bafowa Coulibaly was the rightful heir. 
From Kassoum’s perspective, there was more to this story. Certainly, some ambiguity existed 
regarding the procedures guiding succession to the cantonal chief in Korhogo. Bema Coulibaly, 
Gbon Coulibaly’s son was appointed as the cantonal chief during the late colonial period by the 
French. Bema was succeeded by his younger brother, Souleymane Coulibaly, and then by his 
oldest son (and Kassoum’s older brother) Tiémoko Coulibaly. Thus, there was clearly some 
recent precedent supporting Kassoum’s claims that he should be the next cantonal chief in 
Korhogo.   
The conflict unfolded as follows. First, although Drissa was widely regarded as the head 
of the Coulibaly family (doyen de la famille Gbon) because he was the oldest living descendent 
of Gbon Coulibaly, he was not the cantonal chief (Niangoran 2007). In 2002, Tiémoko Coulibaly, 
Kassoum’s older brother, was still cantonal chief and remained so, until his death in 2004 
(Niangoran 2007). Following Tiémoko’s death, Drissa Coulibaly, Bema’s brother and Kassoum’s 
uncle, was appointed as cantonal chief. Drissa’s claim to be cantonal chief was supported by 
many of Korhogo’s elite, as well as by Fofié Martin and other high-ranking members of the FN. 
Nonetheless, Kassoum still played a prominent role in local Korhogo politics as the interim 
cantonal chief in the years leading up to Drissa’s passing in 2008. This was the case because 
Drissa was, for approximately 10 years, bed-ridden with illness. Kassoum pointed to the apparent 
inconsistency of the decision to appoint his uncle, Drissa as the replacement for his older brother, 
Tiémoko Coulibaly. For Kassoum, “a father cannot inherit from his sons” (un père ne peut 
hériter de son fils) (Niangoran 2007). More specifically, “Coulibaly Drissa can’t inherit a 
position that is the right of his nephews” (Coulibaly Drissa ne peut donc hériter d’un poste qui 
revient de droit à ses neveux) (Niangoran 2007). However, upon Drissa Coulibaly’s death in 
2008, Kassoum was once again by-passed as a potential successor in favor of Drissa’s younger 
brother Bafowa Coulibaly (who himself was 81 years old). Kassoum challenged Bafowa and 
attempted to mobilize support to block his ascendency to the position of cantonal chief.64 It is 
                                                 
64 The exact political content of Kassoum’s claim was not clear. Some interviewees suggested that simply because 
Kassoum was rich and well known, he felt he could impose his views on others (interview, Coulibaly family 
member, Korhogo, 17.02.2011). Others have suggested that there is no accepted ‘traditional’ basis by which the 
position of cantonal chief is passed on through the Coulibaly family. The position itself was a political/colonial 
invention and hence any ‘traditional’ rules surrounding succession can, at least, be called into question (Koffi 2008).       
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obviously difficult to measure, but it appeared that most within the Coulibaly family hierarchy 
opposed Kassoum’s stance. One representative of the Coulibaly family explained this to me in 
these terms:  
 
Drissa was the father. He was our father. A good child never rivals his father. And 
Kassoum, that’s what he did! He insulted our father because he did not give up 
cantonal chieftaincy, but we wouldn’t have it. We supported our father because we 
were all children of Gbon, and we were all stacked against him. Kassoum has some 
brothers, and they were stacked against us. Us and our brothers, we are on the side 
of the children of Gbon, specifically the side of Drissa Coulibaly, and after that the 
conflict started (interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo, 17.02.2011).  
 
Although the breadth of support garnered by each side in this conflict is admittedly unclear, the 
position taken by Fofié Martin and the FN significantly altered the balance of power.  
 By most accounts, the FN was firmly on the side of the pro-Bafowa faction (which, as 
described above, seemed to include most of the established chiefly hierarchy) in this dispute. 
There are a number of potential factors explaining the decision of the FN to support this side and 
work to prevent Kassoum Coulibaly’s controversial attempt to become Korhogo’s next cantonal 
chief. One important reason had to do simply with the decision of Kassoum to flee Korhogo 
during the early stages of the conflict. Despite his role as interim chief, Kassoum only returned to 
Korhogo in 2007, just before his attempt to challenge Bafowa’s claim to the cantonal chieftaincy. 
One interviewee explained why the FN supported Drissa and most of those Coulibaly family 
members linked to Bafowa in these terms:   
    
When everything began in Côte d’Ivoire, and when the war broke out and the FN 
came [to Korhogo], everybody fled. But, Drissa Coulibaly, the cantonal chief, he 
was there. It was him who received them like they were his children. All those who 
were with Kassoum fled. That’s why it was difficult, when someone returns just to 
say ‘I am the new cantonal chief’. And when the shots were being fired he fled, he 
disappeared. It was them [Kassoum’s followers] who were behind all that. But 
Drissa stayed with us. He received the FN like they were his children. He made 
[religious] sacrifices for them, so that our ancestors would save them and protect 
them. And they [the FN] knew this, and they were grateful. And they were not 
ingrates. They knew well that Drissa was their father, and that he did everything for 
him. Thus, they had to support him. Kassoum, he sold out the FN. Thus, why would 
they [the FN] support him? And this wasn’t just some policy. Everyone saw this 
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happening. Everyone who followed him [Kassoum] was against the rebels 
(Interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo 17.02.2011).  
 
In short, Drissa’s decision to stay in Korhogo and welcome the rebels to the city after the onset of 
fighting signalled some solidarity with the movement. Kassoum’s decision to leave had the 
opposite effect, creating some suspicion amongst FN member as to where his loyalties lay.    
 Additionally, there was a handful of other reasons why the FN supported the pro-
Drissa/pro-Bafowa elements after Drissa’s death. First, there was some overlap between the bases 
of support drawn on by Kassoum and those who supported IB during the intra-FN factional 
conflict that consumed Korhogo in 2004. As indicated above, Kassoum’s own political and 
economic authority rested in part on his position as a trader within regional trade networks and 
the support he drew from Dyula traders. Indeed, as indicated previously, drawing on the support 
of the Dyula community has been a recurring strategy employed by those marginalized from 
power within the local Korhogo political milieu. At some points during the civil war (including 
even the debate over succession described above), it became difficult to even distinguish the 
coalitions formed on each side of these traditional intra-Coulibaly divisions from those that ran 
through the FN itself. As indicated above, although divisions within the FN were for the most 
part ‘settled’ in the aftermath of the purging of pro-IB elements within the movement, suspicion 
between the FN in Korhogo and the city’s Dyula population (particularly young people living in 
Koko) remained. Thus, when Kassoum sought to mobilize political support for his claim to the 
cantonal chieftaincy by exploiting divisions between the Malinké and the Senoufo in villages 
surrounding Korhogo, the FN apparently reacted harshly and suggested that Kassoum’s actions 
represented an attempt to ‘destabilize’ the political order established by the FN in Korhogo. In 
the end, Kassoum’s contested claim to the cantonal chieftaincy as well as his attempts to actively 
mobilize support amongst marginalized groups in the Senoufo heartland (Dyula, Malinké) 
apparently provoked a 2008 night time meeting between Kassoum, Fofié Martin and the FN 
Delegate General in Korhogo, Soro Kanigui Mamadou. During the course of this meeting, 
Kassoum was allegedly pressured to stop pursuing actions that ran at cross purposes with the 
interests of the rebellion in the north (interview, journalist, Korhogo, 11.02.2011). My 
interviewee suggested there was a subtle coercive effect to this night-time meeting, forcing 
Kassoum to cease his opposition to Bafawo’s succession to the cantonal chieftaincy, as well as 
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any other political activities that might be perceived to be at odds with the interests of the 
northern rebellion more generally.65  
 
The 2010 Presidential Elections, Factionalism, and the Emergent Political Order in Korhogo 
The presidential elections in October and November 2010 reinforced rather than challenged the 
wartime coalitions formed in Korhogo during the crisis period between Fofié Martin and the 
conservative faction of the Senoufo elite. Consequently, these elections strengthened rebel social 
control during this transitional period.  
After numerous delays since the signing of the OPA in 2007, Côte d’Ivoire held 
presidential elections on 31 October 2010. This was the country’s first presidential election in 
over a decade since Gbagbo’s contested victory back in 2000. In some ways, the kinds of 
partnerships that formed in the Korhogo region in the run-up to the elections were predictable. 
The RDR relied on its old interlocutor, and arguably the most important figure in Korhogo and 
national politics at that moment, Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Since the 1995 elections, Amadou 
Gon’s star-power had been rising steadily. He served as the Minister of State and the Minister of 
Agriculture in the Government of National Reconciliation established in 2003, soon after the 
beginning of the conflict. During the presidential elections in 2010 and 2011, Amadou Gon 
remained highly visible, serving as the National Campaign Manager for Alassane Ouattara. In 
Amadou Gon, Alassane Ouattara and the RDR drew squarely upon the conservative faction of the 
Coulibaly family and the partnership it had formed with the pro-Soro wing of the FN, personified 
by Fofié Martin. The bigger question was precisely how Gbagbo’s efforts at mobilizing support 
in Korhogo would alter the political landscape. Above, I showed that, at its creation, the FPI had 
little success in mobilizing support in this part of the north. The last chapter showed that Gbagbo 
was in fact quite successful in winning the allegiance of arguably the most prominent ‘big-man’ 
politician in the Ivoirian Northeast, Palé Dimaté. In many ways, Gbagbo was able to seize upon 
the wellspring of discontent with the FN that had been generated in Bouna over the preceding 
eight years. In Korhogo, the authority of the FN was instead substantially strengthened by the 
alliances it had established with segments of the Korhogo elite. During the terminal stages of the 
                                                 
65 Kassoum Coulibaly passed away soon after in 2009.  
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conflict, the electoral success of the RDR in Korhogo and the victory of Alassane Ouattara 
nationally reinforced the coalition formed during the conflict that underwrote the authority of 
Fofié Martin in Korhogo.         
 Historically, national-level opposition leaders have attempted to mobilize support in the 
Korhogo region by allying with disaffected elites upset with their positions within the local 
political hierarchies. The central problem for the FPI (and past opposition parties) was that, once 
local social hierarchies are absorbed as part of rival party structures, it becomes very difficult for 
alternative movements to tap into them. As one FPI party member put it, the central “problem 
with the Coulibaly family is that they are not open” (interview, FPI party member, Korhogo, 
14.10.2010). The inability to rally ruling factions of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo has meant that 
the second best strategy for the FPI in this part of the North has been to mobilize support from 
Coulibaly family members dissatisfied with their standing within these local social hierarchies. 
As explained above, the local ruling coalition formed during the conflict – between the FN 
members supporting Guillaume Soro, and the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family (with 
Amadou Gon Coulibaly as its figurehead) – did have its opponents. As a result, the FPI mirrored 
the dominant strategy of past opposition parties (including the FPI itself in the early 1990s) of 
drawing on these factional disputes to mobilize political support in the North.  
 FPI’s efforts to mobilize northern politicians and constituencies began well before the 
2010 presidential elections (K. Marras 2007). During this time, the FPI experienced some success 
in attracting defectors away from both the RDR and the PDCI-RDA. A number of prominent 
national examples include Lanzéni Coulibaly, Samba Coulibaly and Zémogo Fofana66 from the 
RDR and Silue Kagnon Augustin, Soro Sinali and Issa Ouattara from the PDCI-RDA (K. Marras 
2007; P.A.T. 2009). This strategy appeared particularly effective vis-à-vis the PDCI-RDA, whose 
support has declined in the north since the death of Houphouet-Boigny and as a result of Bedié’s 
instrumental use of ivoirité to retain the Ivoirian Presidency in the 1990’s.  
In Korhogo, two prominent examples of the FPI’s strategy of mobilizing disaffected 
Senoufo elites stand out: Lanzéni Coulibaly and Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly. When it appeared that 
Lanzéni had the support of a majority of the city counsellors to become the next 4th assistant to 
                                                 
66 Zémogo Fofana left the RDR in 2007 to start a new party: l’Alliance pour la nouvelle Côte d’Ivoire (Anci).  
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the mayor, the decision was reversed by Amadou Gon and Lanzéni Coulibaly’s main competitor, 
Salimou Coulibaly, was appointed instead (Mazola 2008).67 Lanzéni’s decision to join the FPI 
stemmed precisely from these efforts on the part of the Senoufo hierarchy in Korhogo to block 
Lanzéni’s independent political ambitions.68  Not unlike the past strategies historically employed 
by other elites disaffected with their standing within the local Korhogo hierarchy, Lanzéni drew 
heavily on support from the Dyula community in Korhogo (specifically Dyula youth in Koko) to 
advance his political position. 
The highest profile example was the former PDCI member and 2010 FPI national 
campaign manager, Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly. Looking for a political foothold in the north, 
Gbagbo had originally approached Amadou Gon Coulibaly’s old rival and Malick’s cousin, 
Kassoum Coulibaly (prior to his efforts to become the next cantonal chief in Korhogo), to lead 
the FPI’s campaign in Korhogo and the north. Approaching Kassoum, of course, made sense; he 
had a serious axe to grind with fellow Coulibaly family member Amadou Gon Coulibaly, who 
had defeated Kassoum in the 2001 mayoral elections. Kassoum declined, but introduced Gbagbo 
to his cousin, Issa Malick Coulibaly, who eventually became the assistant director of the 
presidential cabinet for the FPI (Airault 2010). Although Malick stayed with the FPI up until the 
beginning of the 2010 elections, some FPI politicians that I spoke with seriously questioned his 
loyalty to the party, suggesting that he was not “really FPI” (interview, FPI party member, 
Korhogo, 14.10.2010). The assumption here was that, although the FPI gave Malick access to 
substantial resources to gain advantage over factional rivals, he was not willing to commit long-
term to a party that had limited access to social networks at local levels. Abandoning these 
                                                 
67 The reliance on appointments rather than elections by senior members in the Coulibaly family hierarchy worked as 
part of a larger strategy to block political threats in constituencies with numerically large Dyula populations. This 
was apparently the case in 2008 when Eric Ouattara was appointed president of the youth wing of the RDR by 
Amadou Gon. It was Amadou Gon’s lack of faith in Dyula youth to make the ‘right’ choice that was supposedly 
behind this decision (Mazola 2008).   
68 This has strong parallels with past methods of managing political selections that illustrated and buttressed the 
authority of those on top of the political hierarchy in Korhogo. Boone writes that “one particularity in the rules of 
local party competition also underscores the specificity of this region: in Korhogo PDCI secretaries-general at the 
sous-préfectural level were elected (via queuing) rather than appointed to office. This represented a measure of 
devolution of prerogative that was specific to this region: it seems that the regime counted on hierarchical cohesion 
at the local level to produce acceptable electoral results” (2003, 271).    
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networks completely could have serious long-term political consequences (interview, FPI party 
member, Korhogo, 14.10.2010; Dossa 2009).69  
Whatever successes the FPI has had in mobilizing and attracting defections from more 
established parties in the north, the limitations of this strategy are highlighted by the number of 
politicians that defected to the FPI only to return to their original party, particularly the RDR, 
before the presidential elections in 2010.  Zémogo Fofana, Adama Coulibaly, and Jean-Jacques 
Becho are some of the more prominent examples. Not surprisingly, the RDR triumphed in the 
Senoufo heartland around Korhogo. In the region of Savanes (which included the departments of 
Boundiali, Ferkessedougou, Korhogo, and Tengrela) the RDR won just under 85% of the vote in 
the first round of the elections.70 The FPI won under 7% of the vote. The numbers were similar in 
the second round, with Ouattara garnering almost 94% of the vote and Gbagbo receiving less 
than 7%.71 After the country-wide results were announced, the votes cast in these departments 
were annulled by the Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) President, Paul Yao N’Dré, due 
to the suspicion of large-scale voting irregularities. However, following the removal of Laurent 
Gbagbo in April 2011, Alassane Ouattara was named President of the Republic. Amadou Gon 
Coulibaly’s close ties with Alassane Ouattara cemented his status within the RDR and at the apex 
of Korhogo politics. Not surprisingly, Amadou Gon renewed his mandate as mayor after Côte 
d’Ivoire’s municipal and regional elections. It would not be a stretch to say that Amadou Gon is, 
at present, one of the most influential political figures in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Moreover, the electoral successes of the RDR, Alassane Ouattara and Amadou Gon in the 
Senoufo heartland around Korhogo have only reinforced the authority of their old wartime ally in 
Korhogo, the former FN Com’zone commander, Fofié Martin. In 2011, Fofié Martin was named 
by Alassane Ouattara as the head of the military company (Compagnie territoriale) in Korhogo. 
In the period immediately following the forced removal of Laurent Gbagbo, Martin was charged 
                                                 
69 As in the case of Dimaté in Bouna, there is some evidence to suggest that decisions to side with Gbagbo and the 
FPI represented a risky decision in the short term as well. Prior to the elections, the FPI headquarters in Korhogo was 
burnt down. After it became apparent that Gbagbo would resist stepping down (after the results of the second round 
of the Presidential elections were announced), the house of Malick Coulibaly was looted and covered with anti-FPI 
graffiti (author’s observations).  
70 See http://www.abidjan.net/elections/presidentielle/2010/resultats/1ertour/ 
71 See http://www.abidjan.net/elections/presidentielle/2010/resultats/2emetour/CC.html#Savanes 
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with guarding the former president until his ultimate transfer to the International Criminal Court 
in November 2011. Martin has retained his appointment as head of the Compagnie territoriale in 
Korhogo until the present day. 
Conclusion 
In both Bouna and Korhogo, conflicts emerged between some of the most prominent pre-conflict 
political actors, Palé Dimaté in Bouna and Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo, and their FN 
counterparts, commandants Morou Ouattara and Fofié Martin. Open hostility emerged between 
these groups of actors largely because of the threat the northern rebellion posed to the political 
power and authority pre-conflict elites previously enjoyed. These dynamics support Pierre 
Englebert’s (2009, 139) claim that armed movements in Africa are often motivated by the 
marginalization and replacement of local or regional elites. Yet struggles to replace local elites do 
not tell the whole story. The rebels in the two localities differed in their ability to socially control 
local populations given the elite coalitional choices available to them and the distinct hierarchical 
configurations they confronted. Morou Ouattara and the FN were the object of much scorn from 
not just Dimaté and other Lobi politicians in Bouna, but from the Lobi community in Bouna as a 
whole. Ouattara had few bases of support from which to draw in this part of the North. Martin 
and the local FN in Korhogo proved far more capable of mobilizing support for their authority in 
Korhogo, despite the obvious threat the rebels’ posed to established politicians such as Kassoum 
Coulibaly. In Korhogo, there was no popular backlash against the rebels. What explains these 
differences?  
My argument focuses attention on differences in the position of local elites as state 
brokers and elite hierarchical configurations. In contrast to Bouna, in Korhogo, some segments of 
this influential group were available as potential allies to the rebels when the civil war began. In 
Korhogo, some segments of the local elite were available as allies to the FN in part because of 
how this region was governed by local and national actors since independence. Since the end of 
colonialism, the authority of Senoufo elites in Korhogo has been rooted in their autonomous 
control over land and labour and their position as agents of their national-level party bosses, first 
the PDCI, then the RDR. As explained in this chapter, the authority of Senoufo elites has 
historically stemmed from social control over land, marriage and the labour power of young men. 
In partnership with Côte d’Ivoire’s long-serving President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Gbon 
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Coulibaly won the admiration of many across the Senoufo heartland in taking a stand against 
France’s forced labour regime during the late colonial period. Gbon’s descendants benefitted 
greatly from the legitimacy his legacy bestowed upon them. Since independence, these actors 
have constituted the bulk of the political class in Korhogo. Since the 1970s, the legitimacy 
enjoyed by this set of actors has been recognized and harnessed by their national-level political 
counterparts. As Boone argued, the old PDCI single-party did not attempt to challenge or 
dismantle these local social hierarchies. Rather, they aimed to incorporate them as an integral part 
of the state apparatus. After the 1960s, working with the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite 
represented the primary means by which national-level political actors mobilized support in the 
Korhogo region. 
One of the significant implications of this ruling strategy was how it heightened factional 
conflicts at the local-level during the pre-conflict period, between elites looking to become the 
principal set of interlocutors through which state power was exercised in Korhogo. Comparing 
Kassoum Coulibaly and Palé Dimaté highlights the implication of ongoing factional conflict in 
Korhogo for coalition-building during the conflict period. Overall, Kassoum Coulibaly and Palé 
Dimaté drew on very similar bases of support. In the Dyula and Lobi, each drew on the support 
of ‘strangers’ (or non-natives) to their respective communities. What differed was how state 
structures mediated the relationships between these elites and their principal backers. For elites 
like Dimaté, retaining the support of the Lobi community required state backing as a means of 
mitigating the customary authority of the Koulongo monarchy (particularly its authority over 
land). This meant that social hierarchies in Bouna were tied directly to the state and that there 
was no other set of elites with comparable levels of authority. Since the colonial period, state 
interventions gradually worked to curb the autonomous power of the Koulongo monarchy.   
By contrast, Kassoum used support from Dyula traders in Korhogo to attempt to harness 
customary institutions (as cantonal chief) to his own advantage; customary institutions that were 
recognized and politically buttressed by the pre-conflict state. Ongoing factional conflict created 
a unique set of opportunities for the FN to mobilize support in this part of the north. In Korhogo, 
there existed more than one potential elite group with which the rebels could ally. Overlapping 
divisions within the Senoufo elite (between a conservative side and a reformist faction, tied to the 
Dyula community in Korhogo) and within the FN (between elements loyal to Soro and IB) 
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produced a predictable set of alliances in the city by the time of the 2010 Presidential elections. 
Fofié Martin, the FN Korhogo zone commander, was by no means in a position to displace 
Senoufo elites, but he used support drawn from the conservative faction of this group to 
consolidate his position in the city by war’s end. This relationship was in the end mutually 
beneficial. The conservative faction of the Coulibaly family also used the support it garnered 
from the pro-Soro group within the FN to marginalize its political opponents and in particular 
Kassoum Coulibaly. Overall, the case of the FN in Korhogo represents a case of what my 





Chapter 6. Rebellion in the Borderlands: The FN and 
les commerçants in Ouangolodougou 
Ouangolodougou (or ‘Ouangolo’ as it is commonly called) is located in the extreme northern part 
of Côte d’Ivoire, where the borders of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso meet. On the 
surface, the experience of Ouangolo during the conflict mirrored that of Korhogo. After the 
rebels established control over the North, both cities were administered as part of Com’zone 10 
and fell under the authority of zone commander Fofié Martin. In both Ouangolo and Korhogo, 
the local FN was able to gain some support from some of the most powerful actors in the city. In 
Korhogo, Fofié Martin proved successful in winning support from Amadou Gon Coulibaly, 
Drissa Coulibaly and other members of the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite. In 
Ouangolo, the local FN drew on support from many of the city’s traders including Issaka 
(‘Potcho’) Sawadogo, the most prominent trader and head of the Confédération des Fédérations 
des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l’UEMOA72 (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). 
Unlike the FN in Korhogo, the FN in Ouangolo did not confront brokers with levels of political 
authority comparable to their principal ally, Issaka Sawadogo. This chapter argues that, as a 
result, the FN in Ouangolo was able to establish higher levels of social control than elsewhere in 
Northern Côte d’Ivoire.  
Prior to the civil war, the central state did not have a powerful ally or broker in Ouangolo. 
Before the 1990s, Ouangolo’s traders had a fairly positive relationship with the state. State 
investment in the border region around Ouangolo contributed, in part, to the attractiveness of 
                                                 
72 UEMOA refers to the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine. 
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Ouangolo as a base of operations for West African traders. This changed during the era of 
multiparty politics in the 1990s when attacks on ethnic ‘strangers’ living in Côte d’Ivoire 
intensified (see chapter 2). This shift directly threatened Ouangolo’s traders because the bulk of 
the city’s population were immigrants from Mali and Burkina Faso. Like migrants elsewhere in 
Côte d’Ivoire,73 Ouangolo’s traders became the targets of state efforts to restrict the rights and 
benefits associated with Ivoirian citizenship. By attacking Ouangolo’s migrant-traders, the state 
was left without a powerful ally in the city. As pre-conflict brokers, the state allied with a group 
of local political officials who lacked support from any social base comparable to Ouangolo’s 
traders.  The absence of any set of strong state brokers also enabled rebel control over the 
Ouangolo.  
Moreover, the north-south division of the country and the rebel occupation of the city 
arguably enhanced the authority of the FN’s chief interlocutor, Issaka Sawadogo. As this chapter 
explains, the rebellion created new opportunities for wealth creation for influential traders such as 
Sawadogo. Additionally, during the crisis, Sawadogo mobilized support based on his capacity to 
shield other traders from state efforts to regulate and control flows of peoples and goods across 
the northern border (through Ouangolo). Many of the organizations headed by Sawadogo, 
particularly the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, aimed to protect Malian and Burkinabe traders 
with operations in Côte d’Ivoire. Most of Ouangolo’s traders lacked Ivoirian citizenship and 
occupied a precarious position as ‘strangers’, especially during the conflict when debates about 
citizenship and belonging were at their highest pitch. Even Sawadago himself came under intense 
criticism as a result of his (contested) status as a non-Ivoirian citizen. Thus, while Sawadago 
drew on his authority as nominal leader of Ouangolo’s Malian and Burkinabe trading community, 
his authority also become the target of different state interventions (surrounding the enforcement 
of Ivoirian citizenship or taxation) during the conflict that sought to curb his political power and 
attack the position of Ouangolo’s traders. Together, these attacks, and the economic opportunities 
the crisis created buttressed Sawadogo’s authority in Ouangolo. This, in turn, enhanced the FN’s 
control over the city given that Sawadogo was the chief ally of the rebels.    
                                                 
73 As discussed in Chapter 4, Lobi migrants in Bouna represented the important exception in this regard.  
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The hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN in Korhogo differed because the 
political clout of state brokers and rebel allies was relatively equal. Since the political and 
administrative reforms introduced in the late 1960s, members of Coulibaly family became the 
principal group through which the PDCI mobilized political support in Korhogo. As the previous 
chapter argued, the dual function of Senoufo elites in Korhogo as both legitimate community 
representatives and agents of PDCI (and later RDR) politicians based in Abidjan fanned factional 
conflict in Korhogo amongst descendants of the town’s founder, Gbon Coulibaly. These conflicts 
continued unabated into the conflict period. Competing factions of the Senoufo elite struggled to 
determine who would succeed as Korhogo’s Cantonal Chief after the death of Drissa Coulibaly in 
2008. During the conflict, the FN in Korhogo confronted elite factions and allied with others, 
both of which were capable of exerting comparable levels of political power and authority.  
Despite their shared status as migrants, Ouangolo’s traders also occupied a different 
position vis-à-vis the pre-conflict state than Lobi migrants in Bouna. Bouna’s Lobi community 
were migrants to the northeast but remained tied to political networks based in Abidjan 
throughout the crisis period. In northeastern Côte d’Ivoire, both the colonial and post-colonial 
state sponsored Lobi migration as a strategy to promote economic development and mobilize 
political support. The state’s promotion of Lobi migration to northeastern Côte d’Ivoire also 
circumscribed the authority of Koulongo elites, particularly their control over land. Overall, Lobi 
elites remained dependent on the political backing of what would become a diverse set of 
national-level patrons (first Hophouët-Boigny, then Bédié and Gbagbo) throughout the post-
colonial period. National-level politicians depended equally on Lobi elites as agents of the state 
in northeastern Côte d’Ivoire. Through Lobi brokers, the state controlled local populations and 
mobilized support. In Bouna, the hierarchical configuration favored state brokers, the Lobi. In 
Ouangolo, the configuration was reversed. Rebel allies were far more powerful than their state 
backed counterparts.  
What were the implications of this hierarchical configuration for establishing rebel 
control? The autonomy of Sawadogo and the rest of the Ouangolo’s immigrant-traders created 
significant opportunities for the FN to build support for the movement. In order to minimize 
potential barriers to trade created by the conflict, the FN worked closely with many of 
Ouangolo’s traders, especially Sawadogo. The alliance between these groups was also on display 
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when, after the signing of the OPA, Ouangolo’s mayor took steps to re-establish control over 
local taxation. These efforts were resisted heavily by many in Ouangolo’s trading community 
and, in the end, were successfully blocked by the FN. Overall, the FN and Ouangolo’s 
community of traders demonstrated a shared vested interest in restricting the reconstitution of the 
state’s authority over taxation.  
Additionally, the rebellion seemed to have propelled far more significant political changes 
in Ouangolo than those observed in Korhogo or Bouna because national level actors based in 
Abidjan did not have any local political base or set of political partners they could call upon to 
contest the alliance formed between the rebels and Ouangolo’s community of traders. In this 
sense, the case of Ouangolo differs greatly from Korhogo and Bouna, where national-level actors 
could call upon sets of local-level partners with substantial (albeit varying) levels of political 
clout. The contrast with Korhogo is particularly illustrative because, while there, like in 
Ouangolo, the FN was able to garner substantial support for the movement, the local leadership 
of the rebellion was never in position to displace the Senoufo elite as the principal intermediaries 
through which national level actors ruled this part of the North. In Ouangolo, more pronounced 
changes were evident in the outcomes of the municipal and legislative elections in 2013. One 
former FN leader based in Ouangolo ran as an independent candidate during Ouangolo’s mayoral 
election and finished second, with nearly 30% of the vote. Although for very different reasons, 
the very thought of a former FN member running in Korhogo or Bouna seems farfetched. 
Additionally, during the political transition initiated by the signing of the OPA, the state relied on 
former rebels as administrators to tax and regain control over trans-border trade. The state was 
forced to draw upon the legitimacy the rebels had built up among the trading community in 





Figure  6.1: Map of administrative Region of Savanes, North-Central Côte d’Ivoire 
(original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara). 
   
Overall, Ouangolo represents a case of what my framework described as high social 
control. In these cases, we expect there to be the greatest opportunity for establishing social 
control because the hierarchical configuration favours armed groups. Rebel allies are politically 
stronger than their broker counterparts. This chapter supports this argument through the case of 
Ouangolo and proceeds in four sections. The first provides a short history of Ouangolo and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s northern border. The second examines the kinds of opportunities and constraints for 
cross-border trade created by the conflict. This section also provides a brief background to 
arguably the most influential of the Ouangolo-based traders, Issaka Sawadogo. It details the 
origins of the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA and the efforts of Sawadogo and other West 
Africans to overcome the trade barriers presented by the Ivoirian crisis. The third section 
examines debates surrounding Sawadogo’s authority and control over livestock marketing during 
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the conflict period. The final section looks at the local conflicts over the authority to tax in 
Ouangolo during the post-OPA period and describes how the alliance between Ouangolo’s 
traders and the FN rebuffed efforts by the mayor’s office to re-establish its authority over 
taxation. Overall this section demonstrates the enduring authority of the FN in Ouangolo after the 
signing of the OPA and the subsequent removal of Laurent Gbagbo in 2011. It highlights the 
FN’s lasting influence in Ouangolo through a focus on the strategies employed by the state to re-
establish their authority over their border and the outcomes of the 2013 municipal and legislative 
elections in this part of the north. I argue that the FN’s ability to cement its political position 
during the transitional period after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo stemmed from the strength of 
the FN’s elite coalitional partner relative to the state’s broker counterpart.  
 
Trade, Migration and Brokerage in West Africa 
Ouangolo currently functions as an important node in trans-West African trading networks. 
Nonetheless, Ouangolo’s significant role in facilitating West African trade developed only 
recently. This section provides a brief historical background of trans-West African trade and 
Ouangolo’s emergent role in it. It examines three interrelated aspects of this history. First, I 
describe two types of brokerage relationships that have facilitated the expansion of Dyula-trading 
networks across West Africa: the diagiti and indigenous hosts. Diagiti refers to Dyula resident 
traders who have historically played an important role in welcoming and enabling new traders in 
local arenas. The other set of brokers are those indigenous hosts that facilitate West African trade 
by providing local political protection. In the case of north-central Côte d’Ivoire, the first set of 
broker relationships emphasizes intra-Dyula or Dyula-Dyula relations and the second refers to 
relations between the Dyula and their indigenous, largely Senoufo hosts. For the purposes of my 
argument, this distinction is important because it illuminates some basic differences between my 
cases, specifically Korhogo and Ouangolo. While Dyula merchants have been historically 
dependent on their Senoufo hosts in Korhogo, equivalent indigenous actors are absent in 
Ouangolo. As a result, Dyula brokers (diagiti) have historically played a more prominent political 
role in Ouangolo. As a result of their status as ‘strangers’, Dyula brokers (vis-à-vis other Dyula 
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merchants) were positioned very differently vis-à-vis the state compared to their Senoufo 
counterparts in Korhogo.74 Without protection from Senoufo hosts (such as, for example, 
Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo), Dyula merchants are more susceptible to attacks from the state 
given their status as strangers.75 
Second, this section examines the history of inter-West African trade in livestock, given 
the importance of this commodity to many of Ouangolo’s traders, especially Sawadogo, during 
the conflict period. Finally, this section explains the historical processes that led to the emergence 
of Ouangolo as an important town within the larger network of transnational West African 
economic exchange. It highlights the state’s role in promoting the development of Ouangolo as a 
trading center, as well as the brokering relationships established over time by local elites.  
 
Dyula Expansion and the History of Brokerage Relations in Northern Côte d’Ivoire 
Ouangolo is a city populated overwhelmingly by Dyula merchants with origins elsewhere in 
West Africa. The previous chapter briefly introduced the history of the Dyula in West Africa, 
focusing primarily on debates surrounding the meaning of the term ‘Dyula’, the character of 
social organization within Dyula communities, and the specific relationships formed between 
Dyula traders and their Senoufo hosts in Korhogo. What follows below overlaps with the 
material presented in the previous chapter, but emphasizes the regional and international trade 
relationships Dyula merchants have built and sustained up until the contemporary period.    
Prior to colonization, West Africa had long been the site of well-developed regional 
(within West Africa) and trans-regional (between West Africa and the rest of the world) trade 
linkages. Trade linkages criss-crossed a variety of ecological zones, each of which specialized in 
                                                 
74 In the case of Ouangolo, the term brokerage relations actually refers to two distinct sets of social relationships. The 
first refers to how local elites broker relationships between localities and the wider network of trans-West African 
trade. I am referring to these types of brokerage relations in discussing differences between Dyula-Dyula relations 
(diagiti, or stranger-stranger brokerage ties) and Senoufo-Dyula relations (or stranger-native brokerage ties). The 
other types of brokerage examined in this chapter are those discussed throughout this dissertation, specifically the 
relationships between local elites and the central state. In this chapter, I suggest that brokerage relations between 
local elites and the wider network of trans-West African trade shaped both the hierarchical configurations and the 
brokerage relations between local elites and the state confronted by the rebels.  
75 However, non-indigenous brokers are less susceptible to attack when their authority is protected and supported 
directly by the state (as in the case of Bouna). In these cases, the position of non-indigenous elites is less precarious, 
even without the protection from local indigenous patrons.  
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the production of different commodities. The realization of profits through trade motivated 
successive waves of southward migration of Manding speaking peoples from western Mali to the 
savannah zones of what is now Guinée, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, beginning around the fifteenth 
century. However, migration to what is now northern Côte d’Ivoire did not begin in earnest until 
the seventeenth century (Launay 1982, 13). The gradual southward migration of the Manding 
ultimately created a dense set of economic ties that traversed the different climatic zones of West 
Africa. Various commodities were exchanged across these distinct regions. Gold from Northern 
Ghana was sent northward to Timbuktu and then, ultimately, to the coasts of North Africa. Kola 
was sent from coastal forests northward up the Niger River. Clothes from the Sahel were 
exchanged for other commodities across the network of city-states spanning West Africa (Lewis 
1971, 276; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 39). 
‘Dyula’ trading networks remained remarkably resilient to political change. For instance, 
European colonialism did not always work to weaken these networks and in many cases, actually 
strengthened them. Robert Launay (1979, 73) explains how, across Manding regions, resident 
trader/landlords known as diatigi guarded their entrenched positions in frontier areas and their 
privileged relationship with the producers of kola in the southern forest-zones. French 
colonialism in Côte d’Ivoire effectively broke the monopoly of the diatigi over kola production 
and trade. Launay writes that “once the pax colonia was established, Dyula living up to the north 
of the ethnic frontier were quick to avail themselves of the opening of the Guro markets, 
bypassing the landlords wherever direct access was made possible” (see also Launay 1982, 15). 
Additionally, many Dyula traders played a privileged role in the systems of export crop 
marketing managed by colonial states in Africa (Lewis 1971, 287-290).   
Despite their weakened control over trade in southern forest zones, diatigi still played 
important roles in the maintenance of Dyula trading networks. These landlords had a number of 
important social and economic roles, including: providing food and accommodation, connecting 
sellers coming from afar to potential buyers, wholesaling (by buying from foreign traders and 
selling goods at set prices to local retailers), and providing credit to retailers (so that foreign 
traders could sell their goods quickly) (Perinbam 1973, 428-429; Launay 1979, 72). Landlords or 
brokers facilitated economic exchanges and functioned as powerful intermediaries between the 
trading networks to which they belonged and the local communities in which they were 
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embedded. The authority of these actors was derived from a number of sources. Material factors, 
such as their strategic positioning vis-à-vis different commodity flows, their own success as 
traders, and their ability to dispense credit all played a role. Their investment in social ties with 
other traders and prominent political actors buoyed their position as brokers between these 
groups. Finally, Quarles van Ufford (1999, 45) writes that the symbolic capital accrued by 
brokers from “being a devout Muslim” also played an important role in securing the role of 
specific traders as intermediaries. He writes that “investments in mosques and Koranic schools as 
well as the distribution of gifts among religious authorities equally belong to this category and 
contribute to the status of a trader”. Perinbam (1973, 430) effectively summarizes these 
attributes, suggesting that “regardless of the type of authority which brokers exercised, in theory, 
they supplemented their economic role by moral authority, which reinforced their effectiveness as 
local market officials. Authorized by customary law, brokers theoretically protected public 
interest by exercising social and moral constraints over local market prices.”  
One of the central challenges confronting networked trading groups such as the Dyula in 
West Africa, both historically and presently, has been the absence of any centralized political 
system capable of enforcing the rule of law. As a result, traders relied upon pre-existing social 
institutions to manage expanding trade relationships much more than official market mechanisms 
or sets of accepted standardized rules regulating trade (Perinbam 1973, 418-419).76 One 
implication of drawing on pre-existing trans-local social ties in order to facilitate market 
exchanges is that traders across West Africa, including the Dyula, were commonly viewed as 
‘strangers’ in the communities in which they lived (Quarrels van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 136). 
Maintaining some social autonomy from host communities served two purposes. First, in many 
African societies, where profit making and social differentiation through the market were 
traditionally frowned upon, maintaining social distinctions prevented the negative social sanction 
these activities would otherwise provoke. Second, indigenous elites used their relations with 
foreign traders in order to mobilize resources to support their local position of authority (Launay 
                                                 
76 Perinbam writes that “In the absence of reliable communications and effective central institutions of control, 
merchants from dominant ethnic groups were able to overcome certain technical problems, and control trade at every 
level, by working through ethnic-based trading institutions. They therefore formed a kind of ethnic community with 
corporate economic interests and institutions whose members exercised constraints on individual behaviour, thus 
ensuring loyalty and a measure of conformity in non-contractual or verbal agreements” (1973, 419).  
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1983, 3; Launay and Soares 1999, 500; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 41). Nonetheless, traditional 
social distinctions differentiating the Dyula from their indigenous hosts have changed over time.  
Islam was one of the principal means by which the Dyula identified themselves (Perinbam 1973, 
426). However, religious conversion and the spread of Islam across much of northern Côte 
d’Ivoire meant that the membership of the community of traders became increasingly 
heterogeneous and that Islam itself became a less precise standard by which to distinguish 
stranger/trader and host. Alternatively, traders themselves have also relied on narrower sets of 
identities – particularly ethnic identities associated with different Dyula kabilas – to exclude 
others and work to preserve particular trading privileges for certain more narrowly defined 
identifiable groups (Perinbam 1973, 425; Harre 1993, 249-250; Labazée 1993b, 133-138; Launay 
and Soares 1999, 498; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 43; Quarrels van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 138).     
Overall, Dyula traders have historically struggled to balance efforts to socially embed 
themselves within local communities and maintain some social autonomy from their hosts. 
Generally speaking, these actors went to great lengths to ameliorate threats to their local position 
through the construction of ethnic or social ties with host communities (through institutions such 
as marriage) (Quarles van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 139). Nonetheless, as Launey and Soares (1999, 
514) suggest, these generalizable social categories (ethnicity, race, or religious identifications) 
often overlook “a host of ‘particular’ allegiances to kin groups, villages, chiefdoms, military 
alliances, trading partnerships, marriage networks etc.” (1999, 514). In northern Côte d’Ivoire, 
the local position of the Dyula commonly varied in terms of their relationships to their Senoufo 
hosts. For example, Launay identifies two historic clusters of concentrated Dyula populations 
which enjoyed substantial political autonomy vis-à-vis Senoufo hosts compared to other Dyula 
living in the North: Kadioha and Boron to the south of Korhogo (that was part of the old frontier 
that regulated the trade in Kola nuts with the forest zones of the south) and in Mbengue, Nielle 
and Ngandana to its north (Launay 1988, 358-363). The relationship between everyday Dyula 
and political authorities in areas of high Dyula concentration, versus those where Dyula were 
politically subordinate to Senoufo hosts, generally took radically different forms, limiting or 
enabling the political autonomy enjoyed by the Dyula.77 As the last chapter highlighted, Dyula 
                                                 
77 Referring to the Dyula village of Kadioha, Launay writes that “like any Dyula community Kadioha was divided 
into a number of clan barrios, called kabilaw…The kabilaw were themselves loosely grouped into larger associations 
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communities in Korhogo have largely remained dependent on their Senoufo hosts. In Ouangolo, 
Dyula traders enjoyed far more autonomy, largely because comparable indigenous political actors 
and institutions were absent.  
As indicated above, historically, West African trade specialized in a variety of 
commodities, including clothes, gold and kola. Present-day cross border trade is characterized by 
an equal level of diversity. Merchants specialize in the trade in electronics, cars and motorcycles, 
clothing, cigarettes and livestock. This chapter focuses on the trans-West African trade in 
cattle/livestock as an example of the more general phenomenon of regional West African trade 
and because the trade in livestock emerged as an important regulatory issue during the conflict 
period in Côte d’Ivoire.                 
 
History of the Cattle Trade in West Africa 
Although there has been a long history of trading in livestock in Côte d’Ivoire, researchers have 
typically focused on higher value commodities, such as ivory or slaves. The significance of the 
regional livestock trade in West Africa was limited by the absence of large markets and high 
demand for meat (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 56). Not unlike the trade in other commodities in 
West Africa, the trade in livestock was controlled largely by Haussa and Dyula traders. As a 
result, the central actors in the marketing of livestock at the national level were also typically 
‘foreign’ (Quarles von Ufford and Zaal 2004, 136). Consequently, these traders remained fairly 
dependent on the political and military protection of the number of city-states that dotted the pre-
colonial West African landscape (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 57).  
European colonialism strengthened existing supply chains and established new regional 
trade relationships. The growth in agricultural export crops such as cocoa, oil palm and peanuts 
had the effect of rapidly increasing the demand for food crops and livestock in many African 
colonies. Indeed, demand was highest in those sub-regions and urban areas that were at the heart 
                                                                                                                                                              
known as makufo, comprising three to five kabilaw, one of whom was always ‘host’ to the others who had 
subsequently settled in the community, While the original nature of the ‘host’/‘guest’ bond was generally that of 
patron to client, the strength of this political dependence was not invariably maintained over many generations. 
Essentially, each kabila was fiercely jealous of its own autonomy [which] seriously limited the power of the chief” 
(1988, 360-361).   
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of colonial export-crop marketing project (Southern Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, and the 
groundnut basin in Senegal) (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 57). For instance, Quarles van Ufford 
writes that the imports of cattle to southern Nigeria increased from 8,000 head in 1906 to around 
200,000 in the 1930s (1999, 57). In addition to increasing the demand for meat products, 
colonialism stimulated livestock production and trade in West Africa in two other distinct ways. 
First, in contrast to the marketing of agricultural export crops destined for Europe, which colonial 
administrators controlled tightly through official state marketing boards and channels, the set of 
policy and administrative controls constructed to manage domestic food production remained 
minimal (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 58). Second, colonial administrators boosted regional 
livestock trade and production through investments in transportation infrastructure. Railways in 
particular strengthened ties between centres of livestock production and sale, between different 
national sub-regions within the same colony, as well as across different West African colonies 
(Quarles van Ufford 1999, 58-59).  
A different set of exogenous shocks shaped livestock trade patterns during the post-
colonial period in West Africa. Parts of West Africa that experienced particularly intense periods 
of economic growth (the ‘economic miracle’ in Côte d’Ivoire, oil-led growth in Nigeria) drove 
the development and direction of the livestock trade. Periods of declining economic growth had 
the opposite effect by restricting the regional demand for livestock. Increased imports of frozen 
beef, particularly from Latin American, also decreased the demand for regionally produced 
livestock (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 61).  
Finally, the beginning of the 2002 armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire presented a different set 
of opportunities and constraints for actors involved in West Africa’s regional livestock trade. As 
this chapter explains, the political crisis initially limited access to slaughterhouses, markets and 
ports in Southern Côte d’Ivoire, particularly Abidjan, for regional traders. Nonetheless, the 
regulatory framework governing trade during the conflict also worked to promote the marketing 
of cattle. This chapter uses the trade in livestock as a backdrop for its discussion of wartime 
coalition-building and conflict over authority. I emphasize the trade in livestock because its 
regulation and promotion represented a key interest for many big traders in Ouangolo, including 
Sawadogo, and because it highlights challenges confronted by many traders in Côte d’Ivoire 




The History of Ouangolodougou and Northern Côte d’Ivoire’s Border Regions 
Ouangolodougou is an important frontier town situated where the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Côte d’Ivoire meet. On the Ivoirian side of the border, Ouangolodougou is roughly 625km 
from Abidjan, 30km from Côte d’Ivoire’s border with Burkina Faso, and 84km from the 
country’s border with Mali. Compared to Bouna and Korhogo, Ouangolo’s history is 
distinguished by an overall absence of any enduring indigenous authority structure. This section 
suggests that, again in contrast to Bouna and Korhogo, the emergence of Ouangolo was a direct 
by-product of the foundation of the current West African state system. It has been and remains 
today a town of immigrant traders whose attraction to Ouangolo stems from its strategic position 
at the nexus of the borders dividing Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. To this day, 
Ouangolo’s traders enjoy independence from, not only the Ivoirian state (distinguishing them 
from the Lobi in the case of Bouna), but also from any indigenous social or political system 
(which contrasts with the experience of the Dyula in Korhogo).   
Ouangolo’s growth remained fairly modest until the 20th century, when it gained 
advantage from its strategic economic positioning as a frontier town along Côte d’Ivoire’s 
northern border with Burkina Faso and Mali. Although Côte d’Ivoire’s eastern and western 
political boundaries (with Liberia and Ghana respectively) were established fairly early on after 
its foundation as a French colony, Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border remained in flux as a result of 
the shifting status of Haute Volta (present day Burkina Faso) within French West Africa. Indeed, 
the political boundaries dividing West Africa were altered dramatically during the colonial 
period. All contemporary French West African countries were originally administered as a larger 
federation under colonial rule, l’Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). After the AOF’s borders 
with the British colonies were eventually established in 1898 (see the chapter on Bouna), French 
colonial administrators began to demarcate boundaries between its West African colonies. Côte 
d’Ivoire was officially made a French colony in 1893. French Upper Volta (Haute Volta) was not 
established as a separate colony until 1919.  
By 1929, the economy of the French colony of Haute Volta was in decline. The 
production of cotton for export experienced a precipitous drop, tax rates were viewed by much of 
the population as unbearable, and, in response, most laborers left for the southern cocoa 
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plantation zones in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, where economic conditions were far better (Skinner 
1989, 174). As a result, in September 1932, the French Colonial Minister Sarraut ordered the 
dismemberment of the colony, dividing its territory between three other French colonies: Côte 
d’Ivoire, Niger and French Sudan (present-day Mali) (Skinner 1989, 174). However, by the mid-
1940s, pressure to reinstate Upper Volta as an independent French colony was growing within 
French West Africa. Mossi chiefs called for the re-recognition of Upper Volta in order to bolster 
their own power. When candidates picked by the Mossi establishment seriously threatened the 
election of Houphouët-Boigny to the French parliament in June 1946, Houphouët-Boigny quickly 
sought to shore up the support of this group by promising to push for the reinstatement of Upper 
Volta as a separate colony if the Mossi chief, Moro Naba, agreed to support a PDCI-RDA 
electoral list in the November 1946 elections (Boone 2003, 201).78 French administrators 
responded with an about face: recognizing Upper Volta was understood as a direct means of 
undercutting the political power of the PDCI-RDA by “removing it from (their) influence” 
(Boone 2003, 201; see also Skinner 1989, 185-187). Upper Volta once again became a separate 
colony of France in September 1947 (Skinner 1989, 186). Mali (under colonial rule: Sudan), Côte 
d’Ivoire’s other northern neighbour, also experienced reforms to its borders after its inception as 
a French colony, acquiring its present-day shape in 1944 (Nassa 2008, 5). However, these 
changes did not affect its border with Côte d’Ivoire (Nassa 2008, 5).  
Ouangolo’s emergence as an important political and economic center in northern Côte 
d’Ivoire was a direct consequence of colonial state-formation and the positioning of the border 
dividing Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso. In this respect, the history of Ouangolo contrasts 
with that of both Korhogo (although its significance was also in part a product of fairly recent 
historical processes) and especially Bouna (which functioned as an important city-state in West 
Africa prior to the beginning of European colonialism). In contrast to Ouangolo, the interplay 
between colonial and indigenous or pre-colonial political forces shaped the systems of 
governance established in Bouna and Korhogo. By 1975, Ouangolodougou still remained a fairly 
                                                 
78 The other key reason for the French administration’s appeasement of the Mossi chiefly class in Upper Volta was 
their interests in the labor power of young men, over which this group had direct control. Recognizing their authority 
through the recreation of Upper Volta was one way the French administration could ensure that migration of young 
men from Upper Volta flowed southward to the cocoa plantations in southern Côte d’Ivoire rather than to Ghana 
(Nassa 2010, 4).  
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modest city in terms of population, at 5,402 residents. After its transformation into a sous-
préfecture the same year, the town’s population grew to 12,175 by 1988 and 18,015 by 1998 
(Nassa 2008, 9). The percentage of non-Ivoirians living in Ouangolodougou was an important 
feature of the city’s population. Nassa estimates that, by 1998, almost half of the entire 
population of Ouangolodougou lacked Ivoirian citizenship (43%). Nationals from countries on 
Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border, Burkina Faso (77%) and Mali (20%), made up much of this 
foreign population (Nassa 2008, 9).    
The attraction of migrants and traders from neighboring Sahelian countries to 
Ouangolodougou stemmed largely from its advantages as a frontier town on Côte d’Ivoire’s 
Northern border. Ouangolodougou presented different kinds of opportunities to Malian and 
Burkinabè traders (Nassa 2008, 5-9). The city functioned as a base for foreign traders looking to 
gain access to and embed themselves in lucrative Ivoirian marketing networks. Ouangolodougou 
also benefitted these actors as a result of its position as a strategic node in trans-Sahelian trade. 
The city is situated within a network of roads linking Niger to the east with Senegal. It is also on 
a railway line constructed during the colonial period, linking Abidjan to Burkina Faso (which, as 
discussed above, had enjoyed a shared colonial status briefly during the colonial period). The 
central market in Ouangolodougou played a central role in the system of local markets 
established on the Burkinabè, Malian and Ivoirian sides of the border including Pogo (Côte 
d’Ivoire), Zégoua (Mali), Kadarvogo (Burkina Faso), Bakomi (Burkina Faso), Seribadjan (Côte 
d’Ivoire), Kawara (Côte d’Ivoire), Niangoloko (Burkina Faso, directly across from 
Ouangolodougou), and Nabingué (Côte d’Ivoire). According to Nassa (2008, 6-7), other markets 
in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire border region that occur during the week (from Monday 
to Saturday) allow traders to observe pricing dynamics and build up stocks of different 
commodities (gasoline, agricultural exports, cigarettes, second hand clothing, fabrics) in 
preparation for potential transactions to be made on the principal market day, Sunday, in 
Ouangolodougou and Niangoloko. Institutional development also contributed to 
Ouangolodougou’s emergence as an important border town. A central train station, warehouses 
for the La Compagnie Cotonnière Ivoirienne (LCCI), La Société Internationale des Transports 
par Rail (SITARAIL), as well as the offices for Ivoirian border customs helped to facilitate 
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regional West African trade, particularly for those traders based in Ounagolodougou (Nassa 
2008, 7).  
Finally, prior to the conflict, the state politically controlled the border by allying with a 
group of educated Ivoirian nationals who were not directly tied to Ouangolo’s trading 
community. Many of Ouangolo’s traders lacked Ivoirian citizenship and thus could not run for 
public office or assume formal political appointments. However, prior to the transition to 
multiparty politics in Côte d’Ivoire, Ouangolo’s traders had a positive relationship with the state. 
During the single-party period, the PDCI promoted migration and defended the rights of migrants 
in Côte d’Ivoire. As I discuss in greater detail below, the adoption of ivoirité and promotion of 
anti-immigrant policies by successive governments in the 1990s (see chapter 2) altered the 
relationship between migrants in Ouangolo (and elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire) and national-level 
leadership. In sharp contrast with the case of Bouna, the PDCI (and later the FPI) did not rule 
directly through migrant populations in Ouangolo.79 Migrant-traders did not assume prominent 
positions in government. Prior to the beginning of the civil war, these positions were filled 
largely by educated Ivoirian nationals who were not part of Ouangolo’s trading community. 
Ouangolo’s mayor, Nagnin Ouattara was originally elected in 1990 and held this position until 
his death in 2011. Although mayor, he split his time between Ouangolo and Abidjan where he 
taught history and sociology at l’Ecole Normale Supérieure d'Abidjan. Other representatives of 
the state came from a similar social milieu: they were formally trained at universities in Abidjan 
and elsewhere (Europe, etc.). They did not derive their authority or status from trade or being part 
of Ouangolo’s trading communities (member of mayor’s office, Ouangolo, December 2nd, 2010a; 
member of mayor’s office, Ouangolo, December 2nd, 2010b). They were somewhat equivalent to 
what Tessy Bakary (1986) described as educated “nobodies” or those actors lacking any local 
base of support independent of the state. This is, to a degree, an overstatement. State 
representatives based in Ouangolo maintained positive relations with the traders for much of the 
post-colonial period. Nonetheless, anti-immigrant rhetoric promoted by successive governments 
at the national-level drove a wedge between local representatives of the state and Ouangolo’s 
largely foreign trading community.   
                                                 
79 As explained in Chapter 4, during the post-colonial period, prominent Lobi lineage heads became the principal 




Opportunities and Constraints for Commerce During the Crisis Period 
The political-military crisis that began in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 posed immediate threats to 
commercial networks that extended across Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border. To weaken the 
rebellion, the Gbagbo government blocked goods from being shipped to the North (Nassa 2010). 
Additionally, within weeks of the rebels’ assuming control over the North, passage across Côte 
d’Ivoire’s northern borders with Mali and Burkina Faso came to an abrupt halt. Both the rebels 
and the southern government became immediately suspicious of trucks that could potentially 
smuggle arms to either side under the guise of trans-border trade. Immediately after the outbreak 
of the conflict, trucks headed to Abidjan were held up in Niangoloko, directly across from 
Ouangolodougou on the Ivoirian side of the border with Burkina Faso (Gouly 2002, Niangoran 
2008). Rather than the Ouangolodougou-Ferkessédougou-Bouaké-Abidjan corridor relied on in 
the past, traders from other West African countries increasingly turned to Burkina Faso’s border 
with Ghana (at Paga) as an entry-way into the South. Many traders based in Ouangolodougou 
relocated to Ghana in the initial days of the crisis and remained there for its duration.  
As the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire wore on, initial tensions and suspicions between 
traders and the political administration of the rebels as well as the Gbagbo government based in 
Abidjan, gradually subsided. Nonetheless, serious impediments to cross-border trade remained. 
In particular, the financial costs of conducting trade in Côte d’Ivoire increased considerably after 
the beginning of the conflict. Two factors merit attention. The first was the set of informal taxes 
imposed on traders throughout Côte d’Ivoire and particularly in the North. Bribes demanded at 
checkpoints along the Ouangolodougou-Ferkessédougou-Bouaké-Abidjan corridor significantly 
raised the costs of trade (USAID ATP 2010a). The checkpoints themselves resulted in significant 
delays in the marketing of agricultural commodities. The second factor relates to the set of formal 
taxes established by the financial arm of the FN, La Centrale, which fiscally regulated the 
shipment of goods across the northern zones under the control of the rebels. The rebels 
established this system of taxation in part to formalize and regulate the costs associated with 
transporting goods across Northern Côte d’Ivoire (i.e. minimizing the cost of informal taxation 
through bribes and checkpoints). Such agreements will be discussed in more detail in later 
sections of this chapter.       
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Whatever the efforts of traders and political administrators in the North and the South to 
mitigate the costs of informal taxation, such costs remained high until the terminal stages of the 
conflict. Data from the USAID funded Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG) Initiative 
suggests that the costs of transportation in Côte d’Ivoire remained high throughout the conflict 
relative to other principal West African trade routes (crossing Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Burkina 
Faso, Togo, as well as Côte d’Ivoire). Between April 1st and June 30th 2010, Côte d’Ivoire was 
ranked first by the IRTG in terms of the density of controls per 100km (3.23, Senegal was second 
at 2.93). Roughly half of the stops were conducted by actors tied to the FN. Compared to other 
West African countries, traders passing through Côte d’Ivoire were also forced to pay larger 
bribes. Per 100 km, drivers were forced to pay on average 5,928CFA in bribes in Côte d’Ivoire 
(including regions controlled by the government in the south and the FN in the north). Mali was 
second at 4,022 CFA on average. The majority of these bribes (3,786 CFA) were paid to FN 
actors. Côte d’Ivoire also led in terms of the average time of delays confronted by drivers 
(USAID ATP 2010a, 5-9). Overall, these financial and time costs represented significant 
impediments to trade and powerful incentives to rely on alternative trade routes, specifically 
through Ghana.  
Beyond negotiating directly with both the FN and Gbagbo’s government in the South, 
traders had other strategies for reducing these additional costs. The time and financial costs 
associated with transportation during the crisis period were partially made up for by passing them 
along to consumers and to other actors who were part of the commodity chains in question. In the 
case of livestock marketing, per kilogram meat prices in Côte d’Ivoire rose gradually from 800 or 
900 CFAs at the beginning of the conflict to 2,000, 2,500 and finally to 3,000 CFAs by 2008 
(Z.K. 2008). In the end, slaughterhouses and consumers bore the brunt of these prices. Indeed, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter, high prices for meat generated substantial political 
opposition to Issaka Sawadogo, the president of the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, who was seen 
as benefiting from high tax rates and high production costs just as much as those regulatory 
authorities who were responsible for imposing them (Z.K. 2008). These conflicts will be 
discussed in more detail below.  
However, the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire did not simply create barriers to trans-border 
trade. It also created new opportunities for wealth acquisition. Many of the commodities 
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(principally cocoa, cashews, cotton and diamonds) that were previously directed towards Abidjan 
and the coast for export were now being rerouted to other countries on the Gulf of Guinea (Benin, 
Ghana and Guinea) as well as to those in the Sahel (Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali). 
Ouangolodougou served as the principal exit point for these commodities (Nassa 2008, 10). By 
reorienting commodity markets towards Ouangolo and Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border, the 
rebellion created new avenues for wealth generation for actors who could position themselves 
strategically at different nodes of these commodity chains and play leading roles in the regulatory 
structures devised to manage them in this new environment. Interviews with COFENABVI-
PAM-UEMOA members suggest that profit margins in the trade in livestock increased during the 
later stages of the political crisis (see also COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA 2008, 1). However, no 
comprehensive data exist comparing levels of livestock sales in the pre-conflict period to those 
after the beginning of the political crisis.80 As tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate, sales of cattle in Côte 
d’Ivoire from Mali81 varied slightly year-to-year between 2008 and 2010 (there was more 
variation month to month). Again, interviews suggested that cattle sales between Mali and Côte 
d’Ivoire also increased between 2005 and 2008, after trade was initially halted during the early 
days of the conflict, but no data are available to support this claim.  
One actor widely perceived to have thrived during the conflict was the president of 
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Issaka Sawadogo (aka ‘Potcho’) (Z.K. 2008).  Sawadogo was 
born in 1961 in the political capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou. Upon first moving to 
Ouangolodougou with his family at the age of ten, Sawadogo began his commercial career by 
selling bags of potable water and cigarettes. Later, as an employee of the border services in 
Ouangolodougou, he sold small goods on a table outside of the border office. He subsequently 
moved into the trade of more high-value goods, including cars and car parts (Sidwaya 2009). 
Later, he branched out as a money lender to other businessmen looking to expand cross-border 
trade. Although at the time of the armed conflict, Sawadogo’s principal interest was in the 
regional trade in livestock, his business ventures remain varied (Sidwaya 2009). He was the part 
                                                 
80 Data acquired from COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA only covered the period between 2008 and 2010. As explained 
below, the organization itself was not created until late 2004.   
81 I emphasize Mali because 2010 country data is missing for other West African cattle exporting countries, 
specifically Burkina Faso.  
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owner of INFONET, an internet café in Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina-Faso), which sells up-to-date 
technologies and provides a host of teleconferencing services to local businesses. He also owned 
two gas stations in Bobo-Dioulasso and a hotel in Niangoloko, Burkina Faso. His most recent 
business group (le groupe SIK, Sawadogo Issaka Kombaya) is involved in a number of different 
sectors, including transportation and the cotton trade, as well as trading in a number of different 
agricultural commodities. Due to the diversity of his commercial interests, Sawadogo is also 
linked to a number of groups and organizations in addition to COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA 
including the Société de commerce Côte d’Ivoire – Burkina (SOCOCIB), Société Ivoiro-malienne 
de transport de bétail (SIMTB), the Union transport SOCOCIB-COBOF (UTSC, COBOF: 
Compagnie Bocoum et Frères) and the Coopérative agricole Djiguiya de Ouangolodougou 
(CADO) (Rouamba 2006). Overall, Sawadogo wielded substantial wealth and political influence 
prior to the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. During the crisis, his connections to political and 
economic organizations, as well as his close connections to the governments of both Burkina 
Faso and Côte d’Ivoire made Sawadogo a valuable ally for many, particularly the Malian and 
Burkinabe traders based in Ouangolodougou and the FN, who had vested political and economic 
interests in maintaining trade flows across Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border (Rouamba 2006). The 
following sub-section will focus on COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA to highlight how the 
organization underpinned Sawadogo’s authority and how his authority influenced political 
conflict in Ouangolodougou during the conflict.     
 
 




Figure 6.2 Yearly Number Cattle Sold from Mali to Côte d’Ivoire (2008-2010). Source: 
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA (2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 6.3 : Monthly Number of Cattle Sold from Mali to Côte d’Ivoire (2008-2010). 
Source: COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA (2008, 2009, 2010).  
 
Commerce in Times of Crisis : Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des 
Pays Membres de l’UEMOA (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA).  
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was created on 27 December 2004 in Bamako, Mali, roughly two 
years after the beginning of Ivoirian crisis in 2002. It was formed by representatives from four 
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member countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. However, the number of 
member countries and country representatives quickly expanded. By 2010, COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA included all fifteen West African countries, with each country represented by seven 
delegates in the federation’s governing assembly (totalling one hundred and five). The principal 
body responsible for governance within the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was the board of 
directors. In 2010, the board itself expanded from fifteen to twenty-five members who were 
elected by country delegates. Issaka Sawadago was one of the founders of the federation and 
functioned as its President since its inception in 2004. In 2010, he was elected to another five 
year presidential mandate by COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA’s board of directors.  
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA’s financing comes from two principal sources. Dues paid 
by its members covers about 20% of the federation’s costs. However, the USAID’s Agribusiness 
and Trade Promotion (ATP) project in West Africa covers the lion’s share of the costs of the 
federation’s activities. The central aim of ATP is to “increase the value and volume of intra-
regional agricultural trade in West Africa in order to contribute to achieving the six percent 
agricultural growth target” (USAID ATP 2010b, 1). To accomplish this, ATP focuses on a 
number of specific trade corridors linking Sahelian countries, specifically Mali and Burkina Faso, 
to large coastal markets, namely those in Côte d’Ivoire (Abidjan), Ghana (Tema and Accra), and 
Nigeria (Lagos). ATP also focuses on a number of specific value chains linking these different 
countries, including ruminant livestock and meat, onions and shallots, as well as maize. Given 
these broad, overarching objectives, ATP pursues a number of specific goals that largely overlap 
with the interests and objectives of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. These include objectives 
related to production (cost-effective cattle fattening, enhancing storage capacities and feed 
capacity), reduction of transportation costs, increased access to financing, creation of market 
information systems and organizational development of local partners. The national and federal 
offices for COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA represented one of the two principal interlocutors82 for 
ATP’s activities in West Africa and in Côte d’Ivoire specifically (USAID ATP 2010b, 1-4).83                 
                                                 
82 The other is the Observatoire régional pour le bétail/viande d’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre (ORBV/AOC). 
83 See below. At the time of the foundation of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Côte d’Ivoire did not have a national 
body charged with the management of the livestock/meat industry.  
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COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA’s very creation represented a popular response to the 
impediments to cross-border and regional trade created by the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Incentives to better organize the trade in livestock increased after the beginning of the conflict. 
For traders in livestock – particularly those in Burkina Faso and Mali – the political crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire created significant barriers to trade by cutting off the key corridor leading to the lucrative 
Abidjan market in the south through the northern centers of Ouangolodougou, Korhogo and 
Bouaké. The federation had three interrelated strategies for encouraging the trade in livestock 
despite the barriers presented by the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. The first was simply to 
reduce the rates of taxation on cross-border trade. The onset of the political conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire magnified the general problem of taxation in two ways. First, as a result of the conflict, 
traders now confronted two administrative entities with which they were forced to bargain, the 
government in the South and the rebels in the North. The second challenge was managing the 
problem of bribery and corruption. In addition to the official levies on cross-border trade applied 
by both the bureaucratic apparatus of the government controlled south and the rebel controlled 
North, demands for bribes from soldiers and administrative personnel significantly ate into the 
profitability of regional trade. This was a problem throughout Côte d’Ivoire (See Chelpi-den 
Hamer 2010; McGovern 2011; Bassett 2011b); particularly in the rebel-held North where levels 
of bribery and corruption increased because of the series of checkpoints erected by FN soldiers 
throughout the north-south axis connecting Ouangolodougou to Abidjan. Finally, the federation 
and in particular its President, Issaka Sawadago, showed delegates from other member states that 
the problems created by the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire were not insurmountable. As 
President of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Sawadago played an important diplomatic role for 
other traders and the organization’s member states (USAID ATP 2010b, 24-29).   
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA’s relationship with the FN was central to its ability to 
facilitate trans-border trade. As indicated above, bribery at rebel checkpoints remained an 
ongoing impediment to trade. However, there is some evidence suggesting that bribes paid to FN 
soldiers declined over time (Trader, Ouangolodougou, December 16th, 2010; Trader, 
Ouangolodougou, December 25th, 2010). An important reason for this was the good working 
relationship between the rebels and COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. It required that certain 
‘guarantees’ be made by each side. As president of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Sawadogo 
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played a central role in the foundation and maintenance of this working relationship. In the end, 
the rebels committed to lower rates of taxation for shipping across Northern Côte d’Ivoire and 
agreed to control bribery along the major north-south axis between Abidjan and 
Ouangolodougou. For their part, the federation assured the FN that their trucks would not be used 
to ship arms to the Gbagbo government in the South. As long as this promise was upheld, the FN 
would do its part to ensure the accessibility of these trade networks. Indeed, it had a vested 
interest in ensuring the growth of north-south trade given the large sum of tax revenue it 
generated. As was explained to me, Sawadogo operated as the key broker between the 
Ouangolo’s trading community, the FN and the Ivoirian government in efforts to maintain trade 
routes potentially threatened by the political crisis (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12. 
2010; interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 25.12. 2010).   
 
Belonging and Conflict in Ouangolodougou: National-Local Connections 
Much of Sawadogo’s popularity in Ouangolodougou among the town’s trading community 
stemmed from the support he gave to immigrant communities based in Côte d’Ivoire, specifically 
those from Mali and Burkina Faso. Sawadogo’s popularity among other traders goes far in 
explaining why he emerged as the principal intermediary between the FN and this group. His role 
as broker during the conflict only reinforced the support he received from Ouangolo’s traders 
because of the threats the nativist policies of the Gbagbo government posed to this group. 
Overall, the experience of Ouangolo’s traders bears a striking resemblance to that of migrants 
living in other parts of Côte d’Ivoire during the crisis period. In interviews, traders repeatedly 
showed their keen awareness of their precarious position as ‘immigrants’ to Ouangolo, no matter 
how long ago they had established themselves on the Ivoirian side of the border (for many, this 
was a period of 30+ years). Sawadogo’s status as a wealthy trader and as a privileged partner 
working with the FN as well as the Ivoirian government in the South made him a valuable ally 
for many of the non-Ivoirian traders based in Ouangolodougou. Yet, Sawadogo’s own contested 
status as an Ivoirian citizen also put obvious restrictions on his ability to directly ‘represent’ this 
group vis-à-vis the emergent post-conflict state. Indeed, questions surrounding Sawadogo’s 
citizenship underlay criticisms of his leadership of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA that emerged 
during the later stages of the conflict. 
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For some time, Sawadogo has been widely viewed as the principal defender of the 
Burkinabé and Malian trader population in Ouangolodougou. One of the organizations formed by 
Sawadogo, the Coopérative agricole Djiguiya de Ouangolodougou (CADO), was created directly 
in response to the marginalization of ethnic strangers living in this part of the North. Sawadogo 
intervened in December 2000 when a cooperative of cotton producers refused to pay what was 
owed to some of its members because of their Burkinabè and Malian origins. This was soon after 
Laurent Gbagbo’s contested electoral victory, when politicized resentment against foreigners in 
Côte d’Ivoire was at its peak. Sawadogo fought this ‘flagrant injustice’ and worked to ensure that 
these farmers were paid what they deserved (Rouamba 2006). In just a few years, CADO’s 
profits grew as it attracted an increasing number of farmers looking to mitigate the effects of the 
divisive politics employed by some politicians during this period. For such acts, Sawadogo has 
earned the nickname “le chef du Nord” (Rouamba 2006). 
Anti-immigrant attacks during the conflict period reinforced relationships between 
Sawadogo and Burkinabè and Malian traders in Ouangolo. Indeed, for all the problems associated 
with the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire listed above, one silver lining for the traders based in 
Ouangolodougou was that the administrative system installed by the rebels effectively shielded 
them from Ivoirian citizenship requirements and government demands for proper identification. 
Indeed, uncertainty over the outcome of the political crisis given Gbagbo’s continued reluctance 
to hold elections and give up power since 2000 meant that issues linked to citizenship and 
belonging remained ongoing concerns for many of Malian and Burkinabè traders based in 
Ouangolodougou.   
Overall, narrow definitions of Ivoirian citizenship supported by some national-level 
political actors posed an equally credible threat to traders based in different parts of the north. 
Sawadogo and the rest of Ouangolo’s traders became the targets of state intervention (attempts to 
regain fiscal control over the border, enforcement of Ivoirian citizenship) during the conflict 
period. The susceptibility of ‘strangers’ to state-led attacks on non-Ivoirians was shaped by who 
these actors could potentially ally with to shore up their own position locally. The previous 
chapter showed how the Dyula community in Korhogo aligned themselves with different 
segments of the ruling elite, the Coulibaly family, throughout the post-colonial period. Strong ties 
remained between some segments of the Senoufo elite (Kassoum Coulibaly) and the Dyula 
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population in Korhogo during the political crisis. These relationships shielded traders from the 
worst of the discrimination resulting from the debates over citizenship and belonging that 
remained at the heart of the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. In Ouangolodougou, however, the 
absence of an equivalent set of ‘indigenous’ elites rendered impossible the emergence of similar 
set of coalitional arrangements. Despite the legitimacy bestowed on Sawadogo by many in 
Ouangolodougou, he was by no means immune to attacks regarding his status as an Ivoirian 
citizen. As the final two sections of this chapter will explain, the susceptibility of Sawadogo to 
these kinds of attacks ultimately strengthened the political position of actors tied to the FN in 
Ouangolodougou. Despite the authority Sawadogo wielded as leader of COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA, his status as a non-Ivoirian severely restricted his ability to broker the relationship 
between Ouangolo and Abidjan in formal political life. I suggest later that this provided more 
space – than in either Korhogo or Bouna – for the rebels to fill this role.  
During the course of the political-crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, Sawadago’s growing control 
over the marketing of livestock was challenged by others. Objections over what was perceived to 
be his ‘dictatorial’ or single-handed control over COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA came from a 
number of sources. First, as indicated previously, complaints grew over the extent to which 
Sawadogo was using his positions of authority – as both the president of COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA and as one of the key arbiters of the livestock regulatory system – to manage the trade 
in livestock for his own benefit and at the expense of the majority of the federation’s members. 
Critics noted that, of the total per truck cost of shipping livestock, roughly 642,000 CFA, only 
35,000 CFA went to the state as tax revenue.84 Critics felt that Sawadogo was appropriating a 
disproportionate share for himself. Others felt that COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA also used its 
position as an intermediary between the rebels and the state to inflate shipping costs via rail. A 
train wagon containing livestock was charged only 333,333 CFA by the Ivoirian parastatal 
Sitarail (an organization with which Sawadogo also has close links). However, traders were 
forced to pay 800,000 CFA, with the lion’s share of the difference going to COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA. Overall, the steepness of this cut has garnered criticism from other actors involved in 
the livestock commodity chain, including traders, slaughterhouses, state actors, as well as other 
                                                 
84 At the time of my field work (2010-2011), $1USD equaled roughly 500CFA.  
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executive members of the federation. Another important part of this story was the fact that, at the 
time that COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was formed, Côte d’Ivoire itself did not have a national 
regulatory body charged with managing the marketing of livestock (Zabril 2008). Given its status 
as a regional organization, the privileged role of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA in the setting of 
livestock prices as well as its growing control over many other aspects of livestock marketing 
represented a significant threat to national livestock interests. Indeed, the very creation of the 
Fédération nationale des coopératives, associations et societies de la filière bétail viande de Côte 
d’Ivoire (FENACOFB-CI) represented an attempt led by ‘Ivoirian’ traders to loosen Sawadogo’s 
grip over livestock marketing in Côte d’Ivoire (Coulibaly 2010). Sawadogo substantiated the 
perception of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA as threat to national livestock interests in Côte 
d’Ivoire when, in reaction, he attempted to create a rival national organization under his control 
(Ba 2010; Bakayoko 2010).  
Ultimately, however, Sawadogo’s efforts to consolidate his control over the livestock 
trade in Côte d’Ivoire were limited by his own contested status as an Ivoirian citizen. In early 
2010, Ivoirian police picked up Sawadogo in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Yopougon on 
charges of identity fraud. The problem stemmed from the fact that Sawadogo was found carrying 
two national identity cards that had conflicting information surrounding his place of birth as well 
as his birth parents.85 Sawadogo’s rivals seized upon this incident and used it to limit the growing 
authority over the regulation of the trade in livestock in Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed by COFENABVI-
PAM-UEMOA. During a February 2010 meeting in the Abidjan suburb of Adjame, the President 
and Vice-President of FENACOFB-CI, Koné Vafing and Charles Kossonou, publically 
denounced Sawadogo’s ability to credibly represent the interests of Côte d’Ivoire in 
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, stating that “Issaka Sawadogo was called out for nationality 
fraud. He was holding two pieces of identity. He can no longer represent Côte d’Ivoire within the 
confederation as a result of his questionable nationality” (Ba 2010). Ultimately, attacks on 
Sawadogo’s status as an Ivoirian citizen represented part of a larger strategy of undercutting the 
                                                 
85 One card was from Côte d’Ivoire and the other from Burkina Faso. The Ivoirian card claimed that Sawadogo was 
born on November 26th, 1961 in Kong (Côte d’Ivoire), to his father Sawadogo Tongolo (born January 1st, 1912), and 
mother, Ouattara Tongolo (born January 1st, 1931). In contrast, the Bukinabè card stated that Sawadogo was born on 
April 6th, 1961 in Zongo (Burkina Faso), to the same father as indicated in the Ivoirian nationality card, but to a 
different mother, Sawadogo Sommanagré (Depry 2010).     
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existing authority over taxation and price-setting held by Sawadogo and COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA and shifting these powers under the authority of the ‘legitimate’ national organization, 
the FENACOFB-CI (Ba 2010).          
Taxation, Authority and Political Contestation in Post-OPA Ouangolodougou 
As migrants, many Ouangolodougou-based traders were fully aware of the precariousness of their 
local position as a result of government efforts to restrict Ivoirian citizenship during the crisis 
period even while under the administrative control of the FN. The common self-reference of 
traders as ‘strangers’ evoked the insecurity felt about their future in Ouangolodougou (interview, 
trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2010). Traders expressed concerns over everyday state practices 
such as the enforcement of national identity requirements and procurement of taxes at pre-
conflict rates. The threatened citizenship of Ouangolo’s traders, including Sawadogo himself, 
shaped the post-OPA political transition in this part of the North in two interrelated ways. The 
first feature of the political transition in Ouangolodougou that stands out was the relatively broad 
support the FN received, particularly from the traders. In Ouangolo (as elsewhere in Northern 
Côte d’Ivoire), the OPA prompted efforts by public officials to shift authority over taxation from 
the rebel administration to state agencies. However, the FN, Sawadogo and the rest of the 
Ouangolo’s traders collectively resisted the renewal of the authority of the state because these 
actors were all threatened by the exclusionary politics promoted by the Gbagbo government 
during the crisis period. Second, and relatedly, the relationship between the FN and the mayors’ 
office was far more antagonistic here than in the previously discussed cases of Bouna and 
Korhogo. In Korhogo, the winner of the 2013 mayoral elections, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, was a 
member of the local faction that had supported the zone commander Fofié Martin during the 
conflict.  In Bouna, we saw how the local branch of the FN actually sought to shift some 
authority over local taxation back to the mayors’ office in order to buttress the legitimacy of the 
rebels.86 In Ouangolo, we see quite the opposite; the local arm of the FN expressed a genuine 
mistrust of the mayor’s office up until the terminal stages of the conflict.  
                                                 
86 In order to re-legitimize the movement, the FN’s strategies for reform in Bouna went two ways. On the one hand, 
the central organizers of the rebellion aimed to shift authority away from the military wing of the movement, the 
Com’zone headed by Morou Ouattara, by investing the power to tax in the hands of agents of La Centrale. In this 
way, these reforms heightened the control of the movement over local taxation (although the locus of authority 
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By 2010, Ouangolo still struggled with many of the administrative challenges confronted 
by other northern towns. Being cut off from the central government for the better part of the 
decade seriously restricted the ability of local political institutions – namely the mayor’s office, 
the prefecture and sub-prefecture – to perform even the most day-to-day administrative tasks. 
One particularly irksome and illustrative problem was the rather large piles of garbage that were a 
common sight throughout the city at this time. In 2008, a number of prominent political actors in 
the city, including members of the mayor’s office, the conseil municipaux, and a number of 
traditional chiefs, finally confronted the local FN administration and complained about the 
declining state of the city since the rebels had assumed control over it.  
The sequence of events that followed illustrates well the alliances that had formed during 
the conflict between the FN and local traders, who were largely of Burkinabé or Malian in origin. 
Following the complaint filed by a number of prominent actors in the city, Fofié Martin, the 
commandant de zone in zone 10, agreed to come from his base in Korhogo to Ouangolodougou 
and listen to their concerns. Fofié Martin took some pride in the quality of governance provided 
throughout the zone under his control (interview, FN member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011). He travelled 
to Ouangolodougou to “make an example” of what should be done in terms of rebel governance, 
in light of criticisms directed against the local FN administration by Ouangolo residents 
(interview, FN member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011). After the meeting between Martin, members of the 
mayoral office and a number of other prominent political actors in Ouangolodougou, it was 
agreed that the mayor should re-establish control over certain tax bases in the city, particularly 
the local market. Soon after, however, many traders in Ouangolodougou were up in arms 
regarding this shift in authority over local-level taxation. In reasserting its authority over the 
taxation of the local market, the mayor’s office provoked outrage from many local traders in two 
distinct ways. First, the mayor sought to collect back payments for the years that resident traders 
were paying taxes not to the mayor’s office but to the FN. Second, the tax rate the mayor’s office 
enforced were equivalent to pre-conflict (pre-2002) tax rates and were far higher than those 
established by the FN and what traders were accustomed to paying for the better part of the 
conflict (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2010). Together, these aspects of the tax 
                                                                                                                                                              
shifted from one administrative wing to the other). However, as the chapter 4 explains, the FN also outright ceded 
some authority to tax in Bouna to the mayor’s office in order to buttress the dwindling legitimacy of the movement.  
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demands seriously delegitimized the claims made by the mayor in the eyes of many 
Ouangolodougou based traders. The following quotes, one from a trader and another from a 
member of the mayor’s office based in Ouangolodougou, reflect these sentiments:  
 
Because the mayor came, and he said to the FN that before, the traders worked with the 
mayor, it was us who paid the taxes to the mayor. But right now, we don’t get anything 
from this [from working with the mayor]. There was some dialogue between the FN and 
the mayor, that they would continue to control the border, etc. and the mayor would begin 
to tax the traders at the market, all the small merchants. He says that the stores that are 
there now, when he went there, for all of the past year, all of the merchants have to pay. 
The merchants responded by saying ‘what do we get’? They get nothing! (interview, trader, 
Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2012).  
 
In 2007, there were steps taken by the FN that would allow the mayor’s office to function. 
However, despite all this, we had taxes that needed to be paid, over the market, over the 
buildings in the market provided by the mayor’s office, and the taxes for the 
slaughterhouse. Sadly however, there were business people who, for them, it was more 
advantageous to have the FN in power because they were not yet ready to pay taxes, and 
submit to the taxes issued by the mayor (interview, member of the mayor’s office, 
Ouangolodougou, 12.12. 2010).  
  
Not surprisingly, traders immediately called for the FN to re-intervene. This time, the FN sent the 
Delegate Generale based in Korhogo, Soro Kanigui Mamadou, to calm tensions between the 
traders and mayor’s office in Ouangolodougou. Ultimately, the FN retracted its original decision 
for the mayor to reassume authority over taxation, siding with the traders in this local-level 
conflict (interview, member of the mayor’s office, Ouangolodougou, 12.12.2010; interview, FN 
member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011).  
The obvious effect of the FN’s decision was to marginalize the influence of the mayor 
over the collection of taxes in Ouangolodougou. The mayor himself told me that:     
          
This is reality. Me, I am the mayor. But I have practically no authority over the population since the 
presence of the FN. I was saying that with the taxes, me when I speak with the populations they 
simply don’t listen. At the market, when I go and speak to the people at the market and say ‘that 





Another important part of this story, however, was the position taken by the FN towards 
the institution of the mayor’s office towards the end of the conflict. In contrast to the other cases 
of local FN administration in Bouna and Korhogo, in Ouangolo, the local FN administration 
remained suspicious of the mayor’s office during the post-OPA period. Below is a segment of the 
conversation I had with the highest-ranking FN administrator in Ouangolo in 2010.                
 
JS: Can you explain to me your relationship with the mayor? 
 
FN: OK OK, in terms of our relationship with the mayor, we don’t work together. 
However, it must be said that after the political crisis began the mayor’s office ceased to function. 
Thus the mayor’s office was not functioning; there were some mayors in other zones who did 
return. But in terms of the different taxes, it must be said at the level of mayor, in terms of the 
theme of taxes, when we finish working, the money will pour in as taxes. We can’t let the mayor do 
his work because he is going to send his money where? We can’t work, at the moment that the 
country is divided in two; we can’t let the mayor send the money to the other government. Thus, at 
this time, the mayor’s office is not functioning… 
 
JS: Others have informed me about a conflict that occurred between the FN, the mayor, and 
the commerçants in Ouangolodougou. Can you explain this conflict to me? 
 
FN: OK, in fact, the problem is simple. As I was saying earlier, when the FN 
administratively installed themselves in Ouangolodougou, we assumed control over the 
administration of taxes. As I was saying, we could not let the mayor function because he could send 
the money back to the other side. As a result, we took the situation into our own hands, to allow our 
administration to function. Let me give you an example. One store under the authority of the mayor 
would pay a monthly tax of 20,000CFA. However, when the FN arrived we said no! The mayor 
cannot work and then share information with Abidjan, and send money back to Abidjan. Also, we 
didn’t take the same amount of money as the mayor from the stores, instead of 20,000CFA; it’s now 
10,000CFA, and it is this 10,000CFA that allows the FN to function (interview, FN administrator, 
Ouangolodougou, 7.12.2010).    
 
Just as in Bouna, political conflict during the post-OPA period in Ouangolo revolved 
centrally around the issue of taxation. However, the coalitions underpinning these struggles 
differed in these cases. In Bouna, I argued that the fusion of the authority of the authority of Lobi 
elite and the state pitted the FN and the Lobi community against each other. The specific position 
of Lobi politicians such as Palé Dimaté, as brokers, structured conflicts over authority in Bouna 
as being principally between the rebels and some of the city’s most prominent political and 
economic actors. Because the FN’s principal allies in Bouna, the Koulongo, lacked comparable 
levels of political clout, the FN ceded some powers over taxation to the mayor’s office towards 
the end of the conflict in order to renew the legitimacy of the rebellion. Events played themselves 
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out differently in Ouangolo where shared opposition to the state formed the basis of the alliance 
between the traders and the FN.  
 
Ouangolodougou’s Rebel-Trader Alliance and the Incipient Post-Conflict Order 
The FN in Ouangolo mobilized comparatively high levels of support. Ouangolo differed from 
Bouna, where the FN was viewed with some suspicion up until the end of the conflict by a large 
segment of the population, specifically the Lobi community. There are more similarities between 
the Ouangolo and Korhogo cases. The social control of the FN in Korhogo was enhanced by the 
wartime alliance formed between the FN’s commandant de zone Fofié Martin and the 
conservative faction of the long ruling Coulibaly family. The coalition between Martin and this 
faction of the Senoufo elite was demonstrated at different points of the conflict, especially during 
the debates over chiefly succession after the death of Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. Support was also 
evident after the appointment of Fofié Martin by Alassane Ouattara as the head of the military 
company (Compagnie territoriale) in 2011.87 In Ouangolo, like in Korhogo, there is some, albeit 
mixed evidence illustrating the support received by the local FN after the removal of Laurent 
Gbagbo in 2011. Like in the pre-conflict period, Senoufo elites in Korhogo occupied most of the 
prominent political positions after the conflict. The resounding success of Amadou Gon 
Coulibaly in the 2013 mayoral elections suggests continuity rather than change. In Ouangolo, the 
rebels arguably played a more prominent role in the incipient post-conflict order given the 
precarious position of the intermediaries on which the northern rebellion itself depended for 
support.  
After the removal of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, actors directly involved in 
reconstituting the authority of state institutions in Ouangolo (such as the mayor’s offices and 
customs offices) quickly sought to re-establish control over economic activity running across the 
                                                 
87 Although Martin was appointed by Ouattara, there are two reasons why one might infer a relationship between this 
appointment and local-level support mobilized by Martin during the conflict. First, chapter 5 presented some 
evidence suggesting that during the conflict period, local interests and alliances informed the decision made by FN 
leadership to appoint Fofié Martin as zone commander in the first place. FN leader Guillaume Soro bent to the 
opinion of the then Korhogo Cantonal Chief, Drissa Coulibaly, in making this decision. Thus, there is some 
precedent showing how local interests influence national decisions regarding local-level appointments. Second, as 
also discussed in chapter 5, there were a number of prominent Senoufo elites in the RDR led by Alassane Ouattara. 
This could have influenced the decision to appointment Martin to this position as well.  
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Ivoirian, Malian and Burkinabe borders. Government administrators recognized the importance 
of currying the favor of traders hesitant to work with the state apparatus, which has long been the 
object of some suspicion. In July 2011, three months after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo, the 
new Ivoirian government appointed Fofana Bhouakeye as the head of the customs office in 
Ouangolo. In an interview conducted with Nouveau Réveil, Bhouakeye explains his efforts to 
target the traders as a strategy for implementing the new regulatory order enforced by the state:  
 
It is true that the people (in Ouangolodougou) had spread the rumour that we were going to tax 
them. Thus, most of trucks did not cross. As a result, I tried to make contacts with certain members 
of the network of traders. And after this, there were a number of them who began to come timidly. 
The problem that was posed was when we told them that it has to be our regulations over the border 
that need to be applied. I examined their existing tax payment schedule. And I tried to align ours 
with theirs. On this basis, and the calculations I made, this permitted many of the traders to return. It 
has to be said that, today, things are going well (Sory, Konan, and Touré 2012).  
 
This passage highlights some level of suspicion within the trading community in Ouangolo over 
efforts at state reconstruction, even after the removal of former President Laurent Gbagbo in early 
2011. Not surprisingly, former members of the FN organized resistance to state efforts at 
regaining control over border flows. After Bhouakeye’s appointment, the former rebels expressed 
some hesitation about giving up their position at the border. As a result, tensions and threats of 
violence ran high. The strategy employed by Bhouakeye to re-establish the presence of the state 
in the border regions was influenced by the high levels of support garnered by the rebels in 
Ouangolo, particularly in terms of their relationship with the cross-border traders. He explains 
that:      
 
After I saw the demobilized soldiers dragging their feet, I said to myself that I can’t leave them 
angered, fearing an attack on our position one day. There were certain individuals that I saw, and 
those who would shoot into the air, and I said to them that they could function as an intermediary 
between the traders and us. So they began to work as lobbyists. So if you had let’s say 
50.000CFA’s, this would allow you to leave with it. Thus, they began to work as lobbyists for us. 
As they came to work for us, we made day to day evaluations. Sometimes they were given 50 or 
100CFA’s by the traders which would allow the trucks to go through the border quickly, this was 
good for them. And they were happy. Thus when others (other FN members) would bring actions 
against us, they began to oppose it (quoted in Sory, Konan and Touré 2012).  
 
The comparison with Bouna is again instructive here. In Bouna, the FN intentionally restricted 
the movement’s authority over taxation, by granting some authority over taxation back to the 
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mayor’s office, in order to preserve the legitimacy of the rebellion in the post-OPA period. In 
contrast, in Ouangolo the state itself built upon the FN’s legitimacy as a strategy for post-conflict 
reconstruction by drawing on their already established relationship with the town’s community of 
traders.  
In contrast to both Bouna and Korhogo, support was shown to the FN at the polls during 
the 2013 mayor elections. Conversations with FN members, traders and local politicians in 
Ouangolodougou revealed that one high-ranking FN member, Kanté Ibrahima, planned to 
challenge the incumbent mayor in the next round of municipal and regional elections (which 
were eventually held in April 2013). That a high ranking member of the FN would even consider 
running as a candidate for mayor itself speaks to the level of support garnered by the FN, as well 
as the political opportunities present for rebel leaders in Ouangolodougou, compared to Bouna 
and Korhogo. For very different reasons, the very idea of a FN member running for mayor in 
either Bouna or Korhogo is rather farfetched. In Bouna, any candidate formerly tied to the FN 
would face insurmountable challenges mobilizing support, particularly from the region’s majority 
Lobi population.88 In Korhogo, it is difficult to foresee an actor or group (including former FN 
members) displacing the Coulibaly family as the principal representatives of the Senoufo 
heartland around the city. In Ouangolo, the coalition formed between the city’s community of 
traders and the FN created opportunities for the political advancement of former FN members 
because (a) of the high levels of support they received from the traders and (b) because the most 
prominent of the FN’s backers, Issaka Sawadogo could not run for political office himself.  
After the removal of Gbagbo, a window of opportunity opened up for Kanté Ibrahima 
when Ouangolo’s incumbent mayor, Ouattara Nagnin, passed away in November 2011 (AIP 
2011). Kanté himself was well respected in the city. He was the head of finances for the FN for 
the border region surrounding Ouangolodougou (including Koronani, Nielle, and Kaouara). 
Kanté had fought for the FN in the early days of the conflict and helped purge Liberian fighters 
from the movement in 2003. He proudly displayed a photograph of himself with the Kalashnikov 
assault rifle he used out west in the living room of his home (many residents of Ouangolodougou 
refer to him simply as ‘le soldat’). He housed a number of younger men and their small families, 
                                                 
88 In chapter 4, I suggested that Marou Ouattara’s decision not pursue a political position in Bouna after the 
termination of the conflict reflected an acknowledgement that the FN was not very popular in the region.   
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many of whom had joined the FN as either soldiers or financial agents working at the border. 
Although he is from Korhogo, Kanté worked for the RDR in Ouangolodougou before the 
conflict. He was also the second in charge of Alassane Ouattara’s 2010 presidential campaign in 
Ouangolodougou. Although Kanté did not win the 2013 elections, the results certainly testified to 
his popularity, as well as the political changes that occurred during the conflict period. Kanté 
eventually ran as an independent and finished second in the election, behind another independent, 
Toungara Moussa. Moussa was himself a Ouangolo-based trader born in Ouangolo. Like Kanté 
Ibrahima, Moussa had close ties to Sawadogo. During Moussa’s inauguration speech, he was 
backed and celebrated by Sawadogo as “one of the great sons of Ouangolo, a builder, an altruist, 
and a great businessman who employs more than 300 young people in the commune through his 
businesses” (Traore 2014).  
  . 
Name Party Votes  Percentage 
Toungara Moussa Independent 2,407 46.39 
Kante Ibrahima Independent 1,392 26.83 
Ouattara 
Tiekorobagnouma 
RDR 1,320 25.44 
Ouattara Drissa PDCI 70 1.35 
Table  6.1 : Municipal Election Outcomes : Ouangolodougou 2013. Source: 
http://www.abidjan.net/ELECTIONS/municipales/2013/. 
 
Admittedly, the outcome of the 2013 municipal elections in Ouangolo raise more questions than 
it answers. As a prominent member of Ouangolo’s trading community (albeit one with Ivoirian 
citizenship), Toungara Moussa’s victory does support this chapter’s claim that the state lacked, 
and still lacks, any social base in Ouangolo. The RDR, a party that garnered massive support 
throughout the North (including Ouangolo) during the 2010-2011 Presidential elections, finished 
a disappointing third in the mayoral elections. The 2013 mayoral election results suggest that the 
traders did not uniformly support a single candidate (either a trader or a former FN member). 
This indicates there were significant divisions within this community that were not addressed by 
this chapter. For example, there may be divisions amongst the traders according to country of 
origin (as discussed above, most of the non-Ivoirian traders are from Mali or Burkina Faso) or 
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even between traders according to citizenship (from Côte d’Ivoire or elsewhere). Important 
questions stemming from these voting patterns remain. They will be reserved for future research.       
 
Conclusions 
This chapter argued that the hierarchical configurations confronted by the FN in Ouangolo 
created significant opportunities for the FN to build support and establish political control. In 
contrast to the other cases, the political power of pre-conflict brokers was comparatively limited 
in Ouangolo. Not unlike migrants in other parts of Côte d’Ivoire, migrant traders in Ouangolo 
maintained a positive relationship with the state. The PDCI encouraged migration and drew 
support from migrant communities in Côte d’Ivoire. Infrastructural investments in the city added 
to the attractiveness of Ouangolo as a strategic node in West African trade. The largely positive 
relationship between the state and Ouangolo’s traders soured over the course of 1990s, after Côte 
d’Ivoire’s transition to multiparty politics, as political attacks on the citizenship of migrants 
increased. The shift to exclusionary politics in Côte d’Ivoire left the state without a powerful 
political ally in Ouangolo. Consequently, the state was forced to rely on political actors who did 
not have strong ties to Ouangolo’s traders and lacked an independent social base of its own.  
Sawadogo and other traders based in Ouangolo were able to reposition themselves vis-à-
vis the state during the conflict period because their authority emerged autonomously from their 
relationship to political networks based in Abidjan. As in Ouangolo, Lobi elites in Bouna drew 
support from a community of migrants that benefitted from their demographic and economic 
dominance. However, unlike in Ouangolo, the status of the Lobi community in Bouna was 
reinforced by the support they received from national-level elites under the rule of the old single 
party, the PDCI. In Korhogo, the authority of local elites was recognized and ultimately absorbed 
into the local party-state constructed by the PDCI and subsequently the RDR over the course of 
the post-colonial period.  
Although Issaka Sawadogo – who is arguably the most prominent member of Ouangolo’s 
Malian and Burkinabé trading community – has had a long history as a cross-border trader, the 
chapter suggests that his authority rapidly expanded as a result of the 2002 civil war. In 2004, 
Sawadogo became the president of the Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes 
des Pays Membres de l’UEMOA (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). Indeed, COFENABVI-PAM-
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UEMOA emerged largely in response to the challenges to trans-border trade posed by the 
conflict. As its president, Sawadogo’s regulatory authority over pricing and taxation increased. 
As the principal interlocutor between Ouangolo’s traders and the rebels, this subsequently 
strengthened the FN’s political control over the city. While the authority of pre-conflict elites 
discussed in the two previous chapters either declined (as the case of Palé Dimaté in Bouna) or 
proved resilient to the national-level changes precipitated by the conflict (as in the case of pro-
chiefly faction of the Coulibaly family in Korhogo), the conflict expanded and entrenched 
Sawadogo’s authority in Ouangolo. Sawadogo’s heightened influence during the conflict 
developed despite the fact that he became the target of state efforts to curb his political authority. 
In different ways, the state worked hard to prop up the authority of Lobi elites in Bouna, as well 
as their Senoufo counterparts in Korhogo. In contrast, efforts by the Ivoirian state (particularly 
during the transitional phase of the conflict after the signing of the OPA) to tax traders and 
enforce national citizenship laws were seen to directly target the interests of Sawadogo as well as 
the larger community of Ouangolo based traders.  
Overall, the hierarchical configuration in Ouangolo shaped rebel control in two 
interrelated ways. First, not surprisingly, the FN and Ouangolo’s traders emerged as allies during 
the conflict. Traders benefitted from the new political order established by the rebels. Tax rates 
were seen to be lower than during the pre-conflict era. And given that most of the traders in 
Ouangolo were from Mali and Burkina Faso and were not Ivoirian citizens, the presence of the 
FN also shielded this group from the enforcement of national citizenship. For the rebels, 
encouraging trade across Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border, as well as the de facto border 
separating the North from the government controlled South, was important for financing and 
sustaining the rebellion. Taxes derived from regional trade fed the FN’s coffers. To this end, the 
rebels sought support from Ouangolo’s trading community.  
Second, given this alliance, conflicts over authority in Ouangolo were waged to restrict 
the power of the mayor’s office over local taxation. In Korhogo, the fusion of the state and the 
social power of the Coulibaly family drastically restricted the conflicts between the rebels and the 
state. Instead, the principal conflict was between competing elite factions. In Bouna, the declining 
legitimacy of the rebels resulted in efforts to re-establish the authority of the mayor’s office over 
the taxation of the local market. The exact opposite was the case in Ouangolo. Reservations about 
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the tax rate to be imposed on the traders and what the mayor might do with the resources gave 
both the rebels and the traders ample reason to block efforts to reassert the mayor’s authority over 
local-level taxation after the signing of the OPA. Overall, the post-OPA political transition 
presented greater opportunities for the FN to mobilize support than in Bouna or Korhogo, largely 
because Ouangolo’s foreign traders could not legitimately assume public office (either as elected 
officials or government administrators) given their status as non-Ivoirian citizens. This chapter 
suggests that this limitation of Sawadogo’s authority is one reason why some FN members were 













































Chapter 7. Conclusions  
Since the end of the Cold War, scholarship has grappled with the larger meaning of the kinds of 
violent and non-violent political contestations described in this dissertation. In some pockets of 
Sub-Saharan Africa – in the Great Lakes Region (Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), West Africa, and the Horn – the declining capacity and 
legitimacy of post-colonial states has given way to decentralized forms of governance involving a 
host of different actors (Young 2004, 43-46). Rebel movements have commonly played 
prominent roles in these systems of what Achille Mbembe (2002) refers to as “private indirect 
governance.” What are the larger meanings of these transformations?89 Does civil war and 
rebellion signify an end point of a process of long-term political decay? Or, despite the violence 
commonly associated with these transitions, do they represent the development of an alternative, 
more legitimate post-colonial order? Are they, as Niemann writes (2007, 23), representative of 
“the painful and difficult efforts of developing a new form of political community from the 
shards of a repressive colonial state”? By no means does this project offer definitive answers to 
such ‘big’ questions. However, by looking at these processes through a comparative lens, it 
points to conditions under which we might expect organized violence to produce different, and 
more or less legitimate forms of political order in its wake. 
                                                 
89 I am not implying that civil war has been a problem for all Sub-Saharan countries or that this problem is increasing 
over time. Evidence shows that there was an increase in the number of civil wars immediately after the end of the 
Cold War, but the number of civil wars occurring across the continent has declined steadily since then (Straus 2012, 
6). My point is that where civil war has occurred, organized violence can function as an important ‘critical juncture’, 




Given that local communities often feature competing groups of elites, this dissertation 
began with a straightforward question: what explains the coalitional choices rebels make in the 
zones under their control? Questions about local coalition formation in armed conflict are 
important because coalitional choices influence the extent to which armed movements are able to 
control politically the civilian populations they govern. In each of the localities examined in this 
dissertation, whether the political order imposed by rebels on local communities was broadly 
supported or conversely, met with stiff resistance depended on the alliances that formed between 
local rebel leadership and pre-conflict elites.  
My argument explains coalition-building and levels of rebel control in two steps. First, 
coalition-building is shaped by whether local elites acted as brokers between the state and local 
communities before the onset of the political conflict. Brokers are elite actors that bridge local 
communities with national-level political networks. I argue that where elites function as brokers 
during the pre-conflict period, they are less likely to ally with armed movements. Coalitions are 
less likely to form between pre-conflict brokers and rebel leadership because (a) the political 
position of brokers is likely to be threatened by the presence of the rebels and (b) because they 
are more likely to be viewed with some suspicion by rebel leaders, as result of their proximity to 
the pre-conflict state. Second, I argue that the distribution of political power between state 
brokers and rebel allies shapes rebel control. I describe differences in these distributions in terms 
of what I call ‘hierarchical configurations’. Hierarchical configurations refer to the relative extent 
to which rebel ally and broker groups are organized hierarchically. Organizational differences 
shape the political influence of different sets of elites. Put together, brokerage influences whether 
rebels ally with strong or weak allies relative to their broker counterparts. Where rebel allies are 
weak, they should confront serious obstacles to mobilizing support and controlling local 
populations. Where rebel allies are stronger, systems of rebel governance should confront less 
resistance.  
 In making this argument, this dissertation complements dominant explanations of civilian 
support for armed movements and political order in civil war. The literature on rebel-civilian 
relations offers two kinds of explanations for variation in civilian support for armed movements. 
Structural explanations focus on the conditions under which civilians are most likely to support 
or join rebellion (Johnson 1964; Huntington 1968; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985). 
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Agency-centric perspectives focus on the choices available to civilian populations in violent 
conflict (Arjona 2008; Baines and Paddon 2012; Barter 2012). The empirical material presented 
in the case chapters challenge these perspectives because some level of conflict and cooperation 
between rebels and civilians was always present. Neither of these approaches explains why, 
within the same local arena, certain groups and actors ally with armed movements and others 
resist.   
Another stream of research focuses on the relationship between group behavior and 
civilian support and explains why groups pursue more or less effective mobilization strategies. 
This literature identifies sets of exogenous factors (the availability of material resources, conflict 
dynamics, and the pre-conflict relationship between the organizers of rebellion to the state) that 
shape the kinds of strategies armed groups employ vis-à-vis civilian populations (Reno 2005, 
2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Metelits 2010). Much of this research focuses on questions 
regarding the use of violence. This body of research asks, under what conditions do armed 
movements employ violence indiscriminately and when do they show more restraint? Others look 
instead at mobilization and legitimizing strategies from a broader perspective, in terms of 
whether armed movements provide public goods (education, health care, etc.). These studies 
argue that the more armed movements can control the use of violence or legitimize this violence 
through the provision of public goods or the use of different ideological or discursive appeals, the 
more support these groups are likely to receive. The level of support received is thought to be a 
direct product of the strategies employed by these groups. A focus on the group-wide 
mobilizational strategies employed by armed groups offers a useful starting point in examining 
the variation observed in this dissertation; however any explanation rooted solely in these aspects 
of rebel behavior remains partial. In the cases included in this dissertation, whether or not groups 
limited the use of violence and economic predation represented an imperfect predictor of the 
kinds of relationships that emerged between the rebels and those communities. This study shows 
that social control stems not only from these features of armed group behavior, but also from the 




Summary of Findings 
What explains coalition formation between rebel leaders and local elites? How do coalitional 
choices influence the ability of armed movements to establish social control in particular 
localities? Under what conditions were local rebel leaders able to gain some support for their 
wartime authority? This dissertation responds to these questions by focusing on variation in the 
political authority of the pre-conflict elites and the relationship of these actors to the state.  
There are two justifications for focusing on the impact of pre-conflict elites on these 
wartime processes. First, as others have noted, for both leaders and recruits of armed movements, 
attacking local social and political hierarchies often represents an important motivation for 
participation in rebellion in the first place (Chauveau and Richards 2008, 533; Englebert 2009, 
168; McGovern 2011, 55; Peters 2011, 88). This is especially the case across instances of armed 
conflict in Africa, where local struggles are often couched in generational terms. Armed conflict 
represents a means by which juniors can escape the authority of senior community members, who 
commonly enforce and manipulate rules governing land, women and the labor power of young 
men to their own advantage. And as Englebert (2009, 168) has argued, armed conflicts create 
opportunities for leaders of armed movements to replace existing elites as local intermediaries 
with the central state.  
The second justification for focusing on pre-conflict local elites is that these actors often 
represent significant strategic allies in enforcing political order. Herein lies the tension 
confronting many African rebellions. Even as armed movements in Africa represent significant 
challenges to existing hierarchies at the local level, rebel leaders also rely on these social 
structures as they seek to govern civilian populations. More often than not, across comparative 
cases of rebellion in Africa, old elites retain their authority over diverse issue areas after civil war 
onset and the establishment of rebel held zones. This study aimed to unpack this apparent 
contradiction by showing how brokerage relations and hierarchical configurations result in 
distinct and predictable patterns of conflict and cooperation between local leaders of armed 
movements and pre-conflict elites.  
How do coalitions influence control? My explanation calls attention to the distribution of 
political authority across pre-conflict elites within local communities. I argue that elites derive 
their authority from hierarchical social relationships, or whether authority and material resources 
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are concentrated in the hands of a few. Hierarchical configurations refer to the relative levels of 
social hierarchy of elite groups within a given locality. My framework outlines four possible 
configurations based on the social organization of brokers and rebel allies. I label these 
configurations: low social control, moderate social control, high social control and absence of 
local elites (see Fig. 7.1). The case chapters examined the first three of these ideal type scenarios, 
for which my framework predicts high, moderate, and low social control. The fourth scenario 
predicts an absence of rebel-pre-conflict elite interaction and was not examined in this 
dissertation. Did the evidence presented correspond to the expectations laid out in my theoretical 
framework? I consider each step of the argument in turn. 
 
Social hierarchy of pre-
conflict state brokers 
Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers) 
High Low  
High Moderate social control.  
Indirect resistance against 
rebels. Ongoing factional 
conflict between pre-conflict 
elites. Korhogo 
Low social control. 
Substantial resistance against 
rebels. Bouna 
Low  High social control. Limited 
or weak resistance against 
rebels. Ouangolodougou 
 
Absence of local elites.  
Absence of indigenous elite 
and limited state presence. 
 Table. 7.1: Levels of Social Control 
 
Brokerage Relations and Coalition Formation 
The case chapters presented convincing evidence supporting the causal relationship between 
brokerage relationships and coalition-building in civil war. This step of my argument responded 
directly to the puzzle introduced in chapter 1: that rebels sometimes make what are, on the 
surface, counterintuitive coalitional choices. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the FN justified the use 
of violence to fight against the nativism advanced by Gbagbo and his supporters. Yet, in two of 
my three cases – Bouna and Korhogo – the rebels allied with autochthones and politically 
opposed non-indigenous elites and groups. These alliances marginalized and antagonized non-
native groups in these localities (the Lobi in Bouna and the Dyula merchants and youth allied 
with Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo). In Bouna, the alliance between the Koulongo and the FN 
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was especially puzzling given that the Koulongo were far weaker than their non-native 
counterparts, the Lobi. Why would a group fighting on behalf of immigrants and the equality of 
all Ivoirians ally with politically weak, indigenous elites? Empirical material presented in the 
case chapters supports my claim that pre-conflict brokerage relations explained these 
counterintuitive coalitional choices.   
 As migrants to northeastern Côte d’Ivoire, the Lobi seemed to be natural local allies of the 
FN. Furthermore, Lobi control over the local economy meant that this group had significant 
political influence. However, since the early post-colonial period, the Lobi brokered Bouna’s 
relationship with the central state. Since the colonial period, the state has played an active role in 
sponsoring Lobi migration and distributing land to Lobi migrants. An important consequence of 
this was the reversal in economic and political influence between the Lobi and the native 
Koulongo. Access to land facilitated the rise of the Lobi as the dominant economic group. By the 
1980s, large Lobi family heads had become the principal representatives of the old single party, 
the PDCI, in this region. For Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI, allying with the Lobi politically 
shored up their relationship with a group whose economic ascendency was itself a by-product of 
state interventions. For the Lobi, tying themselves to the PDCI guaranteed access to land and, 
more generally, effectively shored up their otherwise precarious position as ‘strangers’ in the 
Ivoirian Northeast. The Lobi elite’s pre-conflict role as brokers discouraged coalition formation 
between this group and the FN.  
 As in Bouna, the FN opted to ally with an indigenous group in Korhogo, the Senoufo, 
rather than the Dyula. Here, the FN confronted a set of brokers, the Senoufo elite, who, like the 
Lobi in Bouna, buttressed their political position through their alliance with the central state over 
the course of the post-colonial period. Yet, in the case of the Senoufo elite, the state supported 
and drew upon this group’s pre-existing authority over land, labor and women as a strategy for 
governing. The first half of chapter 5 claimed that the relationship between the state and the 
Senoufo elite in Korhogo enflamed factional competition between local elites looking to establish 
themselves as the principal brokers, linking local communities to national level political networks 
based in the capital.90 After the transition to multiparty politics, competing Senoufo factions 
                                                 
90 Sara Berry (1992, 333) has claimed that this is common effect of indirect rule in Africa. In reference to the 
colonial period, she writes that “in general, colonial regimes imposed themselves on societies already engaged in 
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forged alliances with either governing (the PDCI, then the FPI) or opposition parties (the FPI, 
PDCI or the RDR). Alliances constructed during the period of multiparty politics influenced 
coalition formation between Senoufo elites and the FN during the conflict period. Elites that 
allied with the RDR in opposition to the government (such as Amadou Gon Coulibaly) became 
allies of the FN, whereas those that did not (such as Kassoum Coulibaly) were viewed by the FN 
as opponents of the rebellion (and supporters of the Gbagbo government).  
 In contrast to Bouna and Korhogo, the FN did ally with immigrant groups in Ouangolo. In 
Ouangolo, the FN confronted a community of traders, the majority of whom were from elsewhere 
in West Africa, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso. Not unlike elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire during 
the post-colonial period, the Ivoirian state supported this migration and hence had a positive 
relationship with Ouangolo’s traders. However, the adoption of nativist politics by successive 
governments in the 1990s severed this relationship. The most prominent of these immigrant-
traders, Issaka Sawadogo, was the principal representative of a community of ‘strangers’ in 
Ouangolo. Yet, unlike his counterpart in Bouna, Sawadogo’s relationship to the larger 
community of traders in Ouangolo was not supported by the central state. Quite the opposite, 
Sawadogo (as well as the rest Ouangolo’s traders) were the target of state efforts to enforce rules 
surrounding taxation and citizenship. As a result, Sawadogo and other elites belonging to this 
group were available as potential allies for the FN after they assumed military control over 
northern Côte d’Ivoire. During the conflict, Sawadogo served as the FN’s principal ally. 
Conversely, after the signing of the OPA, the state relied on a small number of educated but 
politically weak elites as brokers who lacked direct ties to Ouangolo’s towns trading community.    
A number of the FN’s allies during the war did function as brokers at some point, but not 
immediately prior to the conflict. In Bouna, the Lobi emerged as brokers as a result of state 
interventions and broader changes to the regional economy over the course of the 20th century. In 
Korhogo, the Senoufo elite functioned as the principal broker group for much of the post-colonial 
                                                                                                                                                              
struggles over power and the terms on which it was exercised. By announcing their intention to uphold ‘traditional’ 
norms and structures of authority colonial officials were, in effect, declaring their intention to build colonial rule on a 
foundation of conflict and change. The result was ‘a blizzard of claims and counterclaims’ to rights over land and 
people which served as ‘a mechanism for generating factional struggle’ rather than elimination it.” I am not arguing 
that factional struggles are altogether absent in contexts where states circumvent customary institutions (such as in 
the case of Bouna). Factional pressures are lessened in these cases because class differentiation is determined more 
by economic behavior rather than highly contestable customary rules and practices.   
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period. Still, some of these elites who joined the political opposition in the pre-conflict period 
allied with the FN during the course of the rebellion. And although migrant-traders in Ouangolo 
never formally functioned as brokers prior to the conflict, they did benefit from long-time support 
for migrants under Houphouët-Boigny until successive governments began to promote ivoirité 
during the multi-party period in the 1990s. My argument does not seek to explain why some 
groups could and did shift to a position of opposition (and no longer function as brokers) prior to 
the conflict while others did not. One explanation might be that the type of brokerage relations 
matters. Chapter 1 introduced a distinction between two kinds of brokerage relations: dependence 
and alignment. Dependence refers to the extent to which leaders rely on their relationships with 
the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. Alignment is when elites choose to 
ally with the state even if their authority is derived independently of it. Dependent brokers should 
be less prone to switching and supporting opposition movements because they require the 
ongoing support of the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. This could explain 
why Lobi elites such as Dimaté continued to support the PDCI over the course of the 1990s (and 
during the conflict) despite their attacks on migrant populations. Whatever drives it, elite 
switching – from broker to non-broker elites and vice versa – does have implications for my 
argument regarding coalition formation during armed conflict. If elites retain agency regarding 
their relations vis-à-vis the state as brokers during the pre-conflict period, then were they 
necessarily ‘locked in’ to these relationships during the course of civil war? I revisit this point in 
the limitations section of this conclusion.  
Hierarchical Configurations and Social Control 
The second step of my argument posits that hierarchical configurations influence rebel social 
control. Overall, the empirical material presented in the case chapters supported this causal claim, 
but did not rule out alternative explanations. Generally, where pre-conflict brokers were part of 
relatively hierarchical groups, rebels confronted serious challenges in establishing social control. 
Balanced social hierarchy or social hierarchy favoring rebel allies (non-broker elites) lessened 
these challenges. Nonetheless, the establishment and maintenance of political order (as well as its 
breakdown) is a complex political process influenced by an array of different factors. The case 
chapters present evidence supporting the causal argument regarding the relationship between 
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hierarchical configurations and social control. However, they also showed that different factors 
unique to each case also influenced control.   
 Between the three cases, my framework most accurately predicted outcomes in Ouangolo, 
where the authority of the rebels was the least contested. As indicated above, the adoption of 
nativist politics by successive governments in the 1990s severed the relationship between 
Ouangolo’s traders and the state. As a result, during the conflict period, the state could only draw 
on the support of a small number of educated elites who had no direct ties to Ouangolo’s 
immigrant-trader community. In the case of Ouangolo, hierarchical configurations favored rebel 
allies (non-brokers). The most prominent of these immigrant-traders, Issaka Sawadogo, served as 
the principal ally of the FN amidst efforts to minimize disruptions to cross-border trade. Despite 
being the target of state efforts to enforce rules concerning taxation and citizenship, Sawadogo’s 
authority was arguably enhanced during the crisis period because of his role as the president of 
the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. The FN gained substantial support from Sawadogo and the 
rest of the trading community in Ouangolo. The alliance between the local FN administration and 
Ouangolo’s community of traders was evident after the signing of the OPA, when the mayor’s 
office attempted to reclaim local level authority over taxation. Ouangolo’s community of traders 
used their relationship with the FN to push back against the mayor. The absence of any 
indigenous social structure in Ouangolo, coupled with the alliance that formed between the rebels 
and the traders, left the state with few choices for mobilizing support. In Ouangolo, pre-conflict 
brokerage relations facilitated coalition formation between the FN and the most powerful actors 
in the city: immigrant-traders such as Sawadogo. The hierarchical configuration favoring rebel 
allies buttressed the FN’s control over the city. 
In chapter 4, I argued that the FN administration in Bouna represented a case of low 
social control because relative levels of hierarchical social organization favored the region’s pre-
conflict brokers: the Lobi elite. The FN viewed Lobi elites with some suspicion because of their 
ties to the pre-conflict state. Similarly, many in the Lobi community viewed the system of 
governance installed by the rebels (concerning taxation, enforcement of property rights, public 
good provision) as disproportionately favoring the region’s indigenous group: the Koulongo. 
Without the support of the Lobi, the FN was forced to seek support from Koulongo elites, who 
lacked the political and economic clout of their Lobi counterparts. As a result, the Lobi 
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community outright rejected the political system installed by the rebels. In 2007, Lobi youth 
organized an armed revolt (dimanche noir) to protest the tax regime installed by the armed 
movement. Additionally, the prominent Lobi politician Palé Dimaté sided with Laurent Gbagbo 
(the head of a government the rebels had fought against for almost ten years) in the second round 
of the 2010 presidential elections. Overall, the case of Bouna largely supports my framework. In 
Bouna, the state effectively crowded out the rebels and prevented them from mobilizing support 
for their authority from any strong social base.  Possible options were either too weak (the 
Koulongo) or allied with the state (the Lobi). Nonetheless, in addition to the hierarchical 
configurations confronted by the FN, other factors potentially contributed to the hostile 
relationship between the Lobi and the rebels. Bouna differed from Korhogo and Ouangolo in that 
the political wing of the movement was installed very late (after the signing of the OPA in 2007) 
and thus the movement lacked a legitimate forum for resolving social conflict generated by the 
rebellion. However, the ambiguous effects of the FN’s organizational reforms after 2007, suggest 
that alliance patterns established during the conflict continued to circumscribe rebel efforts at 
establishing social control.     
My framework identifies Korhogo as a case of medium social control. Like in Bouna, the 
outcome in Korhogo was influenced by factors not included in the original framework. Among 
the three cases included in this study, levels of violence were highest in Korhogo. There were 
more casualties in the conflict between the pro-IB and pro-Soro factions of the FN around 
Korhogo than in the tax revolt in Bouna. While in Bouna the absence of the FN’s political 
organization potentially contributed to the declining legitimacy of the movement (and ultimately 
dimanche noir), in Korhogo factional conflicts led to levels of violence not seen in either of the 
other cases. Violence between Dyula youth and the pro-Soro faction of the FN in Korhogo 
differed from those between Lobi youth and the FN in Bouna because, in Korhogo, violent 
clashes were led by elites within the rebellion (between pro-IB and pro-Soro FN factions). This 
aspect of the Korhogo case highlights potential limitations of my explanatory framework because 
FN factions drew support from competing segments of the pre-conflict Senoufo elite. The pro-
Soro faction of the FN allied with the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite (Drissa Coulibaly, 
Amadou Gon Coulibaly), a group that did not function as brokers with the state immediately 
prior to the beginning of the civil war. However, the pro-IB faction of the FN allied with the 
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reform faction of the Senoufo elite (Kassoum Coulibaly, Issa Malick Coulibaly and their Dyula 
supporters), a group that did function as brokers with the state immediately prior to the beginning 
conflict. Although the alliance between pro-Soro elements and the conservative faction of the 
Senoufo elite is consistent with my theoretical expectations, the alliance between pro-IB elements 
of the FN and the reform faction of Senoufo elite obviously contradicts the expectations of my 
framework. This raises important counterfactual questions: what would we have observed had IB 
secured control over the FN during the factional fighting in 2004? Would the alliance between IB 
and the reform faction have held throughout the duration of the conflict? Although not part of my 
framework, there are reasons to suspect that the FN might have been forced to change coalitional 
partners in this case. There certainly would have been substantial political pressure on the FN 
from the RDR to switch alliances because the RDR itself originally aligned with the conservative 
faction of the Senoufo elite prior to the beginning of civil war. Another way of thinking about 
this is that the actual coalition formed in Korhogo – between the pro-Soro faction of the FN and 
the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite – was reinforced (and was less susceptible to 
change) because it mirrored the strategy used by the RDR to mobilize political support in the 
region.  
 In the end, the ability of the FN to establish social control in Korhogo was strengthened 
by the fact that the pro-Soro faction of the FN effectively sidelined pro-IB elements within the 
movement. Although my approach does not explain the violence associated with rebel 
factionalism, it does explain the level of social control achieved by the rebels once rebel factional 
conflict was resolved. Hierarchical configurations confronted by the movement in Korhogo also 
presented the rebels with significant opportunities to mobilize support and establish social 
control. During his time in control of the city, FN zone commander Fofié Martin established 
strong ties with the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family. Fofié Martin’s alliance with this 
group prevented conflict over the FN’s authority surrounding taxation. Debates over authority 
later in the conflict period (after the defeat to the pro-IB faction) did not directly implicate the FN 
in Korhogo (in contrast to Bouna and Ouangolo) but instead implicated competing local elite 
factions (specifically, factions of Coulibaly family members).  
  Each of the case chapters drew on diverse sources – field interviews, newspaper articles, 
NGO reports and second sources – to support the causal claims being made in this dissertation. 
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Where possible, the cases considered numerous causal influences, beyond those emphasized by 
my argument. Despite the idiosyncrasies of each case, brokerage relations consistently appeared 
to influence coalition formation. And in each case, coalition-building shaped the ability of the FN 
to mobilize support and establish political control within local communities, given differences in 
hierarchical configurations.  
Limitations 
What are the potential limits to the model advanced in this dissertation? I identify three potential 
criticisms. First, there are questions regarding the exhaustiveness of the typology generated by 
my model, specifically whether it captures all the plausible scenarios armed movements might 
confront in local communities. A second potential limitation concerns the generalizability of my 
framework. Finally, as a structural explanation of coalition formation and rebel social control, 
this study downplays elite agency and the capacity of local elites to recraft political coalitions 
during the course of armed conflict. I address each of these potential limitations in turn.  
In term of exhaustiveness, my approach does not directly account for wider variation in 
the relationships between pre-conflict elites and the communities they claim to represent. For 
example, my framework does not incorporate variation in the legitimacy of these actors. Across 
the three cases included in the dissertation – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – pre-conflict 
elites are presumed to benefit from some local support and recognition of their authority, albeit to 
varying degrees. As discussed in chapter 1, there are significant ontological and methodological 
challenges to differentiating coercion, self-interest and legitimacy as alternative reasons for 
compliance. Any specific individual behavior or action might reflect one or any combination of 
these reasons for obeying rules and accepting relations of political inequality. One objective of 
this dissertation was to consider the spectrum of reasons why unarmed actors might support rebel 
movements, beyond just coercion. Nonetheless, in doing so, my approach downplayed these 
differences in its description of the relationship between pre-conflict elites and the populations 
they governed. For example, my model ignores situations where elites enjoy no popular support 
and are in fact resented by the majority of the population they claim to represent. These would be 
cases akin to what Mahmood Mamdani (1996) referred to as “decentralized despotism,” where 
exploitative or repressive local leaders rule with little popular support from the communities they 
govern (an example from this study might be Korhogo’s colonial chiefs up until the 1930s). 
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Where elites enjoy little legitimacy, subordinate groups may be less inclined to follow elite 
decisions to support or not to support armed movements. In these cases, civil wars could provide 
opportunities for subordinate groups to heighten autonomy vis-à-vis pre-conflict elites by 
throwing their support behind the rebels. Or, vice versa, subordinate groups could support 
government forces despite the decision of pre-conflict elites to ally with the rebels. My 
framework does not explicitly address such differences because I do not evaluate levels of 
legitimacy as part of my operationalization of social hierarchy.   
Also, although part of my framework, this study did not examine rebel-civilian 
interactions in contexts that Catherine Boone described as zones of “non-incorporation” (2003, 
33). These are instances where social hierarchy is missing altogether. This is not a damning 
omission. Little can be learned about interactions between elites and rebels where pre-conflict 
elites are not present.  
 Another possible criticism speaks more to the potential generalizability of the model. 
Although my approach examines the interaction between local patterns of governance and 
national-level discursive opportunity structures, my framework may not describe outcomes in 
cases of rebel governance with different trans-local dynamics and significant international ties. 
The subnational regions focused on in this study were less internationalized than other parts of 
Côte d’Ivoire (particularly the cocoa growing regions of the southwest, see chapter 2) or other 
cases of armed conflict. International ties might have significantly altered the outcomes described 
in each of the cases included in this study. For example, in the eastern Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Timothy Raeymaekers (2013, 608) explains Hema landlords in Ituri gained 
prominence throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods by using their ties to the state to 
accumulate land formerly under the control of Lendu farmers. The pre-conflict dependence of 
Hema landlords on the state put these actors in a precarious position after the beginning of the 
Second Congolese War (1998-2007). The collapse of state patronage networks and increasing 
violence and insecurity in Ituri eventually left Hema landlords with “no alternative but to search 
for the protection of Ugandan army units, who thus started to behave like the private guards of 
their ill-gotten property” (2013, 608). The story of the Hema in Ituri clearly parallels the case of 
the Lobi in Bouna presented in this study. The key difference is that, unlike the Lobi, the Hema 
had an international partner to turn to in order to defend their position as landholders in Ituri. 
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When they occur, these kinds of trans-border, international partnerships are likely to have 
significant consequences for the maintenance of political order. As a scope condition, my 
framework should apply only to instances of rebel governance where transnational ties are less 
pronounced.  
 Finally, my approach downplays possible coalitional realignments between armed and 
unarmed elites that might occur during the course of armed conflict. This speaks to the point 
regarding elite agency made earlier in this conclusion. There are actually two distinct points 
related to this criticism. The first relates to how my approach under-theorizes coalitional 
continuity over time. My model did not specify potential reasons why coalitions formed between 
rebel and pre-conflict elites hold over time. As mentioned earlier, differences in the basis of 
brokerage relations (dependence versus alignment) appeared to have an effect on the ability of 
local elites to shift their allegiance, either prior to the conflict or during it. Senoufo elites in 
Korhogo were able to alter their allegiances to oppositional movements easily (the RDR after the 
beginning of multiparty politics, and the FN during the civil war) because the basis of their 
authority remained partially independent of the state. Conversely, Lobi elites proved less capable 
of abandoning the state (even after a change in government at the national-level, from PDCI to 
the FPI) because of their reliance on the state to shore up their political position locally.  
The second related point to this criticism is that my approach is, at its core, overly 
deterministic. It ignores elite strategies and behavior that do not conform to the structural 
expectations of my model and downplays changes in elite coalition-building over time. As 
discussed above, this limitation was particularly evident in the case of Korhogo. There is ample 
comparative and historical evidence showing how armed groups and civilian actors overcome 
collective action problems and construct rules and institutions to govern diverse aspects of social, 
economic and political life (Ostrom 1990; Arjona 2014). Nonetheless, in focusing on the 
relationship between coalition-building and control, my point is not that elites completely lack 
the agency required to change strategies and remake ruling coalitions over time, but that agency 
is constrained by the local political configurations armed groups confront in the early stages of 
civil war. In the case of Bouna for instance, FN attempts to construct wartime institutions was 
circumscribed by their ongoing opposition to Lobi politicians such as Dimaté. By pointing to 
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structural impediments to effective institution building, I hope to highlight distinct kinds of 
strategies and interventions actually required to overcome them in different contexts.     
  
Implications and Future Directions 
What are the larger theoretical and policy-related lessons that can be derived from this study? 
Although the line between peace and war is rarely clear, my approach focuses principally on 
interactions between rebels and pre-conflict elites during armed conflict. Wartime coalitions 
between rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites should also have important implications for the 
establishment and maintenance of political order in post-conflict contexts, after the cessation of 
fighting.  
Regarding post-conflict reconstruction, scholars and practitioners debate whether 
international peacekeeping missions and transitional governments should work with or against 
violent non-state actors. In Africa as elsewhere, rural constituencies have generally played 
integral roles in the construction and maintenance of political order throughout the post-colonial 
period. In reference to the political challenges confronted by African leaders after the 
introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s, Catherine Boone has argued that rural elites and 
their backers provided national-level leaders with the “ballast they needed” to defend themselves 
from political challenges posed by rivals based in urban areas (2003, 318; see also Koter 2013b). 
This study showed that these alliances are critical to understanding the sources of political order 
and disorder in civil war as well. Mobilizing the support of key constituencies in rural areas 
becomes equally important in post-conflict contexts, when the stability of national-level 
coalitions forged between former combatants is at its most precarious (Spears 2000). Across 
diverse cases of post-conflict reconstruction, national-level leaders have allied with ‘warlords’ or 
former leaders of armed groups, rather than with rural elites such as chiefs, marabouts or business 
leaders (Beswick 2009; Giustozzi 2003, 2007; Mukhophadyay 2009; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Reno 
2009a, 2009b; Utas 2012).  
 The appropriate role of former rebel leaders in processes of post-conflict reconstruction is 
currently the subject of heated debate in contemporary Côte d’Ivoire. In early October 2012, 
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three former Forces Nouvelles (FN) zone commanders were named as administrative préfets in 
different regions across Côte d’Ivoire by Ivoirian President Alassane Ouattara.91 These moves 
complement the preceding appointments of former FN leaders Chérif Ousmane as the second-in-
command responsible for presidential security (Group de sécurité de la Presidence de la 
présidence de la République) and Fofié Martin as the head of the military company (Compagnie 
territoriale) in Korhogo (see chapter 5). Ouattara appointed these actors because they wield 
sizable political clout. However, these appointments have attracted some criticism, largely 
because of the human rights violations committed by much of the FN’s former military 
leadership (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2006, 7; Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2011). 
Observers have been critical of the decision to reward those accused of perpetrating these acts. In 
the longer term, critics suggest that efforts at reconciliation could very well be endangered by not 
holding these actors accountable for their role in the violence.  
 Similar debates exist in the academic literature. This scholarship acknowledges that in 
diverse cases of post-conflict reconstruction, strongmen have often retained or even enhanced 
their political influence in the post-conflict period by fostering a cooperative relationship with the 
central state (see Mukhopadyay 2009; Beswick 2009; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Reno 2009a, 2009b). 
Does working with rural strongmen tied to former insurgencies enhance the authority of the 
central state? Or do such alliances undermine state institutions capable of providing long-term 
political order in peripheral areas? Marten (2012, 15-16) best represents the skeptical view. She 
defines warlords, in part, by their ability to manipulate “state structures to their advantage, often 
penetrating bureaucracies.” According to her “they face an incentive to continue this behavior.” 
As a result, “warlordism in today’s world leads to ongoing state-failure, not state building.” 
Others are less inclined to support state-building projects that run at cross-purposes with the 
interests of warlord actors who wield sometimes considerable political clout and legitimacy 
(Beswick 2009; Mukhopadyay 2009; Reno 2009a, 2009b). From this perspective, re-establishing 
centralized statehood is viewed as a source of political disorder because of how these political 
projects threaten the authority of warlords. Without denying the significance of these questions, 
                                                 
91 Ousmane (“Ben Laden”) Coulibaly was named the préfet of San-Pedro, Tuo Fozié was named the préfet of Bouna 
(see chapter 4), and Koné Messamba was named the préfet of Cavally à Guiglo (see chapter 5). 
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my dissertation highlights some potential limitations to focusing exclusively on the implications 
of relationships between states and local strongmen.  
 First, this literature tends not to differentiate among different types of warlord governance  
(see Jackson 2003; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Ahram and King 2012) and the potential outcomes that 
come from constructively working with these kinds of actors (for an important exception, see 
Giustozzi 2003, 2007). At the very least, this study reaffirms the need for a comparative approach 
to studying these types of actors because, as I have shown, the ways in which former warlord 
actors and former rebel leaders integrate into the societies they govern can vary dramatically. 
Consequently, the effects of decisions to work with (or not to work with) these types of actors 
during post-conflict reconstruction should vary according to the kinds of coalitions established 
between rebels and pre-conflict elites during the conflict. For instance, post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts that drew on the local FN administration in Bouna as a local partner would 
presumably exacerbate the social tensions generated by the rebellion. Conversely, the choice to 
constructively engage Fofié Martin in Korhogo could conceivably support the development of the 
long-term peace given the coalitions established between Martin and the conservative faction of 
the Coulibaly family.    
 Another problem stemming from this lack of acknowledgement of variation is that 
warlord-based systems of governance are presented as a distinct alternative (for better or worse, 
depending on the perspective) to pre-conflict modes of governance. This study suggests that 
drawing such hard distinctions might conceal more than it explains. This limitation could be 
thought of in two ways. First, it is questionable whether armed groups actually govern in ways 
that break with patterns of governance established prior to the onset of armed conflict. Myriam 
Denov, for example, argues that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone did little 
to challenge the corrupt, patriarchal patron-client system in place before the war, but instead 
reproduced it in the zones under its control (2010, 105, 114-15, 119). Despite the violence and 
limited institution-building in zones controlled by Africa’s armed movements(Englebert 2009), 
overall, it is hard to say if they have been any better or worse than the post-colonial states that 
preceded them. Second, ‘warlord-as-alternatives’ models tend to imply that the rise of these kinds 
of actors necessarily replaces or displaces established structures of authority and political 
hierarchies (Jackson 2003, 132). The cases included in this dissertation collectively demonstrate 
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that the new systems of governance introduced by armed actors did not necessarily displace older 
institutions and actors. Indeed, one striking similarity across each of these cases is that rebel rule 
largely reinforced (and in many cases intensified) existing, pre-conflict patterns of political 
conflict and cooperation. A more productive way of thinking about the political changes 
introduced by armed conflict might be in terms of what institutionalist approaches refer to as 
“layering,” which “involves the partial renegotiation of some elements of a given set of 
institutions while leaving others in place” (Thelen 2003, 225). In this vein, Thomas Bierschenk 
and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2003, 152) refer to the “sedimentary” character of local 
political life in Sub-Saharan Africa. They highlight how successive waves of institutional 
innovation at the national level – during colonialism, the post-colonial period, democratization or 
decentralization – produce different, parallel political hierarchies that reorganized themselves 
along different configurations in response to macro-level changes. My research demonstrates 
how rebellion can simultaneously reinforce and undercut distinct institutional orders at the local 
level while also adding another institutional layer to this sedimentation.    
 More research is required regarding the implications of the kinds of coalitional 
arrangements described in this dissertation. My focus on coalitions mirrors some recent critical 
work on ‘hybridity’ and post-conflict reconstruction (Meagher 2012; Raeymaekers 2013). Rather 
than promoting the rebuilding of centralized states after conflict or uncritically accepting the 
hybrid forms of governance that commonly emerge from violent conflict, scholars and 
practitioners require more research at the micro-level to understand the conditions under which 
different kinds of hybrid systems of government form. As Meagher (2012, 1074) writes, “there is 
a need for a more nuanced, comparative approach to informal governance that is capable of 
distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order, and that clarifies 
rather than blurs the relationship between local order and local legitimacy.” My dissertation 
provides empirical insights into the varied manifestations of informal governance under the FN, 
but additional research is required to draw out their long-term implications. What are the larger 
political effects of the rebel-local elite coalitions described in this dissertation? For instance, are 
these coalitions working to ‘democratize’ access to the state patronage networks that have long 
been monopolized by pre-conflict brokers such as the Coulibaly family in Korhogo or the Lobi 
elite in Bouna? Put another way, will the presence of the rebels in these localities promote the 
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redistribution of material resources and political power? Generally speaking, we still lack 
knowledge concerning the conditions under which ‘militarized’ actors either reconfigure or 
possibly further entrench existing political hierarchies in local arenas. Future comparative 
research should focus on general questions regarding the diverse effects of warlordism on 
political order, conflict and representation over the longue durée. Such research directions should 
help guide interventions during war-to-peace transitions aimed at promoting security and 





















Abalo, Joël. 2007. “Les populations racontent leur misère aux émissaires de Soro.” Le Nouveau 
Réveil. 24 October 2007.  
Adeva, Francesca. 2006. “La branche armée du MPCI pas concernée.” Les Temps. 24 March 
2006. 
AFP. 2007a. “Côte d’Ivoire: Le chef des ‘Patriotes’ nommé ‘ambassadeur de la paix.’” 5 May 
2007. 
AFP. 2007b. “Cote d’Ivoire: Blé Goudé crée des ‘comités de paix’ pour la reconciliation.” 14 
June 2007.  
AFP. 2007c. “Côte d’Ivoire: ‘Patriotes’ et ‘rébellion’ pour un ‘partenariat pour la paix.’” 21 April 
2007. 
AFP 2007d. “Une caravane de paix sera lance le 9 juin a Bouake.” 22 May 2007. 
AIP. 2011. “Le maire de Ouangolodougou inhumé.” 23 November. Accessed from: Abidjan.net 
28 June 2013. http://news.abidjan.net/h/417416.html 
Ahram, Ariel. I., & King, Charles. 2012. “The warlord as arbitrageur.” Theory and Society, 
41(2): 169-186.  
Akindès, Francis A. 2004. The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire. Nordic 
Africa Institute.  
Allard, Simplice. 2008. “La guerre a veritablement commencé entre Ouattara et Soro.” Les 
Temps. 22 February 2008. 
Allen, Chris. 1995. “Understanding African Politics.” Review of African Political Economy, 
22(65): 301-320.  
Apter, David. E. 1995. “Democracy for Uganda: A case for comparison.” Daedalus, 124(3): 155-
190.  
Arjona, Ana. 2008. “One national war, multiple local orders: An inquiry into the unit of analysis 
of war and post-war interventions.” In Morten Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz (eds.), Law 
in Peace Negotiations. Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic Publisher. 123-150.  
Arjona, Ana. 2010. “Social Order in Civil War.” PhD Dissertation, Department of Political 
Science, Yale University.  
Arjona, Ana. 2014. “Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
58(8): 1360-1389.  
Armand Didi, Serge. 2008. “Pourquoi Soro Guillaume a intérêt a désarmer ses combattants.” 
Notre Voie. 7 March 2008. 
Arouna, Sylla. 2004. “Le ministre Koné Messemba serait mis aux arrêts.” Soir Info. 29 June 
2004.  
Arouna, Sylla. 2007. “Affrontement entre jeunes et des soldats.” Soir Info. 22 October 2007. 
232 
 
Autesserre, Sévérine. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the Failure of 
International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ba, Nimatoulaye. 2010. “Filière Bétail et viande : Les acteurs créent une nouvelle federation.” 
L’expression. 22 February 2010. Accessed from: Abidjan.net 28 June 2013. 
http://news.abidjan.net/h/354330.html 
Bah, Abu B. 2010. “Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire.” 
African Affairs, 109(437): 597-615.  
Baikeh, Jonas. 2010. “Soutien de Palé Dimaté à Laurent Gbagbo - Le Pdci menace - Djédjé 
Mady: « Nous prendrons nos responsabilités ».” Ivoirebusiness.net 29 March 2010. 
Accessed from: ivoirebusiness.net, 18 November 2012. 
http://www.ivoirebusiness.net/?q=node/286. 
Baines, Erin & Emily Paddon. 2012. “‘This is how we survived’: Civilian agency and 
humanitarian protection.” Security Dialogue, 43(3): 231-247.  
Bakary, Tessy D. 1986. “Côte d’Ivoire: une ‘décentralisation politique centralisée.” Géopolitique 
Africaine 2 (June): 205–30 
Bakayoko, Lanciné. 2007. “Soro s’engage à réduire les barrages routiers.” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 
22–23 September. 
Bakayoko, Lanciné. 2010. “Sawadogo-Kossonou: le juge tranche aujord’hui.” Nord-Sud 
Quotidien. 22 January 2010.   
Bakke, Kristin Bakke, Kathleen G. Cunningham and Lee J. Seymour. 2012. “A plague of initials: 
Fragmentation, cohesion, and infighting in civil wars.” Perspectives on Politics 10(2): 265-
283. 
Bakonyi, Jutta and Kirsti Stuvøy. 2005. “Violence & social order beyond the state: Somalia & 
Angola.” Review of African Political Economy, 32(104-105): 359-382.  
Balint-Kurti, Daniel. 2007. “Côte d’Ivoire’s Forces Nouvelles.” Chatham House – Africa 
Program Non-State Actors Series (September): 1-42.  
Bamba, Idrissa. 2008. “Les germes d’une nouvelle rebellion.” Soir Info. 27 May 2008.  
Bamba, KI. 2012. “Administration territorial: Ben Laden, Tuo Fozié, Koné Messamba nommés”. 
Nord-Sud Quotidien 27 September 2012. Accessed from abidjan.net, 14 November 2012. 
http://news.abidjan.net/h/441793.html.  
Banégas, Richard & Ruth Marshall-Fratani. 2007. “Côte d’Ivoire: Negotiating identity and 
citizenship.” In Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn (eds.) African Guerrillas: Raging Against 
the Machine. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 81-112. 
Barter, Shane. J. 2012. “Unarmed forces: Civilian strategy in violent conflicts.” Peace & Change, 
37(4): 544-571.  
Bassett, Thomas J. 1988. “The Development of Cotton in Northern Ivory Coast, 1910–1965.” 
Journal of African History, 29(2): 267-284.  
233 
 
Bassett, Thomas J. 2001. The Peasant Cotton Revolution in West Africa .Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge.  
Bassett, Thomas J. 2004. “Containing the Donzow: The Politics of Scale in Côte d'Ivoire”. Africa 
Today, 50(4): 31-49.  
Bassett, Thomas. J. 2011a. “Winning coalition, sore loser: Côte d'Ivoire's 2010 presidential 
elections.” African Affairs, 110(440), 469-479.  
Bassett, Thomas. J. 2011b. “Bassett, Thomas J. "The Costs of the Road in a Divided Côte 
d’Ivoire." Fieldsights - Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online, November 10, 2011, 
http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/190-the-costs-of-the-road-in-a-divided-cote-d-ivoire 
Beall, Jo and Mduduzi Ngonyama. 2009. “Indigenous Institutions, traditional leaders and elite 
coalitions for development: the case of Greater Durban, South Africa.” Crisis States research 
Centre working papers series, 2, 55. Crisis States Research Centre. London School of 
Economics and Political Science, London UK. 1-35.  
Beck, Linda. J. 2008. Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in 
Senegal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Berman, Bruce. J. 1998. “Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: The politics of uncivil 
nationalism.” African Affairs, 97(388): 305-341.  
Berry, Sara. 1992. “Hegemony on a shoestring: Indirect rule and access to agricultural land.” 
Africa, 62(3): 327-355.  
Berry, Sara. 2002. “Debating the land question in Africa.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 44(4): 638-668.  
Beswick, Danielle. 2009. “The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The 
Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 98 (402): 333-346.  
Bierschenk, Thomas. 1988. “Development projects as arenas of negotiation for strategic groups: 
A case study from Benin.” Sociologia Ruralis, 28(2‐3): 146-160.  
Bierschenk, Thomas, & Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 2003. “Powers in the village: Rural Benin 
between Democratization and Decentralization.” Africa, 73(2): 145-173.  
Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements & Anna Nolan. 2009. “Building peace and 
political community in hybrid political orders.” International Peacekeeping, 16(5): 599-615.  
Bonnafé, Pierre and Michèle Fiéloux. 1993. “Le guerre et l’organisation sociale.” In Michèle 
Fiéloux, Jacques Lombard, and Jeanne-Marie Kambou-Ferrand (eds.), Images D'Afrique Et 
Sciences Sociales: Les Pays Lobi, Birifor Et Dagara. Paris: Ird Orstom. 100-121.  
Boone, Catherine. 1990. “The making of a rentier class: Wealth accumulation and political 
control in Senegal.” The Journal of Development Studies, 26(3): 425-449.  
Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and 
Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
234 
 
Boone, Catherine. 2007a. “Property and Constitutional order: Land Tenure Reform and the 
Future of the African State.” African Affairs, 106(425): 557-586.  
Boone, Catherine. 2007b. “Africa’s New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open 
Economy in Côte d'Ivoire.” African Studies Review, 50(1): 59-81.  
Boone, Catherine. 2013. “Land regimes and the structure of politics: patterns of land-related 
conflict.” Africa 83(1): 188-203. 
Bouabre, Alain. 2004. “À Korhogo, on cherche l’ennemi partout.” Soir Info. 25 June 2004.   
Boutellis, Arthur. 2011. The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to 
Peace. New York: International Peace Institute (May 2011).   
Boutillier, Jean-Louis 1969. “La ville de Bouna: De l'époque précoloniale à aujourd'hui.” Cahiers 
ORSTOM. 6(2): 3-20.  
Boutillier, Jean-Louis. 1971. “Les effets de la disparition du commerce précolonial sur le système 
de production koulango.” Cahiers ORSTOM 3(3): 243-253.  
Boutillier, Jean-Louis. 1993. Bouna, royaume de la savane ivoirienne: Princes, marchands et 
paysans Paris: KARTHALA.  
Bovcon, Maja. 2009. “France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and its Ethical 
Implications.” African Studies Quarterly, 11(1): 1-24. 
Braithwaite, Valerie. 2003. “A New Approach to Tax Compliance.” In Valerie Braithwaite (ed.), 
Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion. Aldershot: Ashgate. 1-14.  
Brownlee, Jason. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Campbell, Bonnie. 1985. “The Fiscal Crisis of the State: The Case of the Ivory Coast.” In Henry 
Bernstein and Bonnie Campbell (eds.), Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa- Studies in 
Economy and State. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 267-310 
Campbell, John L. 1993. “The state and fiscal sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology (19):163-
185.  
Chabal, Patrick. 1983. Amilcar Cabral: evolutionary leadership and people's war. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Chabal, Patrick. 1984. “People's war, state formation and revolution in Africa: A comparative 
analysis of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.” In (ed.) Nelson Kasfir State and Class 
in Africa. London: Cass and Co. 
Chaléard, Jean-Louis. 1990a. “Les Lobi de la Z.K.B (Zone Kolodio-Bineda).” Abidjan: Ostrom. 
24p. 
Chaléard, Jean-Louis. 1990b. “Croissance urbaine and dynamisme rurale : L’igname des Lobi”. 
In Chantal Blanc-Pamard, Philippe Bonnefond, Philippe Couty, Veronique Lassailly-Jacob, 
Jean-Yves Marchal, Florence Piton (eds.) Dynamique des systèmes agraires : la dimension 
économique, Paris : ORSTOM : 129-147.  
235 
 
Chaléard, Jean-Louis. 1996. Temps des villes, Temps des vivres. L'essor du vivrier marchand en 
Côte d'Ivoire Paris: Karthala.  
Chaléard, Jean-Louis. 1998. “La société lobi (Nord-Est de la Côte d’Ivoire), mobilités et 
mutations agricoles.” In Dominique Guillard, M. Seysset and Annie Walter (eds.), Le voyage 
inachevé... à Joël Bonnemaison. Paris: OSTROM. 479-485.    
Chaleard, Jean-Louis and Papa Samba N'Daw. 1992. “Migrations et intensifications: La 
dynamique agraire des Lobi du Nord-Est ivoirien”. Cahiers Des Sciences Humaines, 28(2): 
261-281.  
Chappell, David. A. 1989. “The Nation as Frontier: Ethnicity and Clientelism in Ivorian History”. 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 22(4): 671-696.  
Chauveau, Jean-Pierre and Paul Richards. 2008. “West African insurgencies in agrarian 
perspective: Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone compared.” Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(4): 
515-552.  
Chelpi-den Hamer, Magali. 2010. Youngest Recruits - Pre-war, war and post-war experiences in 
Western Côte d'Ivoire. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications/Amsterdam Univ. Press. 
Clapham, Christopher. 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Cohen, Nissim and Tamar Arieli. 2011. “Field research in conflict environments: Methodological 
challenges and snowball sampling.” Journal of Peace Research, 48(4): 423-435.  
Collier, Paul. 2000. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On economic causes of civil war.” Oxford Economic 
Papers, 50(4): 563-573.  
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56(4): 563-595.  
Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l’UEMOA 
(COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). 2008. “Bilan SIM 2008”. COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA 
Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l’UEMOA 
(COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). 2009. “BILAN DE L’ANNEE 2009”. COFENABVI-PAM-
UEMOA 
Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l’UEMOA 
(COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). 2010. BILAN DES IMPORTATIONS DU MALI VERS 
LA COTE D'IVOIRE POUR L'ANNEE 2010. COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA 
Coulibaly, Foumséké. 2010. “Filière bétail : Le bureau exécutif proteste contre l’Ag.” Nouveau 
Réveil 22 January 2010. Accessed from: Abidjan.net 28 June 2013. 
http://news.abidjan.net/h/354271.html 
Coulibaly, Kisselminan. 2008. “‘Soro est contre nous’ ‘Ce qui s’est passé a Vavoua est petit.’” 
Soir Info. 10 July. 
236 
 
Coulibaly, Sinali. 1964. “Les paysans Senoufo de Korhogo.” Dakar : Faculté des lettres et 
sciences humaines. 38 pp.  
Cramer, Christopher. 2006. Civil war is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in 
Developing Countries. London: Hurst & Company.  
Crook, Richard C. 1989. “Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic 
Development in Côte d'Ivoire.” African Affairs 88(351): 205-228.  
Crook, Richard C. 1990. “Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Côte d’Ivoire.” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(4), 649-669.  
Crook, Richard C. 1997. “Winning coalitions and ethno-regional politics: The failure of the 
opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Côte d'Ivoire.” African Affairs, 96(383): 215-
242.  
Cunningham, Kathleen G., Kristin M. Bakke and Lee J. Seymour. 2012. “Shirts today, skins 
tomorrow dual contests and the effects of fragmentation in self-determination 
disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(1): 67-93. 
De Rouville, Cécile. 1987. Organisation Sociale des Lobi: Une Société Bilinéaire du Burkina 
Faso et de Côte d'Ivoire. Paris: L'Harmattan.  
Debos, Marielle. 2008. “Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘ex-liberators’ in the 
Central African Republic.” African Affairs, 107(427): 225-241.  
Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2007. “New dimensions of political cleavage”. In Russell J. Dalton and 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 538-556.  
Denov, Myriam S. 2010. Child soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Depeyla, Armand B. 2004a. “Voici pourquoi et comment Kass a été tué.” Soir Info. 23 June 
2004.  
Depeyla, Armand B. 2004b. “Senoufo et Koyaka s’entre-déchirent.” Soir Info. 27 June 2004.  
Depry, Didier. 2008. “La crise s’accentue entre Soro et ses combattants”. Notre Voie. 22 August 
2004. 
Depry, Didier. 2010. “Des fraudeurs de tout rang social.” Notre Voie 29 March 2010. Accessed 
from: Abidjan.net 29 June 2013. http://news.abidjan.net/h/360716.html 
Didi, Serge Amand. 2008. “Pourquoi Soro Guillaume a intérêt a désarmer ses combattants.” 
Notre Voie 7 March 2008.  
Dossa, Marc. 2009. “Le pays senoufo va-t-il basculer?” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 4 November 2009.  
Doualy, Abel. 2011. “Sortie de crise/Palé Dimaté (Ex- Haute autorité pour le développement du 
Zanzan) : “ LE PRÉSIDENT OUATTARA PEUT FAIRE TRANQUILLEMENT SON 
MANDAT SI...”.” Fraternité Matin, 28 September 2011. Accessed from: Telediaspora.net, 9 
November 2012. http://ivoire.telediaspora.net/fr/texte.asp?idinfo=56980. 
237 
 
Elster, Jon. 2007. Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Englebert, Pierre. 2007. “Whither the separatist motive?” In Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn 
(eds.) African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. 81-112. 
Englebert, Pierre. 2009. Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Fauré, Yves. 1993. “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d'Ivoire.” Africa, 
63(3): 313-329.  
Fauré, Yves and Pierre Labazée. 2002. Socio-Économie des Villes Africaines: Bobo et Korhogo 
dans les Défis de la Decentralization. Paris: KARTHALA.  
Fiéloux, Michèle. 1980. Les Sentiers de la Nuit: Les migrations rurales lobi de la Haute-Volta 
vers la Côte d'Ivoire. Paris: OSTROM 
Fofana, Moussa. 2011a. “Les jeunes dans la rébellion du nord de la Côte d’Ivoire: les raisons de 
la mobilization.” Afrika Focus 24(1):51-70.  
Fofana, Moussa. 2011b. “Des Forces Nouvelles aux Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire.” 
Politique Africaine, 122:161-178.  
Förster, Till. 2010. “Maintenant, on sait qui est qui: Statehood and Political Reconfiguration in 
Northern Côte d’Ivoire.” Development and Change, 41(4): 699-722.  
Förster, Till. 2012. “Imagining the nation: Independence ceremonies under rebel domination in 
Northern Côte d'Ivoire.” African Arts, 45(3): 42-55.  
Förster, Till. Forthcoming. “Dialogue Direct: Rebel Governance and Civil Order in Northern 
Côte d’Ivoire.” In Ana Arjona, Zachariah Mampilly and Nelson Kasfir (eds.) Rebel 
Governance (working title). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Friedman, R. B. 1990. “On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy.” In Joseph Raz (ed.) 
Authority. New York: NYU Press. 56-91.  
Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer. 1996. “Framing political opportunity.” In Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. 
Cambridge University Press. 275-290.  
Gayé, Fatou. 1999. “Pouvoir traditionnel, monopartisme et transition démocratique en Côte 
d'ivoire : L'exemple de la chefferie Tiembara de Korhogo.” PhD Dissertation, École des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris).  
Gbane, Y. 2008. “Siriki Konate, porte-parole des Forces nouvelles soutient: ‘La guerre n’est plus 
possible en Côte d’Ivoire.’” Temps Fort. 7 January 2008. 
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
238 
 
Giustozzi, Antonio. 2003. “Respectable warlords? The politics of state-building in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan.” Crisis States Research Centre working paper series 1:33. Crisis States 
Research Centre: London School of Economics and Political Science, London UK.  
Giustozzi, Antonio. 2007. “War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen.” 
International Peacekeeping, 14(1): 75-89.  
Global Witness. 2007. “Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fueled the Conflict in Cote D’Ivoire”. 
Global Witness Report. 8 June. 
Gouly, Doua. 2002. “La crise ‘tue’ la vie economique à la frontiere.” Fraternité Matin 25 
November 2002.  
Gunderson, William Charles. 1975. “Village elders and regional intermediaries: Differing 
responses to change in the Korhogo region of the Ivory Coast.” PhD Dissertation, 
Department of Political Science, Indiana University. 
Guyer, Jane I. 1992. “Representation Without Taxation: An Essay on Democracy in Rural 
Nigeria, 1952-1990.” African Studies Review, 35(1): 41-79.  
Hagmann, Tobias, and Péclard, Didier. 2010. “Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and 
Domination in Africa”. Development and Change, 41(4): 539-562.  
Harre, Dominique. 1993. “Les hommes d’affaires en Côte d’Ivoire: L’insertion des Malinkés du 
Kabadougou dans 1’économie contemporaine.” In Grégoire Emmanuel and Labazée Pascal 
(eds.) Grands commerçants d'Afrique de l'Ouest: logiques et pratiques d'un groupe 
d'hommes d'affaires contemporains. Paris: Karthala-ORSTOM. 221-262. 
Hechter, Michael. 2000. Containing Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Heitz, Kathrin. 2009. “Power-Sharing in the Local Arena: Man–A Rebel-Held Town in Western 
Côte d'Ivoire.” Africa Spectrum, 4(3): 109-131.  
Heitz, Kathrin. 2013. “Trust and Distrust in the Rebel Held Region of Man: Social Life during 
Violent Conflict in Western Côte d’Ivoire,” PhD thesis, University of Basel.    
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Human Rights Watch. 2003. “Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in 
Western Côte d’Ivoire.” Human Rights Watch Report, 15(14), August.  
Human Rights Watch. 2005. “Country on a Precipice - The Precarious State of Human Rights 
and Civilian Protection in Côte d’Ivoire.” Human Rights Report, 17(6A), May. 
Human Rights Watch. 2008. “The Best School: Student Violence, Impunity and the Crisis in 
Cote D’Ivoire.” 21 May 2008. 
Human Rights Watch. 2011. “Côte d’Ivoire: Military Promotions Mock Abuse Victims – 
President not Living up to Promises of Impartial Justice.” 5 August 2011.  
Hunt, Diana. 2004. “Unintended Consequences of Land Rights Reform: The Case of the 1998 
Uganda Land Act.” Development Policy Review, 22(2): 173-191.  
239 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.  
Hurd, Ian. 1999. “Legitimacy and authority in international politics.” International Organization, 
53(2): 379-408.  
Hyacinthe, K. 2011. “Après la sortie de « l`Alassaniste de première heure» / Palé Dimaté rattrapé 
par ses vérités d`hier : ‘L`appel de Bédié à voter Ouattara est absurde’.” L'intelligent 
d'Abidjan, 28 October 2011. Accesed from: abidjan.net, 18 November 2012. 
http://news.abidjan.net/h/415066.html. 
Ignace, Bidi. 2009. “Bedié fuit L’Ivoirité”. Nord-Sud Quotidien. 6 November 2009. 
International Crisis Group. 2003. “Côte d’Ivoire: The War is Not Yet Over.” Africa Report, 72. 
Brussels: International Crisis Group. 28 November. 
International Crisis Group. 2004. “Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight.” Africa Report, 82. Africa 
Brussels: International Crisis Group. 12 July.  
International Crisis Group. 2005. “Côte d’Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come.” Africa 
Report, 90. Africa Brussels: International Crisis Group. 24 March. 
International Crisis Group. 2006. “Côte d’Ivoire: le paix comme option.” Rapport Afrique, 109. 
Brussels: International Crisis Group. May.  
International Crisis Group. 2007. “Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring 
Peace?” Africa Report, 127. Brussels: International Crisis Group. June. 
International Crisis Group. 2008. “Côte d’Ivoire: Ensuring Credible Elections”. Africa Report, 
13922. Brussels: International Crisis Group. April. 
Isaacman, Allen. 1990. “Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa.” African Studies Review, 
33(2): 1-120.  
Jackson, Paul. 2003. “Warlords as alternative forms of governance.” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 14(2): 131-150.  
Jacob, Kesy B. 2009. “Non M. Bedié, l’Ivoirité etait bel et bien une politique d’Etat.” Nord-Sud 
Quotidien. 9 November 2009.  
Jeune Afrique. 2009a. “Les ex-rebelles transfèrent leur pouvoir aux préfets.” 26 May 2009. 
Jeune Afrique. 2009b. “Les ex-rebelles ne veulent pas perdre... le Nord.” 7 April 2009.  
Joachim, Jutta. 2003. “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's 
Rights.” International Studies Quarterly, 47(2): 247-274.  
Johnson, Chalmers A. 1964. Revolution and the Social System. Stanford: Hoover Institution on 
War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University.  
Johnston, Patrick. 2008. “The Geography of Insurgent Organization and Its Consequences for 
Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone.” Security Studies, 17(1): 107-137.  
Joireman, Sandra F. 2011. Where there is no Government: Enforcing Property Rights in Common 
Law Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.  
240 
 
Jourde, Cedric. 2007. “The International Relations of Small Neoauthoritarian States: Islamism, 
Warlordism, and the Framing of Stability.” International Studies Quarterly, 51(2): 481-503.  
Juul, Kristine. 2006. “Decentralization, Local Taxation and Citizenship in Senegal.” 
Development and Change, 37(4): 821-846.  
K. Marras, D. 2007. “Le camp présidentiel à la conquête du Nord.” Nord-Sud Quotidien 20 July 
2007.  
Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kambou-Ferrand, Jean-Marie. 1993. “Guerre et résistance sous la période coloniale en pays 
lobi/birifor (burkina faso) au travers de photos d’époque.’” In Fiéloux Michèle, Lombard 
Jacques, and Kambou-Ferrand, Jeanne-Marie (eds.), Images d’Afrique Et Sciences Sociales, 
Les Pays Lobi, Birifor Et Dagara (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire et Ghana) : actes du colloque 
de Ouagadougou. Paris: Karthala-ORSTOM. 75-99.  
Kasfir, Nelson. 2005. “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in 
Uganda, 1981-86.” Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(2): 271-296.  
King, Charles. 2004. “The micropolitics of social violence.” World Politics, 56(3): 431-455. 
King, Elizabeth. 2009. “From data problems to data points: Challenges and opportunities of 
research in postgenocide Rwanda.” African Studies Review, 52(3): 127-148. 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert Owen, and Verba, Sidney. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Koffi, Marc. 2008. “Succession dans la famille du patriarche Gbon Coulibaly: on a usurpé la 
place de Kassoum Coulibaly.” Le Nouveau Réveil 23 August 2008. Accessed from: koffi.net 
25 June 2013. http://www.koffi.net/koffi/actualite/56263-Succession-dans-la-famille-du-
patriarche-Gbon-Coulibaly-On-a-usurpe-la-place-de-Kassoum-Coulibaly.htm 
Koffi, Serges and Normel Essis. 2007. “Guillaume sor sous les feux de la critique.” Nord-Sud 
Quotidien. 1 August 2007.  
Kohler, Jessica. 2003 “From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.” Geneva: 
Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN). August. 
Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham. 1999. “Ethnic and Civil Conceptions of Nationhood and the 
Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy.” In Marco Giugni, 
McAdam, Doug and Tilly, Charles (eds.). How Social Movements Matter. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Koter, Dominika. 2013a. “King Makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa.” World 
Politics, 65(2): 187-232.  
Koter, Dominika. 2013b. “Urban and rural voting patterns in Senegal: the spatial aspects of 
incumbency, c. 1978–2012.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 51(4): 653-679. 
Kouamé, Allah 2009. “Les délégués FN demandent la demission de Soro.” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 
15 April 2009.  
241 
 
Kouamé, Jean Roche. 2007a. “Bouna a des blues.” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 2 November 2007.  
Kouamé, Jean Roche. 2007b. “Des jeunes ont été armés pour nous attaquer.” Nord-Sud-
Quotidien. 4 November 2007.  
Kouamé, Jean Roche. 2007c. “Les FN et les cadres se rejettent la responsabilité.” Nord-Sud 
Quotidien. 23 October 2007.  
Kriger, Norma J. 1991. Zimbabwe's guerrilla war: Peasant voices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
L.B. 2002. “Les assaillants accueillis par le maire”. Le Nouveau Reveil.  
Labazée, Pascal. 1993a. “Les dynamiques du champ du pouvoir en pays kiembara (Côte 
d'Ivoire): alliances et conflits entre autorité locale et appareil d'Etat”. In Jaglin, Sylvy and 
Dubresson, Alain (eds.). Pouvoirs et cites d’Afrique noire: décentralisations en questions. 
Paris: Karthala-OSTROM. 219-243. 
Labazée, Pascal. 1993b. “Les échanges entre le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le nord de la Côte 
d’Ivoire”. In Gregoire, Emmanuel and Labazée, Pascal (eds.). Grands Commerçants 
d’Afrique De l’Ouest: Logiques et pratiques d'un groupe d'hommes d'affaires 
contemporains. Paris: Karthala-ORSTOM. 125-174.  
Lake, David. A. 2010. “Rightful rules: Authority, order, and the foundations of global 
governance.” International Studies Quarterly, 54(3): 587-613.  
Launay, Robert. 1979. “Landlords, Hosts, and Strangers among the Dyula.” Ethnology, 18(1): 
71-83.  
Launay, Robert. 1982. Traders without Trade: Responses to Change in Two Dyula Communities. 
Cambridge: University Press Cambridge.  
Launay, Robert. 1992. Beyond the Stream: Islam and Society in a West African Town. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
Launay, Robert and Soares, Benjamin F. 1999. “The formation of an ‘Islamic sphere’ in French 
Colonial West Africa.” Economy and Society, 28(4): 497-519.  
La Mandat. 2012. “Bouna/ PDCI-RDA- Palé Dimaté aux militants : “Essuyez vos larmes, Bédié 
ne vous a pas oubliés’’.” Le Mandat, 29 August 2012. Accessed from: abidjan.net, 18 
November 2012. http://news.abidjan.net/h/439739.html. 
Le Monde. 2011. “Côte d' Ivoire : le chef du "commando invisible" a été tué”. Le Monde. 28 
April 2011. Accessed from: lemonde.fr 20 May 2013. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/28/cote-d-ivoire-le-chef-du-commando-
invisible-a-ete-tue_1513776_3212.html 
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Lewis, Barbara. 1971. “The Dioula in Ivory Coast.” In Carleton T. Hodge (ed.) Papers on the 
Manding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 273-307.  
242 
 
L’intelligent d’Abidjan. 2012. “Région du Bounkani / En prélude aux élections municipales et 
régionales : Palé Dimaté remobilise la base.” L'intelligent d'Abidjan, 26 September 2012. 
Accessed: abidjan.net. 18 November 2012. http://news.abidjan.net/h/441705.html. 
Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction.” In Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments: Cross Regional Perspectives. New York: Free Press. 1-67.   
Little, Peter D. 2003. Somalia: Economy without State. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Lonsdale, John. 1981. “States and social processes in Africa: A historiographical survey.” 
African Studies Review, 24(2/3):139-225.  
Lubkemann, Stephen C. 2008. Culture in Chaos: An Anthropology of the Social Condition in 
War. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.  
Lukes, Steven. 1990. “Perspectives on Authority.” In Joseph Raz (ed.) Authority. New York: 
NYU Press. 203-218.  
Lund, Christian. 2001. “Precarious Democratization and Local Dynamics in Niger: Micro–
Politics in Zinder.” Development and Change, 32(5): 845-869.  
Lund, Christian. 2006. “Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa.” 
Development and Change, 37(4): 685-705.  
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. “Beyond settler and native as political identities: Overcoming the 
political legacy of colonialism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4): 651-
664.  
Mampilly, Zachariah. 2011. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Marten, Kimberly. 2006/7. “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective.” International Security 
31(3): 41-73.  
Marten, Kimberly. 2012. Warlords: Strong Arm Brokers in Weak States. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Mazola. 2005 “Fofié Kouakou combat le racket.” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 11 October.  
Mazola. 2008. “Coulibaly Lanzéni: ‘Je pars, voici les raisons.’” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 29 April.  
Mbembé, Achille. 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
McGovern, Mike. 2011. Making War in Côte d'Ivoire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Meagher, Kate. 2012. “The Strength of Weak States? Non‐State Security Forces and Hybrid 
Governance in Africa.” Development and Change, 43(5): 1073-1101.  
Mehler, Andreas. 2009. “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A not so obvious relationship.” 
African Affairs, 108(432), 453-473. 
243 
 
Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, 
and the Politics of Coping.” International Security 31(3): 74-106.  
Metelits, Claire. 2010. Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group 
Behavior. New York: NYU Press.  
Migdal, Joel S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute one Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Minter, William. 1994. Apartheid's contras: An inquiry into the roots of war in Angola and 
Mozambique. Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books.  
Mitchell, Matthew I. 2012. “Power-sharing and peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Past examples and future 
prospects.” Conflict, Security & Development, 12(2): 171-191.  
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2002. “The terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: 
Towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry.” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 40(2): 181-215.  
Mohamed, Diallo. 2003. “L’arrestation d’IB est un complot contre les Forces nouvelles.” 
Fraternité Matin. 3 September 2003.  
Molle-Laurençon, Cédric. 2007. “Ainsi Survit Korhogo.” Jeune Afrique 15 January 2007. 
Accessed from jeuneafrique.com 10 July 2010. 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN14017ainsiogohro0/ 
Moore, Mick. 2004. “Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing 
countries.” International Political Science Review, 25(3): 297-319.  
Moore, Sally F. 2000. Law as process: An anthropological approach. Oxford: James Currey.  
Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. 2009. “Disguised warlordism and combatanthood in Balkh: The 
persistence of informal power in the formal Afghan state.” Conflict, Security & 
Development, 9(4): 535-564.  
Mundy, Jacob. 2011. “Deconstructing civil wars beyond the new wars debate.” Security 
Dialogue, 42(3): 279-295.  
Nassa, Dabié Désiré Axel. 2008. “Dynamisme d'une ville stimulé par la frontière: L'exemple de 
Ouangolodougou au nord de la Côte d'Ivoire.” Unpublished manuscript.  
Nassa, Dabié Désiré Axel. 2010. “Les frontières nord de la Côte-d'Ivoire dans un contexte de 
crise.” Les Cahiers d'Outre Mer, 251:461-483.  
N'Guessan, Patrick. 2012. “Après sa réintégration / Palé Dimaté : ‘Je vais m’investir 
profondément pour faire remonter le PDCI’.”La Mandat. June 25, 2012. Accessed from: 
Abidjan.net. November 9, 2012. http://news.abidjan.net/h/435965.html\. 
Niangoran Martial. 2007. “Kassoum Coulibaly: Le population avait soif d’entendre et de voir le 





Niangoran, Martial. 2008. “Filière bétail: “Nous payons 20 millions de F par mois aux FAFN.” 
koffi.net 8 July 2008. Accessed from koffi.net, 28 June 2013. 
http://www.koffi.net/koffi/actualite/51937-Filiere-betail-Nous-payons-20-millions-de-F-par-
mois-aux-FAFN.htm 
Niemann, Michael. 2007. “War making and state making in Central Africa.” Africa Today, 53(3): 
21-39. 
Nimaga, Bakary. 2012. “Messamba Koné, après sa nomination comme Préfet de région : 
‘Pourquoi le Président Ouattara m’a choisi.’” Le Patriote 28 September 2012. Accessed 
from: Abidjan.net 28 June 2013. http://news.abidjan.net/h/441904.html 
Norman, Julie M. 2009. “Got trust? the challenge of gaining access in conflict zones.” In 
Chandra Lekha Siriam, John C. King, Julie A. Mertus, Olga Martin-Ortega and Johanna 
Herman (eds.) Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations. New 
York: Routledge. 71-90.  
North, Douglass. C., John J. Wallis and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Order. A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 2005. Anthropology and development: Understanding 
Contemporary Social Change. London & New York: Zed Books.  
Onuf, Nicholas and Frank F. Klink, F. F.1989. “Anarchy, authority, rule.” International Studies 
Quarterly, 33: 149-173.  
Oyugi, Walter O. 2006. “Coalition politics and coalition governments in Africa.” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 24(1): 53-79.  
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge university press. 
P.A.T. 2009. “‘Samba Coulibaly n’a rien apporté au parti.’” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 19 November 
2009.  
Paige, Jeffery M. 1978. Agrarian revolution: social movements and export agriculture in the 
developing world. New York: Free Press.  
Perinbam, B. Marie. 1973. Social Relations in the Trans-Aaharan and Western Sudanese Trade: 
an Overview. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15(4): 416-436.  
Peters, Krijn. 2011. War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Peters, Krijn and Paul Richards. 1998. “‘Why We Fight’: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra 
Leone.” Africa, 68(2): 183-210. 
Piccolino, Giulia. 2012. “David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's war against 
global governance.” African Affairs, 111(442): 1-23.  
245 
 
Poteete, Amy R. 2009. “Is development path dependent or political? A reinterpretation of 
mineral-dependent development in Botswana.” Journal of Development Studies, 45(4): 544-
571.  
Poteete, Amy R. and Jesse C. Ribot. 2011. “Repertoires of domination: Decentralization as 
process in Botswana and Senegal.” World Development, 39(3): 439-449.  
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The logic of comparative social inquiry. New York: 
Wiley-Interscience  
Quarrels van Ufford, Paul. 1999. Trade and traders. the Making of the Cattle Market in Benin. 
Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.  
Quarrels van Ufford, Paul and Fred Zaal. 2004. “The Transfer of Trust: Ethnicities as Economic 
Institutions in the Livestock Trade in West and East Africa.” Africa 74(2): 121-145.  
Raeymaekers, Timothy. 2010. “Protection for sale? War and the transformation of regulation on 
the Congo–Ugandan border.” Development and Change, 41(4): 563-587.  
Raeymaekers, Timothy. 2013. “Post-war conflict and the market for protection: The challenges to 
Congo's hybrid peace.” International Peacekeeping, 20(5): 600-617.  
Ragin, Charles. 1987. The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative 
strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Ranger, Terrance O. 1985. Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe: A 
Comparative Study Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Reno, William. 2005. “The politics of violent opposition in collapsing states.” Government and 
Opposition, 40(2): 127-151.  
Reno, William. 2007. “Patronage politics and the behavior of armed groups.” Civil Wars, 9(4): 
324-342.  
Reno, Will. 2009a. “Illicit markets, violence, warlords and governance: West African cases.” 
Crime, Law and Social Change 52(3): 313-322. 
Reno, Will 2009b. “Understanding Criminality in West African Conflicts.” International 
Peacekeeping 16(1): 47-61.  
Reno, William. 2011. Warfare in Independent Africa Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Richards, Paul. 2005. “New War: An Ethnographic Approach.” In Paul Richards (ed.) No Peace, 
No War: The Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Athens: Ohio University 
Press. 1-21.  
Roberts, David. 2008. “Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in 
Statebuilding from Cambodia.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2(1): 63-86.  
Rouamba, A.L.G. 2006. “Burkinabè de la diaspora: Issaka Sawadogo, l’example d’une réussite.” 
lefaso.net. 14 April 2006. Accessed from lefaso.net, June 28 2013. 
http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?page=impression&id_article=13649 
Ruggie, John G. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the 
Social Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization, 52(4): 855-885.  
246 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an 
Operational Definition.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6): 814-858.  
Savonnet, Georges. 1962. “La colonisation du pays Koulango (haute Côte d'Ivoire) par les Lobi 
de Haute Volta.” Les cahiers d’Outres Mer, 15(57): 25-47. 
Savonnet, Georges. 1986. “Installation des Lobi dans le nord est Ivoirien et développement agro-
pastoral.” Rapport d'enquête socio-géographique sur le terrain. 
Schlichte, Klaus. 2009. In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Schmidt, Vivian A. 2008. “Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and 
discourse.” Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 303-326.  
Schneider, Leander. 2006. “Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania: 
Connects and Disconnects.” African Studies Review, 49(1): 93-118.  
Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Seay, Laura E. 2013. “Effective Responses: Protestants, Catholics and the Provision of Health 
Care in the Post-War Kivus.” Review of African Political Economy, 40(135): 83-97.  
Sidwaya. 2009. “Komyamba Issaka Sawadogo, president de la Conféderation ouest-africaine du 
bétail: ‘Sa justice, pas d’affaire, pas d’investissement’.” lefaso.net. Accessed from lefaso.net, 
June 29th 2013. http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article33342 
Sikor, Thomas and Christian Lund. 2009. “Access and Property: A Question of Power and 
Authority. Development and Change, 40(1): 1-22.  
Simons, Claudia and Franzisca Zanker. 2012. “Finding the Cases the Fit: Methodological 
Challenges in Peace Research.” German Insitute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) 
Working Papers (Violence and Security). No. 189. 1-28.  
Skinner, Elliot P. 1989. The Mossi of Burkina Faso: Chiefs, Politicians and Soldiers. Prospect 
Heights Ill.: Waveland Pr. Inc.  
Snyder, Richard. 2001. “Scaling down: The Subnational Comparative Method.” Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 36(1): 93-110.  
Soro, Guillaume. 2005. Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle: La Côte d'Ivoire au bord du gouffre. 
Paris: Hachette.  
Sory, Diarrasouba, François Konan and Lance Touré. 2010. “Ouangolodougou / Commandant 
Fofana Bhouakeye (chef du Bureau des douanes terrestre): « D’octobre à décembre 2011, 
j’ai réalisé 1, 6 milliard Fcfa de recette ».” Le Nouveau Réveil 18 May 2012. Accessed from: 
Abidjan.net 28 June 2013. http://news.abidjan.net/h/433601.html 
247 
 
Spears, Ian S. 2000. “Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The problems of 
sharing power.” Third World Quarterly 21(1): 105-118. 
Staniland, Paul. 2012. “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders.” Perspectives on 
Politics, 10(2): 243-264.  
Stanislas, Djama. 2008. “Soro Met la Pression Sur Ses Soldats.” Nord-Sud Quotidien. 24 April 
2008. 
Straus, Scott. 2012. “Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan 
Africa.” African Affairs, 111(443): 179-201. 
Tarrow, Sydney. 2004. “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide.” In Henry E. Brady and 
David Collier (eds.) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 171-180.  
Tayaro, Paul D. 2008. “Les populations reclament le fermete face aux manipulateurs”. Notre 
Voie. 28 August 2008. 
Tété, Fabrice. 2010. “Suspendu de ses fonctions au PDCI : Palé Dimaté invite à voter Gbagbo.” 
ivoirebusiness.net. Le Temps, 21 October 2010. Accessed from : ivoirebusiness.net, 18 
November 2012. http://www.ivoirebusiness.net/?q=node/593. 
Thelen, Kathleen. 2003. “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical 
Analysis.” in (eds.) James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 208-240.  
Théroux-Bénoni, L. 2009. Manufacturing Conflict? an Ethnographic Study of the News 
Community in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, 
University of Toronto.  
Thomson, Susan. 2010. “Getting Close to Rwandans Since the Genocide: Studying Everyday 
Life in Highly Politicized Research Settings.” African Studies Review, 53(3):19-34.  
Tilly, Charles. 1964. The Vendee. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In Peter Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 169-187. 
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Oxford:  Blackwell. 
Titeca, Kristof and Tom de Herdt. 2010. “Regulation, cross-border trade and practical norms in 
West Nile, north-western Uganda.” Africa, 80(4): 573-594.  
Torcal, Mariano and Scott Mainwaring. 2003. “The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party 
Competition: Chile, 1973-95.” British Journal of Political Science, 33(1): 55-84.  
Toungara, Jeanne Maddox. 2001. “Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.” Journal of 
Democracy, 12(3): 63-72.  
Touré, Moussa. 2003. “Koné Messamba, chef rebelle de Korhogo (octobre 2002): ‘Notre 




TRAORE, Golleau Isidore. 2014. “Investiture maire de Ouangolodougou : La région des 
Cascades fortement représentée”. Lefaso.net. 7 January 2014. Accessed from: lefaso.net 22 
January 2014. http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article57345 
Tsai, Lily L. 2007. Accountability without democracy: solidarity groups and public goods 
provision in rural China. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Tull, Denis M. 2003. “A reconfiguration of political order? The state of the state in north Kivu 
(DR Congo).” African Affairs, 102(408): 429-446.  
United Nations Security Council 2007. “Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire”. 1 October 2007. 
United Nations Security Council. 2009a. “Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to 
paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008)”. 9 October 2009.  
United Nations Security Council. 2009b. “Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire”. 13 April 2009. 
United Nations Security Council. 2011. “Letter dated 20 Aprily 2011 from the Chair of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte 
d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council” 27 April 2011.  
USAID Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP). 2010a. “12th IRTG/UEMOA Report – 10 
August 2010 (Survey Results from the 2nd Quarter of 2010).” Semi Annual Reports on Road 
Harassment on at least One Selected Trunk Rout. 1-29.  
USAID Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP). 2010b. “Ruminant Livestock Value Chain 
Development Plan – Third Annual Update, 2010/2011.” Value Chain Development Plan for 
Each Selected Value Chain Updated Yearly with Monitoring of Progress. 1-29.  
USA Embassy, Abidjan. 2006. Ambassador visits FN-held northeast; quiet, but tensions in FN 
areas among parties evident,” Wikileaks. Wikileaks cable: HooksVZCZCXRO5695. 
Accessed from Wikileaks.com: October 15th, 2012.  
http://cablegate.at/cables/06ABIDJAN1334.  
Utas, Mats. 2012. African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks. London: Zed 
Books.  
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
Villalón, Leonardo A. 1999. “Generational changes, political stagnation, and the evolving 
dynamics of religion and politics in Senegal.” Africa Today 46(3): 129-147. 
Vlassenroot, Kloen and Timothy Raeymaekers. 2004. “The Politics of Rebellion and Intervention 
in Ituri: The Emergence of a New Political Complex?” African Affairs, 103(412): 385-412.  
von Benda-Beckmann, K. 1981. “Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in 
a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra.” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law, 13(19): 117-159.  
Weber, Max. 2009. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Milton Park: Routledge (original 
work published 1919). 
249 
 
Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. Ambiguities of domination: Politics, rhetoric, and symbols in contemporary 
Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
West Africa. 2000. “Ouattara: end of the road?” 20-26 November 2000.  
West Africa. 2002. “Ouattara is an Ivoirian.” 15-21 July 2002.  
West, Henry G. 1998. “‘This neighbor is not my uncle!’: Changing relations of power and 
authority on the Mueda Plateau.” Journal of Southern African Studies, 24(1):141-160.  
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A 
Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Williams, Rhys H. 2004. “The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities 
and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements.” In David A. Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter 
Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements. Malden MA: Blackwell 
Publishing.  
Wolf, Eric R. 1969. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row.   
Wood, Elisabeth J. 2008. “The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of 
social networks.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 539-561.  
Woods, Dwayne. 1998. “Côte d’Ivoire: The Crisis of Distributive Politics.” In (eds.) Leonardo 
Villalon and Philip E. Huxtable, The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between 
Disintegration and Reconfiguration. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 213-232. 
Woods, Dwayne. 2003. “The tragedy of the cocoa pod: Rent-seeking, land and ethnic conflict in 
Ivory Coast. Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(4): 641-655.  
Yabi, Gilles and Andrew Goodwin. 2009. “From Linas-Marcoussis to the Ouagadougou Political 
Agreement: The Tortuous and Open-Ended Peace Agreement’. In H. Besada (ed.) From 
Civil Strife to Peace Building: ‘Examining Private Sector Involvement in West African 
Reconstruction. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 17-32.   
Young, Crawford. 2004. “The end of the post-colonial state in Africa? Reflections on changing 
African political dynamics.” African Affairs, 103(410): 23-49. 
Z.K. 2008. “Taxes injustifiées, raison de la flambée du prix de la viande.” Notrevoie.com. 
Accessed from notrevoie.com, June 29, 2013. 
http://www.notrevoie.com/a_la_une.asp?id=19035 
Zabril, Koukougnon. 2008. “Magouille et non-loi dans la filière bétail: Les raisons de l’argument 
de la viande.” Notrevoie.com. Accessed from notrevoie.com, June 28, 2013.  
http://www.notrevoie.com/a_la_une.asp?id=19036 
Zolberg, Aristide R. 1964. One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
250 
 
Zuckerman, Alan S. 1982. New Approaches to Political Cleavage: A Theoretical Introduction. 
































Appendix: List of Interviews 
Number General Date Place 










3 Cantonal Chief 12-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 





5 FPI Party Member 16-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
6 FPI Party Member  16-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 










9 Chef de quartier 20-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
10 NGO worker 21-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
11 Chef de village 24-Oct-
10 
Nahouokama, Savanes 
12 Chef de Dozos  25-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
13 FN Soldier 25-Oct-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 








16 NGO worker 10-Nov-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
17 FN Administrator 10-Nov-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
18 FN Administrator 11-Nov-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes 
19 Chef de village 14-Nov-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes  
20 Chef de village  14-Nov-
10 
Korhogo, Savanes  














25 FN Soldier 13-Feb-
11 
Korhogo, Savanes 
26 FPI Party Member 01-Dec-
10 
Ouangalodougo, Savanes 










29 Member of 




30 Member of 







32 FN Administrator 07-Dec-
10 
Ouangalodougo, Savanes 
33 Member of 





















39 FN administrator 24-Dec-
10 
Ouangalodougo, Savanes 
40 NGO worker 25-Dec-
10 
Ouangalodougo, Savanes 





Abidjan, Lagunes  





44 Member of 18-Jan- Bouna, Zanzan 
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Mayor’s Office  11 










47 NGO Worker 20-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
48 NGO Worker 20-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
49 FN Administrator 22-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 








52 NGO Worker 26-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
53 FN Administrator 26-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
54 NGO Worker 27-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
55 NGO Worker 28-Jan-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 













59 FN Administrator 05-Feb-
11 
Bouna, Zanzan 
 
